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I. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS
A. Appellate Jurisdiction
1

In Fort James Corp. v. Solo Cup Co., the Federal Circuit addressed the
2
timeliness of the defendant’s notice of appeal. At issue in the case
1. 412 F.3d 1340, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
2. Id. at 1345, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
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was the defendant’s alleged infringement of the Fort James patent,
the validity of that patent, and alleged inequitable conduct in
3
prosecuting that patent. The district court had bifurcated the trial,
saving the issue of inequitable conduct until after a trial on the issues
4
of infringement and validity. Before the case was submitted to the
jury on the issues of infringement and validity of the Fort James
patent, the defendant filed several motions for judgment as a matter
5
of law (“JMOL”), including one on the issue of invalidity.
Subsequently, on November 25, 2002, the jury found that although
the Fort James patent remained valid, the defendant had not
6
infringed the patent.
On January 16, 2003, the district court
dismissed the defendant’s unenforceability counterclaim on the
7
ground that there was no case or controversy. On June 26, 2003, the
defendant filed a motion to withdraw four of the JMOLs, and
8
requested consideration of the JMOL of invalidity. The district court
denied as moot the motion to withdraw, and final judgment was
9
entered on March 30, 2004.
10
The defendant filed its Notice of Appeal on April 29, 2004. The
plaintiff moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that final judgment was
actually entered on June 16, 2003, by operation of law, 150 days from
the January 16, 2003, verdict, and that the Notice of Appeal was
11
untimely filed. On July 15, 2004, a single judge of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) denied
the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss, determining that the defendant had
renewed its motion for JMOL on June 26, 2003, ten days from the
date the plaintiff had argued was the date of final judgment, thus
tolling the time to appeal until the renewed motion for JMOL was
12
resolved. The plaintiff reasserted its jurisdictional argument before
the three-judge panel.
The Federal Circuit held that “[the plaintiff] should properly have
renewed its jurisdictional challenge by filing a motion to reconsider
the single judge’s order within fourteen days of its issuance as
required by Federal Circuit Rule 27(l),” but that its “failure to comply
with Rule 27(l) is not fatal, however, because this court has held that
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 1344, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259-60.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259-60.
Id. at 1345, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
Id. at 1345-46, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
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the merits panel is not bound by the action of a single judge.”
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit reached the merits of the plaintiff’s
14
jurisdictional argument.
Applying Seventh Circuit law, the Federal Circuit framed the “key
issue to be resolved [as] whether the document filed affords ‘notice
of the grounds and prayer of the motion to both the court and to the
opposing party, providing that party with a meaningful opportunity
to respond and the court with enough information to process the
15
motion correctly.’” The Federal Circuit then determined that the
motion to withdraw, read in conjunction with the JMOL motion
specifically referenced by the motion to withdraw, did not raise a
16
“question regarding the grounds for relief demanded.”
Accordingly, “[t]he Motion to Withdraw satisfied the particularity
requirement of FRCP 7(b)(1) and constituted a valid Rule 50(b)
motion such that [the defendant’s] time to appeal did not start
running until the motion was finally resolved by the district court”
and that the “[defendant’s] Notice of Appeal was timely filed and this
court has jurisdiction to hear its appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
17
§ 1295(a).”
18
In Silicon Image, Inc. v. Genesis Microchip Inc., the defendant
appealed from a district court order enforcing the terms of a
19
settlement agreement in a patent infringement action. The plaintiff
in the case was a promoter of a Digital Visual Interface Specification
(“DVI Specification”), and along with other promoters, agreed to
grant a royalty free license to claims of its patents that would
necessarily be infringed by anyone practicing the standards set forth
20
The defendant signed an Adopters
in the DVI Specification.
Agreement, and began developing DVI receiver technology and
21
incorporating the technology in its products. Later, the plaintiff
sued the defendant for infringing non-necessary claims of its
22
patents.
After a claim construction ruling and discovery, the parties
informed the district court that they had reached a settlement
agreement, and the agreement was memorialized in an
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 1346, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262.
Id. at 1346-47, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262.
Id. at 1347, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263.
395 F.3d 1358, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1758 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1359, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1759.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1759.
Id. at 1360, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1759.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1760.
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Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) signed by the Chairman
23
and CEO of each company. The parties disagreed as to the terms of
24
The
the MOU that defined the products subject to royalties.
plaintiff argued that the MOU required royalties on certain products
regardless of whether the products infringed necessary or nonnecessary claims, while the defendant argued that the MOU left the
25
royalty-free license of the DVI Specification intact. When the parties
failed to draft a definitive agreement, the MOU became the binding
26
settlement agreement.
27
Each party filed cross-motions to interpret and enforce the MOU.
The plaintiff filed a motion requesting that the district court
interpret the MOU to require royalty payments on defendant’s entire
28
product base and to find defendant in breach of the MOU. The
defendant filed a motion to dismiss “urging its own construction of
the MOU and arguing that the terms of the MOU required [the
29
plaintiff] to dismiss the pending patent infringement action.” The
district court agreed with the plaintiff, and issued an opinion
adopting the plaintiff’s construction of the MOU, and “entered an
order, which it called a ‘Final Judgment Order,’ directing [the
defendant] to . . . remit to [the plaintiff] the cash payments,” or to
“remit such payments to the Clerk of Court for deposit in an escrow
account. [The defendant] chose to remit the funds to the Clerk of
30
Court.”
However, the Final Judgment order incorporated the terms of the
MOU, which stipulated that the underlying action would be
dismissed only upon the condition that plaintiff received the payment
31
of the settlement sum. The plaintiff thus moved the district court to
amend the Final Judgment order because the action could not be
32
dismissed until payment of the settlement sum to plaintiff. The
district court agreed and issued an amended order making dismissal
with prejudice contingent upon payment of the settlement sum to
33
the plaintiff. The district court sought to make the amended order
appealable, even though it retained limited jurisdiction to enter an
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1760.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1760.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1760.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1760.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1760.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1760.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1760.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1760.
Id. at 1360-61, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1760.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1760.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1760.
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order of dismissal with prejudice upon defendant’s payment of the
34
The defendant appealed, and the
settlement sum to plaintiff.
Federal Circuit requested supplemental briefing on the jurisdictional
35
issue of whether there was an appealable final judgment.
Although neither party raised an objection to the Federal Circuit’s
jurisdiction, the panel held that it had the obligation to consider
whether a final decision of the district court had been made within
36
the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). The Federal Circuit held
that it did not have jurisdiction under the statute. The court
reasoned that:
Absent the full adjudication of all claims for all parties, the
dismissal of any unresolved claims, or an express determination
that there is no just reason for delay and an express direction for
entry of judgment as to fewer than all of the parties or claims under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), there can be no ‘final decision’ under 28
37
U.S.C. 1295(a)(1).

The Federal Circuit also held that “even in a settled case, a final
38
Because the MOU required that the
judgment must obtain.”
plaintiff certify that it had received payment of the settlement sum
from defendant as a condition precedent to final judgment, the
district court “was powerless to order a dismissal with prejudice of
[the plaintiff’s] infringement claims until the parties complied with
39
the terms of the agreement.” The Federal Circuit also noted that
the defendant could have sought permission to immediately appeal
the interlocutory judgment and order of the district court under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b) and (c)(1), or that the defendant could have made
40
the required payment to plaintiff. Because the defendant did not
follow either of these procedures, the Federal Circuit was without
41
jurisdiction to consider the appeal.
42
In Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., the Federal Circuit
dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal, finding that the court lacked
43
jurisdiction because the lower court failed to issue a final judgment.
The court did note, however, that “in the interest of judicial
34. Id. at 1361, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1760-61.
35. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1760-61.
36. Id. at 1362, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1761.
37. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1762 (citing Nystrom v. TREX Co., 339 F.3d
1347, 1350, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1858, 1860 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
38. Id. at 1363, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1762.
39. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1762.
40. Id. at 1364, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1763.
41. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1763.
42. 414 F.3d 1376, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1602 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
43. Id. at 1378, 1380, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1603.
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economy,” it would allow the plaintiff, Enzo Biochem, to return to
the lower court to seek remedial relief, and then reinstate its Federal
44
Circuit appeal once the lower court issued a final judgment.
During the lower court proceedings, the court ruled that the
45
plaintiff’s patent was invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)’s on-sale bar,
and it therefore, granted summary judgment to the defendant at an
46
oral summary judgment hearing. At the hearing, the judge ruled
that there were “no triable issues of fact,” and asked both parties
whether “there is anything that I have missed in my rulings that I
47
should rule upon.” Neither party responded and the judge noted
he would enter a summary judgment order that would allow the
48
The plaintiff filed an
parties to proceed to the Federal Circuit.
appeal with the Federal Circuit. However, the defendant argued that
the lower court’s ruling was non-final and thus appellate jurisdiction
was not proper, as the lower court never ruled on its counterclaim
49
that plaintiff’s patents were unenforceable for inequitable conduct.
The Federal Circuit first noted that a federal appellate court has “a
50
special obligation to satisfy itself . . . of its own jurisdiction” and that
the district court must issue a final judgment before parties may
51
appeal. The plaintiff argued that final judgment occurs when the
trial court issued an “unequivocal manifestation” of its belief that the
52
decision it issued was “the end of the case.” The plaintiff argued
that this actually had occurred, as evidenced by the lower court
53
judge’s statements and his issuance of the summary judgment order.
While the Federal Circuit admitted such a statement of finality did
occur, it rejected the plaintiff’s argument, finding that the lower
court was in error because it did not issue final judgment regarding
54
the defendant’s counterclaim.
The plaintiff further argued that the defendant’s counterclaim of
inequitable conduct was moot, given that the lower court found the
55
plaintiff’s patent to be invalid. Moreover, the plaintiff argued that
44. Id. at 1380, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605.
45. Id. at 1377, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1603.
46. Id. at 1378, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1603.
47. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1603.
48. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1603.
49. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1603.
50. Id. (citing Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986)).
51. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2000)).
52. Id. at 1379-80, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1603 (citing Pandrol USA, LP v.
Airboss Ry. Prods., 320 F.3d 1354, 1362-63, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1985, 1992 (Fed.
Cir. 2003)).
53. Id. at 1380, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1603.
54. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1603.
55. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 414 F.3d 1376, 1379, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d
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the only outstanding issue as to inequitable conduct would be the
attorney fees, which would not prevent a final judgment for appellate
56
review purposes.
The Federal Circuit rejected these arguments. The court agreed
that a pending attorney fees issue will not render an otherwise final
57
judgment unappealable. This is only the case, however, when there
58
are no other outstanding, unadjudicated claims. Because there was
an outstanding unadjudicated claim, and the lower court still needed
to determine whether the plaintiff engaged in inequitable conduct,
the Federal Circuit concluded that issues still remained for the lower
59
court and thus never issued a final judgment.
60
In Pause Technology LLC v. Tivo Inc., the plaintiff sued the
defendant alleging that the defendant’s digital video recorder
products infringed its reissue patent. The district court entered
61
summary judgment of non-infringement in favor of the defendant.
The plaintiff appealed, stating that the district court did not rule on
62
the defendant’s motion for summary judgment of invalidity. The
Federal Circuit issued an order to “show cause as to why th[e] appeal
63
should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.” The plaintiff then
submitted a supplemental brief, arguing that the Federal Circuit had
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) because the district court
ordered judgment in favor of the defendant and because the district
64
court’s docket sheet showed that the case was dismissed.
The Federal Circuit held that it had no jurisdiction. As a general
matter, it explained that, under the “final judgment rule” of 28
U.S.C. § 1295, the parties could only appeal a district court’s final
65
decision. The court found that there were no special exceptions to
this rule in patent cases, and that “piecemeal litigation is as strictly
precluded by the rule of finality for patent cases as it is for any other
66
case.” Therefore, it concluded, to promote the policies explained
67
by the Supreme Court in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, it
would “insist upon diligent compliance by counsel with the rule of
(BNA) 1602, 1604 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
56. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1604.
57. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1604-05.
58. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1604-05.
59. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1604-05.
60. 401 F.3d 1290, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1058 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
61. Id. at 1291, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1059.
62. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1059.
63. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1059.
64. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1059.
65. Id. at 1292, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060.
66. Id. at 1293, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060.
67. 440 U.S. 368 (1981).
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68

finality.”
In this case, the Federal Circuit found no final judgment where the
district court had not expressly disposed of the invalidity
counterclaim and where there was no finding that the invalidity
69
counterclaim was moot.
It was not persuaded by the plaintiff’s
argument that the court should deem the invalidity counterclaim
70
impliedly dismissed. It found that, even if the district court could
impliedly dispose of the invalidity defense in its ruling on
infringement, the invalidity counterclaim was a separate claim that
71
remained unresolved.
To accept plaintiff’s argument that the
72
counterclaim was impliedly dismissed would eviscerate Rule 54(b).
The Federal Circuit found no case which found appellate jurisdiction
73
despite the existence of an unadjudicated counterclaim. Therefore,
74
it held that no appellate jurisdiction existed. It granted the plaintiff
leave to seek remedial action at the district court and thereafter
75
reinstate the appeal.
76
In Cross Medical Products, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., the
district court had permanently enjoined defendant Medtronic from
infringing claim 5 of plaintiff Cross Medical’s patent involving
orthopedic surgical implants, following grant of partial summary
77
judgment of validity and infringement.
Medronic sought
interlocutory appeal of the injunction, and the Federal Circuit found
78
there to be jurisdiction, over Cross Medical’s objection. Medtronic
sought review of the district court’s claim constructions, reversal of
79
the granting of summary judgment, and to vacate the injunction.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction
over appeals from orders “granting, continuing, modifying, refusing
or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify
80
injunctions.” Cross Medical argued that the injunction issued was
68. See Pause Tech., 401 F.3d at 1293, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060 (finding that
the “importance of the rule of finality [was] underscored by the court’s recent
amendment of Federal Circuit Rule 28(a)(5), which now requires that the
jurisdictional statement also include a statement that the judgment or order
appealed from is final or otherwise appealable”).
69. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060.
70. Id. at 1294, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061.
71. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061 (emphasis added).
72. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061.
73. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061.
74. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061.
75. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061.
76. 424 F.3d 1293, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1662 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
77. Id. at 1297, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1665.
78. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1665.
79. Id. at 1299, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667.
80. Id. at 1300, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667.
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only in form, not substance, since it merely prohibited activity it had
81
Further, it argued that the Court had no
already abandoned.
jurisdiction since there was no final judgment on the merits but
merely a grant of partial summary judgment, not certified for
82
83
appeal. Cross Medical relied on Woodward v. Sage Products, Inc.,
which held that an order granting defendant’s motion for summary
judgment of non-infringement could not be appealed even where the
plaintiff’s complaint included a prayer for injunctive relief, since no
order granting or denying an injunction had been issued. In this
case, an injunctive order was explicitly issued, thus, Sage Products, and
84
Carson v. American Brands, Inc., upon which Sage Products relied, were
inapplicable. The Court also held that it could review the partial
summary judgment orders despite the lack of final judgment because
85
they were “inseparably connected” to the merits of the injunction.
The Court went on to reverse the grant of partial summary judgment
of non-infringement and validity based on claim construction issues,
finding genuine issues of material fact precluding summary
86
judgment.
B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the United States District Courts
87

In Fort James Corp. v. Solo Cup Co., the Federal Circuit addressed
the timeliness of the defendant’s notice of appeal. At issue in the
case was Solo Cup’s alleged infringement of Fort James’s patent, the
validity of the patent, and alleged inequitable conduct during
88
prosecution of the patent.
Prior to trial, the district court had
bifurcated the trial, saving the issue of inequitable conduct until after
89
a trial on the issues of infringement and validity. Before the case
was submitted to the jury on the issues of infringement and validity,
Solo Cup filed several motions for JMOL, including one on the issue
90
of invalidity. Subsequently, on November 25, 2002, the jury found
that although Fort James’s patent remained valid, Solo Cup had not
91
infringed the patent.
On January 16, 2003, the district court
dismissed Solo Cup’s unenforceability counterclaim on the ground
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667-68.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1668.
818 F.2d 841, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1649 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc).
450 U.S. 79 (1981).
Id. at 1301.
Id. at 1314-19.
412 F.3d 1340, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1344, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260.
Id. at 1345, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
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that there was no case or controversy. On June 26, 2003, Solo Cup
filed a motion to withdraw four of the JMOLs, and requested
93
consideration of the JMOL on invalidity. The district court denied
as moot Solo Cup’s motion to withdraw, and final judgment was
94
entered on March 30, 2004.
95
Solo Cup filed its Notice of Appeal on April 29, 2004. Fort James
moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that final judgment was actually
entered on June 16, 2003, by operation of law, 150 days from the
January 16, 2003 verdict, and that Solo Cup’s Notice of Appeal was
96
untimely filed.
On July 15, 2004, a single judge of the Federal Circuit denied Fort
James’s motion to dismiss, determining that Solo Cup renewed its
motion for JMOL on June 26, 2003, ten days from the date Fort
James argued was the date of final judgment, thus tolling the time to
97
appeal until the renewed motion for JMOL was resolved. Fort James
reasserted its jurisdictional argument before the three-judge panel.
At issue was whether the district court had jurisdiction to consider
98
Solo Cup’s counterclaim of unenforceability.
After the jury
returned a verdict of non-infringement, Fort James covenanted not to
99
sue Solo Cup on the patents at issue in the case. The district court
agreed with Fort James that this divested the district court of
jurisdiction to hear the counterclaim of unenforceability, and the
district court dismissed this counterclaim as moot on the ground that
100
there was no case or controversy.
The Federal Circuit disagreed, however, and concluded that the
101
district court had jurisdiction to hear the counterclaim.
The
Federal Circuit distinguished its decision in Super Sack Manufacturing
102
Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., explaining that “[t]he district court’s
92. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
93. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
94. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
95. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
96. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
97. Id. at 1345-46, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261-62.
98. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261-62.
99. Id. at 1345, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
100. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
101. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
102. 57 F.3d 1054, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1139 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The Federal
Circuit explained that:
The rationale applied by the court in Super Sack was that the patentee’s
covenant not to sue resolved the actual controversy between the parties, i.e.,
the question of infringement of the subject patent, such that the court no
longer had Article III jurisdiction to hear a declaratory judgment action
regarding the validity or enforceability of that patent. Here, the district
court concluded that in light of the [covenant] there was no actual
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literal application of the holding of Super Sack fails to comprehend
103
In this case,
the unique procedural posture of the instant case.”
“the Post-Verdict Covenant had no effect on Fort James’s claim for
infringement, because that controversy had already been resolved by
the jury’s verdict.” The Federal Circuit observed that “[t]he question
then becomes whether the court retained jurisdiction to hear Solo
Cup’s declaratory judgment counterclaim after the jury determined
104
that Solo Cup’s products do not infringe Fort James’s patents.”
Resolving the issue, the Federal Circuit explained that “a
counterclaim questioning the validity or enforceability of a patent
raises issues beyond the initial claim for infringement that are not
105
disposed of by a decision of non-infringement.”
The Federal
Circuit concluded that “the jury verdict holding that Solo Cup did
not infringe Fort James’s patents did not moot Solo Cup’s
counterclaim for unenforceability nor did it act to divest the district
106
court of jurisdiction to hear that unlitigated counterclaim.”
107
In MedImmune, Inc. v. Centocor, Inc., the Federal Circuit affirmed
the district court’s decision that it did not have jurisdiction to hear
MedImmune’s declaratory judgment claims of invalidity and
inequitable conduct. MedImmune entered into a license with
108
Centocor for rights to practice Centocor’s patent.
MedImmune
argued that it had only agreed to the license after mounting pressure
109
and the threat of an infringement lawsuit. MedImmune continued
to make timely royalty payments and was not otherwise in violation of
110
the licensing agreement.
After concluding the license,
MedImmune brought suit claiming that Centocor’s patent was invalid
controversy between the parties capable of resolution by a hearing on the
unenforceability of the ‘140 Patent and therefore Solo Cup’s counterclaim
was moot.
Fort James Corp., 412 F.3d at 1348, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263 (citations omitted).
103. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263.
104. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263.
105. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263.
106. Id. at 1348, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1257, 1263. In his dissent, Judge Schall
“agree[d] that a finding of non-infringement does not, by itself, moot a counterclaim
of invalidity or unenforceability.” Id. at 1353, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1267-68. In
Judge Schall’s view, however, “Fort James’s covenant had the effect of eliminating
any real and immediate controversy between the parties and, therefore, mooted Solo
Cup’s counterclaim.” Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1267-68. According to Judge
Schall, due to Fort James’ covenant, “Solo Cup no longer faced the prospect of Fort
James pursuing its original infringement claim—through, say, an appeal to this
court—or the risk of being sued for other present or past acts of perceived
infringement.” Id. at 1354, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1268.
107. 409 F.3d 1376, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1942 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
108. Id. at 1378, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1943.
109. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1943.
110. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1943.
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111

and unenforceable.
The district court granted Centocor’s motion
to dismiss MedImmune’s case for lack of jurisdiction for failure to
112
establish an actual controversy between the parties.
The Federal Circuit explained that:
When a potential infringer seeks declaratory relief in the absence
of a lawsuit by the patentee, there must be both (1) a reasonable
apprehension on the part of the declaratory judgment plaintiff that
it will face an infringement suit; and (2) present activity by the
declaratory judgment plaintiff which could constitute
infringement, or concrete steps taken with the intent to conduct
113
such activity.

The Federal Circuit’s decision relied on its holding in Gen-Probe,
114
Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., stating that “[i]n Gen-Probe, we considered the case
of a licensee in good standing who sought a declaratory judgment
that it was not infringing the licensed patent, and that the licensed
115
patent was invalid.” The Federal Circuit noted that:
For the purposes of the Declaratory Judgment Act, . . . the license,
“unless materially breached, obliterated any reasonable
apprehension of a lawsuit,” and that once the licensor and licensee
“formed the license, an enforceable covenant not to sue, the events
116
that led to the formation [of the license] became irrelevant.”

The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that there was no
controversy between MedImmune and Centocor, explaining that
“[a]ny controversy that may have existed between MedImmune and
Centocor prior to and during their various negotiations vanished
when MedImmune executed the license agreement, which is a
117
covenant by Centocor not to sue.”
The Federal Circuit explained that its decisions here and in Gen118
Probe were consistent with Supreme Court precedent. The Federal
119
Circuit first noted that Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton International
only dealt with the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit to hear an
appeal, and did not address the issue of a district court’s
120
jurisdiction. Next, the Federal Circuit acknowledged that Lear, Inc.
121
v. Adkins held that a licensee is not estopped from challenging the
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1943.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1943.
Id. at 1379, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1943-44 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
359 F.3d 1376, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1087 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Medimmune, Inc., 409 F.3d at 1379, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1943-44.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1943-44.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1943-44.
Id. at 1380, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1945.
508 U.S. 83 (1993).
409 F.3d at 1380, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1945.
395 U.S. 653 (1969).
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validity of a licensed patent, but explained that Lear left open
whether a court has jurisdiction to hear such a challenge, noting that
“the fact that a party is not estopped from making an argument does
not mean that federal courts have jurisdiction to entertain that
122
argument in all circumstances.”
The Federal Circuit also determined that its decision was consistent
123
with its prior decision in C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Schwartz.
The court
noted that in C.R. Bard, several facts supported the existence of a case
or controversy, including that the licensee had ceased paying
124
royalties.
“By contrast, in this case MedImmune can have no
reasonable apprehension of suit—indeed, it can have no
apprehension of suit at all—because there is nothing for which
125
Centocor can sue MedImmune.” The Federal Circuit also rejected
MedImmune’s argument that a controversy existed once Centocor
filed an infringement suit against MedImmune in response to
MedImmune’s suit, noting that “[t]he presence or absence of a case
126
or controversy is based on facts at the time the complaint was filed.”
Finally, the Federal Circuit rejected MedImmune’s argument that
it was unfair to have to pay royalties on an invalid patent, explaining
that every alleged patent infringer must make a “Hobson’s choice”:
127
whether to “settle or fight.” This dilemma arises, not from the GenProbe precedent, but from Article III’s requirement that an “actual
controversy” exist between the parties before a court can exercise
128
jurisdiction over the dispute.
129
In University of Texas System v. Nippon Telephone & Telegraph Corp.,
the Federal Circuit transferred the appeal to the Fifth Circuit after
130
determining that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction, as the
131
case did not “arise[] under the federal patent laws.”
The suit
stemmed from an agreement between the University of Texas (“the
University”) and Nippon Telephone and Telegraph Corporation
(“NTT”), which allowed an NTT scientist to work as a visiting scientist
132
Per the agreement, “any
at the University for one year.
information, ideas, discoveries, applications, research, inventions,
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

409 F.3d at 1380, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1945.
716 F.2d 874, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 197 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
409 F.3d at 1381, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1946.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1946.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1946.
Id. at 1382, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1946.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1946.
414 F.3d 1358, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1518 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1359, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1519.
Id. at 1362, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1359-60, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1519-20.
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and work product generated by the [NTT] scientist, directly or
indirectly, or with which he became familiar as a result of his stay,
133
were the exclusive property of [the University].”
During the NTT scientist’s one year at the University, he produced
134
work that eventually led to the University obtaining a patent.
However, after the scientist returned to Japan, NTT filed for a
135
Japanese patent based on his work.
The plaintiff University filed
suit against NTT in a Texas state court alleging state law claims
including: breach of confidential relationship, conversion, breach of
contract, statutory and common law misappropriation of trade
secrets, breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference, unfair
136
competition, and civil conspiracy. The defendant removed the suit
to federal district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), which
provides federal courts jurisdiction over civil actions involving patent
137
laws.
The district court found it had jurisdiction under § 1338, as
the University’s tortious interference claim required it to “show that
[] [its] patent overlaps the subject matter of NTT’s Japanese
138
patent.” Three years after removal, NTT filed a motion to dismiss
139
arguing it had sovereign immunity from suit.
The district court
denied its motion, and NTT appealed this ruling with the Federal
140
Circuit.
The Federal Circuit bypassed NTT’s sovereign immunity issue,
141
finding that the Federal Circuit did not have jurisdiction. It noted
that 29 U.S.C. § 1338 provides the Federal Circuit with jurisdiction
over those cases where the “well-pleaded complaint establishes either
that federal patent law creates the cause of action or that the
plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a
substantial question of federal patent law in that patent law is a
142
necessary element of one of the well-pleaded claims.”
Moreover,
the Federal Circuit noted that courts must closely review the
plaintiff’s pleadings to make “the determination as to whether a
143
cause of action arises under the patent laws.”
133. Id. at 1360, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1520.
134. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1520.
135. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1520.
136. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1520.
137. Id. at 1361, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1520.
138. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1520.
139. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521.
140. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521.
141. Id. at 1359, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1519.
142. Id. at 1362, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521 (quoting Christianson v. Colt, 486
U.S. 800, 809 (1988)).
143. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521 (quoting Air Prod. & Chem., Inc. v.
Reichhold Chem., Inc., 755 F.2d 1559, 1562, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 121, 123 (Fed. Cir.

LATHAM.OFFTOPRINTER

1016

5/20/2006 3:02:04 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:1001

The Federal Circuit quickly concluded that the University’s
pleadings only asserted Texas state law causes of action, and
accordingly, a federal action under § 1338(a) could only be sustained
if resolution of the state claims depended “on resolution of a
144
substantial question of federal patent law.”
NTT argued that the University’s tortious interference claim
required a federal court to resolve a “substantial question[] of patent
145
law.” One of the elements of the state’s tortious interference with a
business relationship law required plaintiffs to show that there was a
“reasonable probability that the parties would have entered into a
146
contractual relationship.”
NTT argued that in order for the
University to prove this element, a federal court would have to rule
that the plaintiff was the “rightful inventor” and owner of the
147
patent.
Additionally, NTT argued that issues of patent
148
inventorship, validity, enforceability, and interpretation would arise.
Although the Federal Circuit agreed that these issues would provide
it jurisdiction under § 1338(a), it denied that these patent issues
149
would arise in regard to the University’s tortious interference claim.
Further, it stated that “the patent law issues identified by NTT are
150
not essential to the resolution of Plaintiffs’ claim.” First, the court
stated that the University did not need to prove its patent was valid in
order to satisfy the business expectancy element of the tortious
151
interference claim, as patents are presumed valid.
Second,
questions regarding who has true inventorship of a product does not
“convert the state law action into one arising under the patent
152
laws.” NTT made an additional argument that, in order for a court
to resolve whether NTT’s actions interfered with the University’s
business opportunities, it would also need to construe the University’s
patent and that the Federal Circuit’s holding in U.S. Valves, Inc. v.
153
154
Dray demanded this conclusion.
The court explained that the
U.S. Valves holding required the court to construe a patent only when
the breach of contract claim rested on a determination of the subject
1985)).
144. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521 (quoting Christianson, 486 U.S. at 809).
145. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521.
146. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521 (quoting Ash v. Hack Branch Distrib. Co.,
54 S.W.3d 401, 414-15 (Tex. App. 2001)).
147. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522.
148. Id. at 1363, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522.
149. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522.
150. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522.
151. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522.
152. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522.
153. 212 F.3d 1368, 1372, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1834 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
154. Univ. of Texas Sys., 414 F.3d at 1363, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522.
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155

patent’s scope.
However, U.S. Valves “does not stand for the
proposition that all breach of contract actions involving patents
156
require such a determination.”
Lastly, the court stated that the plaintiff’s request for an injunction
in the lower court did not provide the Federal Circuit with
157
jurisdiction. The defendant argued that the injunction prohibiting
it from disseminating information contained in the patent was
improper on the theory that the plaintiff’s trade secrets ceased when
158
it filed its patent application.
Citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc., the defendant argued that the plaintiff’s requested
injunction presented a conflict between state law and federal patent
159
laws.
The Federal Circuit rejected the defendant’s argument and
stated that the Bonito Boats precedent did not mean that “patent laws
preempt a patentee’s right to recover under theories sounding in
either contract or tort for misappropriation of property protected
160
under state law at the time of its misappropriation.”
Further,
“[n]othing in the injunction requested by Plaintiffs would improperly
expand the scope of rights granted under [] [the Plaintiffs’ patent]
and Plaintiffs’ quest for such an injunction does not require
161
resolution of a substantial question of patent law.” Accordingly, the
Federal Circuit denied jurisdiction and transferred the case to the
162
Fifth Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631.
C. Personal Jurisdiction
163

Rates Technology Inc. v. Nortel Networks Corp. involved the appeal of
a dismissal of a patent infringement action for lack of personal
jurisdiction. The plaintiff’s complaint alleged that the defendant, a
Canadian corporation, was the successor-in-interest to other
164
companies that infringed the patent-in-suit.
The defendant’s
answer to the complaint raised the lack of personal jurisdiction as an
165
In the same pleading, the defendant also
affirmative defense.
counterclaimed for declaratory judgment of noninfringement,
155. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1523.
156. Id. at 1364, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1523.
157. Id. at 1365, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1524.
158. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1524.
159. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1524.
160. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1524.
161. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1524.
162. Id. at 1366, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525. The Federal Circuit transferred
the case to the Fifth Circuit because the defendant provided an alternative argument
that gave the Fifth Circuit jurisdiction. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1524.
163. 399 F.3d 1302, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1904 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
164. Id. at 1304, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1905.
165. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1905.
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invalidity, and unenforceability of the patent-in-suit, as well as unfair
166
competition and patent misuse. After obtaining leave of court, the
defendant also filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure (“FRCP”) 12(b)(2) to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint for
167
lack of personal jurisdiction. The defendant supported its motion
to dismiss with a declaration from an executive stating that it was a
Canadian holding company that did not manufacture, use, sell, or
offer for sale products in the United States, and the executive also
stated that the defendant was not a successor-in-interest to any
company that manufactured, used, sold, or offered for sale products
168
accused of infringement.
The plaintiff did not offer any evidence
contradicting the defendant’s declaration, but argued that the
defendant had waived its personal jurisdiction defense by filing
169
permissive counterclaims in its answer.
The district court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss,
finding that the plaintiff had failed to offer any evidence
170
contradicting the defendant’s declaration.
The district court also
found that the defendant properly raised its jurisdictional objection
from the inception of the litigation, and did not waive its personal
jurisdiction defense by filing permissive counterclaims with its
171
answer.
The Federal Circuit was persuaded by the views of other circuits in
172
regard to the personal jurisdiction issue and affirmed the district
court’s dismissal order. The court held that “filing a counterclaim,
compulsory or permissive, cannot waive a party’s objections to
personal jurisdiction, so long as the requirements of Rule 12(h)(1)
173
are satisfied.”
The court reasoned that a contrary holding “would
effectively eliminate the unqualified right provided by Rule 12(b) of
174
raising jurisdictional defenses either by motion or answer.”
175
In Commissariat a L’Energie Atomique v. Chi Mei Optoelectronics Corp.,
the Federal Circuit considered the appeal of an order of dismissal for
166. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1905.
167. Id. at 1304-05, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1905.
168. Id. at 1305, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1905.
169. Id. at 1305, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1906.
170. Id. at 1306, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1906.
171. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1906.
172. Id. at 1307, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1907 (citing Bayou Steel Corp. v. M/V
Amstelvoorn, 809 F.2d 1147, 1149 (5th Cir. 1987) and Neifeld v. Steinberg, 438 F.2d
423, 428-29 (3d Cir. 1971) to stand for the proposition that raising jurisdictional
defenses in the same pleading with a counterclaim does not waive such jurisdictional
defenses).
173. Id. at 1308, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1907-08.
174. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1908 (internal citation omitted).
175. 395 F.3d 1315, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1145 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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lack of personal jurisdiction. The plaintiff, a French government
research agency that developed new technologies for sale and license
to the private sector for commercial use, owned two patents directed
to technology for the design and manufacture of liquid crystal
176
displays (“LCDs”). The defendant was a Taiwanese manufacturer of
LCD products, including modules alleged to infringe the plaintiff’s
177
patents.
The defendant sold its modules directly to original
equipment manufacturers that incorporated the modules into
computer monitors which were, in turn, shipped to major brandname computer manufacturers that shipped their products to
178
retailers in the United States. The defendant made no direct sales
179
to these retailers.
After the plaintiff filed suit against the defendant in Delaware, the
defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s infringement lawsuit for
180
lack of personal jurisdiction prior to any discovery taking place. In
its response to the motion, the plaintiff submitted documentary
evidence that arguably was sufficient to support denial of the motion.
Alternatively, the plaintiff argued that, if the record were not
181
sufficient, it should be allowed to conduct discovery.
The
defendant also submitted evidence that it had not transacted business
in Delaware, had not done any type of work in Delaware, had no
operations or property in Delaware, had no employees living in
182
Delaware, and was not licensed to do business in Delaware.
The
defendant did not, however, submit any evidence to contradict the
allegation that it derived substantial revenue from sales of its
products in Delaware or that its modules incorporated in other
183
products were likely to reach Delaware.
The defendant did argue
that mere introduction of its products into the “stream of commerce”
was not sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction under Delaware’s
184
long arm statute. The district court dismissed the plaintiff’s action
for lack of jurisdiction, rejecting arguments that the Delaware long
185
arm statute conferred jurisdiction.

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id. at 1316-17, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147.
Id. at 1317, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147.
Id. at 1317-18, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147-48.
Id. at 1318, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148.
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The plaintiff had argued that section 3104(c)(1), (3) and (4) of
Title 10 of the Delaware Code conferred jurisdiction. Subsection
(c)(4) establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant that:
Causes tortious injury in the State or outside of the State by an act
or omission outside of the state if the person regularly does or
solicits business, engages in any other persistent course of conduct
in the State or derives substantial revenue from services, or things
186
used or consumed in the State.

The district court found the record insufficient to satisfy the
requirements of the long-arm statute because the plaintiff failed to
demonstrate that the defendant derived substantial revenue
187
specifically from Delaware. As a result, the district court declined to
reach the issue of whether the requirements of due process had been
188
satisfied.
In its motion to reconsider, the plaintiff again requested
jurisdictional discovery, which it had raised in its original response to
189
the defendant’s motion to dismiss.
The court declined to grant
jurisdictional discovery, and entered final judgment in favor of the
190
defendant pursuant to FRCP 54(b).
Upon appeal, the Federal Circuit considered whether the district
court properly dismissed the action for lack of personal jurisdiction.
The court stated that to establish personal jurisdiction in a patent
infringement case over a non-resident defendant whose products are
sold in the forum state, “a plaintiff must show both that the state long
arm statute applies and that the requirements of due process are
191
satisfied.”
The court found that the plaintiff had presented
sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the defendant sold a large
volume of LCDs to companies that incorporate the LCDs into final
product and that the products were “likely sold in Delaware in
192
substantial quantities.”
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that
the district court should have found the plaintiff’s showing “sufficient
to establish that substantial revenues could be derived by [the
defendant] from the sales of products in Delaware incorporating [the
193
defendant’s] LCDs.”
However, the Federal Circuit noted that
whether the plaintiff’s showing was sufficient for personal jurisdiction
186. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148 (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 10,
§ 3104(c)(4) (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
187. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148.
188. Id. at 1318, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148.
189. Id. at 1318-19, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148.
190. Id. at 1319, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149.
191. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149.
192. Id. at 1320, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149.
193. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149.
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“presents difficult questions under both Delaware law and the due
194
process clause.”
The scope of the stream of commerce theory under Delaware law
had not been addressed directly by the Delaware Supreme Court.
While lower Delaware courts held that the theory was available under
the long arm statute, it was not clear whether proof of intent to serve
the Delaware market was necessary, nor was it clear whether the
Delaware long arm statute extended to the full extent that the due
195
process clause permits.
Moreover, the United States Supreme
Court has not been clear on whether a showing such as the one made
by the plaintiff was sufficient to satisfy the purposeful minimum
contacts required to exercise personal jurisdiction under the due
196
process clause.
The Federal Circuit analyzed the two “minimum
contacts” analyses from the plurality opinions of Justices O’Connor
197
198
The
and Brennan in Asahi Metal Industries Co. v. Superior Court.
Federal Circuit stated:
On the existing record, this case thus presents a factual scenario
which would require us to determine whether or not additional
conduct, beyond a showing of use of established distribution
channels, is required to meet the demands of due process under
the stream of commerce theory of personal jurisdiction. We have
not had occasion to resolve that question, and we conclude that we
199
should not do so on the inadequate record presented here.

Because the Federal Circuit found that there was “substantial
uncertainty” regarding the scope of Delaware law and of the due
process clause, the court decided that “these issues should not be
resolved on the present record because the district court declined to
200
order jurisdictional discovery.”
The Federal Circuit then considered the district court’s denial of
201
the plaintiff’s discovery request as untimely. Applying Third Circuit
law, the Federal Circuit found that the plaintiffs had adequately
preserved their discovery request, as Third Circuit law did not require
the formal filing of a request for discovery in order to preserve the
202
issue.
The Federal Circuit held that the plaintiffs preserved their
194. Id. at 1320, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149.
195. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149-50.
196. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1150.
197. Id. at 1321-22, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1150-51.
198. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
199. 395 F.3d at 1322, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1151 (internal footnote omitted).
200. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1151.
201. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1151.
202. Id. at 1323, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1151 (citing Renner v. Lanard Toys Ltd.,
33 F.3d 277, 283 (3d Cir. 1994)).
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request for discovery in their opposition to the motion to dismiss and
that the request was reiterated during oral argument and in a motion
203
to reconsider. The Federal Circuit also held that “[t]he mere fact
that [the plaintiffs] also argued that the record was sufficient to
establish jurisdiction without discovery was not a waiver of the right to
204
discovery in the event the district court disagreed.”
Finally, the Federal Circuit held that the discovery request was
highly relevant and that additional facts would likely assist the court
in making the jurisdictional determination. Because a threshold
showing had been made to merit jurisdictional discovery, the Federal
205
Circuit held that the district court erred in denying the request.
The Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s decision and
206
remanded for further proceedings.
207
Trintec Industries, Inc. v. Pedre Promotional Products, Inc. also
involved the appeal of a district court’s dismissal for lack of personal
208
jurisdiction. Trintec involved a patent infringement lawsuit in which
Trintec Industries, Inc., a Canadian corporation, and Time to Invent,
L.L.C., a District of Columbia corporation (collectively “Trintec”),
sued Pedre Promotional Products, Inc. (“Pedre”) for patent
infringement in the United States District Court for the District of
209
The complaint alleged that Pedre was a New York
Columbia.
210
corporation with its main office in New York City. Pedre moved to
211
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue,
supporting its motion with a declaration from Pedre’s president
stating that the corporation’s sole office was in New York, that all of
its manufacturing facilities were in New York, and that it had no
offices, employees, facilities, or sales representatives in Washington,
212
D.C.
The declaration also stated that Pedre did not directly employ sales
representatives, but rather contracted with Multiline Marketing
Group, Inc. (“Multiline”), a sales organization based in Florida, for
213
these employees. Multiline also acted as the sales representative for
203. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1151.
204. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1152.
205. Id. at 1323-24, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1152.
206. Id. at 1324, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1152.
207. 395 F.3d 1275, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1587 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
208. Id. at 1277, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1588.
209. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1588.
210. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1588.
211. See id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1588. Defendant also moved for alternative
relief of a transfer to the Southern District of New York pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1588.
212. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1588.
213. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1588.
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seven other product manufacturers that had no relationship to
214
Pedre further stated that one of its sales
Pedre’s product lines.
representatives spent only four to five days per year visiting clients in
Washington, D.C. not only on behalf of Pedre, but also Multiline’s
215
seven other product manufacturers.
Trintec replied that Pedre’s
products were extensively advertised on dozens of web sites, including
Pedre’s own website, where it offered infringing products for direct
216
sale to customers living in the District of Columbia.
Trintec also
claimed that Pedre’s company website advertised product exhibitions
that took place throughout the country, including two exhibitions in
217
Washington, D.C.
Without explanation, the district court granted
218
Pedre’s motion to dismiss the complaint.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit again applied the two-step inquiry
to determine whether a district court has personal jurisdiction in
patent cases: (1) does jurisdiction exist under the state long-arm
statute and (2) would the exercise of that jurisdiction be consistent
219
with the limitations of the due process clause?
The Federal Circuit noted that the District of Columbia permits
general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation for claims not arising
from the corporation’s conduct in the District, if the corporation is
“doing business” in the District and if its business contacts are
220
“continuous and systematic.” Thus, the court held that the reach of
general jurisdiction in the District is “coextensive with the reach of
221
constitutional due process.”
The Federal Circuit also stated that specific jurisdiction depends
on the District of Columbia’s long-arm statute, providing that:
A District of Columbia court may exercise personal jurisdiction
over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim for
relief arising from the person’s—
(1) transacting any business in the District of Columbia; . . .
(3) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or
omission in the District of Columbia;
(4) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or
omission outside the District of Columbia if he regularly does or
solicits business, engages in any other persistent course of conduct,
214. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1588.
215. Id. at 1277-78, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1588.
216. Id. at 1278, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1588-89.
217. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1589.
218. Id. at 1279, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1589.
219. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1589.
220. Id. at 1279, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1590 (quoting D.C. CODE § 13-334(a)
(2004)).
221. Id. at 1279-80, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1590.
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or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed, or
222
services rendered, in the District of Columbia; . . . .

The court held that specific jurisdiction under the District’s longarm statute would be met under subsections (a)(3) or (a)(4) if an
infringing product were sold in Washington, D.C. because patent
infringement is a tort and such a sale would therefore constitute
223
“tortious injury.”
Noting that the district court’s order did not
disclose the grounds or factual basis upon which it might have
concluded that personal jurisdiction did not exist, either under the
224
long-arm statute or in light of due process requirements, the
Federal Circuit evaluated the evidence in the record to determine if
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia had
225
appropriate jurisdiction over this matter.
The Federal Circuit noted that Pedre’s use of its own interactive
website to advertise its products was not dispositive to the issue of
whether jurisdiction existed because the site was “not directed at
customers in the District of Columbia, but instead is available to all
226
customers throughout the country who have access to the Internet.”
The Federal Circuit held that “‘the ability of District residents to
access the defendants’ websites . . . does not by itself show any
227
persistent course of conduct by the defendants in the District.’”
The court further reasoned that “[a]lthough Trintec has shown that
Pedre’s websites contain some interactive features aimed at
transacting business, it is unclear how frequently those features are
utilized or, indeed, whether any District residents have ever actually
228
used Pedre’s website to transact business.”
The Federal Circuit
concluded that Trintec’s evidence of Pedre’s contracted sales
representative’s annual visits to the District was insufficient to support
its claim of jurisdiction, remarking that it could not know how much
time the representative spent with Pedre’s clients or the extent of the
229
Additionally, the court could not find
representative’s visits.
evidence in the record to support Trintec’s claim that Pedre

222. Id. at 1280, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1590 (quoting D.C. CODE § 13-423(a)
(2004)).
223. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1590 (internal quotation omitted).
224. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1590.
225. Id. at 1281-82, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1591-92.
226. Id. at 1281, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1591.
227. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1591 (quoting GTE New Media Servs. Inc. v.
BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).
228. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1591.
229. See id. at 1282, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1591-92 (mentioning that the
evidence in the record was also insufficient to establish the nature of Pedre’s
exhibitions in Washington, D.C.).
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conducted sufficient sales of infringing products to customers in the
230
District of Columbia.
The Federal Circuit thus held that it was unable to determine
231
whether specific or general jurisdiction existed over Pedre.
With
respect to specific jurisdiction, the record provided insufficient
evidence on the issue of whether Pedre was transacting business in
the District, nor could the court determine whether Pedre was
causing injury in the District by its conduct outside the District while
regularly doing or soliciting business, engaging in any persistent
course of conduct, or deriving substantial revenue from goods used
232
or consumed in the District.
On the issue of general jurisdiction, the court determined that the
record also provided insufficient facts to determine whether Pedre
had contacts with the District that were so continuous and systematic
as to overcome the fact that the claim did not arise from Pedre’s
233
conduct within the District. Noting that no jurisdictional discovery
had been conducted, and that Trintec’s prima facie showing of
jurisdiction was sparse and contained considerable evidentiary gaps,
the Federal Circuit concluded that “additional evidence [would be]
needed before a decision on jurisdiction properly [could] be
234
made.” The Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal for
235
lack of personal jurisdiction and remanded for further proceedings.
D. Standing
236

In Sicom Systems Ltd. v. Agilent Technologies, Inc., the PlaintiffAppellant, Sicom, executed a license agreement with the Canadian
government for a patent covering a type of digital signal transmission
channel monitor. The Canadian government retained the title to the
patent and reserved the rights to: “(1) continue operating under the
patented technology; (2) veto proposed sublicenses; (3) grant
contracts to further develop the [] patent; (4) sublicense any
improvements or corrections developed by Sicom; and (5) sue for
infringement of the [] patent except for ‘commercial infringement
actions.’”
In addition, the agreement prevented Sicom from
assigning its rights to the patent without first obtaining Canada’s

230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1592.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1592.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1592.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1592.
Id. at 1283, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1592.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1592.
427 F.3d 971, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1933 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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approval, and prevented Sicom from suing infringers without first
notifying Canada.
Sicom’s standing to sue for infringement was at issue in the appeal.
In 2003, Sicom sued Agilent, Lecroy, and Tektronix for infringing
237
upon the patent.
The Canadian government declined to join the
litigation. The defendants in that case moved to dismiss on the
238
ground that Sicom lacked standing to sue.
The district court
granted the defendants’ motion holding that “Canada had retained
substantial rights to the patent to a degree sufficient to bar Sicom
239
from commencing without the Canadian government.”
Subsequently, Sicom and the Canadian government amended their
original agreement.
The amendment granted to Sicom: (1) the exclusive right to
‘initiate commercial infringement actions’ related to the patent;
(2) an extension of the term of the Agreement to coincide with the
term of the patent; and (3) an extension of Sicom’s right to initiate
240
commercial infringement actions after expiration of the patent.

Shortly thereafter, Sicom filed a second suit, and the defendants
241
Again, the
filed a second motion to dismiss for lack of standing.
district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the case
although this time the district court dismissed the case with
242
prejudice.
The court held that “Sicom does not possess the
substantial rights necessary to be an ‘effective patentee’ for purposes
of granting Sicom standing to sue for infringement of the []
243
patent.”
The court then proceeded to review five recent cases that
addressed the issue of what constitutes a transfer of Substantial rights:
(1) In Intellectual Property Development, Inc. v TCI Cablevision of
244
California, Inc., the court held that the transfer of rights constituted
an exclusive license and not assignment of the patent because the
patent holder “did not transfer the sole right to sue other parties for
infringement [of the patent]” and because the agreement provides
for certain circumstances in which the patent holder must consent to
245
litigation—the consent could be with drawn at any time.
(2) In

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Sicom, 427 F.3d at 973, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1934-35.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1935.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1935.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1935.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1935.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1935.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1935.
248 F.3d 1333, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1681 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Sicom, 427 F.3d at 977, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1937.
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Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. A-Roo Co., the court held that the transfer of a
license from the first exclusive licensee, Prima Tek I, to Prima Tek II,
demonstrated that the original license transferred less than
247
substantial rights in the patent. (3) In Textile Products, Inc. v. Mead
248
Corp., the court held that patent owner’s failure to clearly promise
to refrain from granting further licenses demonstrated that the
249
patent owner failed to transfer substantial rights to the patent.
250
(4) In Abbott Labs v. Diamedix Corp., the patent holder retained the
right to produce and sell the patented products to those parties with
251
whom the patent holder had pre-existing contracts.
The patent
holder also retained the right to bring its own infringement suits, the
252
As a result,
right to veto any further assignment by the liscensee.
the court held that the patent owner transferred fewer than
253
substantial rights. (5) In Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro
254
Italia SPA, the court held that the patent owner transferred
substantial rights to the patent because the assignee received the
right to sue for infringement without the approval of the patent
owner. The court affirmed the district court because Canada’s failure
to transfer the right to sue for all infringement, both commercial and
non-commercial, demonstrate that Canada did not transfer
substantial rights.
255
In Evident Corp. v. Church & Dwight Co., Evident Corp. (“Evident”)
sued Church & Dwight Co. and Colgate-Palmolive Co. (collectively
256
Church &
“Church & Dwight”) for infringement of a patent.
Dwight answered Evident’s complaint and filed a declaratory
judgment counterclaim alleging invalidity, noninfringement, and
257
unenforceability of the patent-in-suit due to inequitable conduct.
Church & Dwight also joined the Peroxydent Group (“Peroxydent”),
258
Evident’s licensor, as a third-party defendant.
After a three-day
bench trial, the district court held that the patent-in-suit was
unenforceable due to inequitable conduct; namely, the inventors’
withholding of three material references from the United States
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

222 F.3d 1372, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1742 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Sicom, 427 F.3d at 977, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1937-38.
134 F.3d 1481, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1633 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Sicom, 427 F.3d at 977-78, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1938.
47 F.3d 1128, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1771 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
Sicom, 427 F.3d at 978, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1938.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1938.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1938.
944 F.2d 870, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1045 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
399 F.3d 1310, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1910 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1312, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911.
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Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) with the intent to
259
Evident and Peroxydent appealed that decision and the
deceive.
260
While that appeal was
Federal Circuit affirmed without opinion.
pending, Church & Dwight moved for attorney’s fees and $1.3
261
million in expenses, arguing that the case was exceptional.
The
district court agreed and awarded Church & Dwight nearly all of the
262
requested attorney’s fees.
On appeal to the Federal Circuit regarding the fees awarded to
Church & Dwight, Peroxydent argued that the award could not stand
because Evident was a mere licensee, lacking all substantial rights in
the patent, and therefore did not have standing to bring the original
263
patent suit against Church & Dwight. Peroxydent also claimed that
as a passive third-party defendant, it held no interest in the
264
litigation. Church & Dwight responded to Peroxydent’s contention
by arguing that constitutional and prudential standing requirements
were met because Evident possessed sufficient rights to bring suit in
its own name, and because any deficiency in standing that might have
originally existed was cured when Peroxydent was joined as a third265
party defendant.
The Federal Circuit agreed with Church & Dwight, stating that
“Evident and Peroxydent, being on the losing side of both their own
patent infringement claim and an opposing claim for attorney fees,
now appear to seek escape from the judgment by arguing that
266
The court stated
Evident lacked standing in the first place . . . .”
that constitutional standing “requires only that a plaintiff must have
suffered an injury in fact, that there be a causal connection between
the injury and a defendant’s conduct, and that the injury be
267
redressable by a favorable court decision.”
The Federal Circuit
consequently held that Evident, as an exclusive licensee to the patentin-suit, did have standing to sue because it had significant rights to
the patent and would be injured by any party that made, used, or sold
268
the patented product.

259. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911.
260. Evident Corp. v. Church & Dwight Co., 78 Fed. Appx. 113 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
261. Evident Corp., 399 F.3d at 1312-13, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912.
262. Id. at 1313, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912.
263. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912.
264. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912.
265. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912.
266. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912.
267. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
268. Id. at 1313-14, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912.
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The Federal Circuit next examined the primary issue of whether
Peroxydent’s presence in the suit, as simply a third-party defendant,
269
With respect to the
satisfied prudential standing requirements.
prudential components of the standing doctrine, the court stated that
“‘a patentee should be joined, either voluntarily or involuntarily, in
270
any infringement suit brought by an exclusive licensee . . . .’”
Noting that this case did not involve a typical challenge to prudential
271
standing because it was brought by the patent owner, the court held
that there was no standing problem, regardless of “whether
Peroxydent was brought into the suit by the accused or the
272
licensee . . . .”
The court reasoned that Peroxydent was joined in
the lawsuit through Church & Dwight’s counterclaim and was
therefore involved and participating in the suit from the start of the
273
litigation.
The court also noted that Peroxydent could not fairly
argue that it was uninterested in the litigation, as its patent was in
274
jeopardy and the litigation would have affected its interest.
Accordingly, Peroxydent’s presence in the litigation as a third-party
275
defendant satisfied any standing requirements.
276
Thatcher v. Kohl’s Department Stores, Inc., involved a motion for a
rule to show cause for lack of standing in a patent infringement
277
case. This motion was filed by Deckers Outdoor Corp. (“Deckers”),
the patent owner’s assignee, for the right to enforce a 1997 consent
judgment between Mark Thatcher (“Thatcher”), the patentee, and
278
the defendant, Kohl’s Department Stores (“Kohl’s”).
The district
court dismissed Deckers’s motion and ruled that it lacked standing,
reasoning that the 1997 consent judgment did not contain language

269. Id. at 1314, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912.
270. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912 (citing Prima-Tek II, L.L.C. v. A-Roo Co.,
222 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
271. See id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913 (mentioning that a typical prudential
standing challenge involves the allegedly infringing party asserting that the plaintiff,
a licensee with rights to the patent, lacked standing to bring the original lawsuit
because the patentee was not a party).
272. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913.
273. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913.
274. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913.
275. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913.
276. 397 F.3d 1370, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1861 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
277. Id. at 1372, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1862.
278. See id. at 1372-73, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1862 (noting that Deckers
acquired, from Thatcher, all of the intellectual property rights to the challenged
product’s patent and trade dress, along with purchasing the right to all contracts,
claims, rights, causes of action, and judgments that were related to the business and
intellectual property assets). Deckers is therefore the purported successor-in-interest
to Thatcher. Id. at 1373, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1863.
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granting Thatcher the power to assign his rights under the judgment,
279
or for his successors to enforce his rights.
The Federal Circuit applied both the law of the Seventh Circuit
280
and Illinois contract law, and found that the consent judgment was
an unambiguous written agreement in which Thatcher expressly
281
declined to assign his right of enforcement to another party. The
Federal Circuit noted that while consent judgments have the
attributes of contracts, they are different from contracts in that
consent judgments not only reflect an agreement on terms, but also
“a resolution and compromise of contested legal positions in matters
282
that are the subject of litigation.” Relying on United States v. Armour
283
& Co., the Federal Circuit held that the scope of the consent decree
“‘must [therefore] be discerned within its four corners, and not by
reference to what might satisfy the purposes of one of the parties to
284
it . . . .’” Because Thatcher did not assign his rights to a third party,
including any successor-in-interest, the court held that this “silence
[was] the functional equivalent of the parties’ express intent to
285
exclude language of assignment.”
286
In Israel Bio-Engineering Project v. Amgen Inc. the plaintiff sued the
defendants for infringement of a patent, developed by researchers
affiliated with two Israeli companies, Yeda and Inter-Yeda, covering a
287
tumor necrosis factor inhibitory protein.
On appeal, the Federal
Circuit addressed the issue of whether Yeda, Inter-Yeda, or the
288
Yeda and Inter-Yeda had entered
plaintiff owned the invention.
into an agreement in which Inter-Yeda agreed to finance Yeda
research projects including those that focused on anticellular factor
289
research.
This “1981 contract” expired in 1986. In 1982, the
plaintiff agreed to fund Inter-Yeda’s financial obligations to Yeda
290
under the 1981 contract (“the 1982 agreement”). In return, Inter-

279. Id. at 1373, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1863.
280. The Federal Circuit reasoned that interpretation of a settlement agreement is
not an issue unique to patent law and that a consent decree is a form of contract that
should be governed by state contract law. Id. at 1373-74, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1863.
281. Id. at 1374, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864.
282. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864.
283. 402 U.S. 673 (1971).
284. Thatcher, 397 F.3d at 1375, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864 (quoting Armour,
402 U.S. at 681-82).
285. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864.
286. 401 F.3d 1299, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1198 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
287. Id. at 1300-01, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1199-1200.
288. Id. at 1302, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1200.
289. Id. at 1301, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1200.
290. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1200.
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Yeda agreed that the plaintiff would own any discoveries that were
291
made as a result of the research funded by the plaintiff.
The patented invention was developed in 1987 after the 1981
agreement had expired but during the time in which the 1982
292
agreement was still in effect.
The plaintiff argued that the
invention belonged to it and sued the defendants and three licensees
293
for infringement. The district court granted summary judgment in
294
the defendants’ favor. The plaintiff, on appeal, argued that under
Israeli law, which governed the 1981 and 1982 agreements, the 1981
agreement should be “harmonized” with the 1982 agreement. Once
“harmonized,” all of Yeda’s discoveries through the later expiration
date of the 1982 agreement would become the property of the
295
plaintiff by operation of its 1982 contracts with Inter-Yeda.
296
The Federal Circuit rejected this “single transaction” theory.
Although the Federal Circuit found that Israeli law permits related
agreements for a common purpose to be read as a whole under
“some circumstances,” it did not require two related agreements to be
297
read to have the same terms.
Additionally, although the court
agreed that Israeli law allows a court to consult extrinsic evidence to
determine the meaning of contracts, the Federal Circuit found the
plaintiff’s evidence of its own intent in entering the 1982 agreement
to be irrelevant to Yeda and Inter-Yeda’s intent in entering the 1981
298
agreement.
Thus, there was no evidence that “alter[ed] the fact
that both Yeda and Inter-Yeda entered into a contract in 1981 whose
299
terms expired in 1986.”
The plaintiff argued in the alternative that at the time of their
invention, the inventors were employees of Inter-Yeda, and that the
1982 agreement provided that the plaintiff would own all discoveries
made by Inter-Yeda research that was funded by the plaintiff between
300
The district court rejected
December 1982 and December 1987.
this argument, stating that expert testimony indicated that the
301
inventors were not employees of Inter-Yeda. The Federal Circuit
reversed, finding that the district court improperly failed to analyze
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1200.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1200.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1200.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1200.
Id. at 1302, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1201.
Id. at 1303, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1202.
Id. at 1304, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1202.
Id. at 1303, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1202.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1201.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1202.
Id. at 1304, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1202.
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the plaintiff’s affirmative evidence that the inventors were Inter-Yeda
302
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit reversed the district
employees.
303
court’s grant of summary judgment on this issue.
E. Trial Procedures
304

In Junker v. Eddings, the Federal Circuit considered the appeal of
the district court’s finding that the defendant had infringed a valid
305
design patent for a catheter introducer sheath.
The defendant
challenged the district court’s denial of its motion for JMOL, and the
plaintiff cross-appealed from the district court’s refusal to establish a
306
constructive trust for the patentee’s benefit. The defendant argued
that the design patent at issue was invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e),
(f) and/or (g)(2), because the patentee was not the first to invent the
307
ornamental design features shown in the patent.
The Federal Circuit agreed with the plaintiff that the defendant
had failed to adequately challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
308
supporting the plaintiff’s infringement claim.
The Federal Circuit
reasoned that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) requires that a
motion for JMOL must be sufficiently specific regarding its factual
basis to inform the plaintiff of exactly what the moving party believed
to be deficient in the evidence, thus giving the plaintiff an
309
Additionally, the
opportunity to cure the defects in proof.
specificity requirement serves the purpose of informing the trial
310
court of the precise issues it must resolve in ruling on the motion.
The Federal Circuit noted that the defendant’s original motion
referred to the subject matter claimed in the patent in general terms,
but that the plaintiff had presented evidence on the sole ornamental
feature he claimed to have invented: the shape of the introducer
311
sheath’s handle.
On appeal, however, the defendant argued that
312
The Federal
additional features of the design were ornamental.
Circuit held that the general statements of invalidity in the original
motion for JMOL were inadequate to inform the plaintiff or the
district court that the defendant’s validity challenge involved the
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.

Id. at 1305-06, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1203-04.
Id. at 1307, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204.
396 F.3d 1359, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1850 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1360, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1851.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1852.
Id. at 1362, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1853.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1853.
Id. at 1363, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1853.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854.
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specific ornamental elements raised on appeal. The Federal Circuit
also noted that the defendant had failed to offer evidence regarding
313
the additional ornamental features at trial, and that while the postverdict motion was “somewhat more specific,” it also was not
sufficiently specific to describe the facts and ornamental features
314
upon which the defendant based its invalidity claim.
Additionally, the Federal Circuit noted that the defendant’s
arguments regarding the interpretation of the design patent
diagrams did not sustain its position, as the issue before the Federal
Circuit was not one of claim construction, but rather “which elements
of that claim [defendant] asserted in its JMOL motions as a basis for
315
its invalidity assertions.”
Finally, the Federal Circuit held that the
evidence before the jury “support[ed] the jury’s finding that there
was not clear and convincing evidence that [the plaintiff] was not the
first to invent the enlarged ‘Mickey Mouse ear’ shaped handle design
316
claimed in the [design] patent.”
F.

USPTO Procedures
317

Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States involved a lawsuit brought by the
applicants for a plant patent, alleging that the Patent and Trademark
Office (“PTO”) abused its discretion when it deemed the plaintiff’s
application abandoned for failing to respond to a Requirement for
318
Information under 37 C.F.R. § 1.105.
Plaintiff had filed a patent
319
application directed to a variety of peach tree. In an office action,
the PTO requested information regarding the sale or other public
distribution of the claimed plant anywhere in the world, as well as
“copies of the application, published proposed denomination, and
320
published breeder’s right grant.” The PTO also informed plaintiff
that to the extent plaintiff did not have or could not readily obtain
the required information, a statement to that effect would be a
321
complete response to the requirement.
Plaintiff declined to
provide the required information on the grounds that it was not
322
material to patentability.
The PTO informed plaintiff that its
refusal to provide the required information was a deliberate omission
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

Id. at 1364, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854.
Id. at 1365, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854-55.
393 F.3d 1277, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1409 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1280, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1411.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1411.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1411.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1411.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1411.
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323

and issued a Notice of Abandonment. The PTO denied plaintiff’s
petition to accept the response as complete, but reset the time period
to respond to the Requirement for Information to three months.
Plaintiff requested reconsideration, which the PTO denied, and the
324
PTO deemed the application abandoned.
Plaintiff filed suit, and
the district court held that plaintiff had abandoned its application by
325
refusing to provide the required information.
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the PTO abused its discretion
by requiring compliance with the Requirement for Information. The
plaintiff argued that the duty of candor embodied in 37 C.F.R. § 1.56
326
controls the requirements of § 1.105.
Thus, the plaintiff argued
that an applicant need not comply with any Requirement for
327
Information that is not material to patentability.
Plaintiff also
argued that it was the applicant, not the examiner, that determines
what information is material to patentability under § 1.56, and
therefore, the PTO cannot require information unless the product of
328
the requirement will require a rejection.
The majority of the
Federal Circuit’s panel disagreed.
The majority noted that § 1.105 allows the PTO to require
329
information that does not directly support a rejection.
Moreover,
the majority noted that the PTO is an agency, and the PTO’s
interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to substantial
deference, and will not be overturned unless plainly erroneous or
330
inconsistent with the regulation. The majority held that the PTO’s
interpretation of § 1.105 was not plainly erroneous or inconsistent.
The majority reasoned that
Such information as may be reasonably necessary to properly
examine or treat the matter,” 37 C.F.R. 1.105(a)(1), contemplates
information relevant to examination either procedurally or
substantively. It includes a zone of information beyond that
defined by section 1.56 as material to patentability, and beyond
that which is directly useful to support a rejection or conclusively
331
decide the issue of patentability.

The majority further reasoned that: (1) the applicant’s duty to
disclose under § 1.56 would render § 1.105 superfluous if it did not
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1411.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1411.
Id. at 1280-81, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1411-12.
Id. at 1281, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1412.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1412.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1412.
Id. at 1281-82, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1412.
Id. at 1282, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1412.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1413.
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empower the PTO to require information from the applicant, (2)
“reasonably necessary to properly examine or treat the matter” is
different language with a different intended meaning than “material
to patentability,” and (3) § 1.105’s plain language contemplates
requirements for information that go beyond information required
332
The majority also rejected plaintiff’s argument that the
by § 1.56.
duty of candor from § 1.56 gives the applicant the power to refuse a
requirement for information under § 1.105. The majority reasoned
that neither section permits the applicant to limit responses under
§ 1.105 to what the applicant believes it might have been required to
333
submit under § 1.56.
Moreover, the majority held the plain
language of § 1.105 “very expressly states that the Office, not the
334
applicant, controls the scope of the requirement.”
The majority also noted that the “real issue” in Star Fruits was
“whether the [PTO] can use section 1.105 to compel disclosure of
information that the examiner deems pertinent to patentability when
335
the applicant has a contrary view of the applicable law.” In holding
that the PTO could do so, the majority stated that the PTO “is clearly
entitled to use section 1.105 to seek information that may support a
rejection. Just as the applicant produces information it deems
pertinent to patentability under section 1.56, the examiner is free to
request information under section 1.105 that the examiner deems
336
pertinent to the issue of patentability.” The majority reasoned that
the dispute involved in Star Fruits “boil[ed] down to a disagreement
between [plaintiff] and the examiner as to the significance of the
information sought to the ultimate question of whether [plaintiff’s]
337
application discloses patentable subject matter.”
The majority
noted that it was “hardly surprising” that an examiner may disagree
338
with the applicant “on the theory or scope of the law to be applied.”
The majority held that in such situations,
So long as the request from the examiner for information is not
arbitrary or capricious, the applicant cannot impede the
examiner’s performance of his duty by refusing to comply with an
information requirement which proceeds from the examiner’s view
of the scope of the law to be applied to the application at hand. To
allow such interference would have the effect of forcing the Office
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1413.
Id. at 1283, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1414.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1414.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1414.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1414.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1414.
Id. at 1284, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1414.
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to make patentability determinations on insufficient facts and
information. Such conduct inefficiently shifts the burden of
obtaining information that the applicant is in the best position to
most cheaply provide onto the shoulders of the Office and risks the
systemic inefficiencies that attend the issue of invalid patents.
Examination under such circumstances is neither fair and
339
equitable to the public nor efficient.

The majority also noted that plaintiff’s argument that the
information sought was not relevant to the examination process
rendered the PTO’s request improper as a “preemptive challenge to
340
the [PTO’s] patentability determination.”
The majority held that
“APA challenges in cases like this are not properly directed to
341
prospective patentability determinations.”
The majority reasoned
that “[a]ssuming the [PTO] intended to enter a rejection under 35
U.S.C. § 102(b), the correctness vel non of that rejection is not
properly challenged by . . . withholding information from the
342
[PTO].”
The majority held that the plaintiff’s proper course of
conduct would have been to “wait a rejection under section 102(b)
and then litigate the propriety of that rejection before the proper
forum for such a complaint, in the first instance, the Board of Patent
343
Appeals and Interferences (“Board”), not the district court.”
The
majority held further that the PTO’s Requirement for Information
was not unreasonable and was within the scope of the regulation,
meaning there was no abuse of discretion or arbitrary or capricious
344
conduct in the PTO’s decision.
Moreover, while the district court
erred if it “deemed itself powerless to review the final action of the
[PTO] deeming [plaintiff’s] application as abandoned,” the majority
noted that the district court’s review under the APA was limited to
“guard[ing] against the possibility of arbitrary or capricious behavior
by examiners in seeking information,” and was not to “enmesh itself
345
in the decision-making process of the examiner.”
The majority
held the Requirement For Information under § 1.105 was not
unreasonable and it affirmed the district court’s decision.
In dissent, Judge Newman noted that the majority failed to address
the issue underlying plaintiff’s dispute with the PTO: whether
foreign sales and use are relevant to patentability in the United
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.

Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1414.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1414.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1414.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1414.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1414.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1414-15.
Id. at 1285, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1415.
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States. Because 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) bars patentability only when an
invention is “in public use or on sale in [the United States] more
than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the
346
United States,” Judge Newman agreed with plaintiff’s argument that
347
the PTO’s Requirement for Information was “contrary to law.”
Judge Newman stated that the majority ignored the APA’s criterion
348
for judicial review of agency decisions that are “contrary to law.”
Judge Newman reasoned that:
Despite its broad power to grant or deny patents, the Patent and
Trademark Office does not have the responsibility, or the
authority, to depart from the law, or to make or change the policy
embodied in the law, or to reinterpret the statute in a way that
departs from congressional intention or judicial interpretation.
Judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act serves to
test agency compliance with statute and precedent. An agency
change of law, particularly a change that was not subjected to
notice-and-comment rulemaking before its implementation, is not
immune from APA review. My colleagues’ rule that the patent
applicant’s only recourse is to comply with the request for
information and undergo full examination to final rejection, with
appeal available only through the PTO Board of Appeals, bypasses
and forecloses APA procedures. When an agency unilaterally
makes a major and far-reaching change in law, the entire
administrative process need not be forced to proceed on the
incorrect law, a process that may consume years, in order to
challenge the change in law. I know of no reason for denying to
the invention community the full scope of APA procedures, now
that the Court has confirmed . . . that the APA applies to the Patent
349
and Trademark Office.
350

In Group One Ltd v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court’s determination that a patent in suit had
been retroactively reinstated. More than a year before the jury’s
verdict in the case, Group One failed to pay the required
351
maintenance fees for one of the patents in suit.
After the jury’s
verdict, but before the trial court issued final judgment, Group One
petitioned the PTO to accept delayed payment of the maintenance

346. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
347. Star Fruits, 393 F.3d at 1286, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1416.
348. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1416.
349. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1416 (citing Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150
(1999)).
350. 407 F.3d 1297, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1759 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
351. Id. at 1306, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1766.
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fee.
The PTO granted the petition before the trial court issued
353
final judgment.
Relying on 35 U.S.C. § 41(c)(1), the Federal Circuit determined
that the patent was properly retroactively rendered enforceable
during the lapse time period when the PTO accepted the late
354
payment.
Hallmark argued that the trial court erred by taking
judicial notice, after the close of evidence, of the patent’s
355
reinstatement.
Federal Rule of Evidence 201(f), however, allows
the court to take judicial notice at any time, as long as it is not
356
unfair. Hallmark did not allege that the taking of judicial notice of
the patent’s reinstatement was unfair in this case, and the Federal
357
Circuit accordingly affirmed the trial court’s decision.
Next, the defendant argued that the terminal disclaimer filed for
the patent was ineffective because it was signed by the applicant and
358
not the assignee.
The governing regulation, 37 C.F.R. § 1.321,
stated that a terminal disclaimer must be signed by the applicant
359
unless there is an assignee of record. The patent had been assigned
360
twice, but neither assignment had been recorded. There being no
assignee of record, the terminal disclaimer was properly signed by the
361
applicant.
362
In In re Kumar, the Federal Circuit vacated a decision of the
363
Board and remanded for further proceedings.
Sujeet Kumar, the
patent applicant, had appealed the Board’s rejection of his patent
application as obvious in view of U.S. Patent No. 5,389,194
364
(hereinafter “the Rostoker patent”).
Kumar appealed to the
Federal Circuit arguing the Board erred procedurally by failing to
allow him to respond to its decision and by refusing to consider
365
evidence submitted in his request for reconsideration.
Kumar’s patent application related to aluminum oxide particles of
366
submicron size. While the Rostoker patent also involved aluminum
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.

Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1766.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1766.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1766.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1766.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1766.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1766.
Id. at 1301, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1762-63.
Id. at 1306, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1766.
Id. at 1307, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1766.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1766.
418 F.3d 1361, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1048 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1363, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1048.
Id. at 1364, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1050.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1050.
Id. at 1363, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1048.
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oxide particles of submicron size, Kumar argued his particles differed
367
To support this argument, Kumar
in particle size distribution.
presented the Board with a declaration by co-inventor Dr. Kambe
attesting to the Rostoker patent’s failure to enable one of ordinary
skill in the field to produce particles of the size or distribution of the
368
particles in Kumar’s application.
The Board rejected this
369
declaration as conclusory and unsupported by evidence.
In its
370
decision, the Board stated it found a prima facie case of obviousness.
In the decision’s appendix, the Federal Circuit included
371
mathematical calculations it conducted supporting its holding. The
372
calculations were not made by the examiner or applicant. Rather,
the Federal Circuit made the calculations sua sponte and presented
373
them for the first time in its decision. Kumar requested the Board’s
reconsideration and included a declaration from Dr. Singh with this
374
Dr. Singh was a professor of Materials Science and
request.
Engineering and his declaration provided evidence supporting
Kumar’s argument that his particles differed from those in the
375
Rostoker patent.
The Board refused to consider Dr. Singh’s
declaration, stating Kumar had this declaration prior to its ruling and
376
thus, the submission was tardy.
Agreeing with Kumar, the Federal Circuit found the Board erred
by its inclusion of calculations that never appeared in prior art, the
377
examination record, or by Kumar.
The Federal Circuit stated,
“[i]nstead of basing its decision on the values directly disclosed by
Rostoker, the Board ‘went off on its own in considering the
378
differences’ between Rostoker and the Kumar invention . . . .”
Because the Board found facts not relied on by the examiner, its
379
decision constituted a new ground of rejection.
Citing In re
380
DeBlauwe and 37 C.F.R. § 1.196(b), the Federal Circuit indicated
that where the Board provides a new ground of rejection, the

367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.

Id. at 1364, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1049.
Id. at 1365, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1050.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1050.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1050.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1049-50.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1049-50.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1049-50.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1050.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1050.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1050.
Id. at 1367, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1051-52.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1051-52.
Id. at 1368, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1052.
736 F.2d 699, 706 n.9, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 191, 203-04 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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381

applicant has a right to respond. Accordingly, the Board erred by
failing to consider Dr. Singh’s declaration, which, although in
existence, was not presented by Kumar during the patent
382
prosecution. The Federal Circuit reasoned that the content of Dr.
Singh’s declaration was not at issue until the Board issued its decision
383
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit
containing new calculations.
vacated the Board’s decision and remanded for further
384
proceedings.
G. Miscellaneous Procedural Issues
385

In Ultra-Precision Manufacturing, Ltd. v. Ford Motor Co., the Federal
Circuit upheld the district court’s summary judgment that plaintiff’s
unjust enrichment claim was preempted by federal patent law. Ford
Motor Company asked Ross Herron and Gary Beard, who formed
Ultra-Precision (the plaintiff), to design a solution to noise, vibration,
386
and harshness problems with its air conditioner compressors.
Herron and Beard designed a solution, patented it, assigned the
patent to Ultra-Precision, and attempted to sell the solution to Ford
387
Motor Company, the defendant.
Negotiations broke down, and
388
Ultra-Precision ultimately did not sell the solution to Ford.
Later, Herron and Beard found a Ford vehicle that they believed
389
Herron and Beard filed suit claiming “unjust
used their solution.
enrichment” under Michigan law, but did not claim patent
390
infringement. The district court raised the issue of preemption sua
sponte, but determined that federal patent law did not preempt the
391
unjust enrichment claim.
Ford later raised the defense of
preemption; the district court held a hearing, and ruled (over UltraPrecision’s objections that the defense had been waived) that the
392
unjust enrichment claim was preempted.
Applying Sixth Circuit law, the Federal Circuit determined that
393
Ford had not waived the preemption defense. The Federal Circuit
explained that “[f]ailure to raise an affirmative defense by responsive
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.

418 F.3d at 1367, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1051.
Id. at 1369, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1053.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1053.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1053.
411 F.3d 1369, U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1371-72, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1066-67.
Id. at 1372-73, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067-68.
Id. at 1373, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067.
Id. at 1374, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1068.
Id.,75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1068.
Id. at 1375, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069.
Id. at 1376, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069-70.
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pleading does not always result in waiver. The purpose of Rule 8(c)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to give the opposing party
394
notice of the affirmative defense and a chance to respond.” In this
case, the district court raised the issue of preemption sua sponte,
allowed the plaintiff a chance to brief the issue, and held oral
395
argument on the issue.
The Federal Circuit concluded that the
district court had not abused its discretion in finding that Ford had
396
not waived the preemption defense.
On the issue of preemption, “[f]ederal law preempts state law that
offers ‘patent-like protection’ to discoveries unprotected under
397
federal patent law.”
The Federal Circuit determined that Ultra
Precision was seeking damages based on Ford’s cost savings gained by
technology disclosed in but not claimed by Ultra Precision’s patents:
Ultra-Precision has insisted throughout this lawsuit that it is
entitled to damages based on cost savings Ford allegedly realized by
“using, manufacturing, and selling vehicles equipped with UltraPrecision’s technology,” despite the fact that the technology that
Ford used was not patented and was publicly disclosed in Plaintiff’s
‘482 and ‘647 patents, such that “one of ordinary skill in the art”
398
could readily glean the concept from Plaintiff’s patents.

According to the Federal Circuit, this was a “royalty-like award,
premised on Ford’s savings from using Ultra-Precision’s technical
information after Ultra-Precision made the discovery available to the
399
public.”
The result of allowing Ultra-Precision’s claim to proceed
would be that “a would-be inventor need not satisfy any of the
rigorous standards of patentability to secure a perpetual patent-like
400
royalty under state law based on the use of an unpatented idea.”
401
In ArthroCare Corp. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., the Federal Circuit
vacated the dismissal of defendant Smith & Nephew’s antitrust
counterclaim. The plaintiff had alleged infringement of its patents,
402
and the defendant responded with the antitrust counterclaim. The
lower court bifurcated the case, trying the patent issues first and the
403
antitrust issues second.
At trial on the patent issues, the jury

394. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070 (quoting Smith v. Sushka, 117 F.3d 965, 969
(6th Cir. 1997)).
395. Id. at 1376, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070.
396. Id. at 1377, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070.
397. Id. at 1377-78, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071.
398. Id. at 1380, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072.
399. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073.
400. Ultra-Precision Mfg., Ltd., 411 F.3d at 1381, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073.
401. 406 F.3d 1365, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
402. Id. at 1367, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1752.
403. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1752.
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determined that the defendant infringed the patents and that those
404
The defendant moved for JMOL and a
patents were not invalid.
new trial, while the plaintiff moved to dismiss the antitrust
405
counterclaim.
Before the defendant had responded to the motion to dismiss, the
trial court stayed all proceedings on the antitrust counterclaim while
406
considering the motion for JMOL or a new trial.
In a
teleconference, in response to a question about the motion to
dismiss, the trial court stated that everything regarding the antitrust
407
counterclaim was stayed, including the motion to dismiss.
The
lower court subsequently denied the motions for JMOL and new trial,
and granted the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the antitrust
408
counterclaim without the defendant’s response.
The defendant
then moved for reconsideration, and the lower court held that
reliance on the teleconference was misplaced and that the written
order only stayed discovery on the antitrust counterclaim, and not
409
the motion to dismiss.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit explained that, in light of the lower
court’s representations during the teleconference, “it was reasonable
for [the defendant] to conclude that the stay order extended to the
proceedings on the motion to dismiss and that it would not be
required to respond to the dismissal motion until the stay was
410
lifted.”
The effect of these events resulted in the lower court
inappropriately granting the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss without
411
giving the defendant’s an opportunity to respond.
Applying Third Circuit law, the Federal Circuit determined that a
categorical rule exists ensuring Smith & Nephew an opportunity to
412
respond.
The lower court’s consideration of the defendant’s
motion for reconsideration did not cure the lower court’s error
because “the district court did not conduct a de novo analysis of the
motion to dismiss, but instead applied the highly restrictive standard
413
The Federal Circuit
applicable to reconsideration motions.”
further instructed the lower court that in the event it found the
404. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1752.
405. Id. at 1367-68, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1752-53.
406. Id. at 1368, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1753.
407. Id. at 1368-69, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1753.
408. Id. at 1368, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1753.
409. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1753.
410. Id. at 1369, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1753.
411. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1753.
412. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1753 (citing Dougherty v. Harper’s Magazine
Co., 537 F.2d 758, 761 (3d Cir. 1976)).
413. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1753 (emphasis added).
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defendant’s counterclaim if not sufficiently specific, it could only
dismiss the counterclaim “the complainant is unable or unwilling to
414
amend the complaint.”
415
In Electronics for Imaging, Inc. v. Coyle, the plaintiff and the
defendant had been involved in negotiations in which the defendant
offered to license to the plaintiff printing technology for which the
416
defendant had filed patent applications that were pending.
The
defendant had informed the plaintiff that it expected the PTO to
issue a patent, and that it would sue the plaintiff and its customers if
417
the plaintiff did not agree to a license.
The defendant also
identified specific law firms and attorneys in making its litigation
threats, and issued ultimatums including deadlines by which
defendant would initiate litigation if the plaintiff refused to agree to a
418
deal.
The plaintiff then sued the defendant in a declaratory
judgment action, seeking a declaratory judgment that it did not
breach two non-disclosure agreements and that it did not
419
misappropriate the defendant’s trade secrets.
Upon issuance of the patent to the defendant, the plaintiff
amended its complaint to assert non-infringement and invalidity of
420
the patent.
The defendant filed motions to dismiss for “lack of
personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and failure to comport with
421
the objectives of the Declaratory Judgment Act.” The district court
initially dismissed on grounds of lack of personal jurisdiction, and the
422
Federal Circuit reversed the dismissal.
On remand, the district court determined that the plaintiff did not
have any uncertainty about the defendant’s intention to sue, or about
423
the strength of its legal position. As a result, the district court held
that the declaratory suit did not serve the purposes of the Declaratory
Judgment Act and that the suit was merely anticipatory and designed
to preempt the defendant’s suit and secure the plaintiff’s choice of
424
forum.

414. Id. at 1370, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1753-54.
415. 394 F.3d 1341, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d 1528 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
416. Id. at 1343-44, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1529.
417. Id. at 1344, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1529.
418. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1529.
419. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1530.
420. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1530.
421. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1530.
422. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1530; see also Elecs. for Imaging, Inc. v. Coyle, 340 F.3d
1344, 1351, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d 1940, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (remanding the case to
district court).
423. 406 F.3d at 1344, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1530.
424. Id. at 1345, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1530.
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On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that the district court has
discretion to exercise jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment
425
Act, but that the court must have “well-founded reasons for
426
declining to entertain a declaratory judgment action.” The Federal
Circuit also held that the “question whether to accept or decline
jurisdiction in an action for a declaration of patent rights . . . impacts
this court’s mandate to promote national uniformity in patent
427
practice.”
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit applied its own law in
428
The Federal Circuit reversed the decision of
deciding the appeal.
the district court, finding that the district court “erred as a matter of
law when it held that [the plaintiff] suffered no uncertainty of the
429
kind recognized by the Declaratory Judgment Act.”
The Federal
Circuit explained that the district court incorrectly interpreted the
term “uncertainty” as used in the Declaratory Judgment Act.
Recognizing that litigation is “rarely ‘certain,’” the court instead
defined “uncertainty” to mean “the reasonable apprehension created
by a patentee’s threats and the looming specter of litigation that
430
results from those threats.”
The Federal Circuit also dismissed the defendant’s argument that
the district court properly dismissed the plaintiff’s lawsuit as
431
“anticipatory.”
The Federal Circuit applied the “general rule
favoring the forum of the first-filed case, ‘unless considerations of
judicial and litigant economy, and the just and effective disposition of
432
disputes, requires otherwise.’”
The Federal Circuit also reasoned
that it had endorsed the anticipatory nature of a declaratory action as
“merely one factor in the analysis” of whether to dismiss a declaratory
433
action.
Because the defendant offered evidence of no “other
factors” favoring dismissal, such as “convenience and availability of
witnesses, . . . absence of jurisdiction over all necessary . . . parties, or
the possibility of consolidation” with other actions, the Federal
Circuit held that the first to file rule should apply, and it reversed the
434
district court’s dismissal of the declaratory judgment action.
425. 28 U.S.C. § 2001 (2000).
426. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 394 F.3d at 1345, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1530 (quoting Capo,
Inc. v. Dioptics Med. Prods., 387 F.3d 1352, 1355, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d 1051, 1053 (Fed.
Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
427. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1531.
428. Id. at 1345-46, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1531.
429. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1531.
430. Id. at 1346-47, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1531-32 (citation omitted).
431. Id. at 1347, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1532.
432. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1532 (quoting Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
998 F.2d 931, 938, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
433. Id. at 1347-48, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1532.
434. Id. at 1348, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1532-33 (quoting Genentech, 998 F.2d at
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The Federal Circuit also considered the district court’s sua sponte
dismissal of a purported counterclaim-in-reply in Rates Technology, Inc.
435
During the pre-trial period, the plaintiff
v. Nortel Networks Corp.
attached a “purported counterclaim-in-reply”—naming both the
original defendant and its subsidiary as defendants—to a
supplemental opposition to the original defendant’s motion to
436
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
However, the plaintiff did not serve its supplemental opposition or
the counterclaim-in-reply upon the non-party subsidiary at all, and it
did not serve the supplemental opposition or counterclaim-in-reply
upon the original defendant until four months after the district
437
court’s deadline for joinder of additional parties. The district court
438
dismissed the counterclaim-in-reply.
The Federal Circuit affirmed
the district court’s dismissal, rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that
sua sponte dismissal of the counterclaim was improper under FRCP
4(m) and because the plaintiff had 120 days to serve the non-party
439
subsidiary. The court decided that it need not reach the appellant’s
arguments, because “[t]he proper course of conduct for [the
plaintiff] would have been to seek leave of the district court to join
[the non-party subsidiary] as a defendant to the suit prior to the []
cutoff,” and the “so-called counterclaim against [the non-party
440
subsidiary] was improper as filed without leave of court.”
The
Federal Circuit held that the lower court did not abuse its discretion
441
when it dismissed the counterclaim-in-reply.
442
Lisle Corp. v. A.J. Manufacturing Co. involved an appeal from a
denial of summary judgment of patent invalidity on the grounds of
indefiniteness and impossibility under United States Patent Code
443
§§ 101 and 112. The plaintiff urged the Federal Circuit to decline
consideration of this appeal, because the defendant had allegedly
444
The Federal
waived these defenses in the final pretrial order.
Circuit agreed that the defendant had waived the defenses, as the
938, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1244).
435. 399 F.3d 1302, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1904 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 125 S.
Ct. 2981 (2005) (mem.).
436. Id. at 1305, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1906; see also supra Part I.C (elaborating
on the personal jurisdiction issues in Rates Technology).
437. Rates Tech., 399 F.3d at 1305-06, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1906.
438. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1906.
439. Id. at 1309-10 & n.8, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1909-10 & n.8.
440. Id. at 1309-10, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1909.
441. Id. at 1310, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1909.
442. 398 F.3d 1306, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1891 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
443. Id. at 1317, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1897 (citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 112
(2000)).
444. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1897-98.
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defendant had failed to pursue the defenses at trial, failed to ask the
district court to dismiss the defenses with prejudice, and, “in the
[f]inal [p]retrial [o]rder, merely reserved the right to appeal the
§§ 101 and 112 defenses contingent on this court’s adopting [the
defendant’s] proposed construction of the ‘detachably cooperative’
445
Because the Federal Circuit rejected the defendant’s
limitation.”
proposed construction, the court concluded that the defendant
446
waived its indefiniteness and impossibility defenses.
447
In Israel Bio-Engineering Project v. Amgen Inc., two parties appealed
a district court’s denial of their motion to intervene as defendants in
448
a patent infringement case.
The Federal Circuit did not describe
the relationship of the two parties to the litigation. Rather, the
Federal Circuit summarily overturned the district court’s decision
prohibiting intervention where the parties “had an interest relating to
the intellectual property that is the subject of the current litigation,”
the “disposition of [the] litigation may impair or impede the []
parties’ ability to protect [their] interest,” and the parties intended to
assert a laches defense and a contract defense that were personal to
449
the parties and could not be represented by any named defendant.
450
In Schreiber Foods, Inc. v. Beatrice Cheese, Inc., the plaintiff sued the
defendants for infringement of a patent relating to machinery and
451
methods for packaging food products.
At the time the plaintiff
initiated the suit, the plaintiff was the owner of the asserted patent;
during the litigation, however, the plaintiff assigned the patent and
the rights to all causes of action for infringement of the patent to its
452
subsidiary to avoid state income taxes. The subsidiary did not join
the action, and the plaintiff did not inform the defendants or the
453
district court of the assignment. During discovery the plaintiff did
not turn over documents relating to the assignment although the
454
plaintiff was responsive to the defendants’ requests. Further, one of
the plaintiff’s directors who had approved of the assignment testified
at trial that the plaintiff had owned the asserted patent since its
455
issuance from the PTO.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.

Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1898.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1898.
401 F.3d 1299, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1198 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1306, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204.
402 F.3d 1198, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1200, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1206.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1206.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1206.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1206.
Id. at 1201, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1206.
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The jury returned a special verdict finding the patent valid and
infringed, calculating total damages at approximately $26 million for
456
the infringement of two separate patents at issue in the trial. After
the verdict, while the defendants’ motion for JMOL remained
pending, the plaintiff’s counsel became aware of the assignment of
457
the patent. The plaintiff’s counsel concluded that at that point in
the litigation process no legal or ethical obligation to disclose the
458
assignment existed.
The plaintiff did, however, reacquire the
459
patent and all associated causes of action. The defendants’ motion
for JMOL was granted, but the Federal Circuit reversed on appeal,
reinstating the jury’s verdict and ordering the defendants to pay
460
approximately $15 million in damages.
One of the defendants eventually learned of the patent’s
assignment and moved to vacate the judgment pursuant to FRCP
461
60(b). The district court granted the motion, holding that the
plaintiff’s lack of ownership during the litigation deprived the
plaintiff of standing, rendering the suit moot and the judgment
462
void.
The district court also found that the plaintiff’s conduct
during litigation “constituted fraud, misrepresentation or misconduct
463
that would warrant relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(3)” and
that the assignment was “newly discovered evidence that would
464
warrant relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(2).”
On appeal, the Federal Circuit considered “whether a judgment is
void when there is a temporary transfer of the patent in suit to a nonparty, which temporarily deprives the court of jurisdiction, even
though the plaintiff owned the patent at the commencement of the
465
suit and at the time of judgment.” Applying Federal Circuit law, the
466
court decided that the judgment was not void. Contrasting this case
456. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1206.
457. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1206.
458. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1206.
459. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1206.
460. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1206-07.
461. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1207. Footnote 2 notes that FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)
permits relief from final judgment when new evidence arises following the judgment,
regardless of whether the new evidence was genuinely undiscoverable prior to
judgment or improperly concealed by the opposing party, or when a judgment is
otherwise void.
462. Id. at 1201-02, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1207.
463. Id. at 1202, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1207 (citing Schreiber Foods, Inc. v.
Beatrice Cheese, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 2d 939, 958-61 (E.D. Wis. 2004)).
464. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1207 (citing Schreiber Foods, Inc. v. Beatrice
Cheese, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 2d 939, 961 (E.D. Wis 2004).
465. Id. at 1203, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1208.
466. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1208 (citing Boryhill Furniture Indus., Inc. v.
Craftmaster Furniture Corp., 12 F.3d 1080, 1082-84, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d 1283, 1284-86
(Fed. Cir. 1993).
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to those in which the original plaintiff lacked initial Article III
467
standing, the Federal Circuit emphasized that the plaintiff had
constitutional standing at the commencement of the lawsuit, and, in
accordance with the Supreme Court’s holding in Caterpillar Inc. v.
468
Lewis, the plaintiff could correct a temporary lapse in standing so
469
Here,
long as the correction occurred prior to final judgment.
though the patent was reassigned to the plaintiff after the trial
completed, the patent was nonetheless reassigned “before the entry
470
of judgment and thus the judgment was not void.”
Although the Federal Circuit disagreed with the district court’s
holding that the judgment should be vacated under Rule 60(b)(4)
for lack of jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit agreed that the judgment
should be vacated under Rule 60(b)(3) due to misconduct during
471
litigation.
The Federal Circuit found that once the plaintiff’s
counsel discovered that a witness had made “highly material false
statements” in court documents, and that other “highly material
documents” had not been produced, the plaintiff and his counsel
472
“were under an obligation to promptly correct the record.”
The Federal Circuit further rejected the plaintiff’s argument that
vacating the entire judgment was inappropriate to the extent that the
plaintiff “removed the effects of tangible prejudice” to the defendant
473
by waiving claims to monetary damages on appeal.
The Seventh
Circuit, the court noted, “has held that a new trial on all issues may
474
be granted as a form of sanction for attorney misconduct.”
The court also rejected the defendant’s request that, in addition to
475
vacating the judgment, the court dismiss the case with prejudice.
The court noted that the Seventh Circuit viewed dismissal as a
“draconian” sanction, specifically requiring a dismissal with prejudice
to be backed by findings, on the record, as to why lesser remedies are
476
insufficient.
In this case, such findings were unnecessary: the
defendant effectively waived the possibility of dismissal by failing to

467. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1208.
468. See 519 U.S. 61, 73 (1996) (permitting parties to cure most jurisdictional
defects at any time before the court enters final judgment in the case).
469. Schreiber Foods, 402 F.3d at 1203-04, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1208.
470. Id. at 1204, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1209.
471. Id. at 1204-06, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1209-10.
472. Id. at 1205, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1209.
473. Id. at 1206, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1210.
474. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1210 (citing Petrilli v. Drechsel, 94 F.3d 325, 330
(7th Cir. 1996)).
475. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1210.
476. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1210.
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request dismissal in its motion to vacate judgment under Rule
477
60(b)(3).
478
In Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., the defendant crossappealed the lower court’s finding that its PowerScript RT product
infringed four claims of the plaintiff’s patent, as well as the lower
479
court’s grant of partial summary judgment.
On appeal, the
defendant, Clontech, made several arguments. It argued the lower
court erred by failing to construct the plaintiff’s claims using the test
results of a solubilization assay, which is the method the defendant
480
used in developing its product.
Additionally, it argued that the
lower court erred in its grant of partial summary judgment on the
481
issue of infringement, as it ignored two issues of fact.
Clontech argued partial summary judgment was improper when
discrepancies existed between its expert, Dr. Falkinham, and the
plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Champoux, regarding interpretation of gel
482
assays. The lower court found that Dr. Champoux’s explanation of
how gel assays worked was consistent with the plaintiff’s patent
specification, as well as a 1996 article by scientists Blain and Goff who
483
had done considerable research on RNase activity. Dr. Falkinham’s
theory differed considerably and the lower court found that Dr.
Falkinham did not provide any explanation or evidence for his
484
theory.
Therefore, the lower court held his “assertions [did] not
485
The Federal Circuit
rise to the level of genuine issues of fact[.]”
agreed, stating “no reasonable juror could find for Clontech based on
486
Falkinham’s speculative difference of opinion.”
Moreover, “[a]
party does not manufacture more than a merely colorable dispute
simply by submitting an expert declaration asserting that something
is black when the moving party’s expert says it is white; there must be
487
some foundation or basis for the opinion.”
The Federal Circuit also rejected the defendant’s argument that a
second genuine issue of fact existed which should have precluded the
488
lower court from granting partial summary judgment.
In 1993, a

477.
478.
479.
480.
481.
482.
483.
484.
485.
486.
487.
488.

Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1210.
429 F.3d 1052, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1074, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1176.
Id. at 1076, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1178.
Id. at 1079, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1180.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1180.
Id. at 1079-80, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1180.
Id. at 1080, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1181.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1181 (quotation omitted).
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1181.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1181.
Id. at 1081, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1181.
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published article provided RNase H studies involving a mutant RT—
489
the same mutant RT from which the defendant derived its product.
490
The 1993 article showed that the RT had some RNase H activity.
The defendant argued that because its product was a derivative of this
491
RT, its product could not possibly infringe on the plaintiff’s claims.
Thus, the lower court’s determination that this article did not create
492
a genuine issue was in error.
Reasoning that the 1996 article by
Blain and Goff revised and corrected the 1993 article, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the lower court’s finding that the 1993 article did
493
not create a genuine issue of fact.
494
In Dorel Juvenile Group, Inc. v. Graco Children’s Products, Inc., the
Federal Circuit vacated the lower court’s grant of summary judgment
to the defendant, Graco Children’s Products, Inc. (“Graco”) and
495
remanded for further fact finding.
In the lower court’s
proceedings, the plaintiff brought suit against the defendant for
496
literal infringement of two of its patents involving a child’s car seat.
Under the lower court’s interpretation of the relevant claim terms, it
found no literal infringement and granted summary judgment to the
497
498
defendant. Reviewing the claim terms independently, the Federal
Circuit found that an issue of fact existed as to whether the
499
defendant’s product literally infringed on the plaintiff’s patents.
The plaintiff’s two patents-at-issue involved a child seat that
consisted of two parts, a seat and base, from which the seat could
500
easily be removed.
The defendant’s product also involved a twopart seat, however, the two parts were “firmly held together with
[one-way] screws,” and the one-way screws were only removable with a
501
special type of screwdriver.
The lower court reviewed the claim
language and found that the claim language of the plaintiff’s patents
did not require or consider the “ease” of detachment of the seat from

489. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1181.
490. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1181.
491. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1181.
492. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1181.
493. See id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1181 (“[T]he 1996 article reports that—when
problems with the . . . 1993 [article] are corrected, and using gels corresponding to
those described in the [plaintiff’s] patent . . . and used in the [plaintiff’s] assay—[the
mutant RT] showed no RNase H activity.”).
494. 429 F.3d 1043, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
495. Id. at 1044, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092.
496. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092.
497. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092.
498. Id. at 1045-46, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092 (citation omitted).
499. Id. at 1047, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1093.
500. Id. at 1044-45, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1091.
501. Id. at 1045, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1091.
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502

the base.
The claim language did, however, require that the seat
and base be “affixed together in a manner that contemplates that the
seat may be removed from the base such that the seat remains
503
functional.”
Because of the one-way screws that the defendant’s
product required and the special type of screwdriver needed to
remove the screws, the lower court found that the defendant’s
504
product did not consist of two parts, but was an “integrated unit.”
Because the lower court found that the defendant’s product did not
consist of two stand-alone structures, it found that the defendant’s
product did not literally infringe on the plaintiff’s patents that
contemplated a product where the seat remained functional when
505
separate from the base.
The Federal Circuit disagreed with the lower court’s interpretation
that the defendant’s product could not literally infringe on the
506
plaintiff’s patents because its seat and base were integral.
Specifically, the Federal Circuit found that the lower court “invaded
the province of the finder of fact” by deciding that the defendant’s
product was integrated—a fact that should have been determined by
507
a jury.
Given that there remained a question of fact, the Federal
Circuit vacated the summary judgment grant and remanded the case
508
back to the lower court.
II. PATENTABILITY AND VALIDITY
A. 35 U.S.C. § 101
509

In In re Fisher, the appellant, Dane K. Fisher and Raghunath
Lalgudi, appealed the decision of the Board that affirmed the
examiner’s final rejection of their patent application. The PTO
found the claimed patent unpatentable for lack of utility under 35
U.S.C. § 101 and a lack of enablement under 35 U.S.C. § 112. The
patent claimed an invention that related to five purified nucleic acid
sequences that encoded proteins and protein fragments in maize
plants. These claimed nucleic acid sequences “are commonly
510
referred to as ‘expressed sequence tags’ or ‘ESTs.’”

502.
503.
504.
505.
506.
507.
508.
509.
510.

Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092 (quotation marks omitted).
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092.
Id. at 1047, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1093.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1093.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1093.
421 F.3d 1365, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1367, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1226.
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Fisher claimed that “the Board unilaterally applied a heightened
standard for utility in the case of ESTs, conditioning patentability
upon ‘some undefined ‘spectrum’ of knowledge concerning the
511
corresponding gene function.’”
Chief Judge Michel begins his
opinion by establishing the historic standard which the court applies
to determine whether the patent utility requirement under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 has been satisfied. The court held that the to show utility the
application must have (1) a “substantial” utility, and (2) a “specific”
512
utility.
The court defines “substantial” utility as “an asserted use [that
shows] that [the] claimed invention has significant and presently
513
available benefit to the public.”
To show “specific” utility, “an
application must disclose a use which is not so vague as to be
514
meaningless.” The court held that this standard is embodied in the
515
Analyzing the Board’s
PTO’s Utility Examination Guidelines.
review of Fisher’s patent application, the court held that the Board
properly reviewed the application, and that the Utility Requirement
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 was not satisfied.
A consequence of failing to meet the Utility Requirement is that
the application fails to satisfy the Enablement Requirement of 35
U.S.C. § 112. Section 112 incorporates the utility requirement of
516
§ 101.
As a result, the count affirmed the Board’s decision that
affirmed the final rejection of the patent application.
In dissent, Judge Rader contends that the ESTs have utility as
517
research tools. Rader contends that if the “ESTs qualify as research
tools, then they have a ‘specific’ and ‘substantial’ utility sufficient for
518
Rader argues that they are “more akin to research tools
§ 101.”
519
than [] unpatentable methods.” In Brenner v. Manson, the Supreme
Court hold that a method for “producing compounds with no known
520
Rader contends that
use” did not satisfy the Utility Requirement.
the ESTs are analogous to a microscope because it takes the
researcher one step closer to finding his or answer. Rader notes that
Patent Office faces a dilemma in that it needs to reject applications
that might advance the “useful arts” but are not deserving of patent
511.
512.
513.
514.
515.
516.
517.
518.
519.
520.

Id. at 1369, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1228.
Id. at 1371, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230.
66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001).
Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1378, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235.
Id. at 1379, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1236.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1236.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1236.
383 U.S. 519, 530 (1966).
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521

protection.
Rader states that the Utility Requirement is poorly
suited to solve this problem and that the Obviousness Requirement
522
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is more appropriate.
B. 35 U.S.C. § 102
1. Anticipation
523
Perricone v. Medicis Pharmaceutical Corp. involved an appeal from a
district court’s grant of summary judgment that claims for treating
524
skin sunburn were invalid as anticipated. The plaintiff first argued
that the disputed prior art reference was not anticipatory because it
disclosed a claimed ingredient among a laundry list of other potential
525
ingredients. The Federal Circuit “reject[ed] the notion that one of
these ingredients cannot anticipate because it appears without special
emphasis in a longer list. To the contrary, the disclosure is prior art
526
to the extent of its enabling disclosure.”
Addressing the plaintiff’s argument that a disclosure of broad
genus does not necessarily nor specifically disclose a species within
that genus, the Federal Circuit reasoned that “[i]n this case, the prior
art does not merely disclose a genus of skin benefit ingredients
without disclosing the particular claimed ingredient. Rather [the
527
prior art reference] specifically discloses ascorbyl palmitate.”
Consequently, the Federal Circuit held “[t]hat specific disclosure,
even in a list, makes this case different from cases involving disclosure
of a broad genus without reference to the potentially anticipating
528
species.”
529
In ArthroCare Corp. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., the Federal Circuit
held that a patent in suit was anticipated, reversing the trial court’s
530
JMOL upholding a jury verdict.
The patent was directed to
controlling the electrical path in conductive fluids for electrosurgical
531
probes. ArthroCare argued that there was a distinction between a
521. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1381-82, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1238.
522. Id. at 1382, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1238.
523. 432 F.3d 1368, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
524. Id. at 1371, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323.
525. Id. at 1376, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326.
526. See id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326 (“The anticipation analysis asks solely
whether the prior art reference discloses and enables the claimed invention, and not
how the prior art characterizes that disclosure or whether alternatives are also
disclosed.”) (citing Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Mustek Sys., Inc., 340 F.3d 1314, 1324 n.6,
67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1825, 1832 n.6).
527. Id. at 1377, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326.
528. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326.
529. 406 F.3d 1365, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
530. Id. at 1367-68, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1752.
531. Id. at 1367, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751-52.
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fluid that provides electrical conductance and “an electrically
532
Particularly, someone of skill in the art would
conductive fluid.”
only consider some fluids “electrically conductive” and this
533
distinction formed a basis for distinguishing the prior art.
The
Federal Circuit disagreed and instead determined that both the
patent in suit and a prior art patent “recite a fluid that provides a
path for the electrical current between the electrodes of the
534
electrosurgical devices.”
The lower court had reasoned that the prior art patent did not
disclose an electrically conducting fluid because it did not list certain
535
examples of electrically conducing fluid.
However, that was error
because “there is no requirement that an anticipating reference must
provide specific examples; rather, the reference need only be
enabling and describe the applicant’s claimed invention sufficiently
to have placed it in possession of a person of ordinary skill in the field
536
of the invention.” The district court also improperly focused on a
single embodiment of the prior art patent, when there were other
537
embodiments that could show an electrically conducting fluid.
Therefore, the Federal Circuit held that “it was error for the district
court to limit the disclosure of the prior art reference to a preferred
538
embodiment.”
The district court also concluded that a prior art article did not
539
teach an electrically conductive fluid.
The prior art article
described both a monopolar electrosurgical procedure that would
likely not use an electrically conducting fluid and a bipolar
540
procedure that would use such a fluid.
The district court had
concluded, based on the article’s description of the fluid as an
“irrigation liquid” for both monopolar and bipolar procedures, that
541
the fluid in both procedures must be non-conducting. The Federal
Circuit, on the other hand, concluded that the article “describes the
liquid as providing a path for the current, thus serving as a
542
conducting fluid.”

532.
533.
534.
535.
536.
537.
538.
539.
540.
541.
542.

Id. at 1371, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1754.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1754.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1754.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1755.
Id. at 1371-72, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1755 (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 1372, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1755.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1755.
Id. at 1371-72, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1755.
Id. at 1372, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1755.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1755.
Id. at 1372-73, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1756.
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ArthroCare also asserted that the prior art references did not teach
a “connector near the proximal end,” arguing that the jury could
have concluded that a wire (disclosed in the prior art) was not a
543
connector.
The Federal Circuit disagreed, concluding that the
district court’s construction of connector as a “structure” that
electrically links the electrodes and the power supply, which was not
challenged by ArthroCare, “easily encompasses a wire between the
544
electrodes and the power supply.”
Regarding the prior art article,
ArthroCare limited its arguments to contesting the veracity of Smith
545
& Nephew’s expert. The Federal Circuit, however, concluded that
546
the article itself disclosed a connector.
547
In Seachange International, Inc. v. C-COR Inc., the Federal Circuit
revisited the lower court’s denial of JMOL of anticipation in light of
548
its construction of certain claim elements.
“When [the Federal
Circuit] determine[s] on appeal that a trial judge has misinterpreted
a patent claim, [it] independently construe[s] the claim to determine
its correct meaning, and then determine[s] if the facts presented at
549
trial can support the judgment as a matter of law.” On appeal, the
Federal Circuit narrowed the claim construction of one limitation
550
and broadened the construction of two other limitations.
In
particular, the Federal Circuit explained:
If [the broadened limitations] were the only limitations at issue
and C-COR were properly entitled to JMOL of anticipation under
the district court’s narrower construction, [the Federal Circuit’s]
broader construction of those limitations would not change the
outcome. However, [the Federal Circuit] ha[d] more narrowly
construed the “network for data communications” limitation to
cover only point-to-point interconnections. If the jury was not

543. Id. at 1373, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1756.
544. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1756.
545. Id. at 1374, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1757.
546. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1757.
547. 413 F.3d 1361, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
548. See id. at 1365, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386 (concluding that the district
court incorrectly construed the limitations “network for data communications,”
“distributed computer system,” and “processor systems” and that C-COR did not
infringe as a matter of law).
549. Id. at 1379, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1397.
550. See id. at 1375-77, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1394-96 (finding that the term
“network for data communications” is “limited to networks in which every processor
system is connected to every other processor system via direct, point-to-point channel
interconnections,” that the term “distributed computer system” ordinarily means “a
computer system in which several interconnected computers share computing tasks,”
and that “processor systems” must have a CPU but do not need to be “capable of
running application-type software”).
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presented with any evidence that the references disclosed point-to551
point interconnections, JMOL would be precluded.

The Federal Circuit concluded that “[t]he district court’s opinion
does not discuss the details of the evidence before the jury on the
‘network for data communications’ limitation, nor do the parties in
their briefs in this appeal elucidate the evidence presented to the jury
552
to establish that this limitation was disclosed.”
Addressing the trial court’s determination that the “processor
systems” limitation was not met by the Gardner reference, the Federal
Circuit stated that it was enough to find disclosure in the text of the
553
reference.
“To be anticipating, Gardner need not disclose a
separate figure depicting a plurality of machines with the combined
media client and media server; disclosing the embodiment in textual
554
form is enough.”
Moreover, “[t]he fact that another embodiment
555
is disclosed does not detract from the remainder of the disclosure.”
The Federal Circuit also characterized Seachange’s argument that
“Gardner teaches away from a computer with a combined media
client and media server” as “misplaced,” explaining that “[t]eaching
556
away is irrelevant to anticipation.”
Because the Federal Circuit broadened the constructions of two
terms, and because there was insufficient discussion in the record to
address anticipation in light of the narrowed construction of a third
claim term, the Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s denial of
JMOL and remanded the issue for reconsideration by the district
557
court. The Federal Circuit instructed that:
If the district court determines that, on the basis of clear and
convincing evidence in the record presented to the jury, no
reasonable juror could not find anticipation based on Gardner, the
district court should grant JMOL to C-COR on that ground. If not,
558
JMOL based on Gardner should be denied.

In the alternative, the Federal Circuit also granted C-COR a new
trial on the issue of anticipation. The Federal Circuit explained that
“[a]n erroneous instruction on claim interpretation that affects the
559
jury’s decision on anticipation is grounds for a new trial.”
“For
prejudicial error to exist, there must have been sufficient evidence
551.
552.
553.
554.
555.
556.
557.
558.
559.

Id. at 1379, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1397 (internal citations omitted).
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1397.
Id. at 1380, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1397-98.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1398.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1398.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1398.
Id. at 1381, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1398.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1398.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1399.
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proffered below to support anticipation under a correct
560
The district court had explained in its denial of
construction.”
JMOL that if the Federal Circuit decided that C-COR’s claim
construction was correct, then C-COR would be entitled to a new
561
trial. Determining that the trial court would have considered such
error prejudicial, the Federal Circuit remanded the issue of
anticipation for a new trial in the event that the district court did not
562
grant C-COR’s motion for JMOL on anticipation.
563
In Northpoint Technology, Ltd. v. MDS Am., Inc., the Federal Circuit
affirmed a district court’s denial of JMOL, agreeing that substantial
evidence supported the jury’s finding that the asserted claims were
anticipated. The claims at issue asserted receiving a broadcast signal
from a satellite and receiving a terrestrial broadcast signal (e.g., local
television channels) on the same frequency by using an antenna that
receives the terrestrial broadcast signal “outside of the directional
reception range of the first antenna positioned to receive direct
564
broadcast satellite signals from the satellite.”
The district court
construed the term “directional reception range” to mean a “threedimensional space about the centerline of a receiving antenna within
which a usable signal can be received, a usable signal being a signal
565
from which the information carried by it can be extracted.”
The
Federal Circuit interpreted this construction to mean “the threedimensional space in which the antenna could receive a usable signal,
and not solely with reference to the physical positioning of the
566
antenna.”
The prior art reference, the Hult reference, described electronic
canceling rather than the physical positioning of the antennas to
receive both signals broadcast on the same frequency without
567
interference.
Based on its understanding of the district court’s
claim construction, which was not challenged by Northpoint, the
Federal Circuit explained that:
Far from teaching away from the claims of the ‘605 and ‘878
patents, as Northpoint argues, the Hult reference describes an
antenna in which the directional reception range is generated by
creating areas of high gain in certain directions from the antenna

560.
561.
562.
563.
564.
565.
566.
567.

Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1399.
Id. at 1366, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387.
Id. at 1381-82, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1399.
413 F.3d 1301, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1303-04, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1246-47.
Id. at 1306, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1248.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1248.
Id. at 1307, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1248-49.
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and areas of little or no gain in other directions. The terrestrial
signal in Hult is outside the directional reception range of the
satellite receiver because there is a null in the gain of the satellite
receiving antenna in the direction of the terrestrial transmitter,
which prevents the satellite antenna and receiver from receiving a
signal from the terrestrial transmitter from which usable
568
information can be extracted.

The Federal Circuit noted that both experts agreed on the
teaching of the Hult reference, and that:
The Hult reference and the expert testimony regarding it made
clear that the unwanted signal in Hult is outside the directional
reception range of the antenna as that term is used in the ‘605 and
‘878 patents. Accordingly, there was substantial evidence from
which a jury could find that the Hult reference taught the separate
“directional reception ranges” recited by Northpoint’s patents and
569
therefore anticipated the asserted claims.

Northpoint argued that it was entitled to a new trial because the
defendant relied upon five prior art references, and, Northpoint
contended, each of those references constituted a separate legal
theory of anticipation, and that a failure of proof with respect to any
570
of the five references was sufficient for a grant of a new trial. The
Federal Circuit disagreed, stating that “the five prior art references
offered to prove anticipation in this case did not represent separate
legal theories, but instead simply provided separate factual bases for
the jury to consider with regard to the single legal theory of
anticipation” and further explaining that:
It is not necessary for every possible factual basis for liability to be
independently sufficient in order for the evidence to be sufficient
to support a jury verdict. A failure of proof with respect to any
single item of evidence does not justify a grant of either JMOL or a
new trial; even if some of the proposed factual grounds for liability

568. Id. at 1307-08, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1249.
569. Id. at 1308, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1249. Judge Dyk, in his dissent, argued
that:
[the district court’s] claim construction, referring to a “three-dimensional
space about the centerline of a receiving antenna within which a usable
signal can be received,” in my view clearly requires that the patented device
achieve non-interference as a result of the geographic orientation of the two
antennas so that each is outside the range of the unwanted signal due to the
limitation of the antennas. The majority effectively rejects the district court’s
claim construction and construes the claims so that geographic separation is
unnecessary, and the claims are satisfied if the unwanted signal is not
received through electronic canceling of the unwanted signal rather than
physical pointing.
Id. at 1315, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1255 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
570. Id. at 1311, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1252.
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are not legally sufficient to support a verdict, that is not fatal,
because the critical question is whether the evidence, taken as a
571
whole, was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict.

The Federal Circuit continued, explaining that the sufficiency of
the evidence with respect to at least one of the prior art references
supported the jury’s verdict of anticipation:
In the context of this case, the question is whether the evidence as
a whole was sufficient to enable a reasonable jury to conclude, by
clear and convincing evidence, that the asserted claims of the ‘605
and ‘878 patents were anticipated. The inadequacy of any
particular item of evidence to establish anticipation, such as the
failure of any particular reference to contain all the limitations of
the asserted claims, would not undermine the verdict as a legal
matter. In this case, the evidence with respect to at least one of the
prior art references was sufficient to prove anticipation of the
572
asserted claims.
573

In Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. Polypap, S.A.R.L., the Federal Circuit,
concluding that the district court erred in its claim construction,
reversed that court’s judgment that Prima Tek’s patents were not
invalid as anticipated. The asserted claims of the patents were
directed to “an assembly and method for displaying a floral
574
grouping.”
The primary prior art reference that anticipated the
asserted claims was a French patent granted to one of the defendants,
and was before the examiner during the prosecution of the patents in
575
suit.
The Federal Circuit first considered the meaning of the claim term
“pot means,” which the district court construed as “a closed bottom
576
receptacle such as a flower pot, vase, etc.” The claims required an
577
The Federal Circuit consulted a
absence of a “pot means.”
dictionary, and determined that the ordinary meaning of “pot” was a
“rounded metal or earthen container of varying size used for
578
domestic purposes.”
“The specifications do not define pot means
579
other than to give the example of a flower pot.”
The prior art
reference disclosed “wire or string tied around . . . moss” and did not

571. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1252.
572. Id. at 1312, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1252-53.
573. 412 F.3d 1284, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
574. Id. at 1286, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1221.
575. Id. at 1287, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1222.
576. Id. at 1288, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1222.
577. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1222.
578. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1223 (citing Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary
1774 (2002)).
579. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1222.
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use a metal or earthenware container, and thus satisfied the
580
limitation of an absence of a “pot means.”
The Federal Circuit also addressed the claim limitation “floral
581
holding material,” which the Federal Circuit had construed in a
582
previous appeal. The district court, after the appeal, construed this
limitation to require that the floral holding material be capable of
583
holding its predetermined shape.
The Federal Circuit explained
that the language in the specification relied upon by the district
court:
Which appears as part of the Description of the Preferred
Embodiments, merely describes the preferred embodiment, and
does not define floral holding material to include an undefined
limitation not found in the ordinary meaning of the claim
language. We have repeatedly made clear that limitations cannot
584
be imported from the specification into the claims.

The district court also determined that the prior art reference did
585
In
not include a “crimping and overlapping fold” limitation.
addressing the issue of inherent anticipation, the Federal Circuit
explained that “a prior art reference may anticipate when the claim
limitation or limitations not expressly found in that reference are
nonetheless inherent in it” and that “[i]nherent anticipation does
not require an appreciation of the inherent limitation by those of
586
skill in the art before the critical date of the patents in issue.” The
court found that the evidence clearly showed that crimping and
overlapping folds were inherent to the Charrin reference because
“[o]ne figure shows the sheet of material tied up around a flower pot
by the string such that the material has overlapping folds and is
587
crimped.”
The Federal Circuit also relied on the testimony of the
prior art inventor (a defendant in the case) in determining that the
588
prior art reference inherently disclosed the limitation. Concluding
that the prior art reference disclosed each of the limitations of the

580. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1223.
581. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1223.
582. Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. Polypap, S.A.R.L., 318 F.3d 1143, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1818 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
583. 412 F.3d at 1289, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1223.
584. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1223.
585. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1223.
586. Id. at 1289-90, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1223-24.
587. Id. at 1290, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1224.
588. See id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1224 (“Philippe Charrin provided testimony
that when tightened, the string would create overlapping folds in the sheet of
material.”).
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asserted claims, the Federal Circuit reversed the lower court and held
589
that the asserted claims were invalid as anticipated.
590
In Upsher-Smith Laboratories, Inc. v. Pamlab, L.L.C., the Federal
Circuit held that “a prior art composition that ‘optionally includes’
an ingredient anticipates a claim for the same composition that
591
expressly excludes that ingredient . . . .”
The patents at issue
claimed vitamin supplement compositions that prevent brain and
nervous system damage, and expressly required that the compositions
592
be “essentially free of antioxidants.”
The prior art relied upon by
the district court in its grant of summary judgment of anticipation
was a European patent application that disclosed the same
composition as the patents in suit with the difference that the
593
European application “optionally include[d]” antioxidants.
On
appeal, Upsher-Smith argued that the district court erred in finding
that an application describing a composition that optionally included
antioxidants anticipates a limitation that expressly excludes
594
antioxidants.
Relying on “[a] century-old axiom of patent law [that] holds that a
product ‘which would literally infringe if later in time anticipates if
595
earlier,’” the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of
596
summary judgment of anticipation. The court determined that the
European application presented a prima facie case of anticipation, and
required Upsher-Smith to present rebuttal evidence in order to raise
597
a genuine issue of material fact.
Upsher-Smith attempted to rebut Pemlab’s evidence by arguing
that the European application taught away from the claimed
598
invention in the patents in suit. The Federal Circuit explained that
whether a reference teaches away from the claimed invention is
irrelevant and does not raise an issue of material fact: “a reference is
no less anticipatory if, after disclosing the invention, the reference
599
then disparages it.”
Upsher-Smith also argued that the European
application taught a genus of compositions that could not anticipate
589. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1224.
590. 412 F.3d 1319, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1213 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
591. Id. at 1320-21, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1214.
592. Id. at 1321, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1214.
593. Id. at 1320, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1214.
594. Id. at 1322, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1215.
595. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1215 (quoting Schering Corp. v. Geneva
Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1379, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1664, 1669 (Fed. Cir.
2003)).
596. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1215.
597. Id. at 1322-23, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1215.
598. Id. at 1323, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1215.
599. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1215 (internal citation omitted).
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600

the species claimed in the patents in suit.
The Federal Circuit
dismissed this argument, finding that “t]he compositions claimed in
the ‘624 and ‘646 patents are as equally broad as the compositions
taught by the European Application without antioxidants,” and that
“[c]onsequently, the claims of the ‘624 and ‘646 patents are not
601
‘species’ of the compositions taught by the European Application.”
The Federal Circuit noted that the inventor of the patents was the
first to recognize that antioxidants destroy vitamin B12 and folate,
and that consequently vitamin compositions are more effective
602
without antioxidants. However, since the claimed composition was
already disclosed to the public, “the public remains free to make, use
or sell prior art compositions or processes, regardless of whether or
not they understand their complete makeup or the underlying
603
scientific principles which allow them to operate.”
Consequently,
the court reasoned that Dr. Herbert was not entitled to remove prior
604
art from the public domain by patenting those compositions.
605
In SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., SmithKline had taken
a license in 1980 from Ferrosan, a British company, for a patent
covering a class of compounds that included a compound later
606
known as paroxetine hydrochloride (“PHC”) (“‘196 patent”).
SmithKline then manufactured PHC as a drug for the treatment of
607
depression. The form of PHC that was originally made by Ferrosan
and SmithKline was anhydrous, a crystalline form that comprised
608
In 1985, one of
crystals of PHC without bound water molecules.
SmithKline’s chemists discovered a new crystalline form of
609
paroxetine, PHC hemihydrate.
PHC hemihydrate, which had one
bound water molecule for every two PHC molecules, was found to be
more stable, and thus more easily packaged and preserved than PHC
610
anhydrate.
SmithKline was granted a U.S. Patent on PHC
hemihydrate in 1988 (“‘723 patent”) and was later granted approval

600. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1215.
601. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1215-16.
602. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1216.
603. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1216 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Atlas
Powder Co. v. Ireco Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1348, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1943, 1947 (Fed.
Cir. 1999)).
604. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1216.
605. 403 F.3d 1331, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1398 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
606. Id. at 1334, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1399-1400.
607. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1399-1400.
608. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1400.
609. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1400.
610. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1400.
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by the FDA to commercially market it as an antidepressant drug
611
under the name Paxil®.
SmithKline accused Apotex of infringing its ‘723 patent directed to
paroxetine hydrochloride hemihydrate (PHC hemihydrate) by filing
an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) with the FDA under
21 U.S.C. § 355(j) seeking approval to market its own generic version
612
of PHC anhydrate.
The only claim at issue, claim 1, read:
613
Although
“Crystalline paroxetine hydrochloride hemihydrate.”
Apotex listed the anhydrous form of PHC as the active ingredient in
its proposed drug product, SmithKline asserted that Apotex’s
product would nevertheless infringe because it would inevitably
contain trace amounts of PHC hemihydrate as a result of a chemical
614
conversion process.
The evidence of record indicated that SmithKline had discovered
PHC hemihydrate when it was producing PHC anhydtrate according
615
to the prior art ‘196 patent. It also showed that production of PHC
anhydrate according to the teachings of the prior art patent
inevitably resulted in the production of at least a trace amount of
616
PHC hemihydrate.
Finally, it showed that neither Apotex nor
SmithKline could presently produce PHC anhydrate that does not
617
contain at least trace amounts of PHC hemihydrate.
Based on this evidence, the Federal Circuit concluded that the ‘723
patent was inherently anticipated by the ‘193 patent. It relied on
618
Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., which held that the
doctrine of inherent anticipation applies to the entire claimed
subject matter just as it does to a single claimed feature, and that
inherent anticipation does not require a person of ordinary skill in
the art to recognize the inherent disclosure in the prior art at the
619
time the prior art is created. Thus, although PHC hemihydrate was
not expressly described in the ‘193 patent and although PHC
hemihydrate was not discovered until 1985, the ‘193 patent still
anticipated the ‘723 patent because the evidence showed that PHC
hemihydrate was necessarily produced as a result of the production of
PHC anhydrate according to the teachings of the ‘196 patent. It

611.
612.
613.
614.
615.
616.
617.
618.
619.

Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1400.
Id. at 1334-35, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1400.
Id. at 1340, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1404.
Id. at 1341, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1404.
Id. at 1334, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1400.
Id. at 1336, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1400.
Id. at 1344, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1407.
339 F.3d 1373, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1664 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1377, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667.
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found that the district court, in coming to an opposite conclusion,
had committed legal error by requiring Apotex to present clear and
convincing evidence that PHC hemihydrate existed before the critical
620
date of the ‘723 patent. It found that Apotex did not need to prove
that it was impossible to make PHC anhydrate in the United States
that contained no PHC hemihydrate, but “merely that ‘the disclosure
[of the prior art] is sufficient to show that the natural result flowing
from the operation as taught [in the prior art] would result in’ the
621
claimed product.”
In 1993, Apotex filed an Abbreviated New Drug Application
(“ANDA”) with the FDA under 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j) seeking approval
622
to market its own generic version of PHC anhydrate.
Apotex’s
ANDA included a Paragraph IV certification that its drug would not
623
infringe the ‘723 patent. SmithKline sued Apotex for infringement
of its ‘723 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) as a result of Apotex’s
ANDA filing. SmithKline asserted claim 1 which read in its entirety:
624
“Crystalline paroxetine hydrochloride hemihydrate.”
SmithKline alleged that although Apotex listed the active
ingredient in its PHC product as PHC anhydrate, its product would
nevertheless infringe the ‘723 patent claim directed to hemihydrate
forms because Apotex’s PHC anhydrate would necessarily contain at
least trace amounts of PHC hemihydrate as a result of a conversion
625
process it described as “seeding.” According to SmithKline and its
experts, once PHC hemihydrate was formed in SmithKline’s facilities,
the general environment became “seeded” with crystals of PHC
hemihydrate. When exposed to this environment, PHC anhydrate
626
inevitably converts to PHC hemihydrate.

620. Apotex, 403 F.3d at 1345, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1407-08.
621. Id. at 1343, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1406 (quoting In re Oelrich, 666 F.2d
578, 581, 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 323, 326 (C.C.P.A 1981)).
622. Id. at 1334, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1400.
623. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1400; see 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv) (2000).
624. Id. at 1340, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1404.
625. Id. at 1355-56, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1414-15 (Gajarsa, J., concurring).
626. SmithKline also argued that PHC anhydrous would convert to PHC
hemihydrate in the stomach of patients. The Federal Circuit found that the district
court did not clearly err in excluding this evidence, however, finding that SmithKline
would likely not meet its burden of showing “gastrointestinal infringement.” Id. at
1336, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1401. SmithKline also presented evidence that tests of
Apotex’s tablets showed detectable quantities of PHC hemihydrate, but the district
court excluded this evidence because it found that SmithKline had excluded certain
tablets that represented the product Apotex would manufacture from the testing
without reasonable explanation. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1401. The Federal
Circuit again found that the district court did not err in its conclusion.
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In IPXL Holdings, L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc., the Federal Circuit
affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment to
Amazon.com on the basis that four of the plaintiff’s claims were
anticipated, as the claims’ limitations were disclosed by U.S. Patent
628
No. 5,389,773 (“Coutts patent”).
The plaintiff argued that Amazon.com’s “1-click system” infringed
five claims of its patent entitled “Electronic Fund Transfer or
629
Transaction System.”
In finding that four of the plaintiff’s claims
were anticipated, the court declined to rule on the issue of whether
630
Amazon.com infringed these claims.
The plaintiff’s patent covered a system commonly used in
conducting electronic financial transactions with automated teller
631
machines (“ATMs”) or point of sale (“POS”) terminals. This system
632
allowed the user to view transaction information on a single screen.
The Coutts patent involved “predictive technology to increase the
speed of operation of the system,” and was also used with ATM
633
machines. The plaintiff argued that its claims were not anticipated
by the Coutts patent, as that patent did “not disclose the ‘single
634
screen’ limitation” of the plaintiff’s patent. Instead, the transaction
parameters of the Coutts patent “are selected over multiple
635
The plaintiff further argued that the Coutts patent does
screens.”
not allow the screen to display “stored transaction information,” and
the input mechanism disallows the user from using “the displayed
636
information ‘to specify one or more transaction parameters.’”
The Federal Circuit rejected all of the plaintiff’s arguments. It
stated that while patents are presumed valid under 35 U.S.C. § 282, “a
patent may be found to be anticipated on the basis of a reference that
had properly been before the patent examiner in the PTO at the
637
time of issuance.”
As to the plaintiff’s first argument, the court
reviewed the district court’s claim construction and found that
regardless of how the claim is constructed, the Coutts patent
638
anticipates four of the plaintiff’s claims.
Additionally, the court

627.
628.
629.
630.
631.
632.
633.
634.
635.
636.
637.
638.

430 F.3d 1377, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1140 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1379-80, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1141.
Id. at 1379, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1141.
Id. at 1380, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142.
Id. at 1378-79, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1141.
Id. at 1379, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1141.
Id. at 1381, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1143.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1143.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1143.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1143.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1143.
Id. at 1382, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1144.
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found that the Coutts patent’s description contemplated a single
639
The Federal Circuit quickly rejected the plaintiff’s
screen display.
second and third arguments by stating that “the Coutts patent clearly
discloses the display of multiple transaction types and multiple
640
transaction parameters[,]” and that the Coutts patent “allows a user
641
to select one of a variety of transaction options.”
642
In Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Laboratories, Inc., the Federal Circuit
vacated the lower court’s grant of partial summary judgment to the
643
defendant, Clontech Laboratories, Inc. (“Clontech”). Both parties
644
appealed to the Federal Circuit.
The plaintiff, Invitrogen, argued
that the lower court erred in its calculation of the conception and
645
The defendant argued that the
reduction to practice dates.
plaintiff’s claims were invalid because they were anticipated by two
646
scientists at Columbia University.
The plaintiff owned a patent which dealt with reverse transcriptase
(“RT”), a genetically modified enzyme which is involved in the
647
replication of DNA.
During both first and second strand DNA
replication, messenger RNA (“mRNA”) assists in transcribing the
648
DNA’s information. During RT activity, the mRNA are destroyed (a
process referred to as “RNase H activity”) and therefore, are not
649
If RNase H activity is
available for further DNA replication.
repressed, then the mRNA are not destroyed and additional DNA can
650
be formed, which may prove useful for DNA cloning.
The
plaintiff’s patent created a form of RT that had no RNase H activity
(“RNase H minus”) and it reduced this invention to practice on
651
January 27, 1987.
The plaintiff filed a corresponding patent
652
application on January 13, 1988.
During the early 1980s, Doctors Goff and Tanese at Columbia
653
University also experimented with RT. Tanese studied the effects of
mutations of the Maloney-Murine Leukemia Virus (“MMLV”) gene
639.
640.
641.
642.
643.
644.
645.
646.
647.
648.
649.
650.
651.
652.
653.

Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1144.
Id. at 1383, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1144.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1144.
429 F.3d 1052, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1057, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163.
Id. at 1061, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166.
Id. at 1062, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167.
Id. at 1058, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164.
Id. at 1057, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164.
Id. at 1058, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164.

LATHAM.OFFTOPRINTER

2006]

5/20/2006 3:02:04 PM

2005 PATENT SUMMARY

1067

654

for RT.
In 1984, Tanese prepared 100 mutants, but did not
sequence them, and therefore did not realize that two of the mutants
655
Later that year, Tanese tested the results
lacked RNase H activity.
to determine if there was RNase H activity, but the results were
656
inconclusive.
Goff and Tanese conducted further tests in March
1987, and it was at this time that they realized that two of the one
657
hundred mutants created in 1984 contained no RNase H activity.
On January 29, 1988, Goff filed a patent application relating to the
658
research performed in 1984 and 1987. Although the PTO declared
an interference with this application as well as Invitrogen’s
659
application, Columbia University, Goff’s assignee, defaulted.
Because of this default, the PTO ruled in Invitrogen’s favor; however,
it never made a determination of whether Goff or Invitrogen had
660
priority of invention. The defendant argued that Goff and Tanese
had priority, and therefore anticipated and invalidated the plaintiff’s
661
patent claims.
At the lower court, the plaintiff and the defendant both filed
summary judgment motions under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2), which
states that:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . before such
person’s invention thereof, the invention was made in this country
by another inventor who had not abandoned, suppressed, or
concealed it. In determining priority of invention under this
subsection, there shall be considered not only the respective dates
of conception and reduction to practice of the invention, but also
the reasonable diligence of one who was first to conceive and last to
662
reduce to practice, from a time prior to conception by the other.
663

The lower court denied the motions, but made four findings.
First, Invitrogen reduced to practice its RT with no RNase H activity
664
on January 27, 1987. Second, in December 1984 Goff conceived of
665
RT with no RNase H activity. Third, Goff finally reduced the above
666
invention in March 1987. Lastly, Goff “did not abandon, conceal or
654.
655.
656.
657.
658.
659.
660.
661.
662.
663.
664.
665.
666.

Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164.
Id., at 1058-59, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164.
Id. at 1059, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165.
Id. at 1061, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2) (2000)).
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166-67.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166.
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suppress” his invention and he was diligent in reducing it to
667
On appeal, Invitrogen only challenged the lower court’s
practice.
first finding—that Goff conceived of the RT with no RNase H activity
668
before the critical date.
In evaluating Goff’s conception under 35
U.S.C. § 102(g)(2), the Federal Circuit looked to two things: (1) the
invention at issue and (2) the date of Invitrogen’s conception of the
669
RT with no RNase H activity. Because Invitrogen only appealed the
issue concerning the date of Goff’s conception, the court resolved
itself to determining the date which Goff conceived of the RT with no
670
RNase H activity.
In beginning its assessment of when Goff conceived of his
invention, the Federal Circuit noted that conception requires “more
than unrecognized accidental creation[,]” and “that the inventor
671
appreciate[s] that which he has invented.” Moreover, “under some
672
conditions conception is delayed until a reduction to practice.”
Consequently, the court focused on when Goff realized that two of
the mutants had no RNase H activity, but retained DNA polymerase
673
activity. The court stated it would look for “objective corroboration
674
of the inventor’s subjective beliefs.” However, objective test results,
plus testimony of the inventor’s state of mind, would not be sufficient
675
Instead, the court would need
to establish a conception date.
objective evidence that the party “interpreted or evaluated the results,
676
and understood them to show the existence [of] the invention.”
The Federal Circuit found that the lower court not only failed to
find adequate objective and subjective evidence to warrant its
conception ruling, but the record contained evidence that was
677
inconsistent with the lower court’s ruling. Evidence suggested that
Goff did not intend to create RT with no RNase H activity, and that
he did not recognize this creation in 1984, as the lower court
678
found. Specifically, the court found Goff’s research to be “general
in nature,” which involved a random experiment involving 100

667. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167.
668. Id. at 1062, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167.
669. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167.
670. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167.
671. Id. at 1063, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1168.
672. Id. at 1064, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1168.
673. Id. at 1063-64, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1168.
674. Id. at 1064, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1169.
675. Id. at 1065, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1169.
676. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1169 (citing Langer v. Kaufman, 465 F.2d 915,
919, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 172, 174 (C.C.P.A. 1972)).
677. Id. at 1066, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1170.
678. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1170.
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679

mutants. Moreover, the ability to create RT with DNA polymerase
680
Goff testified
activity, but without RNase H activity was unknown.
that “it wasn’t that we wanted one [RT without RNase activity]. There
681
was no reason to have one in our minds.”
Given this, the Federal
circuit found that the lower court had no objective basis for granting
partial summary judgment to the defendant on the conception
682
issue.
After finding that the lower court failed to find an objective basis
for its grant of partial summary judgment and that it therefore
misapplied the law, the Federal Circuit determined whether the grant
of the partial summary judgment would have been valid if the lower
683
court had correctly applied the law. Goff testified that by late 1986
684
he suspected that two of the mutants were RNase H minus.
The
defendant urged the Federal Circuit to find a set of laboratory
notebooks as objective evidence that Goff appreciated the creation of
685
RNase H minus.
The court declined to do so, reasoning that the
notebook entries did not just focus on the mutants showing RNase H
686
Moreover, the
minus behavior, but also several other mutants.
court found the defendant’s expert’s testimony (that these notebook
entries “demonstrate[d] Goff’s conception, diligence and reduction
to practice”) to be conclusory and insufficient to carry the
687
defendant’s summary judgment burden.
Considering the lack of
objective evidence, the Federal Circuit vacated the lower court’s grant
of partial summary judgment, finding it erred in holding that Goff’s
688
conception occurred prior to January 27, 1987.
2. On-sale bar and public use
689
In Sparton Corp. v. United States, the Federal Circuit reversed a
finding that the inventions claimed in the patents-in-suit were the
subject of an invalidating commercial offer for sale under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b). The government asserted that the plaintiff’s “dual depth”
sonobouys, claimed in the patents-in-suit, were invalid under the on-

679.
680.
681.
682.
683.
684.
685.
686.
687.
688.
689.

Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1170.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1170.
Id. at 1067, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171 (emphasis omitted).
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171.
Id. at 1068, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171-72.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172.
Id. at 1069, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172.
399 F.3d 1321, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1919 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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sale bar and moved for summary judgment. The Court of Federal
Claims found that the subject matter of the patents-in-suit were
offered for sale prior to the critical date and that the plaintiff’s sale of
691
the device at issue was primarily for commercial purposes.
Accordingly, the Court of Federal Claims granted the government’s
692
motion for summary judgment of invalidity under the on-sale bar.
The Federal Circuit considered the two prong test the Supreme
693
Court articulated in Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., which held that in
order for a patent to be invalid under the on-sale bar, the product
must have been the subject of a commercial offer for sale and must
694
have been ready for patenting prior to the critical date.
The
Federal Circuit held that the invention claimed in the patents-in-suit
was not the subject of a commercial offer for sale prior to the critical
date and reversed the Court of Federal Claims’ grant of summary
judgment without reaching the question of whether the invention
695
was ready for patenting prior to the critical date.
The government’s argument supporting invalidity focused on an
Engineering Change Proposal (“ECP”) that the plaintiff had
submitted to the Navy under an existing contract to supply
696
sonobouys. The government alleged that the ECP, which proposed
to incorporate dual-depth capability into an existing sonobouy
697
design, was a commercial offer for sale for the claimed inventions.
The Federal Circuit rejected this allegation, noting that the parties
conceded in the Court of Federal Claims that the ECP did not
describe the “release plate mechanism” as claimed in the patents-in698
suit.
Thus, the Federal Circuit reasoned that prior to the critical
date, the plaintiff had not offered anything for sale “other than dualdepth sonobouys having the release plate mechanism described in
699
the ECP.”
The government also argued, and the Court of Claims agreed, that
the ECP did not preclude a different release plate design, and the
plaintiff was therefore permitted to substitute any release plate
mechanism capable of performing the function described in the ECP

690.
691.
692.
693.
694.
695.
696.
697.
698.
699.

Id. at 1322, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1921.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1921.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1921.
525 U.S. 55 (1998).
Id. at 67-68.
Sparton Corp., 399 F.3d at 1323, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1921.
Id. at 1322, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1920.
Id. at 1323, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1921.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1921.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1921.
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700

under the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”).
The government
therefore argued, and the Court of Claims concluded, that delivery of
a sonobouy with the patented release plate mechanism was the
delivery of a conforming good under the ECP and the UCC, and the
701
patents were therefore invalid under the on-sale bar.
The Federal
Circuit disagreed, noting that to follow the Court of Claims’ analysis
would require the Federal Circuit to find that the claimed release
plate mechanism “was the subject of an offer for sale before it was
702
even conceived.”
The Federal Circuit noted that such a result
would be illogical and reversed the Court of Claims grant of summary
703
judgment.
The Federal Circuit also held that the Sparton case was
704
distinguishable from the Robotic Vision Systems cases, in which the
invention had been conceived prior to the offer for sale.
705
Lisle Corp. v. A.J. Manufacturing Co. also involved an appeal from
the denial of the defendant’s JMOL motion of invalidity, made after
the jury found that the patent-in-suit was not shown to be invalid for
706
public use.
The plaintiff had developed an early prototype tool
707
The
similar to the product found to infringe the patent-in-suit.
plaintiff did not dispute that the prototype tool fell within the scope
of the claims of the patent, nor did it dispute that it had delivered the
prototype to four automobile repair shops over thirty months before
708
it filed the application leading to the patent. The jury determined
709
The defendant
that the patent was not invalid for public use.
argued that the plaintiff’s lack of a formal confidentiality agreement,
the lack of restrictions placed on the use of the prototype tool, and
the lack of any documentary evidence showing the actual testing of
710
the prototype were grounds to reverse the jury’s verdict.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the jury’s verdict that the patent was
711
not invalid for public use.
The court held that “substantial
evidence supports the jury’s findings of fact in favor of [the plaintiff]
700. Id. at 1324, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1922.
701. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1922.
702. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1922.
703. Id. at 1325, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1923.
704. E.g., Robotic Vision Sys., Inc. v. View Eng’g, Inc., 249 F.3d 1307, 58
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1723 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Robotic Vision Sys., Inc. v. View Eng’g, Inc.,
112 F.3d 1163, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1619 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
705. 398 F.3d 1306, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1891 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
706. Id. at 1309, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1892.
707. Id. at 1315, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1896.
708. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1896.
709. Id. at 1311, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1894.
710. Id. at 1315, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1896.
711. See id. at 1317, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1898 (“We further affirm the court’s
denial of A.J.’s motion for JMOL to reverse the jury’s verdict that A.J. failed to prove
the [] patent was invalid.”).
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on the question of experimental use, and those findings support the
712
The Federal Circuit noted that
conclusion of lack of public use.”
the plaintiff had presented testimony that its engineers would have
contacted the mechanics who were given the prototype tool to
receive testing feedback, that the design of the tool had been
modified based on comments from the mechanics, and that the
plaintiff believed that the mechanics knew the tool was given to them
713
for experimental purposes.
The Federal Circuit also noted that the plaintiff had provided the
jury with “General Meeting Reports” giving updates on the status of
the prototype project, plans for future testing, and suggestions from
714
mechanics on how to improve the design for the tool.
Without
commenting as to whether the panel found the evidence to be
sufficient to rebut a prima facie case of public use, the Federal Circuit
found that such evidence was substantial evidence from which a
reasonable jury could find that the plaintiff rebutted the prima facie
715
case of public use.
The Federal Circuit also rejected the
defendant’s argument that the district court improperly instructed
the jury that the plaintiff was required to come forward with
“evidence” of experimental use, rather than the “convincing
716
evidence” instruction that the defendant suggested.
While acknowledging that Federal Circuit case law has suggested
that a patentee must come forward with “convincing evidence” of
717
experimental use to counter a prima facie showing of public use,
the court found that such suggestions “did not set forth a new legal
standard regarding the burden of production for patentees to rebut a
prima facie case of public use, nor did it impose a burden of
production comparable to the clear and convincing evidence
718
required to invalidate a patent.” The court held that “although the
district court might have specified in the jury instruction that the
patentee needed to provide sufficient evidence to rebut the prima
719
facie case for public use, its failure to do so was harmless.”
In Electromotive Division of General Motors Corp. v. Transportation
720
Systems Division of General Electric Co., the Federal Circuit affirmed
712. Id. at 1315, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1896.
713. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1896-97.
714. Id. at 1316, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1897.
715. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1897.
716. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1897.
717. See id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1897 (citing TP Labs., Inc. v. Prof’l
Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 971, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 577, 582 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
718. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1897 (emphasis in original).
719. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1897 (emphasis in original).
720. 417 F.3d 1203, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1650 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

LATHAM.OFFTOPRINTER

2006]

5/20/2006 3:02:04 PM

2005 PATENT SUMMARY

1073

the district court’s grant of summary judgment on non-infringement
721
The district court found that the defendants,
grounds.
Transportation Systems Division of General Electric Company (“GE”)
and Daido Industrial Bearings, LTD. (“Daido”), did not infringe the
plaintiff’s two patents, as they were invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)’s
722
on-sale bar.
The plaintiff, Electromotive Division of General Motors
723
Corporation (“EMD”), had two patents at issue.
Both patents
724
related to turbocharger bearings used in locomotives the first being
725
a compressor bearing, and the second being a planetary bearing.
EMD tested these bearings during a two-phase program, which
726
included an in-house testing period followed by a “field program.”
During the field program phase, EMD actually integrated the
bearings into locomotives it sold to customers, testing them under
727
actual use conditions. The purpose of this field program test phase
728
was to ensure durability of EMD’s products.
In July 1989, EMD determined that its compressor bearing was
729
EMD subsequently contacted several of its
ready for field testing.
customers who had outstanding locomotive orders with EMD, and
obtained permission to replace previously installed bearings with the
730
new compressor bearings. In August 1989, one of these customers,
Norfolk Southern, modified its order with EMD to purchase spare
731
locomotive parts, which included the new compressor bearings.
EMD did not file a patent application for its compressor bearing until
732
November 1990.
With its planetary bearings, EMD initiated its field testing in March
733
It contacted Union Pacific, a customer who had an
1993.
outstanding order with EMD, and allegedly obtained Union Pacific’s
permission to substitute the planetary bearings for the previously
734
installed bearings. On July 6, 1993, to fill this order, EMD ordered

721.
722.
723.
724.
725.
726.
727.
728.
729.
730.
731.
732.
733.
734.

Id. at 1206, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651.
Id. at 1205-06, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651.
Id. at 1205, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651.
Id. at 1206, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652.
Id. at 1207, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652.
Id. at 1208, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653.
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735

105 planetary bearings from its supplier, the defendant Daido. On
September 29, 1994, EMD filed a patent application for its planetary
736
bearing.
In both the compressor and planetary bearing customer
transactions, EMD did not require its customers to sign a
confidentiality agreement, or a contract agreeing to partake in the
field testing program, nor did EMD incorporate any further
737
restrictions or monitoring regarding these bearings.
Applying 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), the district court granted the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment after concluding that the
738
plaintiff’s patents were invalid.
This section states that one “is
entitled to a patent, unless, inter alia, ‘the invention was . . . on sale in
this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application
739
for patent in the United States.’” Under this section, evidence must
show that two elements existed prior to the critical date: (1) “the
claimed invention must be the subject of a commercial sale;” and
740
(2) ”the claimed invention must be ready for patenting.”
Given
that the second element was not a factor in either the district court,
741
or on appeal, the Federal Circuit focused on the first element.
The Federal Circuit first set out to determine whether the
742
plaintiff’s sales transpired before the critical date. Looking first to
EMD’s sale of spare compressor bearings to Norfolk Southern, the
court determined that this patent’s critical date was November 27,
743
1989, the date EMD filed its patent application. Determining that
EMD’s agreement to sell spare compressor bearings occurred on
August 28, 1989, the court concluded that EMD’s sale occurred prior
744
to the critical date. The court then looked to see if EMD’s sale of
745
planetary bearings occurred before the critical date.
The court
established that the critical date for the planetary bearings was
746
September 29, 1993, the date EMD filed its patent application. The

735. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653.
736. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653.
737. Id. at 1206-07, 1208, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652-53.
738. Id. at 1208, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653.
739. Id. at 1209, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
(2000)).
740. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000)).
741. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654.
742. Id. at 1210, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654-55.
743. Id. at 1207, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652.
744. Id. at 1210, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655.
745. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655.
746. Id. at 1208, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653.
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court determined that Daido’s July 6, 1993 sale of these bearings to
747
EMD for Union Pacific’s order was prior to the critical date.
EMD argued its actions did not satisfy the first element because the
748
sales had the primary purpose of experimentation.
Under the
experimental use doctrine, the court addressed the question of
“whether the transaction constituting the sale was not incidental to
749
the primary purpose of experimentation.”
The court rejected the
plaintiff’s argument in regards to both the compressor and planetary
750
Addressing compressor bearings, the court agreed with
bearings.
defendant that EMD’s sale of spare compressor bearings to Norfolk
751
Southern could not constitute experimentation.
The court
reasoned that the record failed to indicate how Norfolk Southern
anticipated using these spare bearings or that Norfolk Southern even
752
used one of these spare bearings.
The Federal Circuit gave EMD’s experimentation argument
753
considerably more attention as it related to its planetary bearings.
First, the court stated that while it ruled that Daido’s sale of planetary
bearings to EMD satisfied the prior-to-critical-date sale, this
“upstream” sale was inextricably linked to EMD’s “downstream” sale
to Union Pacific—which is the transaction that would determine
754
whether § 102(b) invalidated the sale. Second, the court provided
thirteen factors it would consider in determining whether a sale’s
755
primary purpose was commercial or experimental.
These factors
include:
(1) the necessity for public testing; (2) the amount of control over
the experiment retained by the inventor; (3) the nature of the
invention; (4) the length of the test period; (5) whether payment
was made; (6) whether there was a secrecy obligation; (7) whether
records of the experiment were kept; (8) who conducted the
experiment; (9) the degree of commercial exploitation during
testing; (10) whether the invention reasonably requires evaluation
under actual conditions of use; (11) whether testing was
systematically performed; (12) whether the inventor continually

747. Id. at 1210, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655.
748. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654.
749. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654 (quoting Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell
Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1353, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769, 1779 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
750. Id. at 1211, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655.
751. Id. at 1210, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655.
752. Id. at 1210-11, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655.
753. See id. at 1211-18, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655-61 (deliberating the merits of
EMD’s argument regarding the planetary bearings).
754. Id. at 1211, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655-56.
755. Id. at 1213, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657.
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monitored the invention during testing; and (13) the nature of the
756
contacts made with potential customers.

After reviewing its use of these factors in its previous cases, the
Federal Circuit concluded that at least two of these factors are critical
in determining whether a sale had the primary purpose of
experimentation—the amount of control the inventor retains over
the experimentation, and whether the customer is aware of the
757
purported experimentation.
In fact, the court stated that
“ordinarily” these factors must be present in order for the court to
758
Applying these two factors to the case, the
find experimentation.
court found that EMD failed to control any aspect of the
experimentation, and that there was insufficient evidence that Union
759
Pacific had knowledge of the experimentation.
As to the control factor, the court noted that the plaintiff failed to
provide Union Pacific with any protocols for using the bearings, nor
760
did EMD supervise or restrict Union Pacific’s use of the bearings.
In response, the plaintiff argued that its failure to oversee Union
Pacific’s use was due to its method of experimentation—determining
the success of its bearings by measuring the number of failed
turbochargers containing the new planetary bearings returned to it
761
by Union Pacific.
The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument,
reasoning that the plaintiff neither required nor received any data or
762
observations from Union Pacific regarding its bearings. The court
also noted that Union Pacific returned failed turbochargers on a
purely voluntary basis, as permitted under a warranty provided to
every EMD customer, regardless of whether the turbocharger
763
contained a planetary bearing or not. Accordingly, the court found
that EMD failed to maintain sufficient control over the use of its
764
bearings to constitute experimentation.
The Federal Circuit then analyzed whether Union Pacific had
sufficient awareness of the experimentation. It determined that even
on a motion for summary judgment, EMD lacked enough evidence of
765
The court reviewed the deposition and internal
such awareness.
756. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657.
757. See id. at 1214, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658 (stating “this court has
effectively made control and customer awareness dispositive.”).
758. Id. at 1214-15, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658.
759. Id. at 1215, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659.
760. Id. at 1215, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658.
761. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658.
762. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658.
763. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658.
764. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659.
765. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1650.
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memo of Mr. Blase, an EMD employee and a planetary bearing
766
In Mr. Blase’s deposition, he stated that the customer
inventor.
would understand that EMD was conducting a durability test on the
products they were receiving and which components were involved
767
with that testing.
However, Mr. Blase was unaware whether these
customers had signed a secrecy or confidentiality agreement, and was
768
unaware of who at EMD would have such information.
In Mr.
Blase’s memo, he stated that “the customer is made aware that there
is an experimental part in the turbochargers they are receiving, yet
769
details of the part are not fully disclosed.”
The court found Mr.
Blase’s statements in his deposition and memo insufficient to show
that Union Pacific was aware that EMD inserted a new experimental
planetary bearing into its order for the purpose of experimentation,
770
“rather than as part of a commercial sale.” The court further noted
that EMD failed to produce any evidence of a written agreement with
Union Pacific regarding the experimentation, provide any testimony
from a Union Pacific representative indicating awareness, or provide
771
any other corroborating evidence. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit
found no evidence that EMD’s sale actually had the primary purpose
of experimentation, and therefore, it affirmed the district court’s
ruling that 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) raised the on-sale bar and invalidated
772
the plaintiff’s patents.
773
In Broadcast Innovation, L.L.C. v. Charter Communications, Inc., the
Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to the defendant, after the district court found the
774
plaintiff’s patent invalid as anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
On November 26, 1993, the plaintiff filed a consolidated
775
international patent application (“the PCT application”).
In July
776
1995, this application became a national stage application. During
the pendency of the national stage application, the plaintiff filed a
continuation application, which was approved as U.S. Patent No.
777
5,999,934 (“‘934 patent”).
The plaintiff also filed a divisional

766.
767.
768.
769.
770.
771.
772.
773.
774.
775.
776.
777.

Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1650.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1650.
Id. at 1215-16, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659.
Id. at 1216, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659.
Id. at 1218, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1661.
420 F.3d 1364, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1220 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1365, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1220.
Id. at 1366, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1221.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1221.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1221.
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application, U.S. Patent No. 6,076,094 (“‘094 patent”), which was the
778
The national stage application was approved and
patent at issue.
779
became U.S. Patent No. 5,737,595 (“‘595 patent”). The ‘094 patent
did not specifically reference the PCT application or the three
Australian separate patent applications that existed prior to their
780
consolidation on November 26, 1993.
During the prosecution of
the ‘094 patent, the plaintiff filed a transmittal letter and an “oath &
781
declaration” asserting priority to the PCT application and the three
782
Australian applications that existed prior to the consolidation.
In determining the validity of the ‘094 patent, the district court
783
looked to 35 U.S.C. § 120 and 37 C.F.R. § 1.78(a)(2)(i).
Section
120 allows a patentee to claim priority based on an earlier filed
application if the newer application “contains or is amended to
784
contain a specific reference to the earlier filed application.”
Additionally, § 1.78 insists that the “specific reference” requirement
of § 120 must appear in the first sentence of the specification, as well
785
as the patent’s cover page. Because the ‘094 patent stated its filing
date as July 18, 1995, the district court found the June 9, 1994
publication of the PCT application anticipated the ‘094 patent, and
786
therefore rendered the ‘094 patent invalid.
The Federal Circuit disagreed with the district court’s
determination that the ‘094 patent’s filing date was July 18, 1995, and
787
it reversed that court’s ruling. The Federal Circuit stated, “[w]here
proper reference to a national stage application exists, no reference
to the corresponding PCT application is required because the
national stage application effectively has the same U.S. filing date as
788
the PCT application.” The court determined that the ‘094 patent’s
reference to the ‘595 and ‘934 patents in the first sentence of the
specification and the patent’s cover page satisfied the requirements

778. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1221.
779. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1221.
780. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1221. The ‘094 patent states: “This application
is a divisional of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 09/054,896, filed Apr. 3, 1998, now
patented as U.S. Pat. No. 5,999,934, which is a continuation of U.S. patent
application Ser. No. 08/436,336, filed Jul. 18, 1995, now patented as U.S. Pat. No.
5,737,595.” Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1221.
781. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1221.
782. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1221.
783. Id. at 1367, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1222.
784. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1222. (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2000))
(emphasis omitted).
785. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1222. (citing 37 C.F.R. § 1.78(a)(2)(i) (1997)).
786. Id. at 1368, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1222-23.
787. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1223.
788. Id. at 1367, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1222.
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789

of 35 U.S.C. § 120 and 37 C.F.R. § 1.78(a).
Accordingly, the
Federal Circuit determined that the ‘094 patent could adopt the
filing date of the ‘595 patent, which was the earliest filed application
790
and had a filing date of November 26, 1993.
Accordingly, the
Federal Circuit found the ‘094 was not anticipated, and therefore,
791
was not invalid.
792
In Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., plaintiff Enzo Biochem
appealed from the district court’s decision granting summary
judgment of invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) in favor of defendant
based on a prior offer for sale. The patent covered a probe to detect
793
gonorrhea and related bacteria.
In 1982, Enzo and Ortho
Diagnostic Systems had entered into an agreement involving research
794
and development for gonorrhea. In 1984, as part of the agreement,
Enzo transferred to Ortho a probe essentially identical to a probe
795
upon which its January 1996 patent application was based.
Enzo argued the agreement with Ortho had been purely for
796
797
research purposes.
It did so relying on In re Kollar, holding a
broad research and development program experimental rather than
commercial. Enzo also asserted that the agreement contained no
798
enforceable offer for sale. However, the court noted that § 2.14 of
the Agreement stated that “ENZO shall supply to ORTHO and
ORTHO shall purchase from ENZO . . . no less than ninety percent
799
(90%) of ORTHO’s United States requirements . . . .”
The Court
found this language to create “the necessary contractual obligations
800
on the parties to constitute a commercial offer for sale.” The Court
distinguished this case from Kollar by virtue of the fact that the Enzo
device was a tangible item or product, not simply an experimental
process that had “not been carried out or performed as a result of the
801
transaction.”
The Court concluded that there was no issue of
material fact as to whether what was sold in 1984 anticipated the
802
asserted patent, and therefore affirmed summary judgment.
789.
790.
791.
792.
793.
794.
795.
796.
797.
798.
799.
800.
801.
802.

Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1222.
Id. at 1368, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1223.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1223.
424 F.3d 1276, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1616 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1278, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1618.
Id. at 1279, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1618.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1619.
Id. at 1281, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1620.
286 F.3d 1326, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Enzo Biochem, 424 F.3d at 1281, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1620.
Id. at 1279, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1619.
Id. at 1281, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1620.
Id. at 1282, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1621.
Id. at 1282-85, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1621-23.
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C. 35 U.S.C. § 103—Obviousness
803

In Merck & Co., Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., plaintiff
sued the defendant for constructive patent infringement after
defendant had submitted an Abbreviated New Drug Application
(“ANDA”) seeking FDA approval to market generic versions of
plaintiff’s once-weekly method of treating osteoporosis through the
804
oral administration of alendronate monosodium trihydrate.
The
district court found that defendant had constructively infringed the
patent by submitting the ANDA, and also found the patent was not
805
invalid for anticipation or obviousness.
After the Federal Circuit
806
it considered
reversed the district court’s claim construction,
whether the patent-in-suit was invalid for obviousness.
807
The defendant’s obviousness defense relied on two Lunar News
articles that the district court had held were prior art under 35 U.S.C.
808
§ 102(a).
The court found that the district court committed
reversible error in finding the claims were not invalid under 35
809
The court then considered the four factual
U.S.C. § 103.
determinations to decide the issue of obviousness: “(1) the scope
and content of the prior art, (2) the level of ordinary skill in the art,
(3) the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art,
810
and (4) objective indicia of non-obviousness.”
In addressing these determinations, the court found that there
were “more similarities than differences between [the claims at issue]
811
and the teachings of the Lunar News articles.” The court also stated
that the claims and the articles both indicated “and it has been
conceded as known in the art at the time—that for treating or
preventing osteoporosis a once-weekly dosage at seven times the daily
812
dose would be as effective as seven daily doses.”
The court also
803. 395 F.3d 1364, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
804. Id. at 1366-67, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1643.
805. Id. at 1365-66, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1642-43.
806. Id. at 1369-72, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645-48.
807. “Lunar News is a quarterly newsletter distributed to . . . physicians and others
in the medical art by Lunar Corporation, a manufacturer of bone densitometry
equipment used to diagnose osteoporosis.” Id. at 1367 n.5, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1644.
808. Id. at 1367, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644 (citing Merck & Co., Inc. v. Teva
Pharms. USA, Inc., 288 F. Supp. 2d 601, 618-19 (D. Del. 2003)).
809. Id. at 1372, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648. 35 U.S.C. § 103 provides that a
patent claim is invalid “if the differences between the subject matter sought to be
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have
been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in
the art to which said subject matter pertains.” 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
810. Id. at 1372-73, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648.
811. Id. at 1373, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648.
812. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648.
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concluded that in light of the prior art, “there was no great leap
required of those skilled in the art to go from 40 or 80 mg once a
week, the pills available at the time to treat patients with Paget’s
813
disease, to a 35 or 70 mg pill once a week.” The court also rejected
the district court’s distinguishing the prior art on the ground that the
article failed to explain how the once-weekly dosing overcame
concerns in the art with adverse GI side effects, because the patent,
both articles, and the prevailing knowledge of those skilled in the art
Recognized that to the extent ‘dosing problems’ were related to
repetitive irritation of the esophagus (from patients getting pills
stuck in their throats), taking fewer pills each week could reduce
the attending GI problems. Thus, the district court clearly erred in
finding any significant difference between the claimed invention
814
and the two articles as to this type of GI problem.

The court also reasoned that the neither the patent nor the articles
explained how the once-weekly dosing regimen avoided adverse GI
side effects, as the patent did not provide any human clinical or
laboratory data showing the safety and tolerability of the treatment
815
methods claimed in the patent.
Thus, while the article “may have
invited skepticism based on concerns for dose-related GI problems,
the claimed invention adds nothing beyond the teachings of those
816
articles.” The Federal Circuit also held that the district court erred
in relying on the indicia of reliability—whether the articles were peer
reviewed and the credentials of the author—to distinguish the
817
articles from the claimed invention. Finally, the court held that the
only difference between the articles and the claims were minor
818
Because plaintiff’s own inventors
differences in the dosage.
admitted the difference in dosage was obvious, the court held the
district court “clearly erred to the extent it found lacking any
motivation to combine existing knowledge with the . . . articles to
819
reach the claimed invention.”
The court also found error in the
district court’s weighing of secondary considerations of nonobviousness. The court held that the district court’s correct finding
that plaintiff’s treatment was commercially successful had minimal

813.
814.
815.
816.
817.
818.
819.

Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648.
Id. at 1373-74, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1649 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 1374, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1649.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1649.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1649.
Id. at 1375, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1650.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1650.
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probative value in the context of this case.
reasoned that
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The Federal Circuit

Commercial success is relevant because the law presumes an idea
would successfully have been brought to market sooner, in
response to market forces, had the idea been obvious to persons
skilled in the art. Thus, the law deems evidence of (1) commercial
success, and (2) some causal relation or “nexus” between an
invention and commercial success of a product embodying that
invention, probative of whether an invention was non-obvious.
That rationale has no force in this case. In Graham the Supreme
Court relied on the reasoning from a law review note discussing
commercial success. The article suggested “[t]he possibility of
market success attendant upon the solution of an existing problem
may induce innovators to attempt a solution. If in fact a product
attains a high degree of commercial success, there is a basis for
inferring that such attempts have been made and have
failed.” . . . [T]hat chain of inferences fails on these facts.
Although commercial success might generally support a conclusion
that Merck’s claimed invention was non-obvious in relation to what
came before in the marketplace, the question at bar is narrower. It
is whether the claimed invention is non-obvious in relation to the
ideas set forth in the Lunar News articles. Financial success is not
significantly probative of that question in this case because others
were legally barred from commercially testing the Lunar News
821
ideas.

The court further stated that “[b]ecause market entry by others was
precluded on those bases, the inference of non-obviousness of
weekly-dosing, from evidence of commercial success, is weak. . . .
Thus, we conclude the district court misjudged this factor as
822
confirming its conclusion of non-obviousness.” The Federal Circuit
vacated the district court’s determination that the patent-in-suit was
823
not invalid as obvious.
824
In In re Harris, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s decision
825
that the claims of the Harris application were obvious. The Harris
application claimed a nickel-based superalloy that comprised several
826
The prior art
elements defined by ranges of weight percentages.
patent on which the patent examiner’s rejection was based described
820. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651.
821. Id. at 1376-77, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651 (citing Graham v. John Deere
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966)).
822. Id. at 1377, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651.
823. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652.
824. 409 F.3d 1339, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1951 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
825. Id. at 1340, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)at 1952.
826. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)at 1952.
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superalloys with ranges that overlapped those of the Harris
827
The PTO can establish a prima facie case of
application’s claims.
obviousness by showing that the ranges of a claimed composition
828
overlap the ranges disclosed in the prior art. If the ranges do not
completely overlap, the PTO can still establish a prima facie case if
829
there is only a “minor difference.”
The Federal Circuit concluded that the Board established a prima
facie case of obviousness by comparing the differences between the
Harris claims and the prior art to the differences present in the
830
Federal Circuit’s decision in In re Peterson.
As compared to the
Peterson case, the prior art cited against Harris claimed narrower
ranges than that cited against Peterson, and the Harris application
831
claimed wider ranges than that claimed by Peterson.
Once the PTO established a prima facie case of obviousness, the
burden shifted to Harris to show that his claimed invention produced
832
unexpected results.
Harris first argued that the prior art did not
833
The Federal
teach the weight ranges for two of the elements.
Circuit disagreed, concluding that the prior art taught a portion of
the claimed ranges, and that Harris’s “use of the term ‘about’ shows
that [Harris] did not intend to limit the claimed ranges to their exact
834
end-points.”
Harris next compared a compound in the center of
the claimed ranges with prior art commercial alloys and argued that a
thirty-two to forty-three percent increase in stress-rupture life was an
835
unexpected result.
The Federal Circuit determined that such a
result was not a “difference in kind,” and hence not an unexpected
836
result. Moreover, even assuming that such results were unexpected,
Harris did not show that these results covered the entire claimed
837
range. The court also noted that both the commercial compound
to which Harris compared the claimed compound and the claimed
compound itself were equally representative of the prior art relied
upon by the PTO, and hence a comparison of those two compounds
838
could not be used to establish unexpected results.

827.
828.
829.
830.
831.
832.
833.
834.
835.
836.
837.
838.

Id. at 1341, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1953.
Id. at 1340, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952.
Id. at 1341, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1953.
315 F.3d 1325, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Harris, 409 F.3d at 1343, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1954.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1954.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1954.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1954.
Id. at 1344, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1955.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1955.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1955.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1955.
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839

In Syntex (U.S.A.) LLC v. Apotex, Inc., the Federal Circuit vacated
the district court’s final judgment of non-obviousness after a bench
trial, citing several instances of clear error in the district court’s fact
840
finding.
The patent at issue claimed the use of octoxynol 40 as a
841
Syntex, the
surfactant in eye drops that treat eye inflammation.
842
plaintiff, sued the defendant pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2).
The defendant argued at trial that the claims of the patent in suit
843
were obvious in light of prior art cited by the patent office.
The Federal Circuit first found error in the district court’s finding
that octoxyonal 40 was not used in pharmaceuticals prior to its use in
844
the patented invention.
It determined that the district court’s
finding was contradicted by statements of the inventors, published
five days after the priority date of the invention, which asserted that
octoxynol 40 was a well-known ingredient in pharmaceutical
845
products. The Federal Circuit found it “incredulous that octoxynol
40 could progress from no use, to ‘well known’ . . . in a matter of five
days,” and accordingly found the publication “an important fact to
846
consider in assessing the obviousness of the claims in suit.”
The Federal Circuit next found error in the district court’s finding
that the prior art references taught away from the claimed
847
invention.
The Federal Circuit set out the framework for
determining when a reference teaches away from a claimed
invention, explaining:
What a reference teaches a person of ordinary skill is not, as
Syntex’s expert appears to believe, limited to what a reference
specifically “talks about” or what is specifically “mentioned” or
“written” in the reference. Under the proper legal standard, a
reference will teach away when it suggests that the developments
flowing from its disclosures are unlikely to produce the objective of
848
the applicant’s invention.

The court continued, “[a] statement that a particular combination
is not a preferred embodiment does not teach away absent clear
849
discouragement of that combination.”
The trial court committed

839.
840.
841.
842.
843.
844.
845.
846.
847.
848.
849.

407 F.3d 1371, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1823 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1373, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1825.
Id. at 1373-74, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1825.
Id. at 1376, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1827.
Id. at 1376-77, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1827.
Id. at 1379, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1829.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1829.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1829.
Id. at 1380, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1829.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1829-30.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1830.
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error by finding that a prior art reference taught away from the use of
octoxynol 40 because the only surfactant mentioned in that reference
850
was polysorbate 80. According to the court:
This is error because a prior art reference that does not specifically
refer to one element of a combination does not, per se, teach away.
If it did, only references that anticipate could be used to support an
obviousness analysis. However, prior art references that are
capable of rendering an invention obvious under a section 103
analysis are not limited to reference that also anticipate the patent
851
at issue.

The Federal Circuit also found error in the district court’s finding
that another prior art reference taught away from the claimed
852
invention because it stated that a surfactant was not preferred.
“This is error because although the preferred embodiment of [the
prior art reference] does not use a stabilizer [surfactant], [the prior
art
reference]
discloses . . . ophthalmic
formulations
that
853
‘optionally . . . contain a stabilizer.’”
The Federal Circuit also advised the district court to reconsider the
854
testimony of the defendant’s expert. In particular:
[The defendant’s] expert testimony [] cannot be lightly
disregarded on the theory that [the expert] only sought to show
the obviousness of substituting octoxynol 40 for another surfactant.
[The expert’s] testimony may be relevant on another level, which is
the very point on which the examiner concluded that the otherwise
suspect invention was non-obvious. [The expert’s] testimony has to
be considered as well on the point of whether the results produced
by use of octoxynol 40 are sufficiently unexpected as to secure the
855
validity of the claims in suit.”

The Federal Circuit acknowledged it does “not require that the
district court credit all (or any) of this testimony” but “the district
court should consider [the defendant’s] claim of obviousness in light
of the applicable legal principles and unencumbered by the factual
856
errors identified above.”
The Federal Circuit also examined the prosecution history of the
857
patent in suit.
The patent issued from a continuation of a parent
application, although the two applications had been examined by
850.
851.
852.
853.
854.
855.
856.
857.

Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1830.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1830.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1830.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1830.
Id. at 1381, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1830.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1830.
Id. at 1382, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1831.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1831.
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858

different patent examiners.
During the prosecution of the
continuation, the plaintiff represented that it had shown that the
prior art surfactants were not satisfactory, when in fact the examiner
who handled the parent application expressly found that the plaintiff
859
failed to show unexpected results.
The Federal Circuit stated that
“[w]hether the second examiner was aware of the earlier rejection of
[the plaintiff’s] claims is unknown. But the relevance of the
inconsistency between the views of two examiners is not
860
insignificant.”
Also during prosecution, the applicant submitted a declaration
stating that octoxynol 40 is satisfactory for use in the claimed
861
formulation while octoxynols 3 and 5 were not.
The plaintiff,
however, knew that octoxynol 40 did not outperform octoxynol 12.5,
862
but did not include this information in the applicant’s declaration.
While this did not rise to the level of inequitable conduct, “the
unvarnished view of the prosecution history shows some weakness in
the conclusion that the patentee established unexpected results for
863
the claimed surfactant.”
The court acknowledged the heightened
burden placed on a challenger to a patent’s validity when the prior
art references have been considered by the patent examiner, but
determined that the facts of this case cast this added burden in
doubt:
While we recognize that an issued patent is entitled to the presumption of
validity and that a challenger’s burden to show invalidity is more difficult to
858. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1831.
859. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1832.
860. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1832. In her concurrence, Judge Prost
challenged the majority’s views on the inconsistencies between the prosecutions of
the two applications. Id. at 1385, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1834 (Prost, J.,
concurring). Judge Prost pointed out that Apotex had never asserted that there was
any inconsistency between Syntex’s statements to the two patent examiners. Id., 74
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1834 (Prost, J., concurring).
In general [Judge Prost explained], I fail to see how the conduct of a patent
applicant is relevant to an obviousness determination. Alleged misconduct
at the PTO . . . goes to the heart of an inequitable conduct inquiry but is
simply irrelevant to an obviousness inquiry. That is not to say that if
evidence showing that a claimed invention does not produce unexpected
results was not disclosed to the PTO then that evidence should not be
considered by the district court in its obviousness analysis. On the contrary,
a district court should consider evidence relevant to an obviousness analysis
even if that evidence is not disclosed to the PTO.”
Id. at 1386, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1834 (Prost, J., concurring). Moreover, she
found it “hard to believe that the second examiner was somehow duped into
thinking that the first examiner agreed that the previous data showed
unexpected results even if the statement could be understood to be misleading.”
Id. at 1385-86, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1834.
861. Id. at 1382-83, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1832.
862. Id. at 1383, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1832.
863. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1832.
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satisfy when prior art references have been presented to the PTO, we think
this case is unusual because certain key facts existed that give rise to some
doubt as to the strength of the factual proposition that octoxynol 40 indeed
produced unexpected results. With full respect for the general propositions
that the issued patent is entitled to a presumption of validity, and that the
examiners are expected to perform reasonably, on remand the district court
should review the file history as part of its assessment
of whether the
864
invention claimed by the claims in suit are nonobvious.

Finally, the Federal Circuit addressed the district court’s heavy
reliance on the commercial success of Syntex’s product in its finding
865
of nonobviousness. The court explained:
The secondary consideration of commercial success exists largely to
provide a means for patentees to show in close cases that subject
matter that appears obvious is in law unobvious because a high
degree of commercial success permits the inference that others
have tried and failed to reach a solution . . . [and] evidence of
commercial success result[s] in a particularly weak inference
[when] prior art patents prevented others from competing to
866
reach the solution embodied in the claims at issue.

The Federal Circuit recommended in a case such as this, where
“the active ingredient in the formulation was previously patented,”
that the district court consider this analysis in determining whether
the commercial success of the plaintiff’s products was in fact due to
867
the patentable distinctiveness of the plaintiff’s claims.
868
In Group One Ltd v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., the Federal Circuit
reversed the district court’s JMOL of obviousness as to claims from
two patents claiming a device and method for curling ribbon, and
869
reinstated the jury verdict of non-obviousness. The Federal Circuit
explained that “[o]bviousness is a question of law based on
underlying facts,” and that when the underlying factual disputes are
submitted to a jury, “[t]he question thus becomes whether the jury
870
verdict of non-obviousness was supported by substantial evidence.”
In this case, the prior art disclosed three of the four elements of the
independent claims of the asserted patents, and that the fourth
element appeared in several other prior art references, but that none
of the references showing the fourth element related to ribbon

864. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1832 (internal citations and explanatory
parentheticals omitted).
865. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1832.
866. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1832.
867. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1832.
868. 407 F.3d 1297, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1759 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
869. Id. at 1309, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1768.
870. Id. at 1303-04, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1764.
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871

curling. The Federal Circuit framed the issue as whether there was
872
a motivation to combine these references.
Motivation to combine is a question of fact. Expert testimony of a
lack of motivation to combine and the use of hindsight by
[opposing experts] constitutes substantial evidence of
nonobviouness. A showing that the motivation to combine stems
from the nature of the problem to be solved must be clear and
873
particular, and it must be supported by actual evidence.

The defendant argued that Group One’s expert failed to address
why the nature of the problem to be solved did not provide the
874
motivation to combine. The Federal Circuit rejected the argument,
concluding that:
Although [Group One’s expert] did not address the problem-to-besolved issue in so many words, he did provide testimony that the
problem to be solved had been appreciated in the prior art and
noted that this had not led to the air blower solution. This
testimony is sufficient to rebut [Hallmark’s expert’s] testimony and
875
to sustain the jury verdict of nonobviousness.

The court also rejected the significance of the patent examiner’s
failure to consider various stripping means references during
prosecution. The court noted that, “[w]hile this may affect the ease
with which Hallmark may carry its burden of proof, we do not see
876
how this can provide a basis for overturning the jury’s factfinding.”
877
In Princeton Biochemicals, Inc. v. Beckman Coulter, Inc., the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of JMOL that substantial
878
evidence did not support the jury’s verdict of non-obviousness. The
parties did not dispute that the prior art references taught each
879
element of the claim at issue. In particular, an article written prior
to the date the plaintiff filed its patent application disclosed six of
eight elements; the seventh was disclosed in a thesis also published
prior to the application, and it was undisputed that the eighth
880
The issue was whether there
element was known in the prior art.
881
was motivation to combine the elements in the prior art references.
871. Id. at 1304, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1764.
872. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1764 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
873. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1764 (internal citations omitted).
874. Id. at 1304, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1765.
875. Id. at 1305-06, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1765-66.
876. Id. at 1306, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1766.
877. 411 F.3d 1332, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
878. Id. at 1339, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1056.
879. Id. at 1337, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1054.
880. Id. at 1335, 1337-38, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1053.
881. Id. at 1337, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1054.
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The Federal Circuit explained that making an obviousness
determination requires consideration of the claimed invention “as a
882
whole.” The court elaborated on this requirement:
The “as a whole” instruction in title 35 prevents evaluation of the
invention part by part. Without this important requirement, an
obviousness assessment might successfully break an invention into
its component parts, then find a prior art reference corresponding
to each component. This line of reasoning would import hindsight
into the obviousness determination by using the invention as a
roadmap to find its prior art components. Further, this improper
method would discount the value of combining various existing
features or principles in a new way to achieve a new result—often
883
the essence of invention.

According to the Federal Circuit, “[a] suggestion or motivation [to
combine] prior art references may appear in the content of the
public prior art, in the nature of the problem addressed by the
invention, or even in the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the
884
art.”
The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that the
motivation to combine the prior art references was found in the
885
knowledge of one skilled in the art at the time of the invention.
The defendant’s expert testified and provided unrebutted testimony
886
to this effect. The court acknowledged its prior “skepticism about
invoking the knowledge of a skilled artisan to supply the motivation
to combine on a scanty record,” but explained that in this case, the
defendant’s expert “supplied detailed analysis of the prior art and the
reasons that one of ordinary skill would possess knowledge and
887
motivation to combine these simple elements.”
The Federal Circuit also agreed with the district court that the
nature of the problem addressed by the invention supplied a
888
motivation to combine the prior art references. This was supported
by testimony from another Beckman witness, in addition to testimony
889
from Beckman’s expert.
Finally, the Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that the
references relied upon by the district court were proper prior art

882.
883.
884.
885.
886.
887.
888.
889.

Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1054.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1054 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 1338, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1055.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1055.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1055.
Id. at 1338, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1055.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1055.
Id. at 1338-39, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1055-56.
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890

references. The court explained that “[a] reference is appropriate
prior art if within the field of the inventor’s endeavor” or if it is
“reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the
891
invention of claim 32 was involved.”
In this case, the Federal
Circuit determined that “all of the references . . . constitute
analogous art,” including some references from related fields of
892
endeavor.
The Federal Circuit relied on the district court’s
determination that the other fields of endeavor were “closely related”
to that of the invention, as well as testimony from Beckman’s expert
that one of ordinary skill would look to the related fields to solve
893
problems in the field of the invention. Evaluating the evidence as a
whole, the Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that
substantial evidence did not support the jury’s verdict, and the
894
Federal Circuit held that claim 32 was “invalid for obviousness.”
D. 35 U.S.C. § 112
1. Written description
In Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Laboratories, Inc., the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court’s interlocutory ruling that the plaintiff’s
claims were not invalid for failing the written description
895
The Federal Circuit first noted
requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112.
that findings regarding written descriptions are questions of fact, and
therefore, a court needs clear and convincing evidence that the claim
fails the written description requirement in order to invalidate a
896
claim. The defendant argued that University of California v. Eli Lilly
897
& Co. controlled and requested that the court find that the
898
plaintiff’s claims failed the written description requirement.
In Eli Lilly, the Federal Circuit invalidated a claim that “recit[ed]
899
The
only the nucleotide sequence of rat cDNA for insulin.”
defendant argued that the court should likewise invalidate the
plaintiff’s claims in this case, as they “do not recite the DNA or
900
protein sequences as required” by the holding in Eli Lilly.
890. Id. at 1339, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1056.
891. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1056 (internal citations omitted).
892. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1056.
893. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1056.
894. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1056.
895. 429 F.3d 1052, 1081, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1182 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
896. Id. at 1072, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1175.
897. 119 F.3d 1559, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1398 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
898. Invitrogen Corp., 429 F.3d at 1073, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1175.
899. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1175.
900. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1175 (citing Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1566-69, 43
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1403-08).
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The Federal Circuit rejected the defendant’s argument, finding
that: (1) in addition to the sequence cited in the plaintiff’s
specification, “the sequences of RT genes were known and members
of the RT gene family shared significant homologies from one species
901
of RT to another”; (2) the plaintiff’s specification cites to references
which provide “the known nucleotide sequences of these RT
902
genes”; (3) by January 1988, these RT gene sequences were known
903
in the art; and (4) Eli Lilly and other cases cited by the defendant
involved specifications that did not identify any DNA sequence of
claim, whereas the patents-in-issue cite both a DNA and amino acid
904
sequence of the claimed RT. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held
that the lower court did not err in finding that the plaintiff’s claims
905
satisfied the written description requirements of § 112.
906
The Federal Circuit in Capon v. Eshhar vacated a ruling by the
907
Board. The parties to the original interference proceedings, Daniel
908
Capon and Zelig Eshhar, appealed to the Federal Circuit after the
Board dissolved the interference and invalidated all claims involved
in the interference proceedings, including all claims of Capon’s
909
patents and Eshhar’s patent application.
The Board held that the
specifications in Capon’s patents and in Eshhar’s application failed to
910
The Federal Circuit
satisfy the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112.
disagreed with the Board’s assessment, and it vacated and remanded
911
for further proceedings.
Capon’s and Eshhar’s inventions involved a chimeric gene which
912
artificially sequences “DNA in a way that does not occur in nature.”
913
The
Both inventions have the potential to treat cancer tumors.
Board ruled that Capon’s and Eshhar’s specifications provided the
“functional characteristics” of the inventions but failed to provide a
sufficient description of the “‘structure, formula, chemical name, or
914
physical properties’ of the DNA or proteins.”
Specifically, the
Board commented that the specifications failed because “persons
901.
902.
903.
904.
905.
906.
907.
908.
909.
910.
911.
912.
913.
914.

Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1175 (quoting the district court opinion).
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1175 (internal citation omitted).
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1175.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1176.
Id. at 1073-74, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1176.
418 F.3d 1349, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1078 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1350, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1079.
Id. at 1350-51, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1079.
Id. at 1351, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1079.
Id. at 1354-55, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1082.
Id. at 1350, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1079.
Id. at 1351, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1079.
Id. at 1351-52, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1079-80.
Id. at 1354, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1082 (quoting the Board decision).
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having ordinary skill in the art would not have been able to visualize
and recognize the identity of the claimed genetic material without
considering additional knowledge in the art, performing additional
915
experimentation, and testing to confirm results.”
Focusing on the reasoning behind § 112’s written description
requirement, the Federal Circuit noted that written descriptions serve
to “satisfy the inventor’s obligation to disclose the technologic
knowledge upon which the patent is based, and to demonstrate that
916
the patentee was in possession of the invention that is claimed.”
Section 112, however, does not require that each patentee describe
917
its invention in the same manner.
Instead, the requirements for
satisfaction of § 112 will vary depending on the invention’s “nature
and scope,” as well as the “scientific and technologic knowledge”
918
existing.
Capon and Eshhar argued that the Board erred when it
ruled that § 112 required their specifications to contain a complete
919
nucleotide sequence for at least one of their chimeric genes.
Specifically, Capon and Eshhar asserted that persons experienced in
this field would readily know the nucleotide sequences of the
chimeric genes’ DNA, and that “where the structure and properties
920
of the DNA components were known, reanalysis was not required.”
The Federal Circuit agreed with Capon and Eshhar’s argument,
stating that the “Board’s rule that the nucleotide sequences of the
chimeric genes must be fully presented, although the nucleotide
sequences of the component DNA are known, is an inappropriate
921
generalization.”
Because the court found that Capon’s and
Eshhar’s inventions involved DNA sequences of known function,
requiring this information in their specifications would not “add
922
descriptive substance.” Accordingly, the Federal Circuit ruled that
the Board’s requirement of a nucleotide sequencing of its chimeric
923
gene was in error.
The Federal Circuit then discussed the Board’s argument that
Capon’s and Eshhar’s specifications did not sufficiently encompass
924
and support the full scope of their claims. The Board asserted that
Capon’s and Eshhar’s claims were unacceptably broad considering
915.
916.
917.
918.
919.
920.
921.
922.
923.
924.

Id. at 1355, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1082 (quoting the Board decision).
Id. at 1357, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1084.
Id. at 1358, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1085.
Id. at 1357, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1084.
Id. at 1358, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1085.
Id. at 1356, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1083.
Id. at 1358, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1084.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1085.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1085.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1085.
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the fact that some of the gene combinations included in their claims
925
The Federal
might be inoperable to accomplish their purpose.
Circuit responded that “[i]t is well recognized that in the
‘unpredictable’ fields of science, it is appropriate to recognize the
variability in the science in determining the scope of the coverage to
926
which the inventor is entitled.”
The Federal Circuit presented five factors to assist courts in
assessing whether these “generic” claims to biological subject matter
927
had sufficient support.
These factors are: “(1) the existing
knowledge in the particular field; (2) the extent and content of the
prior art; (3) the maturity of the science or technology; (4) the
predictability of the aspect at issue; and (5) other considerations
928
appropriate to the subject matter.”
Additionally, the court stated
“every permutation within a generally operable invention” need not
929
prove effective, as long as sufficient support is provided.
The Federal Circuit found that both Capon and Eshhar provided
sufficient support, considering that the claims presented general
teachings of selecting and combining DNA, as well as specific
930
examples of how to produce named chimeric genes.
The court
contrasted Capon’s and Eshhar’s generic claims from “wish” or “plan”
claims, where a patentee only presents a desire or a plan to invent
931
what their claims promise.
Therefore, the court rejected the
Board’s argument that Capon’s and Eshhar’s claims were overly
broad, and accordingly vacated and remanded for further
932
proceedings.
933
In Pandrol USA v. Airboss Railway Products, Inc., the Federal Circuit
affirmed judgment of the district court that the patent-in-suit, for a
railroad track fastening system, was not invalid for failure to satisfy
934
the written description requirement.
The patent specification,
describing the preferred embodiment, read as follows:
The improvement of this invention is to provide an abrasion plate
10 between the pad 4 and the tie 1. The plate 10 is smooth edged
and incorporates recesses 11 to fit around the clamp supports or
shoulder 5.
925.
926.
927.
928.
929.
930.
931.
932.
933.
934.

Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1085.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1085.
Id. at 1359, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1085.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1085 (numbering added).
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1085.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1086.
Id. at 1360, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1086.
Id. at 1360-61, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1086-87.
424 F.3d 1161, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1524 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1163, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525.
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The plate 10 may be bonded by layer 12 of adhesive (epoxy resin
adhesives are preferred) to the tie 1 or an HDPE closed cell foam
of 1.5 mm thickness of the same size and shape as plate 10 fitted
935
between plate 10 and tie 1.

The defendant had argued that the written description
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 was not satisfied sufficiently to
support claim terms “adhering material” and “sole means for
936
adhering,” in claim 1.
In an opinion by Judge Rader, the court affirmed summary
judgment that the written description requirement was satisfied.
The purpose of the written description requirement is to prevent
an applicant from later asserting that he invented that which he did
not; the applicant for a patent is therefore required “to recount his
invention in such detail that his future claims can be determined to
937
be encompassed within his original creation.”
The Court applied the “possession test” of Vas-Cath Inc. v.
938
Mahurkar.
With respect to the “adhering material” term, the Court noted the
939
original, unamended description for purposes of § 112.
The
original specification stated:
Preferably the abrasion plate may be adhered to the surface of the
concrete tie to ensure that ingress of abrasive particles and water
onto the surface of the rail tie is avoided.
...
The plate may be bonded to the rail tie or a resilient gasket can be
interposed between the rail tie and the plate.
...
The plate 10 may be bonded by adhesive (epoxy resin adhesives are
preferred) to the tie 1 or an HDPE closed cell foam of 1.5 mm
thickness of the same size and shape as plate 10 is fitted between
940
plate 10 and tie 1.

Thus, the original specification demonstrated that an effective
“adhering material” as was ultimately claimed could be formed using
941
a closed cell foam pad.

935. Id. at 1163-64, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525.
936. Id. at 1164, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525.
937. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1526 (citing Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion
Roussel Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1330, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
938. 935 F.2d 1555, 1561, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1111, 1114 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
939. Pandrol, 424 F.3d at 1165, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1526.
940. Id. at 1166, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527.
941. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527.
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Regarding the “sole means for adhering” limitation, the defendant
had also argued that although the claim required the adhering
material to be the sole means, the specification instead disclosed
mechanical clamps which also exerted force on the rail to hold it in
942
place.
However, the Court noted that the patent showed that the
clams secure the rail at some place, but the clamps still do not
943
“adhere” in the sense of an adhesive.
The specification, it said,
provided adequate distinction between “clamping,” and “adhesion,”
the latter’s purpose being to prevent erosion of the concrete rail tie
944
using a watertight seal.
2. Enablement
945
Warner-Lambert Co. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. involved an
appeal from a district court’s grant of summary judgment holding
that the asserted claims were not invalid under the enablement
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1. On appeal, the defendant, Teva
Pharmaceuticals, argued that the claims were invalid because a
person of ordinary skill in the pharmaceutical field would need to
undertake undue experimentation to create the plaintiff’s claimed
946
invention.
In order to support this contention, the defendant
pointed to expert declarations that had been submitted to the district
947
In addition, the defendant argued that there were many
court.
remaining issues of fact regarding enablement that would have to be
resolved before the court could grant summary judgment on the
948
description’s validity. In particular, the defendant claimed that the
Patent’s written description does not teach a person of skill in the
art how to make and use the full scope of the invention without
undue experimentation . . . because, while the patent claims
numerous combinations of ACE inhibitors, alkali or alkaline earth
metal carbonates, and saccharides, the specification only discloses
two working examples, both of which are based on the same
general combination of quinapril hydrochloride, magnesium
949
carbonate, and lactose.

The defendant further argued that the written description lacked
meaningful guidance to enable a person of skill in the art to create

942.
943.
944.
945.
946.
947.
948.
949.

Id. at 1166, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527.
418 F.3d 1326, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1336, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871.
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appellee’s claimed invention without first performing extensive
950
experimentation.
The Federal Circuit began its analysis by stating that to comply with
the enablement provision of the Patent Act, a written description of
the invention must be described “in such full, clear, concise, and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it
pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use
951
the same.”
The Federal Circuit explained that
[t]he purpose of this requirement is to ensure that
“the public knowledge is enriched by the patent specification to a
degree at least commensurate with the scope of the claims.” . . .
Accordingly, we have held that the specification must provide
sufficient teaching such that one skilled in the art could make and
use the full scope of the invention without undue
952
experimentation.

The Federal Circuit then observed that the defendant was asking it
to review an incomplete record because the district court had not
addressed the issue of enablement in its decision granting the
953
plaintiff’s summary judgment motion.
Thus, in reviewing the
limited record, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s grant
of summary judgment because the defendant had introduced factbased arguments to support its enablement defense that the trial
954
court should have addressed.
955
In Northpoint Technology, Ltd. v. MDS America, Inc., the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of JMOL, agreeing that
substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding that the asserted
claims were not enabled. The claims at issue involved an invention
that permitted users to receive a satellite broadcast signal and a
terrestrial broadcast signal on the same frequency without the signals
956
interfering with each other.
The reception of both signals was
accomplished through the use of two antennas which receive the two
signals “outside the ‘directional reception range’ of the other
957
antenna.”
950. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871.
951. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000)).
952. Id. at 1336-37, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872 (quoting Nat’l Recovery Techs.,
Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1195-96, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d 1671,
1675 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
953. Id. at 1337, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872.
954. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872.
955. 413 F.3d 1301, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
956. Id. at 1304, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1246.
957. Id. at 1304, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1246.

LATHAM.OFFTOPRINTER

2006]

5/20/2006 3:02:04 PM

2005 PATENT SUMMARY

1097

One of the inventors of the asserted patents admitted at trial that
in order to avoid interference between the satellite and the terrestrial
signals, numerous techniques had been used during the first test of
958
Northpoint’s technology.
Specifically, he claimed that such
parameters had been submitted to the FCC, but that the techniques
959
had not been disclosed in the patents.
Testimony from the defendant’s expert contradicted the inventor’s
testimony claiming that a person of skill in the art would have known
960
how to use the techniques without undue experimentation.
Moreover, a report by the Mitre Corporation, a not-for-profit
engineering company hired by the Federal Communications
Commission (“FCC”) to determine whether Northpoint’s technology
961
was feasible without causing interference,
concluded that
techniques in addition to those in Northpoint’s tests were necessary
962
Thus, the court held that the jury’s
to avoid interference.
conclusion that Northpoint’s “techniques for avoiding interference
were not so plain to a person of skill in the art so as to obviate the
need for any enabling disclosure in the patent” was a rational
963
conclusion based on all the evidence that had been presented.
Judge Dyk, however, argued in his dissent, that
The testimony on which the majority relies to sustain the verdict
does no more than establish that experimentation was required to
determine the required power level . . . [and that] MDS presented
no evidence showing that the experimentation conducted on the
Northpoint system was anything but routine, or would be
964
considered undue by one of skill in the art.

The Federal Circuit addressed the dissent’s concerns, explaining
that “[w]hile determining whether the required amount of
experimentation is undue is an inherently imprecise undertaking, the
jury was properly instructed as to its task, and it reached a reasonable
965
conclusion.” The Federal Circuit also recognized that the evidence
“was sufficient to show that elaborate measures, not described or even
adumbrated by the patent, were required to make the claimed
966
invention effective.” According to the Federal Circuit, although no
witness testified in haec verba that the experimentation was “undue,”
958.
959.
960.
961.
962.
963.
964.
965.
966.

Id. at 1309, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1250.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1250.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1250.
Id. at 1305, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1247.
Id. at 1309, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1250-51.
Id. at 1310, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1251.
Id. at 1316-17, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1256-57.
Id. at 1310, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1251.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1251.
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there is “no principle that requires that a witness testify as to that
legal conclusion, as long as the factual showing is sufficient to justify
the jury’s conclusion on the highly factual issue of whether, under all
the circumstances, more than routine experimentation was needed to
967
make the invention work.”
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held
that, because the factual showing was sufficient to justify the jury’s
conclusion, “the district court properly denied Northpoint’s motion
968
for judgment as a matter of law on the enablement issue.”
969
In Rasmusson v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., the Federal Circuit
addressed the issue of enablement in the context of an interference.
The Board held that, for Rasmusson’s patent application at issue,
Rasmusson could not claim priority back to earlier filed
970
applications. Thus, Rasmusson’s application could not defeat the
priority date accorded to SmithKline’s patents and reissue
971
applications. The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that the Board’s
decision was supported by substantial evidence and not contrary to
972
law.
The rationale for the Board’s determination that Rasmusson could
not claim priority back to the earlier applications rested on the fact
that the earlier applications had failed to satisfy the enablement and
973
written description requirements.
The Board found that without
undue experimentation, a person of ordinary skill in the art would
not have believed that finasteride, a chemical compound that
Rasmusen claimed could be used to treat prostate cancer, would be
an effective treatment in light of the state of the art and Rasmusson’s
974
failure to provide data demonstrating such effects.
Rasmusson
argued, however, that because the Board did not make its
determination based on 35 U.S.C. § 101, its finding regarding efficacy
did not support the finding that its application failed to meet the
975
enablement requirement.
The Federal Circuit disagreed,
explaining that “the how to use prong of section 112 incorporates as
a matter of law the requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 101 that the
967. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1251.
968. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1251. Judge Dyk “agree[d] that expert testimony
need not use the word ‘undue’ but it must do more than talk about the absolute
quantity of experimentation. It must suggest that the amount of experimentation
would be considered excessive or not routine by one of ordinary skill in the art.” Id.
at 1318, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1257.
969. 413 F.3d 1318, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
970. Id. at 1320, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1298.
971. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1298.
972. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1298.
973. Id. at 1322, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1299.
974. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1299.
975. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1300.
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specification disclose as a matter of fact a practical utility for the
976
Moreover, the court observed that prior decisions
invention.”
reflect the proposition that “an applicant’s failure to disclose how to
use an invention may support a rejection under either section 112,
paragraph 1 for lack of enablement, or section 101 for lack of utility
when there is a complete absence of data supporting the statements
977
which set forth the desired results of the claimed invention.”
With regard to the Board’s finding that Rasmusson’s prior
applications lacked data, the Federal Circuit explained that in order
to determine whether sufficient utility has been alleged,
substantiating evidence must be presented unless a person of
ordinary skill in the art could determine that the claim was obviously
978
correct.
Elaborating on the relationship between utility and
enablement, the Federal Circuit explained that where no such
showing is made, the applicant fails to prove sufficient utility and
979
thus, enablement.
The evidence relied upon by the Board, which the Federal Circuit
determined to be substantial evidence to support the Board’s
conclusion, included “articles and [expert] testimony to show that a
person of ordinary skill in the art as of the filing date of the eighth
application would not know that 5<<alpha>>R inhibition contributed
to any anti-tumor effects, because it was not clear whether DHT or
980
testosterone caused prostate cancer.” Moreover, the Board looked
at the evidence that was relevant to each applicant’s filing dates to
981
further support the fact that causation had not yet been established.
Commenting on the evidence relied upon by Rasmusson, the Federal
Circuit stated that
The evidence cited by Rasmusson on appeal does not contravene
the Board’s finding, because that evidence is either dated too late
with respect to the respective filing dates of the applications or
pertains only to the use of multi-active inhibitors to treat prostate
cancer. In order to obtain a priority date earlier than June 27,
1990, Rasmusson needed to provide experimental proof that his
invention could be effective in treating cancer.
Because
Rasmusson failed to do so and obtained a priority date only as of
the filing date of his ‘296 application, the Board was correct to find
that all applications prior to that application were not enabled, and
976.
977.
978.
979.
980.
981.

Id. at 1323, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1300.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1300 (internal quotations omitted).
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1300 (internal quotations omitted).
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1300 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 1324, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1301.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1301.
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that Rasmusson is not entitled to a priority date earlier than the
priority date of SmithKline’s ‘310 and ‘553 patents and the
982
corresponding reissue applications.

Regarding the level of proof for showing utility, the Federal Circuit
stated that “[i]f mere plausibility were the test for enablement under
section 112, applicants could obtain patent rights to “inventions”
consisting of little more than respectable guesses as to the likelihood
983
of their success.” “When one of the guesses later proved true,” the
Federal Circuit observed, “the “inventor” would be rewarded the
spoils instead of the party who demonstrated that the method actually
984
worked.”
Such a situation “is not consistent with the statutory
requirement that the inventor enable an invention rather than
985
merely proposing an unproved hypothesis.”
The Board also had determined that SmithKline’s patents and
reissue applications were not anticipated by Rassmuson’s European
patent application because the European application did not meet
986
the enabling requirements.
In particular, “[t]he Board found []
that EP ‘383 does not anticipate those claims because EP ‘383 lacks
an enabling disclosure inasmuch as it fails to demonstrate that
finasteride is effective in treating prostate cancer,” and “provides no
reasonable expectation of success for treating prostate cancer with a
987
5<<ALPHA>>R inhibitor.”
Reversing the Board’s determination that the European
application was not enabling, the Federal Circuit explained that the
standard for proper enablement under § 102 is different than that of
988
§ 112. In particular, a disclosure not specifying in detail how to use
a compound for a specific use or how to use the compound when the
process of producing it is disclosed is, “under the present state of the
law, entirely adequate to anticipate a claim to either the product or
the process and, at the same time, entirely inadequate to support the
989
allowance of such a claim.” The court’s rationale rested on the fact
that unlike § 102 that contained no such requirement, § 112 requires
that the specification enable one skilled in the art to use the
990
invention. As to the disclosure of a prior art reference, it “need not

982.
983.
984.
985.
986.
987.
988.
989.
990.

Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1301.
Id. at 1325, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1301.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1301.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1301.
Id. at 1320, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1298.
Id. at 1325, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302 (citation omitted).
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302 (citation omitted).
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demonstrate utility in order to serve as an anticipating reference
991
under section 102.”
Regarding the disclosure of the European application, the Board
found that no evidence had been produced to prove that an ordinary
person skilled in the art could conclude that the method described in
992
EP ‘383 would have been an effective treatment for prostate cancer.
Nevertheless, “those findings are insufficient to support the Board’s
conclusion that EP ‘383 is not an enabling reference for purposes of
993
anticipation.” Accordingly, the Federal Circuit reversed the Board’s
finding on enablement and remanded the case for the Board to
994
address the issue of anticipation.
However, the Federal Circuit
noted that, in addition to the SmithKline patents and reissue
applications, determining that EP ‘383 constituted an enabling
reference would affect Rasmusson’s ‘296 application given that the
European application had been published more than one year prior
995
to Rasmusson’s patent application.
996
In Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Laboratories, Inc., the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court’s interlocutory ruling that the plaintiff’s
claims-in-suit were not invalid for failing the enablement
997
requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112.
The Court focused on whether
the plaintiff’s claims were enabled even though the plaintiff’s written
description only included instructions on how to create RNase H
minus RT using deletion mutation, and it did not include
instructions regarding point mutation, a method used by the
998
defendant in the production of at least one of its accused products.
In resolving this issue, the Federal Circuit emphasized the purpose
of the enablement requirement and explained that section 112
requires that the “patent specification enable ‘those skilled in the art
to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention without
undue experimentation’ in order to extract meaningful disclosure of
999
the invention and, by this disclosure, advance the technical arts.”
The defendant argued that the plaintiff failed to meet § 112’s
requirements as to the creation of RNase H minus RT using point
991. Id. at 1326, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302.
992. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303.
993. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303.
994. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303.
995. Id. at 1327, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303.
996. 429 F.3d 1052, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
997. Id. at 1071, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174.
998. Id. at 1070, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173.
999. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Genentech, Inc. v. Noro Nordisk, 108 F.3d 1361, 1365, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
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mutation, and therefore, claims involving the creation of RNase H
1000
The Federal
minus RT using this method were not enabled.
Circuit rejected the defendant’s argument, explaining that the
enablement requirement is satisfied if the description enables “any
1001
mode of making and using the invention.”
Accordingly, the
plaintiff’s instruction on deletion mutation was sufficient to satisfy
1002
§ 112’s enablement requirements.
3. Indefiniteness
1003
involved claims
Marley Mouldings Ltd. v. Mikron Industries, Inc.
that “require the volume of wood flour to be measured in connection
1004
with starting ingredients instead of the finished product.”
The
district court construed the term “in parts (volume)” to mean the
“proportional volumetric quantity of one material component to all
1005
other components [within a given formulation.]”
The district
court then held the claims invalid for indefiniteness “because the
means to calculate the percent volume of wood flour, a critical
determination to discerning whether the final product has been
produced by the claimed process and necessary to the practice of the
invention, was not specified in the patent and could not be discerned
1006
by the specification.”
On appeal, the Federal Circuit first noted that the definiteness
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 is satisfied “if a person skilled in
the field of the invention would reasonably understand the claim
1007
when read in the context of the specification.”
The court observed
that:
The parties and the district court agree that in accordance with
claim 1, the minimum amount of wood flour in the first stage of
the claimed process is 11.1% by volume (15 parts of 135 total
parts). They agree that the minimum amount of wood flour for
1008
the second stage is 10.7% by volume (15 parts of 140 total parts).

The Federal Circuit concluded that the district court erred, as a
matter of law, “in requiring that the specification describe the
1000. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173.
1001. Id. at 1071, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174 (quoting Johns Hopkins Univ. v.
CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1361, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1719 (Fed. Cir.
1998)).
1002. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174.
1003. 417 F.3d 1356, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1954 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
1004. Id. at 1358, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1955.
1005. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1955 (quoting Marley Mouldings Ltd. v. Mikron
Indus., Inc., No. 02-C-2855, 2004 WL 416359, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 2004)).
1006. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1955 (citation omitted).
1007. Id. at 1359, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1956.
1008. Id. at 1360, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1957 (footnote omitted).
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relationship between volume and weight of the wood filler used or
1009
explaining that “[w]hen a claim is not
usable in the process,”
1010
insolubly ambiguous, it is not invalid for indefiniteness.”
1011
In Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., the issue was whether
the term “aesthetically pleasing” was indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
1012
In affirming the district court’s holding of invalidity, the
¶ 2.
Federal Circuit began by observing that the definiteness requirement
ensures that the claims define the scope of the invention using
language that sufficiently notifies the public of the patentee’s “right
1013
to exclude.”
The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that
the “ordinary meaning of ‘aesthetically pleasing’ includes . . .
1014
Addressing the plaintiff’s arguments, the Federal
beautiful.”
Circuit reasoned that the plaintiff was correct in “point[ing] out that
the phrase ‘aesthetically pleasing’ should be considered in the
context of claim 1. Claim construction involves reviewing the
1015
intrinsic evidence of record, including the claim language itself.”
After reviewing the claim language, the Federal Circuit explained
that:
This context, while helpful in terms of identifying the components
of the claimed invention that must be “aesthetically pleasing,” does
not suggest or provide any meaningful definition for the phrase
“aesthetically pleasing” itself.
Merely understanding that
“aesthetically pleasing” relates to the look and feel of interface
screens, or more specifically to the aggregate layout of elements on
interface screens, fails to provide one of ordinary skill in the art
with any way to determine whether an interface screen is
1016
“aesthetically pleasing.”

The Federal Circuit then rejected the plaintiff’s invitation to
“adopt a construction of ‘aesthetically pleasing’ that only depends on
the subjective opinion of a person selecting features to be included
1017
on an interface screen.”
The Federal Circuit further explained that the plaintiff failed to
provide an objective standard for identifying when an interface
screen is “aesthetically pleasing,” and that without such a standard
1009. Id. at 1361, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1957.
1010. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1957 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Bancorp Servs., LLC v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 359 F.3d 1367, 1371, 69
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1996, 1999 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
1011. 417 F.3d 1342, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
1012. Id. at 1347, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1804.
1013. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1804 (citation omitted).
1014. Id. at 1348, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1805.
1015. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1805.
1016. Id. at 1349, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1806.
1017. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1806.
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“aesthetically pleasing” is dependent upon an individual’s subjective
1018
The Federal Circuit emphasized that an objective
opinion.
standard is essential to permit “the public to determine the scope of
1019
the claimed invention.”
The Federal Circuit then noted that:
A purely subjective construction of “aesthetically pleasing” would
not notify the public of the patentee’s right to exclude since the
meaning of the claim language would depend on the
unpredictable vagaries of any one person’s opinion of the
aesthetics of interface screens. While beauty is in the eye of the
beholder, a claim term, to be definite, requires an objective
anchor. Thus, even if we adopted a completely subjective
construction of “aesthetically pleasing,” this would still render [the
1020
asserted patent] invalid.

The Federal Circuit, addressing the specification, determined that
the written description only indicated that there are “good standards
of aesthetics” and thus failed to provide an objective standard to
1021
determine whether an interface screen is “aesthetically pleasing.”
The Federal Circuit explained that without referring to “the
considered opinions of aesthetic design specialists, database
specialists, and academic studies on public access kiosk systems and
user preferences and problems,’ [there is no indication as to] how to
determine, for example, what button styles, sizes, and placements are
1022
‘aesthetically pleasing.’”
The Federal Circuit thus concluded that:
Reference to undefined standards, regardless of whose views might
influence the formation of those standards, fails to provide any
direction to one skilled in the art attempting to determine the
scope of the claimed invention. In short, the definition of
“aesthetically pleasing” cannot depend on the undefined views of
unnamed persons, even if they are experts, specialists, or
academics. Thus, the written description does not provide any
1023
reasonable, definite construction of “aesthetically pleasing.”

The Federal Circuit, addressing the extrinsic evidence, reasoned
that “even the expert could not determine whether the look and feel
of particular interface screens are ‘aesthetically pleasing’ using the
parameters he specified, instead testifying that whether an interface
screen is ‘aesthetically pleasing’ is a ‘multidimensional question’ that

1018.
1019.
1020.
1021.
1022.
1023.

Id. at 1350, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807.
Id. at 1350-51, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807.
Id. at 1352, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1808.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1808.
Id. at 1352-53, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1808.
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is ‘not amenable to a single-word answer.’”
The Federal Circuit
thus concluded that the expert’s own inability to use the parameters
he established to determine whether an interface screen is
“aesthetically pleasing” weighs against using those parameters to
1025
delineate the scope of the invention.
1026
the Federal Circuit
In Group One Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc.,
affirmed the trial court’s decision that one of the patents in suit was
1027
indefinite.
During prosecution of the patent claiming a device for
curling ribbon, the applicant amended the claims to add language to
1028
one of the claim limitations.
However, due to a printing error at
1029
The district
the PTO, this language was omitted from the patent.
1030
court had determined that it lacked authority to correct this error.
In affirming the district court, the Federal Circuit determined that
1031
the PTO had authority to correct the error under 35 U.S.C. § 254,
1032
and that Group One “failed to seek correction from the PTO.”
The Federal Circuit acknowledged that the district court can correct
an error retroactively, but only where “the error is evident from the
1033
face of the patent.”
The Federal Circuit found that the error here
was not evident from the face of the patent because even though the
missing language was required to be added by the examiner as a
condition for issuance, one could not determine what language was
1034
omitted by simply reading the patent.
The district court found that
the missing language was essential to the patent’s validity, and Group

1024. Id. at 1354, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1809.
1025. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1809. The Federal Circuit also rejected
plaintiff’s attempt to rely on the understanding of “aesthetically pleasing” derived
from design patent law:
Use of the phrase “aesthetically pleasing” in design patent law relates to the
threshold question of patentability. A design patent protects a particular
ornamental, or “aesthetically pleasing” as opposed to functional, design. In
contrast, a utility patent protects “any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof,” . . . the scope of which is defined by the patent’s written claims . . . .
In light of this basic difference between design patent law and utility patent
law, it is clear that the understanding of “aesthetically pleasing” used in
design patent law bears no reasonable relationship to utility patent law
generally.
Id. at 1354-55, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1810 (citations omitted).
1026. 407 F.3d 1297, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1759 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
1027. Id. at 1302, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1763.
1028. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1763.
1029. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1763.
1030. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1763.
1031. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1763.
1032. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1763.
1033. Id. at 1302-03, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1763.
1034. Id. at 1303, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1764.
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1035

One did not challenge that finding.
Accordingly, the Federal
1036
Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination of invalidity.
1037
In Default Proof Credit Card Sys., Inc. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., the
Federal Circuit addressed the issue of indefiniteness in the context of
35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 means-plus-function limitations. Default Proof
Credit’s patent claimed a point-of-sale machine that allows a user to
1038
obtain prepaid debit cards.
The claim at issue included “the
1039
The
‘means for dispensing at least one debit card’ limitation.”
district court granted summary judgment of invalidity for
indefiniteness on the ground that the patent specification failed to
1040
disclose any structure corresponding to this limitation.
The Federal Circuit first explained the relationship between
means-plus-function claiming and indefiniteness:
If one employs means-plus-function language in a claim, one must
set forth in the specification an adequate disclosure showing what
is meant by that language. If an applicant fails to set forth an
adequate disclosure, the applicant has in effect failed to
particularly point out and distinctly claim the invention as required
1041
by the second paragraph of section 112.

The court then put forth the standard for determining whether the
specification adequately discloses corresponding structure:
A structure disclosed in the specification qualifies as
“corresponding” structure only if the specification or prosecution
history clearly links or associates that structure to the function
recited in the claim. This duty to link or associate structure to
function is the quid pro quo for the convenience of employing § 112,
¶ 6. “Fulfillment of the § 112, ¶ 6 trade-off cannot be satisfied
when there is a total omission of structure.” While corresponding
structure need not include all things necessary to enable the
claimed invention to work, it must include all structure that
1042
actually performs the recited function.

The Federal Circuit explained that “[t]o meet the definiteness
requirement, structure disclosed in the specification must be clearly
linked to and capable of performing the function claimed by the
1035. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1764.
1036. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1764.
1037. 412 F.3d 1291, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
1038. Id. at 1293, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1118.
1039. Id. at 1292-93, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1117.
1040. Id. at 1296, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120.
1041. Id. at 1298, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1121 (quoting In re Donaldson Co., 16
F.3d 1189, 1995, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1845, 1850 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc)).
1042. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1121 (quoting Atmel Corp. v. Info. Storage
Devices, Inc., 198 F.3d 1374, 1382, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1230 (Fed. Cir.
1999)).
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1043

means-plus-function limitation.”
The only structure the Federal
Circuit could find in the specification that performed the function of
1044
The plaintiff did not
distributing debit cards was a “dispenser.”
argue that the dispenser constituted the corresponding structure for
the limitation, but instead argued that it was certain parts of the
1045
point-of-sale terminal (“POS terminal”).
The Federal Circuit
disagreed, finding that “[t]he intrinsic evidence demonstrates that
the POS terminal and any structure for distributing debit cards exists
separately,” and that “[b]oth the structure and the language of claim
1 indicate that the point-of-sale assembly and dispensing means
1046
constitute separate components.”
Moreover, the court stated that
none of the components of the POS terminal were described in the
1047
specification.
The plaintiff offered expert testimony to the effect that the POS
terminal includes several alternative structures corresponding to the
1048
“means for dispensing.”
The Federal Circuit was not persuaded,
however, because those alternative structures were not detailed in the
1049
The court explained “[t]he district court committed
specification.
no error in refusing to rely on statements unsupported, and, in fact,
contradicted by the intrinsic record. As this court has repeatedly
cautioned, extrinsic evidence cannot be used to vary the plain
1050
language of the patent document.”
Furthermore, it determined
that “the specification of the ‘182 patent discloses no structure
capable of dispensing cards” and that plaintiff’s expert’s “conclusory
1051
testimony cannot compensate for such lack of disclosure . . . .”
The plaintiff also argued (through its expert) that the
corresponding structure was disclosed in a patent incorporated into
1052
the specification by reference.
The Federal Circuit, however, held
that “material incorporated by reference cannot provide the
corresponding structure necessary to satisfy the definiteness
1053
requirement for a means-plus-function clause.”
Rather,
The inquiry under § 112, ¶ 2, does not turn on whether a patentee
has “incorporated by reference” material into the specification
1043.
1044.
1045.
1046.
1047.
1048.
1049.
1050.
1051.
1052.
1053.

Id. at 1299, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1122.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1122.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1122.
Id. at 1299-1300, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1122.
Id. at 1300, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1123.
Id. at 1300-01, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1123.
Id. at 1301, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1123.
Id. at 1302, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1124.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1124.
Id. at 1301, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1123.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1123.
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relating to structure, but instead asks first “whether structure is
described in specification, and, if so, whether one skilled in the art
1054
would identify the structure from that description.”

The Federal Circuit concluded:
In sum, while it is true that the patentee need not disclose details of
structures well known in the art, the specification must nonetheless
disclose some structure. Stated differently, the testimony of one of
ordinary skill in the art cannot supplant the total absence of
structure from the specification. Because the specification of the
‘182 patent discloses no structure corresponding to the claimed
function of the “means for dispensing,” Default Proof cannot use
the declaration of its expert to rewrite the patent’s specification.
1055
We thus hold claim 1 invalid as indefinite.
1056

In Hoffer v. Microsoft Corp.,
the Federal Circuit considered the
issue of whether a claim, written in independent form but
erroneously referring to the wrong claim number upon which it
depends, is rendered indefinite. The claim at issue, claim 22, read,
“[a] method in accordance with claim 38 . . . .” when it should have
1057
stated “[a] method in accordance with claim 21. . . .”
The district
court found that the error arose from the failure of the PTO to
correct the claim number in the text of the claim when it
1058
renumbered the claims in preparation for printing.
The parties
did not dispute that the PTO was responsible for the error.
Subsequently, the patentee obtained a certificate of correction in
accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 254 (2000) to change the claim language
after the action was filed.
Although the district court held that it was “powerless” to correct
1059
the error in claim 22, the Federal Circuit disagreed. It concluded
that
Absent evidence of culpability or intent to deceive by delaying
formal correction, a patent should not be invalidated based on an
obvious administrative error . . . . When a harmless error in a
patent is not subject to reasonable debate, it can be corrected by
1060
the court, as for other legal documents.

The Federal Circuit thus reversed the district court’s holding that
1061
claim 22 was indefinite.
1054.
1055.
1056.
1057.
1058.
1059.
1060.
1061.

Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1123 (citation omitted).
Id. at 1302, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1124 (internal references omitted).
405 F.3d 1326, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1331, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485.
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1062

In Howmedica Osteonics Corp. v. Tranquil Prospects, Ltd.,
the
plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that it did not infringe two of
the defendant’s patents directed to intramedullary prosthesis
apparatuses, which were used for replacement of the ball of the hip
joint and methods for surgical orthopedic implantation of an
1063
Both patents at issue shared the same
intramedullary prosthesis.
specification and the claims in both patents required that the
“transverse sectional dimensions” of the prosthesis constitute certain
percentages of the “transverse sectional dimensions” of the medullary
1064
canal, defined by the cortical bone.
The district court held that
the use of the term “transverse sectional dimensions” rendered the
1065
Although it was understood that
claims of both patents indefinite.
a “transverse section” is a slice taken perpendicular to the vertical axis
of the bone, the district court concluded that it was unclear whether
the “dimensions” of the transverse section referred to in the claims
1066
were the diameter or the cross-section of such slice.
The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that “one of ordinary skill in
the art would readily ascertain from the written description of the
patents that the ‘transverse sectional dimension’ calls for a two1067
dimensional [cross-sectional] measurement.”
It based this
conclusion on its findings that the specifications made it “abundantly
clear” that the invention required a very tight fit for the prosthesis in
1068
the medullary canal.
The court reasoned that “[g]iven the choice
between a construction of ‘transverse sectional dimensions’ that
would require a relatively loose fit and a construction that would
require a much tighter fit, the record shows that one of skill in the art
1069
would readily understand and adopt the latter construction.”
Because a two-dimensional measurement “provides the snug fit that is
the centerpiece of this invention” the court found that the “proper
and evident” construction of “transverse sectional dimensions” would
1070
refer to the cross-sectional area of the transverse sections.
It found
additional support for its conclusion that the claims were not
indefinite in the fact that there were numerous references in the
1071
prosecution history of both patents to “cross-sectional area.”
1062.
1063.
1064.
1065.
1066.
1067.
1068.
1069.
1070.
1071.

401 F.3d 1367, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1680 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1368, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681.
Id. at 1368-70, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682-83.
Id. at 1371, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684.
Id. at 1372, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685.
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Although these references occurred during reexamination
proceedings and therefore did not “directly address the definiteness
requirement—an assessment relevant to the time of filing,” they were
still relevant to the meaning, which one of skill of the art would
1072
attribute to the claims at the time of filing.
1073
In SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., SmithKline accused
Apotex of infringing its patent directed to “paroxetine hydrochloride
hemihydrate” (“PHC”) by filing an Abbreviated New Drug
Application (“ANDA”) with the FDA under 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2000)
seeking approval to market its own generic version of PHC
1074
anhydrate.
The only claim at issue, claim 1, read: “Crystalline
1075
Although Apotex listed
paroxetine hydrochloride hemihydrate.”
the anhydrous form of PHC as the active ingredient in its proposed
drug product, SmithKline asserted that Apotex’s product would
nevertheless infringe because it would inevitably contain trace
amounts of PHC hemihydrate as a result of a chemical conversion
1076
process.
The district court rejected SmithKline’s proposed construction of
claim 1 to include even trace, undetectable amounts of PHC
hemihydrate. Among other reasons, the district court found that
such a construction would render claim 1 indefinite because a
potential infringer would not know how to determine whether it
1077
infringed or avoid infringement.
The Federal Circuit rejected this
analysis, finding the district court’s concerns regarding the
definiteness of claim 1 to miss the mark. The Federal Circuit found
that claim 1 covers a definite chemical structure, and that to a
chemist in this field, “this claim is plain on its face” and thus meets
1078
the definiteness requirement.
It explained that the “test for
indefiniteness does not depend on a potential infringer’s ability to
ascertain the nature of its own accused product to determine
infringement, but instead on whether the claim delineates to a skilled
1079
Thus, even if a claim’s scope
artisan the bounds of the invention.”
is so broad that it covers undetectable amounts of a claimed
1080
invention, “[b]readth is not indefiniteness.”
1072. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685.
1073. 403 F.3d 1331, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1398 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
1074. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1399-1400; see supra Part II.B.1 (summarizing
SmithKline’s factual history).
1075. Id. at 1334, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1400.
1076. Id. at 1335, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1400.
1077. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1400.
1078. Id. at 1340, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1404.
1079. Id. at 1340-41, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1404.
1080. Id. at 1341, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1404 (quoting In re Gardner, 427 F.2d
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The court in IPXL Holdings, L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc., dealt with
an issue of first impression and affirmed the lower court’s finding
that one of the plaintiff’s, IPXL Holdings, claims was indefinite under
1081
35 U.S.C. § 112.
One of these claims included a claimed system, as
1082
The Federal Circuit noted
well as a method for using that system.
that “[w]hether a single claim covering both an apparatus and a
method of use of that apparatus is invalid is an issue of first
1083
impression in this court.”
It looked to the Board, which held that
under § 112 a claim containing an apparatus and a method of use
1084
rendered the claim indefinite.
The Board reasoned, and the court
accepted, that
as a result of the combination of two separate statutory classes of
invention, a manufacturer or seller of the claimed apparatus would
not know from the claim whether it might also be liable for
contributory infringement because a buyer or user of the apparatus
1085
later performs the claimed method of using the apparatus.

Looking to the plaintiff’s actual claim, the court found that it did
1086
include both an apparatus and a method of use.
The plaintiff’s
claim read:
The system of claim 2 [including an input means] wherein the
predicted transaction information comprises both a transaction
type and transaction parameters associated with that transaction
type, and the user uses the input means to either change the predicted
transaction information or accept the displayed transaction type
1087
and transaction parameters.

Because it is unclear whether infringement occurs when one
creates a system similar to that described in the claim, or whether it
occurs when one uses the input means, the Federal Circuit found
1088
that the claim was invalid for indefiniteness.
E. Reissue
At issue in North American Container, Inc. v. Plastipak Packaging,
1089
Inc.,
was whether the lower court correctly granted summary
786, 788, 166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 138, 140 (C.C.P.A. 1970)).
1081. 430 F.3d 1377, 1378, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1140, 1141 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
1082. Id. at 1379, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1141.
1083. Id. at 1384, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145.
1084. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145.
1085. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145.
1086. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145.
1087. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145 (citing U.S. Patent No. 6,149,055 col.22 ll.813 (filed June 26, 1996)) (emphasis in original).
1088. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145.
1089. 415 F.3d 1335, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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judgment to the defendants on finding that the plaintiff’s reissue
1090
The plaintiff,
claims were invalid for violating the recapture rule.
North American Container, Inc., brought suit alleging infringement
1091
of its patent involving one-piece plastic bottles.
The defendants
manufactured and distributed plastic blow-molded bottles, both
1092
Footed bottles “have appendages
“footed” and “non-footed.”
extending from the base portion” of the bottle, while non-footed
bottles do not have this appendage, but instead rest on their base
1093
portion.
The plaintiff alleged that the defendants’ bottles
1094
infringed on the technology covered by the plaintiff’s patent.
The
plaintiff’s patent improved upon prior art by making it less likely that
a carbonated beverage would distort or fracture the blow-molded
bottle holding it, and also reduced production costs by lowering the
1095
amount of manufacturing materials needed for production.
The PTO rejected the plaintiff’s original patent application
affiliated with the patent-at-issue, as obvious in view of two other
1096
patents (the “Dechenne patent” and the “Jakobsen patent”).
The
plaintiff amended its claims in response to include that the inner
1097
walls of its plastic bottles were “generally convex.”
The plaintiff
further argued that the shape of its bottle differed from the
Dechenne and Jakobsen patents because the Dechenne patent had
walls that were “slightly concave,” and the Jakobsen patent had a re1098
entrant portion which was “concave in its entirety.”
Based on these
distinguishing factors, the examiner granted the plaintiff’s patent
1099
1100
application.
Within the two-year allowance of 35 U.S.C. § 251,
the plaintiff filed a reissue application, keeping the original claims,
1101
In these new claims, the plaintiff
and adding fourteen new claims.
1102
eliminated the “generally convex” limitation.
Manufacturers and
distributors filed protests and argued that these new claims violated
the recapture rule by allowing the plaintiff to eliminate subject
matter from the reissue claims that it added to its claims during the
1090.
1091.
1092.
1093.
1094.
1095.
1096.
1097.
1098.
1099.
1100.
1101.
1549.
1102.

Id. at 1338, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547.
Id. at 1340-41, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549.
Id. at 1341, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549.
Id. at 1338, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547.
Id. at 1340, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d at (BNA) 1548.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549.
Reissue of Defective Patents, 35 U.S.C. § 215 (2000).
North American Container Inc., 1335 F.3d at 1340, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549.
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original prosecution in order to distinguish its invention from prior
1103
However, the examiner rejected the protests, finding that the
art.
1104
term “generally convex” was not a “critical limitation.”
The district court ruled the plaintiff’s reissue claims invalid for
1105
violating the recapture rule.
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that
the lower court did not give the examiner’s determination sufficient
1106
deference.
The Federal Circuit prefaced its review by providing
the three factor rule to determine whether reissue claims violate the
1107
These factors are: (1) whether “the reissue claims
recapture rule.
are broader in scope than the originally-issued [patent] claims”;
(2) whether “the broader aspect of the reissue claims relate[] to
subject matter that was surrendered during prosecution of the
original-filed claims”; and (3) whether “the reissue claims were not
narrowed with respect to the “inner wall” limitation, thus avoiding
1108
the recapture rule.”
Applying these factors, the Federal Circuit
affirmed that the plaintiff’s reissue claims violated the recapture
1109
rule.
First, the Federal Circuit found that the plaintiff broadened
the reissue claims by deleting the limitation that required its bottle’s
1110
inner walls to be “generally convex.”
Second, the Federal Circuit
found that this broadness directly related to subject matter that the
plaintiff surrendered during the prosecution of its original patent
1111
application.
The plaintiff added the “generally convex” limitation
to its original claims to distinguish it from prior art, and thus, have its
1112
Lastly, the Federal Circuit found no
application approved.
evidence that the plaintiff narrowed the “inner wall” limitation in any
1113
other way in order to avoid the recapture rule.
The Federal Circuit also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the
lower court erred by failing to give the patent examiner due
1114
deference.
The Federal Circuit found the examiner’s reasoning to
“demonstrate[] the examiner’s inattention to the rule against
recapture,” as the “generally convex” limitation was the only factor
1115
that allowed the plaintiff to overcome an obviousness objection.
1103.
1104.
1105.
1106.
1107.
1108.
1109.
1110.
1111.
1112.
1113.
1114.
1115.

Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549.
Id. at 1349, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1556.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1556.
Id. at 1350, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1557.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1557.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1556-57.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1557.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1557.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1557.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1557.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1557.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1557.
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Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed that the plaintiff’s reissue
1116
claims were invalid for violating the recapture rule.
F. Inventorship
1117

In Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. All-Tag Security S.A., the district court
ruled that the patent in suit was invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) as
incorrectly listing Paul R. Jorgenson as the sole inventor. All-Tag
Security argued that Franz H. Pichl and Lukas A. Geiges were also
1118
inventors.
Pichl and Geiges worked for Actron when the
1119
Jorgenson worked for
application for the patent in suit was filed.
1120
Durago, a supplier to Actron, when the patent was filed.
During
prosecution of the application, Jorgenson filed a small entity
declaration stating that he declared that he was an independent
1121
inventor.
Pichl and Geiges filed small entity declarations with the
1122
patent office stating that they assigned all Actron rights to Durago.
Actron later acquired Durago, and Checkpoint later acquired Actron,
and thus Checkpoint, the plaintiff, became the owner of the
1123
patent.
Pichl later left and formed All-Tag, a defendant in this
1124
Jorgenson, Pichl, and Geiges subsequently signed
case.
declarations stating that Jorgenson was not the sole inventor, that
Pichl was also an inventor, and that Pichl was intentionally left off of
1125
the application because of the parties’ competitive relationship.
Based on these declarations, the district court determined there was
no factual dispute that Pichl was intentionally omitted from the
1126
patent, and granted summary judgment of invalidity.
Checkpoint
argued that there was a material factual dispute, namely, Jorgenson’s
1127
inconsistent declarations.
In defense of the district court’s ruling,
All-Tag and Sensormatic, also a defendant, argued that because the
declarations admitted that the original PTO declaration were false,

1116. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1557.
1117. 412 F.3d 1331, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1200 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
1118. See id. at 1333-34, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1201-02 (noting that the district
court relied on statements from Pichl and Geiges, asserting that Jorgenson was a
“joint-inventor” with Pichl and not the “sole inventor”).
1119. Id. at 1334, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1202.
1120. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1202.
1121. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1202.
1122. Id. at 1334-35, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1202.
1123. Id. at 1335, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1202.
1124. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1202.
1125. Id. at 1333, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1201.
1126. Id. at 1338, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1205.
1127. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1205.
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and Checkpoint offered no rebuttal, summary judgment was
1128
proper.
The Federal Circuit agreed with Checkpoint that there was a
material factual dispute:
The matter can be put simply: defendants proffer the 2002
declarations which state that Jorgensen and Pichl are co-inventors.
Checkpoint proffers the original PTO declarations which recite
Jorgensen as the sole inventor. Thus, there is flatly contradictory
evidence relating to the matter critical for determining whether the
‘555 patent is invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(f).1129

To accept as true the more recent declarations would be “to accept
as true testimony proffered by the movant for summary judgment,
when it is elementary that on summary judgment all evidence and
1130
inferences are to be drawn in the non-movant’s favor.”
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of
1131
summary judgment.
Checkpoint also argued that All-Tag should be barred from
challenging the inventorship of the patent due to the doctrine of
1132
assignor estoppel.
The Federal Circuit explained that: “[t]he
doctrine of assignor estoppel prevents a party that assigns a patent to
1133
another from later challenging the validity of the assigned patent.”
Additionally, under the doctrine of assignor estoppel, “[p]arties in
1134
privity with the assignor are also barred from challenging validity.”
The Federal Circuit observed that “[p]rivity may be established where
there is a close relationship among the relevant parties, such as where
the ‘ultimate infringer availed itself of the inventor’s knowledge and
1135
assistance to conduct infringement.’”
In recognizing the policy
underlying the doctrine, the Federal Circuit stated that “[t]he
doctrine ‘prevents the unfairness and injustice of permitting a party
to sell something and later to assert that what was sold is
1136
worthless.’”
Checkpoint argued that Jorgenson’s relationship with Pichl and his
work on behalf of All-Tag created the necessary privity and thus
1128. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1205.
1129. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1205.
1130. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1205.
1131. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1205.
1132. Id. at 1336, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1203.
1133. Id. at 1336-37, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204.
1134. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204.
1135. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204 (citing Intel Corp. v. United States Int’l
Trade Comm’n, 946 F.2d 821, 839, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1176 (Fed. Cir.
1995)).
1136. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204 (citing Intel Corp., 946 F.2d at 839, 20
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1176).

LATHAM.OFFTOPRINTER

1116

5/20/2006 3:02:04 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:1001

1137

triggered the doctrine of assignor estopppel.
The district court
previously ruled that the other defendant, Sensormatic, was not in
privity, that it had established invalidity, and that the patent was
1138
therefore invalid as to All-Tag as well.
Since the Federal Circuit
reversed the grant of summary judgment of invalidity, it remanded to
1139
the district court the issue of assignor estoppel.
The plaintiff also argued that Jorgenson, Pichl, and Geiges should
not be allowed to testify as to the invalidity of the patent, and that no
party should be able to rely upon their declarations or testimony to
1140
invalidate the patent.
The Federal Circuit disagreed, concluding
that it would be unwise to create a rule barring testimony of the kind
provided by Jorgenson, Pichl, and Geiges in their 2002 declarations
and that “[a] party, such as Sensormatic, that is not barred by
assignor estoppel from challenging the validity of the patent, should
be able to at least proffer all otherwise admissible evidence in support
1141
of its case.”
The Federal Circuit noted that Checkpoint would have
1142
the opportunity to cross-examine each of the declarants.
G. Double Patenting
1143

Perricone v. Medicis Pharmaceutical Corp. involved an appeal from a
district court’s grant of summary judgment that claims for treating
skin sunburn were invalid for double patenting. The Federal Circuit
began its analysis by canvassing the background law of double
patenting:
The double patenting doctrine generally prevents a patentee from
receiving two patents for the same invention. Thus, this doctrine
polices the proper application of the patent term for each
invention. The proscription against double patenting takes two
1144
forms: statutory and non-statutory.

The Federal Circuit explained that statutory double patenting, also
called “same invention” double patenting, is based on the language
of the Patent Act requiring a patent for any new and useful
1145
invention.
The Federal Circuit explained that non-statutory
double patenting, also called “obviousness-type” double patenting, “is

1137.
1138.
1139.
1140.
1141.
1142.
1143.
1144.
1145.

Id. at 1337, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204.
432 F.3d 1360, 1372-73, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1322-23 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1372, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323.
Id. at 1372-73, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323.
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a judicially created doctrine adopted to prevent claims in separate
applications or patents that do not recite the ‘same’ invention, but
nonetheless claim inventions so alike that granting both exclusive
1146
rights would effectively extend the life of patent protection.”
Noting that the appeal involved non-obviousness type double
patenting, the Federal Circuit summarized the district court’s analysis
of the differences between the plaintiff’s two sets of claims:
(1) claim 9 of the ‘063 patent teaches a method for treatment of
certain skin disorders, while claim 1 of the ‘693 patent teaches a
method for treatment of sunburn; (2) claim 9 of the ‘063 patent
recites the use of “an effective amount of an ascorbyl fatty acid
ester . . .,” while claim 1 of the ‘693 patent teaches applying an
ascorbyl fatty acid ester “effective to solubilize in the lipid-rich
layers of the skin an amount effective to scavenge free radicals
present as a result of the transfer of energy to the skin from the
ultraviolet radiation which produced [the] sunburn”; and (3) claim
9 of the ‘063 patent recites the use of “a dermatologically
acceptable, fat-penetrating carrier such that the ester is
percutaneously delivered to lipid-rich layers of the skin,” while the
1147
‘693 patent does not explicitly recite the use of a carrier.

With regard to the differences between the two sets of claims, the
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s analysis, explaining that
because sunburn is a kind of skin damage, there was no error in the
district court’s determination that the earlier species rendered “the
1148
later genus claims invalid under non-statutory double patenting.”
The Federal Circuit also explained that the district court properly
analyzed the genus-species relationship between the claims:
The district court interpreted the language of claim 16 reciting
various tocotrienols, and concluded that it “refers to certain forms
of tocopherols, or Vitamin E.” Thus, the district court did not
improperly conclude that a species was obvious in light of an
earlier claim to a genus but correctly concluded that there was no
patentable distinction between the language of claim 16 of the ‘063
patent and claim 7 of the ‘693 patent. This court finds no error in
1149
that analysis.

Finally, in affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment
on double patenting, the Federal Circuit observed that “the preissuance timing requirement of a terminal disclaimer to overcome a
double patenting rejection does not dictate a prohibition on post1146.
1147.
1148.
1149.

Id. at 1373, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324.
Id. at 1374, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325.
Id. at 1374-75, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325 (internal citations omitted).

LATHAM.OFFTOPRINTER

1118

5/20/2006 3:02:04 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:1001

1150

issuance terminal disclaimers.” The Federal Circuit concluded that
a terminal disclaimer can overcome an invalidity finding for double
1151
patenting.
However, the Federal Circuit reasoned that the appellate record
did not contain evidence of a disclaimer despite the district court’s
1152
invalidation of the claims two years prior.
Thus, while the court
recognized that the plaintiff could still file a terminal disclaimer to
overcome prospectively invalidity for double patenting, the court did
not make a determination on the retrospective effect of such a
1153
disclaimer.
H. Certificate of Correction
1154

In ArthroCare Corp. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., the defendant argued
that a patent was invalid because it was impermissibly broadened by a
certificate of correction. The claims of the patent, as originally
issued, required an electrosurgical device with three electrodes,
which was changed to two electrodes through the certificate of
1155
correction.
Essentially, the term “active electrode” was amended to
1156
“electrode terminal” in some, but not all, instances in the claims.
According to the Federal Circuit, “[t]he correction of a ministerial
error in the claims, which also serves to broaden the claims, is
allowable if it is ‘clearly evident from the specifications, drawings, and
prosecution history how the error should appropriately be corrected’
1157
to one of skill in the art.”
In this case, the Federal Circuit reasoned that the first claim of the
patent at issue would not make sense if interpreted to have three
electrodes instead of two. “The whole point of the patent is to use
the electrode terminal and return electrode to apply a voltage across
the tissue; a third type of electrode would serve no apparent
purpose,” and that “the specification refers to ‘electrode terminal’
1158
and ‘active electrode’ interchangeably.”
It was clear to the court
that the typographical error in the original claims could have been

1150. Id. at 1375, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325.
1151. Id. at 1375, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325.
1152. Id. at 1375, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325.
1153. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325.
1154. 406 F.3d 1365, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
1155. Id. at 1374, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1757.
1156. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1757.
1157. Id. at 1374-75, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1757 (quoting Superior Fireplace Co.
v. Majestic Prods. Co., 270 F.3d 1358, 1373, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d 1668, 1678 (Fed. Cir.
2001)).
1158. Id. at 1375, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1757.
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1159

corrected.
Moreover, “[t]he change of the term ‘active electrode’
to ‘electrode terminal’ was made before any examination on the
merits, and the uncontroverted evidence establishes that it was meant
1160
to be a global renaming.”
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court’s denial of JMOL of invalidity as to this
1161
patent.
III. INFRINGEMENT
A. Claim Construction
1162

In Merck & Co., Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., plaintiff
sued the defendant for constructive patent infringement after
defendant had submitted an Abbreviated New Drug Application
(“ANDA”) seeking FDA approval to market generic versions of
plaintiff’s once-weekly method of treating osteoporosis through the
1163
oral administration of alendronate monosodium trihydrate.
Two
claims of plaintiff’s patent were at issue, particularly the construction
of the terms “about 70 mg of alendronate monosodium trihydrate”
1164
and “about 35 mg of alendronate monosodium trihydrate.”
The
district court held that plaintiff had “acted as its own lexicographer,
and through the specification redefined the ordinary meaning of
‘about’ . . . which both parties agree ahs the ordinary meaning
‘approximately’—to something quite different. Thus, the district
court concluded the terms ‘about 35 mg’ . . . and ‘about 70 mg’ . . .
1165
mean exactly 35 (or 70) mg of alendronic acid.”
Relying on this
construction, the district court dismissed the defendant’s claims of
1166
invalidity under anticipation and obviousness.
The district court
delayed the effective date of the FDA approval of defendant’s ANDA
until expiration of the patent-in-suit, and enjoined commercial sale of
defendant’s generic osteoporosis treatment.
The Federal Circuit disagreed with the district court’s construction
of about, and held that the term should be given its ordinary
1167
meaning of “approximately.”
At issue was whether plaintiff had
acted as its own lexicographer in order to depart from the ordinary

1159.
1160.
1161.
1162.
1163.
1164.
1165.
1166.
1167.

Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1757.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1757.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1757.
395 F.3d 1364, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1366-67, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1643.
Id. at 1367, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1643.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644.
Id. at 1369-70, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646.
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meaning of the disputed terms: “While in some cases there is a
presumption that favors the ordinary meaning of a term, the court
must first examine the specification to determine whether the
patentee acted as his own lexicographer of a term that already has an
1168
ordinary meaning to a person of skill in the art.”
The district court
relied on the following portion of the specification in reaching its
claim construction:
Because of the mixed nomenclature currently in use by those or
[sic] ordinary skill in the art, reference to a specific weight or
percentage of bisphosphonate compound in the present invention
is on an active weight basis unless otherwise indicated herein. For
example the phrase "about 70 mg of bone resorption inhibiting
bisphosphonate selected from the group consisting of alendronate,
pharmaceutically acceptable salts thereof and mixtures thereof, on an
alendronic acid weight basis" means that the amount of bisphosphonate
1169
compound selected is calculated based on 70 mg of alendronic acid.

In holding that the term “about” should have its ordinary meaning,
the court stated that “[w]hen a patentee acts as his own lexicographer
in redefining the meaning of particular claim terms away from their
ordinary meaning, he must clearly express that intent in the written
1170
description.”
The court held that a in order for a patentee to make
this clear expression, “the statement in the specification must have
sufficient clarity to put one reasonably skilled in the art on notice that
1171
the inventor intended to redefine the claim term.”
The Federal
Circuit found that the passage relied upon by the district court was
ambiguous, as it “fail[ed] to define ‘about’ to mean ‘exactly’ in clear
enough terms to justify such a counterintuitive definition of
1172
‘about.’”
The court reasoned that he district court had construed the
“about” phrases to mean that one “should administer approximately
70 (or 35) mg of the derivative compound, such that the end result is
that the patient is administered exactly 70 (or 35) mg of alendronic
acid. In other words, the district court determined that the quantity
specified in the claims . . . modifies the amount of the derivative
1173
compound rather than the active compound.”
The court found
this construction limiting, and reasoned that defendant’s
interpretation would mean that the disputed terms
1168.
1169.
1170.
1171.
1172.
1173.

Id. at 1370, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646 (citation omitted).
Id. at 1369, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645.
Id. at 1370, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646.
Id. at 1371, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647.
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refer[red] to the amount of the active compound to be administered
rather than the amount of the derivative compound. The term
‘about’ in the claims would then serve to modify the quantity of the
active compound in a way that consistent with its normal definition of
‘approximately.’ Under this construction, the modifying phrase
1174
. . . would refer to approximately 70 (or 35) mg of alendronic acid.

The court further reasoned that plaintiff’s construction reads a
portion of the specification passage relied upon out of context,
because the passage also informed “those of ordinary skill in the art
that when the patent refers to a certain amount of a bisphosphonate
compound, it is actually instructing them to administer a certain
amount of the active component of the compound rather than the
compound itself, i.e., that one should calculate the amount dispensed
1175
on an ‘active weight basis.’”
The court held that “Given that the
passage that Merck relies on is amenable to a second (and more
reasonable) interpretation, we hold Merck did not clearly set out
its own definition of ‘about’ with ‘reasonable clarity,
deliberateness, and precision,’ and thus failed to act as its own
lexicographer.”1176 IN further support of its holding, the court also
pointed to portions of the specification in which the patentee
“repeatedly describe[d] a range of acceptable dosage amounts,
with the patentee emphasizing that dosage amounts will vary.”1177
The court also agreed with defendant’s argument that the district
court’s construction of “about” rendered other parts of the claim
superfluous, as if “about” meant “exactly,” “the oft repeated phrase
‘on an alendronic acid active basis’ would be unnecessary since
such an understanding would be clear simply by using the term
‘about.’”1178 The court held that construing “about” to mean
“approximately” made the phrase “‘alendronic acid basis’ . . .
necessary because it is the noun that ‘about 35 [or 70] mg’
modifies.”1179 The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s
claim construction, and held that “about” should be construed
consistent with its ordinary meaning of “approximately.”1180
Judge Rader dissented from the court’s reversal of the district
court’s claim construction. Judge Rader noted that because the
Federal Circuit’s claim constructions
1174.
1175.
1176.
1177.
1178.
1179.
1180.

Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647.
Id. at 1372, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647.
Id. at 1377, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651-52.
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waver[] between the plain meaning rule (often a subtle way for
judges to impose their own semantic subjectivity on clam terms . . .
) and the “specification uber alles” rule (often a way for judges to
import limitations not included in the claim . . . ) a patent
applicant might suppose that the best option to define the scope of
1181
the claim language might be the lexicographer rule.

Judge Rader disagreed with the court’s reversal of the district court
because he determined that “the patentee used the lexicographer
rule to define a lengthy phrase. In its definition, the patentee
defined the phrase with precise values.” Judge Rader noted that it
was the word “about” that caused the majority to reverse the
1182
patentee’s and the district court’s construction.
Judge Rader stated
that the majority
seized on that word [about], gave it an ordinary meaning, and cast
aside the lexicographer rule without a convincing explanation.
Moreover, this court overturned the result of a lengthy district
court trial for the sole reason that the trial court applied this
court's lexicographer rule. I find it hard to explain to the district
1183
court how it erred by following this court's rules.

Judge Rader stated he would have affirmed the district court’s
construction because the patentee “clearly, deliberately and precisely
defined the phrase ‘about . . .’ [by stating] unambiguously that the
‘phrase . . . means that the amount of the bisphosphonate compound
1184
selected is calculated based on 70 mg of alendronic acid.’”
Judge
Rader reasoned that the patentee’s “choice of the words ‘phrase’ and
‘means,’ combined with the use of quotation marks to set the phrase
off from the rest of the sentence, unmistakably notify a reader of the
patent that the patentee exercised the option to define the entire
1185
Judge Rader
phrase without respect to its ordinary meaning . . . .”
also noted the closeness of the claim construction issue, and that the
district court had more time and “superior tools” to evaluate the
1186
issue.
Judge Rader acknowledged the criticism from district court
judges that the Federal Circuit’s reversal rate on claim construction
1187
far exceeded the reversal rate of other circuit courts, and noted
that the response of “nearly every judge” on the Federal Circuit was
to “publicly profess” to “accord some level of deference to district

1181.
1182.
1183.
1184.
1185.
1186.
1187.

Id. at 1377-78, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652.
Id. at 1379, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653.
See id. at 1380-81, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654.
See id. at 1381, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654.
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courts regardless of this court’s de novo review of claim construction
1188
Judge Rader noted that the actual practice of the court
issues.”
departed from its public protestations, and that the Federal Circuit
1189
had a “‘truth in advertising’ problem.”
Judge Rader concluded
that the district court’s “diligent and intelligent process and
1190
resolution earned more respect than it received.”
1191
In Free Motion Fitness, Inc. v. Cybex Int’l, Inc., the Federal Circuit
addressed claim construction on two exercise machine patents
covering a resistance assembly, two adjustable extension arms that
pivot on an axis substantially parallel to the axis of rotation of a pulley
at the end of each arm, and a cable linking the resistance assembly to
1192
Cybex and Nautilus, defendants, sold machines accused
the arms.
1193
of infringement.
However, the arms of the Cybex and Nautilus
machines were attached to the resistance assembly such that they
pivoted in two different planes, as opposed to solely the axis parallel
1194
to the rotation of the pulley.
The district court granted summary
judgment of non-infringement and also ruled that a narrowing
amendment made during prosecution of one of the patents estopped
the plaintiff from asserting as equivalent “a device having extension
arms with axes of rotation transverse to the axes of rotation of the
1195
pulleys at the end of the extension arms.”
The Federal Circuit analyzed the claim construction under Phillips
1196
v. AWH Corp.
The first term was “first pivot point.” The district
court had held “that the first pivot point is construed as an expression
of location, specifically the first pivot point is chronologically the first
point that pivots on the end of the extension arm where the arm is
1197
supported by the frame.”
The parties on appeal apparently agreed
that the Federal Circuit put too much weight into the term “first;” in
fact, as is common in patent law, the terms “first” and “second”
merely are used to “distinguish between repeated instances of an
1198
element or limitation.”
In this case, where a claim requiring two
arms merely referred to one as “first” and the other as “second,”
1188. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653.
1189. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653.
1190. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653.
1191. 423 F.3d 1343, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1432 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
1192. Id. at 1345, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434.
1193. Id. at 1346, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434.
1194. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434.
1195. Id. at 1347, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435.
1196. 415 F.3d 1303, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
1197. Free Motion Fitness, 423 F.3d at 1347, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435.
1198. Id. at 1348, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1436 (citing 3M Innovative Props. Co. v.
Avery Dennison Corp., 350 F.3d 1365, 1371, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d 1050, 1055 (Fed. Cir.
2003)).
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“first” did not “denote spatial location.”
Instead, “first” “merely
1200
associates the first pivot point with the first extension arm.”
The next term construed was a requirement that the pivot point be
1201
“adjacent the resistance assembly.”
The Federal Circuit had
construed “adjacent” to mean “that objects may or may not be in
contact, but are not adjacent to each other where there is another
1202
object between them.”
The court and the parties looked to
1203
Despite
dictionaries for the meaning of the word “adjacent.”
acknowledging the Philips decision’s less than overwhelming support
of use of the dictionaries, the opinion by Judge Dyk applies virtually a
pre-Philips analysis. Faced with two dictionary definitions of adjacent,
one being “not distant,” the other being “relatively near and having
nothing of the same kind intervening,” the court chose the broader
“not distant,” after stating that a claim term does not presumptively
1204
receive its broadest dictionary definition.
The court reasoned that
since nothing in the specification suggested a concern with
“[some]thing of the same kind [i.e., other pivot points] intervening,”
1205
there was no reason not to adopt the broader dictionary definition.
It therefore concluded that “not distant” was the correct
construction, and reversed the district court’s judgment of
infringement based on the fact that the pivot points of the accused
1206
devices are “not distant” from the resistance assembly.
Also, significantly, the Federal Circuit addressed the district court’s
construction of “a cable linking” as being limited to only a single
1207
cable.
The Cybex device had multiple cables linking arms to the
1208
The court noted that the presumption that
resistance assembly.
“a” means “one or more” is overcome only “when the claim is specific
as to the number of elements” or “when the patentee evinces a clear
1209
intent to . . . limit the article.”
The court held that the
specification’s numerous references to a single cable were insufficient
1210
to overcome this presumption.
The court likewise held that the

1199. Id. at 1348, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1436.
1200. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1436.
1201. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1436.
1202. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1436.
1203. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1436.
1204. Id. at 1348-49, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1436.
1205. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1436.
1206. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1436.
1207. Id. at 1350, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437.
1208. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437.
1209. Id. at 1350, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437 (citing KCJ Corp. v. Kinetic
Concepts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1351, 1356, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1835, 1839 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
1210. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437.
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same claim’s later reference to “the” cable did not change the
analysis.
Finally, the court addressed a prosecution history estoppel
argument. The defendant argued that Free Motion had disclaimed
during prosecution a device wherein the axes of rotation of the
1211
This feature
pulleys and extension arms were perpendicular.
1212
appeared in the prior art.
The amended claim required “rotating
1213
However,
about an axis substantially parallel to the second axis.”
the accused device had not only the “disclaimed” perpendicular axis,
1214
but also had the claimed parallel axis as well.
Thus, in a claim
reading “comprising,” the alleged disclaimer did not apply to
unclaimed features in the accused device. The grant of summary
judgment was thus vacated and the case remanded.
In Symbol Tech., Inc. v. Lemelson Medical Educ. & Research Found.,
1215
LP, the district court had held the plaintiff’s asserted patents on
machine vision and automatic barcode reading invalid,
1216
unenforceable, and not infringed.
The patent claimed priority to
two applications, filed in 1954 and 1956, respectively, by none other
than Jerome H. Lemelson, one of the most prolific patenters
1217
(“inventor” gives him too much credit) of the twentieth century.
A
host of continuation applications filed, many containing already
1218
allowed claims.
The two original applications related generally to measuring
devices, the latter specifically directed to measurements using video
1219
images.
Fourteen patents were before the Federal Circuit in this
case, with one claim being representative:
A method for inspecting an image field to determine if a select
image phenomenon is present in said image field, comprising:
(a) scanning an image field containing at least one contrasting
image portion which is detectable with an electronic scanning
device,
(b) generating first electrical signals which vary in accordance with
variations in detected contrasting image portions of the image field
scanned,

1211.
1212.
1213.
1214.
1215.
1216.
1217.
1218.
1219.

Id. at 1351-52, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1439.
Id. at 1352, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1439.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1439.
Id. at 1353, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1439.
422 F.3d 1378, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1380, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1356.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1356.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1356.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1356.
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(c) analyzing said first electrical signals and generating first
information signals corresponding to the detected contrasting
image portions of the image field scanned,
(d) electrically comparing said first information signals from
recordings in a memory which are indicative of said select image
phenomenon, and
(e) generating electrical signals indicative of the presence of said
1220
select image phenomenon in said scanned image field.

The district court ruled that the Lemelson patents were
unenforceable due to prosecution laches, invalid for lack of
1221
enablement, and not infringed.
The court held that
“unreasonable delay alone is sufficient to apply prosecution laches
without the requirement that Lemelson intended to gain some
1222
advantage by the delay.”
The court also held that the asserted
1223
patents were not entitled to the 1954 or 1956 priority dates.
Prosecution laches is an equitable defense and, thus, the Federal
Circuit reviews the district court’s decision in this regard for abuse of
1224
discretion.
The Court determined that although there are
legitimate purposes for long delays in prosecuting patents, such as
filing divisionals in response to restriction requirements, “refiling an
application solely containing previously-allowed claims for the
business purpose of delaying their issuance can be considered an
1225
abuse of the patent system.”
In this case, the district court had
found that somewhere between eighteen and thirty-nine years had
passed between the filing and issuance of the various patents in suit.
The court also found “culpable neglect” by Lemelson in failing to
prosecute his patents, and intervening “public and private rights” in
1226
the time the applications were pending.
The Federal Circuit, thus,
found no abuse of discretion, and did not reach the other issues
raised by Appellant.
1227
In JVW Enterprises, Inc. v. Interact Access., Inc., the Federal Circuit
reversed a confusing claim construction offered by the district court
of a means-plus-function claim. The patent involved a mounted
video game controller inspired by an inventor’s sore wrists upon
1228
playing the Atari video game system for extended periods of time.
1220.
1221.
1222.
1223.
1224.
1225.
1226.
1227.
1228.

Id. at 1381-82, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1356.
Id. at 1382, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1357.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1357.
Id. at 1382, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1357.
Id. at 1384, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1359.
Id. at 1385, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1360.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1360.
424 F.3d 1324, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1326-27, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1643.
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A means-plus-function element of claim 1 recited “means for lockably
receiving a video game controller in fixed position on [a] mounting
1229
member.”
The district court’s construction was confusing because, initially, it
construed “lockably” to include both a locking and unlocking
function, specifically, “attached by a method whereby one can lock a
game controller in place for use and can unlock and release the
1230
game controller after use.”
Later, however, the district court
attempted to “clarify” its earlier claim construction ruling, noting that
it could be “misunderstood” as adding unlocking to the function of
1231
the means-plus-function limitation.
Alternatively, it held that
“lockably” means “received in a fixed position by the interlacing of
1232
fitting of parts into each other.”
The Federal Circuit found this to be error. The first construction
improperly imported the function of “unlocking” into a claim that
1233
merely required locking.
Even the district court acknowledged
1234
However, the district court’s second construction does not
this.
fare better under scrutiny. There, the Federal Circuit confused
function with structure, by requiring the interlacing of “fitting of
1235
parts.”
The importation of structure, while a part of means-plusfunction analysis, is a separate and distinct step from the
identification of that function, and cannot occur until the latter is
1236
complete.
As a result, the Court adopted most of the original claim
1237
construction, minus the “unlocking” functionality.
The Court
ultimately affirmed the district court’s finding of infringement of one
product and reversed as to the other, applying the new
1238
construction.
1239
a narrowing
In Biagro Western Sales, Inc. v. Grow More, Inc.,
amendment made during a reexamination proved to be fatal to the
plaintiff’s desired broad claim construction. All of the independent
claims of the asserted patent for formation of fertilizer for plants had
been amended by adding a limitation relating to the amount of
1229.
1230.
1231.
1232.
1233.
1234.
1235.
1236.
1237.
1238.
1239.

Id. at 1327, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1643.
Id. at 1328, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1643.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1643.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1643.
Id. at 1330-31, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644.
Id. at 1330, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644.
Id. at 1331, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644.
Id. at 1333-35, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647-48.
423 F.3d 1296, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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phosphorous-containing acid or salt thereof in the fertilizer
1240
This was added to distinguish the invention over the
formation.
1241
The limitation at issue called for “phosphorousprior art.
containing acid or salt thereof . . . present in an amount of about 30
1242
to about 40 weight percent.”
The plaintiff, however, argued that a
“chemical equivalent” to this amount of phosphorous-containing acid
1243
would meet the claim.
The total concentration in the accused
product was somewhere around sixty percent, and the plaintiff
1244
The district court held the narrowing
argued for equivalence.
amendment to be a complete bar under Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
1245
Kogyo Kabushiki Co.
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the claim itself allowed for a
1246
“chemically equivalent” amount of acid, not an actual amount.
The Court rejected this argument easily, citing Phillips v. AWH
1247
The language of the claim contained nothing to indicate
Corp.
that anything other than an actual amount in “weight percent” was
1248
covered.
On infringement, the Court affirmed the judgment of no
literal infringement, and moved onto the doctrine of equivalents
under the final Festo standard. The amendment was made to
1249
overcome a prior art obviousness rejection.
Though Biago argued
that the upper limit of the narrowing amendment (as opposed to the
lower limit) was “tangential” to the invention, there was no evidence
1250
either way as to the reason for the upper limit.
Thus, the Court
found the Festo presumption of surrender unrebutted and affirmed
1251
judgment of non-infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.
1252
the district court had granted
In Nystrom v. Trex Co., Inc.,
summary judgment of non-infringement as to some asserted claims
and summary judgment of invalidity as to the others. The patent was
directed toward exterior wooden flooring materials designed to shed
1253
water while remaining comfortable to stand on.
Three claim terms
1240. Id. at 1299, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348.
1241. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)at 1348.
1242. Id. at 1300, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)at 1349.
1243. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)at 1349.
1244. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)at 1349.
1245. 234 F.3d 558, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“Festo I”).
1246. Biagro, 423 F.3d at 1302, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1350.
1247. 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-13, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1325-26 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(en banc).
1248. Id. at 1303, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326.
1249. Biagro, 423 F.3d at 1306, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1353.
1250. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1353.
1251. Id. at 1307, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1354.
1252. 424 F.3d 1136, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
1253. Id. at 1139, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483.
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in claim 1 were in dispute: “board,” “manufactured to have,” and
1254
Nystrom conceded, after Markman, that it
“convex top surface.”
could not prove its infringement case against Trex using the court’s
claim construction, and summary judgment of non-infringement was
1255
granted.
The court subsequently granted summary judgment of
1256
invalidity.
The district court construed “board” as “a piece of elongated
construction material made from wood cut from a log” based on
statements in the written description and those made during
1257
prosecution to avoid an obviousness rejection.
Trex asserted that
the natural meaning of “board” is a piece of lumber cut from a saw,
1258
Applying
and the specification disclosed no other type of board.
Phillips, Judge Linn’s opinion begins by noting that nothing in the
1259
claim language limits “boards” to those cut from wood.
Significantly, claim 16 specifically called for a “wood decking
1260
board.”
However, the Court went on to read the specification as
limiting “board” to wood. The written description stated “[a] variety
of specialized flooring materials have been developed for interior and
1261
exterior use” and went on to describe only wood.
“This context is
1262
The specification
maintained throughout the written description.”
referred to “growth rings” on the boards; “accelerated deterioration
of the boards when exposed to weather”; and “log[s]”, all indicating
1263
the boards are made of wood.
The prosecution history was also
consistent with this, stating that “[t]he present invention represents a
unique and significant advance in the art of exterior wood flooring”
1264
in response to an obviousness rejection.
Significantly, the Court
1265
rejected Nystrom’s dictionary argument.
Regarding the “manufactured to have” limitation, the district court
had construed this term to be “a manufacturing process utilizing
1266
woodworking techniques.”
The Court found this construction to
be correct based largely on the fact that “board” was limited to wood,
1254. Id. at 1140, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484.
1255. Id. at 1141, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484.
1256. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484.
1257. Id. at 1142, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485.
1258. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485.
1259. Id. at 1143, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486.
1260. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486.
1261. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486.
1262. Id. at 1144, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1487.
1263. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1487.
1264. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1487.
1265. Id. at 1144-45, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1487-88 (citing Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
415 F.3d 1303, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
1266. Id. at 1146, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488.
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thereby redefining the scope of the otherwise broad term
1267
“manufactured.”
The last disputed term on infringement was “convex top surface.”
The court construed this to mean “an upper surface with an outward
curve that has a ratio of its radius of curvature to width of the board
between 4:1 to 6:1,” relying on prosecution statements that the
1268
preferred radius of curvature was “about” 5:1.
This time, the Court
decided to start with the dictionary, noting “convex” means “having a
surface or boundary that curves or bulges outward, as the exterior of
1269
a sphere,” and turned to the specification to validate this, which
read
more importantly, the board of the invention has a slightly
rounded upper surface 13 that slopes gradually off to either side of
the center of the board, defining a convex surface that promotes
the running off of water. This surface may have a radius of
1270
curvature R1, for example, of about 24 inches.

Further, the Court noted that the relevant statement made in the
prosecution history was actually related only to one claim, claim 16.
Thus, the district court was reversed on this term.
On invalidity, the district court had found claims 18-20 of the
asserted patent anticipated by a prior art patent. The relevant claim
language read:
said convex top surface being manufactured to have a radius of
curvature with a slightly rounded or curved configuration
extending across the top surface from one side edge to the other,
defining a difference in thickness between the longitudinal centerline and
the opposite side edges, with the ratio of said difference in thickness to the
width of the board being about 1:40 . . . .

Apparently, figures in the prior art disclosed boards of certain
measurements, but did not explicitly disclose the ratio of difference
1271
in thickness to the width of the board.
Instead, a Trex employee
took the figures and from them calculated that boards of the claimed
thickness could be made using the teaching in the patent, even
1272
though the specification was silent on this issue.
The Court found
this to be error. The relevant inquiry, it said, is what was disclosed,
not on what inferences could be drawn from drawings not made to

1267.
1268.
1269.
1270.
1271.
1272.

Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488.
Id. at 1146-47, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1489.
Id. at 1147, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1489.
Id. at 1148-50, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490-91.
Id. at 1148, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490.
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1273

scale.
“Under the principles set forth in our prior cases, the
speculative modeling premised on unstated assumptions in prior art
patent drawings cannot be the basis for challenging the validity of
claims reciting specific dimensions not disclosed directly in such
1274
prior art.”
Summary judgment of invalidity was, thus, reversed.
1275
the Federal
In PC Connector Solutions LLC v. SmartDisk Corp.,
Circuit affirmed the district court’s claim construction and summary
judgment of noninfringement. The claims of the patent were
directed to “the connection of peripherals to a computer via a
1276
coupler inserted into the diskette drive.”
The invention was
described as having an input/output port “normally connectable to a
conventional computer input/output port,” and a method where use
peripheral is “traditionally connectable to a computer by means of an
input/output port of the computer and the standard input/output port” of
1277
the separate peripheral.
The defendant made diskette-shaped adapters that allowed flash
memories and smart cards to be accessed through a computer’s
1278
diskette drive.
The district court construed the claims to refer to
technologies in existence at the time the patent was filed, and
accordingly ruled that the accused flash memories and smart cards,
which were developed after the patent was filed, could not literally
1279
infringe.
The Federal Circuit held that the ordinary meanings of the words
“normally,” “conventional,” “traditionally,” and “standard” “are
1280
implicitly time-dependant.”
The Federal Circuit observed, “[a]
claim cannot have different meanings at different times; its meaning
1281
The Federal
must be interpreted as of its effective filing date.”
Circuit found that the patent’s written description evidenced no
intent by the patentee to give particular meaning to the words used
and that the prosecution history of the patent did not redefine the
1282
terms.
Consequently, the Federal Circuit reasoned that “the
terms . . . are governed by their ordinary and customary meanings,
and that, in view of their implicit time-dependence, the district court
1273. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490 (citing Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Avia
Group Int’l, Inc., 222 F.3d 951, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1487 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
1274. Id. at 1149, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1491.
1275. 406 F.3d 1359, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1698 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
1276. Id. at 1361, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1699.
1277. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1699.
1278. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1699.
1279. Id. at 1361-62, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1699.
1280. Id. at 1363, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1700.
1281. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1700.
1282. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1700.
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did not err in construing the literal scope of the claim limitations
qualified by those terms as being limited to technologies existing at
1283
The Federal Circuit also addressed the
the time of the invention.”
dictionary definitions of those terms, concluding that although the
definitions do not contain a reference to time limitation, ordinary
1284
usage of the words implies time-related significance.
Thus,
“[p]roperly construed, these claim limitations require the peripheral
device to be connectable to a computer I/O port that was in common
1285
use at the time of filing in 1988.”
Under this claim construction, there can be no “literal
infringement” because the “flash memories and smart cards that are
used with the accused devices employ flat, planar surface contact
electrodes at the I/O interface, which, to even a casual observer,
cannot be connected to a vintage 1988 computer I/O port that uses a
1286
multi-pin connector . . . .”
1287
In Seachange International, Inc. v. C-COR Inc., the Federal Circuit
reversed the district court’s claim construction on several claim
elements. The plaintiff’s patent was directed to a method and
1288
apparatus for redundantly storing video data for video-on-demand.
The Federal Circuit first addressed the issue of claim
differentiation. The asserted claims, claim 1 and claim 37, included
the limitation “network for data communications,” which the district
court construed to mean “establishing data communications between
every pair of processor systems in the distributed computer system
1289
using any kind of network.”
The defendant argued that this
limitation should be construed as limited to networks employing
1290
One of the independent
direct, point-to-point interconnections.
claims of the patent, claim 1, was identical in all other respects to the
other independent claim, claim 37, but included the direct, point-to1291
point network limitation.
The Federal Circuit explained that
Although the doctrine is at its strongest where the limitation
sought to be “read into” an independent claim already appears in a
dependent claim, there is still a presumption that two independent
claims have different scope when different words or phrases are
1283. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1700.
1284. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1701.
1285. Id. at 1364, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1701.
1286. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1701 (internal citations omitted).
1287. 413 F.3d 1361, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
1288. Id. at 1365-66, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387.
1289. Id. at 1368, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389 (quoting the district court’s
opinion).
1290. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389.
1291. Id. at 1369, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389.
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used in those claims. However, the doctrine only creates a
presumption that each claim in a patent has a different scope; it is
not a hard and fast rule of construction. The doctrine of claim
differentiation can not broaden claims beyond their correct scope,
determined in light of the specification and the prosecution history
and any relevant extrinsic evidence. Claims that are written in
different words may ultimately cover substantially the same subject
1292
matter.

The Federal Circuit first analyzed the specification of the patent.
The Federal Circuit agreed with the defendants that the description
repeatedly referred to network connections as point-to-point and also
suggested a limit on the number of systems compatible with the
1293
point-to-point wiring.
However, the Federal Circuit determined
that it was not clear whether the references to point-to-point were a
1294
description of the invention or just one possible embodiment of it.
Accordingly, “[t]he issue [was] unresolved with certainty from the
1295
written description in this case.”
The Federal Circuit then looked to the prosecution history of the
patent. During prosecution, the applicant made arguments with
respect to claim 1 as an “illustrative claim” in a grouping that
1296
included both claims 1 and 37.
The applicant distinguished claim
1 over the cited prior art by arguing that the prior art “does not
suggest that each of the processors in the hypercube arrangement are
coupled to each one of the other processors in the hypercube
1297
arrangement as recited in claim 1.”
The Federal Circuit then noted that “[i]n this amendment,
Applicant did not separately argue that claim 37[] was patentably
1298
distinct on any other basis.”
The Federal Circuit explained that
when construing a claim, it considers the prosecution history to
ascertain if the patentee disclaimed subject matter to narrow the
1299
scope of the claim terms.
“In doing so, we examine the entire
prosecution history, which includes amendments to claims and all
1300
arguments to overcome and distinguish references.”
The Federal
Circuit found that “[t]he Examiner grouped several claims together,
including claims 1 and 37[], and rejected them as a group” and that
1292.
1293.
1294.
1295.
1296.
1297.
1298.
1299.
1300.

Id. at 1368-69, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 1370, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1390 (citations omitted).
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1390.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1390.
Id. at 1370-71, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1390-91.
Id. at 1371, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391.
Id. at 1372, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1392.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1392.
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“[a]pplicant then selected claim 1 as ‘an illustrative claim’ and
argued that [the prior art did] not suggest connecting each processor
to each other processor via point-to-point, two-way channel
interconnections.” Accordingly, the Federal Circuit concluded that
the plain reading of the Applicant’s statements suggested that the
“point-to-point” argument applied to each grouping of claims and
that the prosecution history revealed no evidence that the point-to1301
point argument did not apply to all grouped claims.
The Federal Circuit concluded that the disclaimer made during
prosecution to claim 1 equally applied to asserted claim 37 and held
that “[t]he presumption attendant to claim differentiation doctrine is
rebutted” and that “[t]he phrase ‘network for data communications’
is limited to networks in which every processor system is connected to
every other processor system via direct, point-to-point, two-way
1302
channel interconnections.”
The Federal Circuit next reversed the district court’s construction
1303
of the term “distributed computer system.”
The district court had
construed the term to mean “‘a stand alone computer in each
1304
processor system’”
where a stand alone computer requires “that
each processor within the system operate on its own power supply
1305
As an initial matter, the Federal Circuit
and clock . . . .”
determined that this claim language, which appeared in the
1306
preamble of the claim, was in fact limiting.
The Federal Circuit
explained that “‘[i]n general, a preamble limits the invention if it
recites essential structure or steps, or if it is ‘necessary to give life,
1307
meaning, and vitality’ to the claim.’”
In addition, “‘if the preamble
1301. Id. at 1373, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1392-93. The Federal Circuit also
analyzed the applicant’s response to a protest filed after the application was allowed,
and concluded that:
In the final analysis, the Protest Response does not alter our conclusion that
the statements Applicant made in responding to the First Action and in
distinguishing over [the prior art] inescapably narrowed the meaning of the
data communications network in claim 37[] to a point-to-point network.
Applicant’s response to the First Action was a deliberate surrender of claim
scope, unmistakable in its effect because it is not suitable to multiple
interpretations. The Protest Response addressed Gardner, did not alter the
bases upon which the Applicant distinguished [the prior art], and did not
undo this disclaimer already made.
Id. at 1375, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1394 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
1302. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1394.
1303. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1394.
1304. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1394 (quoting Seachange Int’l, Inc. v. nCube
Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 393, 398 (D. Del. 2004)).
1305. Id. at 1376, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1395.
1306. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1394.
1307. Id. at 1375-76, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1394 (quoting Catalina Mktg. Int’l v.
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helps to determine the scope of the patent claim, then it is construed
1308
The Federal Circuit concluded
as part of the claimed invention.’”
that “the preamble provides the only antecedent basis and thus the
context essential to understand the meaning of ‘processor system’;
therefore, the preamble, including the phrase ‘distributed computer
1309
system,’ limits the scope of the claimed invention.”
The Federal Circuit, consulting an IEEE dictionary, determined
that the definition of “distributed system” did not require that each
computer be “stand alone,” and that “neither the claim nor the
1310
written description states such a requirement.”
Moreover, the
Federal Circuit concluded that “[b]ecause it is improper to import a
limitation into a claim where the limitation has no basis in the
intrinsic record,” “the district court erred in requiring that each
processor system ‘stand-alone,’ i.e., have a separate clock and power
1311
supply.”
Finally, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s
construction of the term “processor systems” to require that each
system have “at least one [CPU] capable of running application type
1312
software, and at least one mass storage system.”
The Federal
Circuit determined that the claim itself “does not state that [the
CPU] must be capable of running application-type software,” and
that and IEEE dictionary established the ordinary meaning of CPU
1313
was not so limited.
Moreover the written description supported a
“broader construction” because it included an embodiment where a
CPU could run a “device driver” which “need not be the same as
1314
application-type software.”
The Federal Circuit also rejected
Seachange’s argument that the claim limitation should be construed
1315
more narrowly to preserve the validity of the claim.
In reaching
this decision, the Federal Circuit observed that “this is not a case in
which the court concludes, after applying all the available tools of
1316
claim construction, that the claim is still ambiguous.”
Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1781, 1784 (Fed. Cir.
1999)).
1308. Id. at 1376, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1394 (quoting NTP, Inc. v. Research In
Motion, Ltd., 392 F.2d 1336, 1358, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1231, 1247 (Fed. Cir.
2004)).
1309. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1394.
1310. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1395 (internal citations omitted).
1311. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1395 (internal citations omitted).
1312. Id. at 1376, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1395-96 (quoting Seachange Int’l, Inc. v.
nCube Corp., 115 F. Supp. 2d 473, 483 (D. Del. 2000)).
1313. Id. at 1377, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1395.
1314. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1395.
1315. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396.
1316. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396 (internal citation omitted).
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In Boss Control, Inc. v. Bombardier Inc.,
the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment of
1318
noninfringement based on the district court’s claim construction.
The patent was directed to a security power interrupt apparatus that
1319
prevents unauthorized use of an electrically operated product.
Boss accused Bombardier of infringement based on Bombardier’s
personal watercraft and snowmobiles equipped with Digitally
1320
Encoded Security Systems (“DESS”).
At issue were two claim
limitations the district court found missing in the allegedly infringing
devices: (1) that the devices “monitor the operative connection with
said code-providing device”; and (2) that the device “interrupt power
to the load responsive to said code-providing device being operatively
1321
disconnected from said controller.”
The Federal Circuit focused specifically on the district court’s
construction of the term “interrupt.” Boss contended that this term
should be given its ordinary meaning of “to break off” or “to shut or
cut off,” while Bombardier contended that the term should be
construed more narrowly to require more than just “‘on-off’ control
1322
of electrical power.”
The Federal Circuit agreed with Bombardier,
and determined that the specification defined “interrupt” as
1323
Specifically, the
requiring a two-stage interruption of power.
“Background of the Invention” of the patent specification described
the prior art as including “devices [that] conventionally provide for
on-off control only . . . ,” while the “Summary of the Invention”
section distinguished the invention from prior art by describing a
1324
two-stage interruption of power.
The Federal Circuit explained
that “[t]he specification therefore distinguishes between simple onoff interruption of electrical power and interruption of electrical
power that occurs in two stages” and that, “the specification clearly
sets forth a definition of ‘interrupt’ that is more detailed that simple
1325
on-off control.”
The Federal Circuit went on to explain that the preferred
embodiments described in the specification were consistent with the
1326
narrower construction.
The Federal Circuit acknowledged that “it
1317.
1318.
1319.
1320.
1321.
1322.
1323.
1324.
1325.
1326.

410 F.3d 1372, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1038 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1374, 1381, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1039, 1044.
Id. at 1374, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1039.
Id. at 1375, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1040.
Id. at 1375-76, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1040.
Id. at 1376, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1041.
Id. at 1377-78, 75 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1041-42.
Id. at 1377, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1041.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1041.
Id. at 1377-78, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1041-42.
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is of course improper to limit the claims to the particular preferred
1327
The Federal Circuit
embodiments described in the specification.”
explained, however, that “the patentee’s choice of preferred
1328
embodiments can shed light on the intended scope of the claims.”
In this case, the Federal Circuit concluded, “[t]his description
confirms that, in the context of the invention, interruption of power
1329
to an electrical device involves two stages . . . .”
Further, the
Federal Circuit rejected Boss’s argument that dictionary definitions
and the prosecution history supported a broader construction,
explaining, “[n]either the dictionary definition nor the prosecution
history, however, overcomes the particular meaning of ‘interrupt’
1330
Thus, “[b]ecause the
clearly set forth in the specification.”
specification makes clear that the invention involves a two-stage
interrupt mode, the intrinsic evidence binds Boss to a narrower
definition of ‘interrupt’ than the extrinsic evidence might
1331
support.”
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit determined that
“interrupt” meant “(1) providing electrical current to a device up to a
preset threshold so that auxiliary components may continue to
operate; and (2) completely shutting off electrical current to the
1332
device when the electrical current exceeds the preset threshold.”
1333
In Lisle Corp. v. A.J. Manufacturing Co., the Federal Circuit also
considered whether the district court properly granted summary
judgment of infringement in favor of the plaintiff. The patent
related to an inner tie rod tool for servicing a rack and pinion
1334
steering system.
On appeal, the defendant challenged the district
court’s grant of summary judgment, arguing that the court
improperly construed two claim limitations: (1) “retainer”; and
(2) “said retainer being detachably cooperative with the tabs to rotate
1335
the disc and a tie rod engaged therewith.”
The defendant argued
that the district court improperly applied the ordinary and
1336
accustomed meaning to the disputed limitations.
The Federal Circuit rejected the defendant’s argument that the
term “retainer” should be limited to mean a “collar or ring rotatably
1327. Id. at 1377, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1041 (quoting Astrazeneca AB v. Mut.
Pharm. Co., 384 F.3d 1333, 1340, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1726, 1731 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
1328. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1041.
1329. Id. at 1378, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1042.
1330. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1042.
1331. Id. at 1379, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1042.
1332. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1043.
1333. 398 F.3d 1306, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1891 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
1334. Id. at 1309-10, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1892-93.
1335. Id. at 1313, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1895 (internal citations omitted).
1336. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1895.
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affixed over the surface of the hollow tube” as referred to in the
1337
The Federal Circuit held that the defendant’s
patent specification.
proposed construction was too narrow, and noted that the patent
specification “broadly state[d] that the retainer’s configuration and
1338
shape may be varied.”
With respect to the district court’s construction of the “detachably
cooperative” limitation, the Federal Circuit also rejected the
1339
defendant’s proposed construction. The defendant’s construction
required “the wrench disc and the hollow tube to simultaneously
1340
detach from one another and rotate the tie rod.”
The Federal
Circuit noted that this could not be a proper claim construction, as
the tool disclosed in the patent was not capable of simultaneously
1341
detaching and rotating.
The Federal Circuit relied on the
specification to attain a common-sense meaning of the claim
1342
The
limitation and to clarify the district court’s construction.
Federal Circuit held that the object of the patented invention was to
provide a single tool to be used on many different tie rod
1343
configurations.
The Federal Circuit noted this objective was
obtainable only “because the retainer allows the body of the tool to
engage or disengage the wrench discs” and that the wrench disc “can
perform its stated function of rotating a tie rod” only when secured to
1344
the body of the tool.
In light of these disclosures in the
specification, the court held that the disputed claim limitation was
apparent: “the wrench disc is detachable from the body of the tool,
but when not detached, the tabs of the wrench disc and the retainer
work together to rotate the wrench disc and the tie rod that is
1345
The court affirmed the district
interlocked with the wrench disc.”
court’s summary judgment of literal infringement of the claims
despite its “minor clarification” of the “detachably cooperative”
1346
limitation.
The defendant did not assert a non-infringement
position, other than the proposed claim constructions, with respect
to either the “detachably cooperative” limitation or the “retainer”
1347
limitation.
1337.
1338.
1339.
1340.
1341.
1342.
1343.
1344.
1345.
1346.
1347.

Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1895.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1895.
Id. at 1314, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1895.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1895.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1895.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1895.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1895.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1895.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1895.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1895.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1895-96.
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In SanDisk Corp. v. Memorex Products, Inc.,
the Federal Circuit
vacated the district court’s grant of a judgment of no infringment to
1349
The district court found that the defendants did
the defendants.
1350
not infringe on the plaintiff’s patent,
which involved electrically
erasable programmable read only memory (“EEprom”) that
1351
Specifically, the patent
improved efficiency over prior art.
1352
introduced two new technologies.
First, it arranged memory cells
into sectors in a novel way that allowed for the erasing of information
on either just one EEprom chip or among multiple chips within a
1353
system.
Second, the sectors discussed above are partitioned into at
1354
least two components, consisting of “user” and “overhead” data.
Three years before the plaintiff filed suit against the defendants,
the plaintiff prevailed in a suit against another alleged infringer of
1355
the same patent (“the Lexar suit”).
During the Lexar suit, that
court construed the claim term “user data and overhead data
1356
portions.”
During the district court’s proceedings in the instant
action, the district court “heavily relied” on the Lexar court’s claim
1357
In doing so, the district court construed the
construction.
plaintiff’s claims to “require that every cell in the memory device be
grouped into a sector, and every sector be partitioned into user and
1358
overhead data portions.”
With this claim construction, the court
granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, finding that
1359
their products included some sectors that were not partitioned.
The Federal Circuit found that the district court erred in its claim
1360
construction and its reliance on the prosecution history.
The court
prefaced its discussion of the plaintiff’s patent claims by stating that
“[c]laim construction begins with the language of the asserted
1361
claims.”
Looking to the plain language of the relevant claim
1362
the court found that it used “non-restrictive
language,
1348. 415 F.3d 1278, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
1349. Id. at 1280, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1477.
1350. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1477.
1351. Id. at 1280-81, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1477-78.
1352. Id. at 1281, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1477.
1353. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1478.
1354. Id. at 1282, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1478.
1355. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1479 (describing SanDisk Corp. v. Lexar Media,
Inc., No. C 98-01115 CRB, 1999 WL 129512, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 1999)).
1356. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1479 (quoting the district court’s order).
1357. Id. at 1283, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1479.
1358. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1479.
1359. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1479.
1360. Id. at 1280, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1477.
1361. Id. at 1284, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1480.
1362. The relevant claim language states:
A method of operating a computer system including a processor and a
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terminology,” and that the use of the term “include” also meant
1363
Moreover, neither of these terms “foreclose[]
“comprising.”
additional elements that need not satisfy the stated claim
1364
limitations.”
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit rejected the district
court’s claim construction that required every EEprom cell to “be
grouped into a sector that is partitioned into user and overhead data
1365
portions.”
Rather, the Federal Circuit found that nothing in the
claim language prohibits “the use of Flash EEproms containing cells
1366
that are not grouped into partitioned sectors.”
The plaintiff argued that the district court’s claim construction was
inconsistent with the patent specification, as it excluded at least two
1367
preferred embodiments.
Agreeing with the plaintiff, the Federal
1368
Circuit addressed only the plaintiff’s first embodiment argument.
The Federal Circuit prefaced its decision by stating that, “[a] claim
construction that excludes a preferred embodiment, moreover, ‘is
1369
rarely, if ever, correct.’”
The plaintiff’s patent specification
included an embodiment pertaining to a sector defect map, which
provides information “mapping defective memory sectors into good
1370
ones.”
The sector defect map only contained overhead data, and
1371
As such, the plaintiff argued that the district court’s
not user data.
claim construction, which would have required each cell to have
separate partitions of user data and overhead data, must be incorrect
given that its construction would preclude the situation where the
sector defect map “would contain only overhead data, [and] the
portions of the Flash EEprom memory used in the preferred
embodiment would not be partitioned into user data and overhead
memory system, wherein the memory system includes an array of non-volatile
floating gate memory cells partitioned into a plurality of sectors that
individually include a distinct group of said array of memory cells that are
erasable together as a unit, comprising: providing said memory array and a
memory controller within a card that is removably connectable to the
computer system, said controller being connectable to said processor for
controlling operation of the array when the card is connected to the
computer system, partitioning the memory cells within the individual sectors
into at least a user data portion and an overhead portion . . . .
Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1480 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,602,987, col.16, II.24-37
(filed on June 8, 1988)(emphasis added).
1363. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1480.
1364. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1480.
1365. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1480.
1366. Id. at 1285, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1480.
1367. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1480.
1368. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1481.
1369. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1481 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic,
Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
1370. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1481.
1371. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1481.
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1372

data . . . .”
The district court had rejected this argument by the
plaintiff, finding that the fact that the sector defect map only
contained overhead data did not prove that the embodiment
1373
contemplated this.
The Federal Circuit found the district court’s
1374
rejection of this argument “misplaced.”
The Federal Circuit also rejected a defendant’s argument that the
specification only pertained to those sectors that contained user and
1375
overhead data that were partitioned separately.
Finding that there
was nothing contradicting the plain meaning of the claims, the
Federal Circuit stated that “it is axiomatic that without more the
court will not limit claim terms to a preferred embodiment described
1376
in the specification.”
The Federal Circuit then reviewed the prosecution history to
1377
determine whether the plaintiff surrendered any claim coverage.
The plaintiff argued that the district court erred in finding that the
prosecution history disclaimed “any method or device in which Flash
1378
EEprom memory cells were not grouped into partitioned sectors.”
The Federal Circuit thus set out to determine whether the plaintiff
had made a “clear and unmistakable” disclaimer by reviewing the
1379
plaintiff’s prosecution arguments.
The patent’s prosecution
1380
The
history revolved around an examiner’s obviousness rejection.
plaintiff differentiated its application from two prior patents by
stating that
[t]he memory cell array is divided into sectors, with the cells within
each sector being erasable together as a unit. Stored in each sector
is a sectors [sic] worth of user data and some overhead information
(a header) about the sector and/or about the user data stored in
1381
the sector.

Referring to this language, the district court focused on the
plaintiff’s use of “each sector,” and held that the plaintiff used “each
sector” to mean that “every sector” of the patented product would
1382
contain overhead and user data.

1372. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1481.
1373. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1481.
1374. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1481.
1375. Id. at 1286, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1481.
1376. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1481.
1377. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1481.
1378. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1481.
1379. Id. at 1287, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1482.
1380. Id. at 1287, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1482.
1381. Id. at 1288, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483 (quoting Pretec’s Summary
Judgment Order, slip op. at 25).
1382. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483.
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The Federal Circuit reviewed the above passage, as well as the
prosecution history as a whole, and concluded that “there is no prior
reason why that memory cell array or the discussion of it should be
presumed to exhaust every cell on every EEprom in the ‘memory
1383
system’ recited in the claim preambles.”
In other words, the
plaintiff made “no clear or unmistakable surrender” when it used the
phrase “each sector,” as this phrase may be interpreted to mean
“‘each sector’ subject to the claimed method,” and not every sector in
1384
the EEprom memory system.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit
found that the plaintiff did not disclaim the possibility that not all of
1385
its EEprom memory cells would be partitioned into sectors.
1386
the Federal
In Pfizer, Inc., v. Teva Pharmaceuticals, USA, Inc.,
Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction
1387
to the plaintiff, Pfizer, Inc.
The Federal Circuit outlined the four
1388
As to
elements needed for a grant of preliminary injunction.
proving the first element—that the movant has a “reasonable
1389
likelihood of success on the merits” —the Federal Circuit stated
that the plaintiff would need to show it owned a valid and
enforceable patent and that the defendant likely infringed on this
1390
patent.
Because the defendant did not question the former, the
Federal Circuit focused on whether the district court correctly
1391
construed the patent’s claims.
The plaintiff’s patent related to a pharmaceutical drug named
Accupril®, which uses angiotensin converting enzyme (“ACE”)
1392
inhibitors to treat high blood pressure.
Although many ACE
inhibitors degrade and become unstable due to cyclization,
hydrolysis, and oxidation processes, the patent included a
1393
formulation that avoided these problems.
One of the crucial
1394
compounds in the formulation is “inert diluent lactose.”
In 1999, Teva Pharmaceuticals, USA, Inc. (“Teva”) filed an ANDA
1395
1396
to market a generic version of Accupril®.
Pfizer brought suit
1383.
1384.
1385.
1386.
1387.
1388.
1389.
1390.
1391.
1392.
1393.
1394.
1395.
1396.

Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483.
Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483.
Id. at 1290, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484.
429 F.3d 1364, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1369, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259.
Id. at 1372, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
Id. at 1369, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259.
Id. at 1370, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259.
Warner-Lambert, a subsidiary of Pfizer, actually brought suit.

Id., 77
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against
Teva
alleging
infringement
under
35
U.S.C.
1397
Originally, the two parties argued for different
§ 271(e)(2)(A).
claim constructions. Eventually, however, they stipulated that the
1398
plaintiff’s use of “saccharide” in Claims 1 and 16 meant “a sugar,
and specifically includes only lower molecular weight carbohydrates,
specifically, mono- and disaccharides and their simple derivatives,
including such substances as lactose, sucrose, mannitol and
1399
sorbitol.”
Although the outcome of this litigation was not at issue
for the Federal Circuit, the stipulated definition of saccharide from
this suit did arise when Pfizer later brought suit in the instant action
against the defendants, Teva and Ranbaxy Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
(“Ranbaxy”). In this action, the plaintiff brought an infringement
suit after the defendants entered into a Distribution and Supply
1400
Agreement to co-market a generic version of Accupril®.
In considering the plaintiff’s preliminary injunction request, the
district court refused to adopt the construction of “saccharide” as
1401
defined by the court in the previous suit involving Pfizer and Teva.
It denied adopting the defendants’ definition, which read “sugars,
including the lower molecular carbohydrates, specifically mono-and
1402
disaccharides.”
Instead, the district court construed the term
“saccharide” and “saccharides” as used in Claims 1 and 16 to include
1403
“mono-, di-, tri-, and polysaccharides.”
Finding that this
construction would likely lead to a final judgment of infringement,
the district court granted the plaintiff a preliminary injunction. The
defendants subsequently appealed that grant and the district court’s
claim construction.

U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260.
1397. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260.
1398. Claim 1 states:
A pharmaceutical composition which contains:
(a) a drug component
which comprises a suitable amount of an ACE inhibitor which is susceptible
to cyclization, hydrolysis, and discolorization, (b) a suitable amount of an
alkali or alkaline earth metal carbonate to inhibit cyclization and
discolorization, and (c) a suitable amount of a saccharide to inhibit
hydrolysis. Id. at 1369, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259 (citing U.S. Patent No.
4,743,450 col.5, 1.52—col.6, 1.2 (filed on Feb. 24, 1987)).
Claim 16 states: “[a] process for stabilizing an ACE inhibitor drug against cyclization
which comprises the step of contacting the drug with: (a) a suitable amount of an
alkali or alkaline earth-metal carbonate and, (b) one or more saccharides.” Id. at
1370, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259 (citing U.S. Patent No. 4,743,450 col.6, 11.54-63
(filed on Feb. 24, 1987)).
1399. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260.
1400. Id. at 1371, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260.
1401. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
1402. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
1403. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
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On appeal, the defendants argued that the district court should
have further defined “polysaccharide” to mean sugars “with up to ten
monosaccharide units,” but would not include any polysaccharide,
such as microcrystalline cellulose, that included more than ten
1404
units.
In support of its argument that the district court erred by
not limiting polysaccharides to meaning “sugars,” the defendants
pointed to patent language that referenced “saccharides (i.e.,
1405
sugars).”
While the Federal Circuit admitted it previously
referenced the use of “i.e.” in construing disputed terms, it would not
do so here, as doing so would “ignore[] the fact that the person of
ordinary skill in the art is deemed to have read the claim term in the
1406
context of the entire patent.”
Reviewing the patent as a whole, the
Federal Circuit found the plaintiff used the term “saccharide” in a
very broad manner, and that the plaintiff did not define saccharides
1407
in what they were, but instead, in what they were not.
By doing so,
the plaintiff “left open a vast array of substances that may be
1408
considered” saccharides.
In support of this conclusion, the Federal
Circuit quoted patent language that stated “[m]annitol, lactose, and
1409
other sugars are preferred.”
Because mannitol is not actually a
sugar, but a sugar derivative, the Federal Circuit reasoned that the
‘450 patent did not contemplate limiting the term “saccharide” to
1410
only sugars.
Additionally, the Federal Circuit approved the district
court’s use of a dictionary in construing the claim terms, “so long as
the dictionary definition does not contradict any definition found in
1411
or ascertained by a reading of the patent documents.”
The defendants also argued that the stipulated definition of
saccharides used by the court in the previous litigation between Teva
1412
and Pfizer supports its claim construction.
Rejecting this
argument, the Federal Circuit stated that the defendants did not
identify “any legal doctrines that would compel” the Federal Circuit
1413
to adopt that stipulated construction.
Moreover, it pointed out
that the stipulated construction’s use was exclusively limited to that

1404. Id. at 1373, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262.
1405. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262.
1406. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262.
1407. Id. at 1374, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262.
1408. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263.
1409. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263.
1410. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263.
1411. Id. at 1375, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263 (citing Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415
F.3d 1303, 1322-23, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
1412. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1264.
1413. Id. at 1376, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1264.
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1414

litigation.
Lastly, the defendants argued that the district court’s
claim construction rendered claims 1 and 16 invalid for lack of
1415
The Federal Circuit stated it
enablement under 35 U.S.C. § 112.
would not apply the maxim in this case, “that claims should be
construed to preserve their validity,” because the defendants failed to
show that the PTO would have found the claims invalid had it not
1416
used the defendants’ construction of saccharides.
Accordingly, the
Federal Circuit held that the district court correctly construed the
1417
term saccharide.
1418
In MicroStrategy Inc. v. Business Objects, S.A., the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the
defendant, Business Objects, finding non-infringement of the
plaintiff’s patent. In this case, both parties competed in the business
1419
intelligence software field.
The plaintiff’s patent pertained to a
system and method responsible for automatically broadcasting
information “to multiple types of subscriber output devices and
formatting output for those devices using configurable
1420
parameters.”
The “multiple types of subscriber output devices”
included devices such as “electronic mail, personal digital assistants
(“PDA”), pagers, facsimiles, printers, mobile phones, and
1421
telephones.”
The issue before the Federal Circuit was whether the
plaintiff’s patent required that it support multiple types of output
devices, or whether it could support only one type of output
1422
device.
To make this determination, the Federal Circuit reviewed
1423
the district court’s claim construction of “device-specific style,” and
whether, based on its construction, the district court correctly
concluded that the defendant’s product infringed on the plaintiff’s
1424
patent.
The district court construed the plaintiff’s claim term “devicespecific style” to mean “[t]he format in which a particular type of
output device receives and displays service output, consisting of
1425
Construing the remaining
values of a plurality of parameters.”
1414. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1264.
1415. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1264.
1416. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1264.
1417. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1264.
1418. Microstratesy, Inc. v. Bus. Objects, S.A., 429 F.3d 1344, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1001 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
1419. Id. at 1348, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002.
1420. Id. at 1349, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003.
1421. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003.
1422. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003.
1423. Id. at 1350, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004.
1424. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004.
1425. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004.
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claim language, the district court concluded that the plaintiff’s patent
“requires a particular format and presentation for one device, e.g.,
mobile phone data, that could differ from the format for a second
1426
device, e.g., electronic mail data.”
On appeal, the plaintiff argued
that the correct meaning of the district court’s claim construction
would not require support for more than one type of output
1427
device.
Reviewing claim language and the specification, the
Federal Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s argument, finding that the
1428
As for the
patent required support for at least two output devices.
claim language, the Federal Circuit found that all three of the
plaintiff’s independent claims required “each user output device
subscribed to a service be associated with a device-specific style” and that
a “device-specific formatted output according to a style specified for
1429
each device.”
The Federal Circuit found the claims’ use of the
terms “each” and “specified” require more than one device-specific
1430
style and that only one device-specific style would be insufficient.
The Federal Circuit then focused on the specification, which
stated, “[t]he system then automatically forwards output from the
services to one or more subscriber output devices specified for that
1431
service.”
While the Federal Circuit recognized that this language
suggests that the system may only send output to one output device, it
1432
rejected this interpretation.
In support of its holding, the Federal
Circuit pointed out that the specification does not deal with a
“minimum capacity to support a number of output formats (e.g., only
1433
one).”
Rather, the Federal Circuit found the specification more
strongly suggested that the system required support for more than
1434
Accordingly, the Federal
one type of subscriber output devices.
Circuit affirmed the district court’s claim construction and finding of
1435
non-infringement.
1436
In Pause Technology LLC v. TiVo Inc., the Federal Circuit affirmed
the district court’s grant of summary judgment of noninfringement
1437
based on its claim construction.
In reviewing whether TiVo’s

1426.
1427.
1428.
1429.
1430.
1431.
1432.
1433.
1434.
1435.
1436.
1437.

Id. at 1350-51, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004.
Id. at 1351, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005.
Id. at 1351-52, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005-06.
Id. at 1351, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005.
Id. at 1352, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005-06.
419 F.3d 1326, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1110 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1327, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1112.
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digital video recorder (“DVR”) infringed on the plaintiff’s patent, the
district court construed “circular storage buffer,” and “time interval
1438
of predetermined duration,” as claim terms used in the patent.
The parties agreed that circular storage buffers could be
configured in two different ways to record data—either physically or
1439
logically.
The plaintiff argued that the court should broadly
construe the “circular storage buffer” limitation to include a logical
addressing scheme, rather than limit the construction to a physical
1440
addressing scheme.
The district court denied the plaintiff’s
argument, and construed “circular storage buffer” to pertain to a
1441
physical addressing scheme.
The Federal Circuit began by reviewing the claim language of the
1442
patent.
The plaintiff’s claim states that the circular storage buffer
is a “memory access means [that] continuously writ[es] said sequence
1443
of digital input signal values into said addressable digital memory.”
The circular storage buffer operates so that writing occurs “at a
sequence of continually advancing writing addresses established by
said processor to write over the oldest of said input signal values
recorded in said digital memory as said sequence of writing addresses
1444
are advanced.”
In other words, the plaintiff’s circular storage
buffer allows for new signal values to “write over” the oldest input
1445
signal values.
The plaintiff urged the Federal Circuit to ignore “write over”
language appearing later in its claims, stating that “regardless of what
claim language appears in a later portion of the claim, that language
should not be read into the interpretation of a separate claim
1446
The Federal Circuit refused this request, stating that
element.”
“[p]roper claim construction . . . demands interpretation of the
1447
entire claim in context, not a single element in isolation.”
Further,
the Federal Circuit stated that the “write over” language reflected
how the buffer addressed data for storage, and that there was “no
1448
basis” for it to ignore this language.
1438. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1112.
1439. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1112.
1440. Id. at 1330, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1114-15.
1441. Id. at 1329, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1114.
1442. 419 F.3d at 1330, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1114.
1443. Id. at 1330-31, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1114-15 (quoting patent language).
1444. Id. at 1331, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1115.
1445. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1115.
1446. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1115.
1447. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1115 (quoting Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v.
Converse Inc., 183 F.3d 1369, 1374, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1518, 1522 (Fed. Cir.
1999)).
1448. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1115.
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The plaintiff then argued that the “buffer need not be circular in
the sense that when the last address is reached, the next address
1449
The Federal
accessed is the first [physical] address location.”
Circuit also rejected this argument, finding that it conflicted with the
1450
actual claim language.
Lastly, the plaintiff argued that the district court erred by
“rewriting” the plaintiff’s claims by using the terms “physical address,”
“same repeating,” and “last address/next address” in its claim
construction, which “impermissibly narrow[ed] claim scope,” as these
1451
terms did not appear in the patent’s claim language.
While the
Federal Circuit agreed that courts may not “rewrite” claims, it insisted
that courts may use terms that do not appear in the claim as long as it
1452
does not result in a conflict.
The Federal Circuit also affirmed the district court’s construction
1453
The district
of the term “time interval of predetermined duration.”
court construed this term to mean “the time interval of the recorded
1454
signal must be of a fixed duration determined prior to operation.”
It further held that “predetermined duration” “means that the space
of time for receipt of the signal values was determined before the
1455
time interval began.”
The plaintiff argued that determining the time
interval differed from fixing the time interval of signal values entering
the buffer, and that the time interval can vary after the buffer begins
1456
receiving signals.
The Federal Circuit rejected this argument,
1457
stating that this argument ignores the claim term “predetermine.”
The Federal Circuit further stated, “[i]n construing claims, however,
1458
we must give each claim term the respect that it is due.”
The plaintiff also argued that its written description supports its
argument that the time interval can vary after the buffer begins
1459
receiving signals.
The written description states that “writing over
the oldest data stored on the hard disk seven, so that a fixed duration
or ‘time window’ of prior recorded signals are recorded in the memory
1460
subsystem 5 at all times.”
The plaintiff asserted that “time window”
1449. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1115.
1450. Id. at 1331-32, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1116.
1451. Id. at 1333, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1116-17.
1452. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1116-17.
1453. Id. at 1335, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1117.
1454. Id. at 1333, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1117.
1455. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1117.
1456. Id. at 1334, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1117.
1457. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1117.
1458. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1117 (citing Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA,
Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1372, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1648 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
1459. Id. at 1334-35, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1117-18.
1460. Id. at 1334, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1117-18 (emphasis added).
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was an alternative to “fixed duration” of signals recorded in the
1461
The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, stating that the
buffer.
plaintiff’s use of quotation marks with “time window,” as well as the
context used, indicated that the different terms reference the same
1462
interval.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district
court’s claim construction of “time interval of predetermined
1463
duration.”
The Federal Circuit also directed its attention to the patent’s
1464
The patent examiner initially denied the
prosecution history.
patent’s application as obvious in view of U.S. Patent No. 5,241,428
1465
(“Goldwasser patent”).
The plaintiff filed a preliminary
amendment and added language to distinguish its invention,
including language that made it clear that its buffer “must write over
the oldest signal values recorded in the digital memory as the writing
1466
addresses advance.”
This added language contradicted the
plaintiff’s argument at trial, which was that its buffer allowed for
logical addressing, and it did not require the “write over” of the
1467
oldest recorded signals.
Therefore, the Federal Circuit affirmed
the district court’s claim construction that disallowed the broad
1468
construction of “circular storage buffer.”
Additionally, the Federal Circuit addressed how the prosecution
history also supported the district court’s construction of the term
1469
“time interval of predetermined duration.”
The district court
construed this term to mean that “the time interval of the recorded
1470
signal must be of a fixed duration determined prior to operation.”
It further held that “predetermined duration” “means that the “space
of time for receipt of the signal values was determined before the
1471
time interval began.”
The plaintiff argued that the time interval
1472
In the plaintiff’s
can vary after the buffer begins receiving signals.
Response to an Office Action, the plaintiff stated that its invention
“particularly claims the use of a circular buffer in order to provide a
continuous recording capability wherein only a specified interval of the
1461. Id. at 1335, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1118.
1462. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1118.
1463. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1118.
1464. Id. at 1332, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1116.
1465. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1116.
1466. Id. at 1333, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1116.
1467. Id., U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1116.
1468. Id., U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1117.
1469. Id., U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1118.
1470. Id., U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1117.
1471. Id., U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1117 (citing district court’s ruling on motion for
summary judgment).
1472. Id. at 1334, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1117.
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1473

most recently recorded material is retained.”
The Federal Circuit
held that the plaintiff’s use of the term “specified interval” supports
the district court’s construction—that time intervals are specified
prior to operation and cannot vary after the buffer starts receiving
1474
signals.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court’s
1475
construction of a “time interval of predetermined duration.”
1476
In Research Plastics, Inc. v. Federal Packaging Corp.,
the Federal
Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment of
noninfringement because the district court erroneously constructed
1477
the claim term “rear end.”
The plaintiff’s patent relates to tubes
1478
The plaintiff’s patent
used for caulk or other fluent materials.
integrated the use of ridges, positioned on the interior of the
1479
caulking tubes, that allowed for even application of fluent material.
The examiner initially rejected the plaintiff’s patent application as
obvious in view of United States Patent No. 4,852,772 (“Ennis
1480
patent”).
Similar to the plaintiff’s invention, the Ennis patent also
used interior ridges in its caulking tube, although the Ennis patent
1481
The
only placed ridges near the nozzle end of the caulking tube.
plaintiff amended its application to state that its ridges, “extend[] to
1482
said rear end of said hollow tube body.”
Based on this
amendment, the examiner concluded that the plaintiff sufficiently
distinguished its patent from the Ennis patent, and the PTO issued
1483
the plaintiff’s patent.
The plaintiff brought suit against the defendant for the
manufacture and sale of caulking tubes that included ridges
beginning at the rear edge of the tube and extending approximately
1484
one fifth of the length of the tube.
After constructing the term
1485
“rear end,” which appeared in claim 10 of the plaintiff’s patent, the
district court rejected the plaintiff’s argument of literal infringement
1486
Specifically,
and infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.
the district court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that “rear end”
1473.
1474.
1475.
1476.
1477.
1478.
1479.
1480.
1481.
1482.
1483.
1484.
1485.
1486.

Id. at 1335, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1118 (internal citation omitted).
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1118.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1118.
421 F.3d 1290, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1133 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1134.
Id. at 1292, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1134.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1134.
Id. at 1293, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1135.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1135.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
Id. at 1294, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
Id. at 1294, 1296, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
Id. at 1294-95, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
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1487

referred to the “rear portion” of the tube.
Instead, the district
court determined “rear end” was a specific reference point on the
1488
outside edge of the tube.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that
1489
“rear end” did not include the “rear portion” of the tube.
The
Federal Circuit ruled, however, that the district court impermissibly
1490
limited the patent’s scope with its claim construction.
The Federal
Circuit disagreed with the district court’s determination that “rear
1491
Instead, the
end” only included the outside edge of the tube.
Federal Circuit determined that “rear end” included the “entire rear
edge of the tube, including the point at the rear end on the inside of
the tube, the point on the rear end at the outside of the tube, and the
1492
area in between.”
The Federal Circuit provided additional
reasoning to support the district court’s rejection of the plaintiff’s
1493
The plaintiff’s claims covered a
“rear portion” construction.
“hollow tube body being generally cylindrical and extending from a
1494
rear end to a nozzle end . . . .”
The Federal Circuit found this
description to suggest a body that extended between two points.
Therefore, the Federal Circuit recognized that the term “rear end”
included a portion of the tube, rather than a point on the tube,
would be “illogical,” as it would “leave the extension of the tube ill1495
defined.”
The Federal Circuit also looked to the prosecution history to
provide additional reasoning why the district court correctly rejected
1496
the plaintiff’s “rear portion” construction.
To overcome an
obviousness objection, the plaintiff amended its claim “to cover tubes
in which ‘the air spaces are provided adjacent the rear end of the
1497
tube such that the air spaces are provided when the tube is full.’”
The Federal Circuit found that if it constructed “rear end” to mean
“rear portion” then its construction would conflict with the plaintiff’s
amendment, as “air spaces would not be provided when the tube was

1487. Id. at 1294, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
1488. Id. at 1294, 1296, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136, 1137 (emphasis added).
1489. Id. at 1296, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1137.
1490. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1137-38.
1491. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1137-38.
1492. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1137-38.
1493. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1138.
1494. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1138.
1495. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1138.
1496. Id. at 1297, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1138.
1497. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1138 (quoting statements made by Research
Plastics to the patent examiner that suggested spatial limitations consistent with the
Court’s construction of the term “rear end”).
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full.”
Moreover, if constructed to mean “rear portion,” the
1499
plaintiff’s application would not have avoided prior art.
Regardless, because the district court impermissibly limited the claim
scope, the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded for further
1500
proceedings.
1501
In Chimie v. PPG Industries, Inc., the plaintiff was the assignee of a
patent on certain spheroidal precipitated silica particulates and their
processes of manufacture. The silica particulate covered by the
patent was used as a filler to reinforce elastomeric products such as
1502
automobile tires.
The spheroidal geometry of the invention
overcame the problems of conventional elastomeric fillers in use at
the time, such as carbon black, which were inherently dusty and did
1503
not flow easily.
Claim 1 of the patent required “[d]ry, dust-free
and non-dusting, solid and homogenous atomized precipitated silica
1504
particulates essentially spheroidal in geometrical configuration.”
PPG asserted that the “dust-free and non-dusting” limitation should
1505
be interpreted literally to mean “no dust cloud whatsoever.”
In
contrast, Chimie argued that a person of ordinary skill in the art
would not have adopted this meaning, particularly in light of the
“pour test”—a comparison of the flowability of the commercial
embodiment of the invention versus the prior art that showed that
1506
the invention produced at least some dust.
Thus, Chimie argued,
“dust-free and non-dusting” should be interpreted to mean “very low
1507
dust.”
The district court found that “dust-free and non-dusting” was
ambiguous and could not be read to mean that the invention creates
1508
no dust at all.
It also found that Chimie’s proposed definition of
“very low dust” would not meet the requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112,
¶ 2, that claims must “particularly point out and distinctly claim the
1509
subject matter” of the invention.
The district court ultimately
decided to define “dust-free and non-dusting” by a certain weight
percentage of dust formed from silica abrasion under a German test

1498.
1499.
1500.
1501.
1502.
1503.
1504.
1505.
1506.
1507.
1508.
1509.

Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1138.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1138.
Id. at 1299, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140.
403 F.3d 1373, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1374, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1322.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1322.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1322.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1322.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323.
Id. at 1375, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324.
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standard, the DIN 53 583 standard.
It reasoned that a construction
under the DIN test was “the only meaningful guidance provided in
1511
the patent.”
The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court’s rejection of
PPG’s proposal to read the disputed phrase as meaning no dust at
1512
all.
The Federal Circuit explained that, to interpret “dust-free and
non-dusting” in the patent this way would mean that the claim would
1513
not read on the preferred embodiment.
Such a construction,
observed the Federal Circuit, would “‘rarely if ever [be] correct and
1514
would require highly persuasive evidentiary support.’”
The Federal
Circuit concluded that the specification, prosecution history, and
prior art contain no “highly persuasive evidentiary support” that
1515
would require reaching such an unlikely result.
The Federal Circuit went on to hold that it was proper for the
1516
It
district court to base its claim construction on the DIN standard.
found that “dust-free and non-dusting” was relative, including within
its reach a characteristic of the invention which could only be
1517
understood by comparing it to the prior art.
Looking at the
written description, it pointed out that while ten silica examples are
referenced in the written description, “the preferred embodiment of
1518
Example 5 is repeatedly described as the invention itself.”
Although only two examples in the patent—Examples 5 and 10—
constitute a product of the issued claims, the results of the DIN tests
1519
showed that Example 5 produced more dust.
Accordingly, the
Federal Circuit concluded that the district court correctly defined the
outer limit for the level of dust created by the invention as that in
1520
Example 5.
The Federal Circuit noted that this construction did
not contravene the basic teaching that limitations from the
specification should not be imported into the claims because
reference to this particular example “reconciles the ambiguous claim
1521
language with the inventor’s disclosure.”
Furthermore, the Federal
Circuit found this construction consistent with the proposition that

1510.
1511.
1512.
1513.
1514.
1515.
1516.
1517.
1518.
1519.
1520.
1521.

Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323-24.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324.
Id. at 1377, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325.
Id. at 1378-79, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326.
Id. at 1380, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327.
Id. at 1378, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326.
Id. at 1378-79, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326.
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claims are not necessarily entitled to a broader scope than the
preferred embodiment when the specification describes that
1522
embodiment as the invention itself.
The Federal Circuit also rejected Chemie’s argument that the
“pour test” should be used to determine the level of dust production
1523
claimed by the invention.
It found no language in either the
claims or the written description that taught application of the pour
1524
test as a measure of dust production.
Rather, because the plaintiff
mentioned only the DIN 53 583 standard as a test of dustiness, the
DIN standard was the appropriate standard to construe the claim
1525
term.
1526
the plaintiff sued the
In ASM America, Inc. v. Genus, Inc.,
defendant for infringement of two patents (the “‘590 patent” and the
“‘365 patent”) regarding a process called Atomic Layer Deposition
1527
(“ALD”).
The ALD process deposits very thin layers of different
1528
materials on the surface of a substrate by two different methods.
The plaintiff asserted two claims against the defendant, one from
1529
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the district court
each patent.
misconstrued two terms of the asserted method claims from the ‘590
1530
patent.
The first term, “reaction space,” defines the space in which
users place a substrate to subject it to reaction with vapor phase
1531
reactants.
The second term, “evacuating,” refers to the procedural
step of clearing the reaction space between successive vapor phase
1532
The district court construed “reaction space” as “the
pulses.
reaction chamber and the gas inflow/outflow channels that
1533
communicate immediately with the reaction chamber.”
Affirming
this construction, the Federal Circuit found that the specification’s
express definition of “reaction space,” including the reaction
chamber and the immediately communicating gas inflow/outflow
1534
channels, supported the district court’s construction of the term.
1522. Id. at 1379, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326.
1523. Id. at 1379-80, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326-27.
1524. Id. at 1379, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327.
1525. Id. at 1380, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327.
1526. 401 F.3d 1340, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1211 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
1527. Id. at 1341, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212.
1528. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212.
1529. Id. at 1341-42, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212.
1530. Id. at 1342, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212-13 (challenging the district court’s
construction of the terms “evacuating” and “reaction space”).
1531. Id. at 1342, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1213.
1532. Id. at 1343, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1213.
1533. Id. at 1342, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1213.
1534. Id. at 1342-43, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1213. The specification also states
that “the reaction space includes the entire volume to be evacuated between two
successive vapor-phase pulses.” Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1213. The plaintiff
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The district court construed “evacuation” as “using a vacuum pump
to suck the reactant gasses out of the reaction space, not . . . using an
1535
On appeal, the
inert gas to push the reactant gases out . . . .”
plaintiff argued that this construction was erroneous because it
improperly read in a limitation from the specification requiring
1536
evacuation by a vacuum pump. Instead, the plaintiff argued that
since the claim did not specify the type of pump used in the
evacuation, the district court erred in limiting “evacuation” to use of
1537
a vacuum pump.
1538
The Federal Circuit disagreed with plaintiff for several reasons.
First, it found that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand
the term “pump” to mean “vacuum pump,” especially in light of the
plaintiff’s own expert’s testimony that “all ALD technology uses a
1539
vacuum pump as a necessary component.”
Further, the Federal
Circuit found support in the specification which described the pump
as “capable of evacuating the reaction space to a vacuum” and stated
that the invention could be “implemented using any suitable pump
1540
capable of establishing a sufficient vacuum.”
Finally, during
prosecution the applicant had used the terms “pump” and “vacuum
1541
pump” interchangeably.
The plaintiff next argued that the district court erroneously
construed “evacuation” to mean only sucking reactant gases out of
the reaction space, and not using an inert gas to push the reactant
1542
gases out.
The plaintiff argued that “evacuation” refers to any
process that removes reactant gases from the reaction chamber in
1543
light of the specification’s definition of “evacuation.”
That
specification
[refers generally] to the removal of reactant residues in the vapor
phase. . . . [and] can be accomplished by purging the gas volume of
the apparatus by means of at least one pumping cycle capable of

argued that the district court definition of reaction space was circular because the
parties disputed what portions of the device are used to perform the evacuation step.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1213. The Federal Circuit was not persuaded, finding
that the specification made clear that the “‘entire volume to be evacuated’ includes
both the reaction chamber and the inflow and outflow channels that directly
communicate with the chamber.” Id. at 1343, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1213.
1535. Id. at 1343, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1213.
1536. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1213.
1537. Id. at 1343-44, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1213-14.
1538. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1213-14.
1539. Id. at 1343, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1214.
1540. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1214 (emphasis added).
1541. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1214.
1542. Id. at 1343-44, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1214.
1543. Id. at 1343, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1214.
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lowering the internal pressure in the apparatus to a sufficiently
high vacuum.
When required, the apparatus may be
simultaneously filled with an inactive gas which promotes the
1544
purging of the reactant residues from the reaction space.

The Federal Circuit agreed with the plaintiff that a term’s
1545
The
definition within the patent specification ordinarily controls.
Federal Circuit did not agree, however, that the specification here
1546
supported the plaintiff’s construction of “evacuation.”
The Federal
Circuit found that the specification’s statement that inactive gas
could be used to purge reactants did not suggest that the purging
1547
step is part of the evacuation.
Both the language of the asserted
claim, which described evacuation and purging as two separate steps,
and the prosecution history, which explained the use of inactive gas
as a means for using a weaker vacuum pump to perform the
evacuation, resolved any doubt that the purging and evacuation steps
1548
were distinct.
In other words, the court found that the
introduction of inactive gas was “an additional step that makes the
1549
evacuation more efficient,” not an alternative means of evacuation.
Since the district court did not err in its claim construction, the
Federal Circuit upheld its determination on summary judgment that
the defendant’s device did not literally infringe the plaintiff’s
1550
patent.
The plaintiff also argued that the district court misconstrued
“evacuating the chamber of gases” in the asserted claims of the
1551
patent.
The district court similarly construed terms from both
patents, “evacuating the chamber of gases” and “evacuation,” ruling
that they refer to the removal of gases with a vacuum pump, and not
by using an inert gas to push the gases out of the reaction
1552
chamber.
Again, the plaintiff argued that the district court
improperly excluded from the meaning of “evacuating the chamber
1553
of gases” the process of purging the chamber with an inert gas.
The Federal Circuit again found the plaintiff’s arguments unavailing.
It explained that the plaintiff’s proposed construction, which would
include pushing more gases into the chamber, ignored the plain
1544.
1545.
1546.
1547.
1548.
1549.
1550.
1551.
1552.
1553.

Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1214.
Id. at 1343-44, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1214.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1214.
Id. at 1344, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1214.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1214-15.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1214-15.
Id. at 1345, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1215.
Id. at 1345-46, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1215-16.
Id. at 1346, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1216.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1216.
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meaning of the claim term which required that all gases be
1554
The plaintiff also argued that “removal” should include
removed.
pushing inert gas through the reaction chamber because the
specification explained that a prior art patent included removal of
excess gas by flowing purge gas through the reaction chamber
1555
between each exposure cycle.
The Federal Circuit explained that
the prior art process referenced in the specification described the
removal of excess reactant gas, and therefore, was quite different from
1556
a process of evacuating all gases from a chamber.
The Federal
Circuit refused to limit “evacuating the chamber of gases” to include
only the evacuation of reactant gases because the phrase had been
used in the claim before any reactant gases were inserted into the
1557
chamber.
In addition, the Federal Circuit found that nothing in
the specification itself suggested that the patent claimed a system that
1558
Instead, the
selectively removed certain gases from the chamber.
patent described a system which removed gases from the chamber
1559
specifically by vacuum.
The Federal Circuit also found support for
its constructions in statements by the patent inventor and the
plaintiff’s Chief Technology Officer, which explained that the scope
1560
of the invention was limited to vacuum pumping.
1561
the patent at issue
In Asyst Technologies, Inc. v. Emtrak, Inc.,
1562
related to the manufacturing of integrated circuits.
During the
manufacture of integrated circuits, various tools process large silicon
1563
The creation of the wafers occurs
wafers comprising several layers.
in multiple stages, generating one layer of the wafer at a time, and
1564
must be processed in a particular sequence and by particular tools.
Generally, to maintain a clean environment during this process, the
silicon wafers are transported from tool to tool in sealed containers
1565
known as “pods.”
The patent at issue was directed to an inventory
management and information processing system used to improve
1566
efficiency and reduce human error in this manufacture process.
It
described an automated process, “pod-tool recognition,” which
1554.
1555.
1556.
1557.
1558.
1559.
1560.
1561.
1562.
1563.
1564.
1565.
1566.

Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1216.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1216.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1216.
Id. at 1346-47, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1216.
Id. at 1347, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1216.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1216.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1216-17.
402 F.3d 1188, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1189, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1274.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1274.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1274.
Id. at 1190, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1274.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1274.
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ensures that each pod is processed by the right tool at the right time
and allows operators to track the status of the wafers during
1567
The asserted claims described a system in which
manufacture.
“first microcomputer means” mounted on one or more pods
communicated with a “second microcomputer means” mounted on a
1568
workstation, where the wafers would be processed.
The district court granted summary judgment of noninfringement
1569
to the defendant on several grounds.
First, it found that the
accused’s system did not have a structure that was the same as or
1570
equivalent to the required “second microcomputer means.”
The
district court found that rather than using a local control processor
such as that which corresponded to the “second microcomputer
means” of the patent, the defendant’s system used a central computer
which then communicated with the workstation via a cell
1571
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the cell controller
controller.
qualified as a “second microcomputer means” and submitted
evidence that the cell controllers perform the functions identified
with the second microcomputer means, i.e., those of “receiving and
processing digital information communicated with [the] second two1572
way communication means.”
Without commenting on the weight
of this evidence, the Federal Circuit held that the district court erred
in concluding that the central computer, not the cell controllers,
1573
performed the required functions.
The district court also noted that even if the defendant had
included a “second microcomputer means,” the microcomputer
1574
means would not have been “mounted” on the workstation.
The
plaintiff argued that this limitation was satisfied by the connection of
1575
the cell controllers and the workstation by an electrical cable.
However, the Federal Circuit agreed with the district court and the
defendant on this issue, interpreting the phrase “mounted on” with
1576
its ordinary meaning, “securely attached, affixed, or fastened to.”
The Federal Circuit reasoned that this construction was correct given
the following factors: (1) the plaintiff’s failure to point to any
1567. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1274.
1568. Id. at 1190-91, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1274-75.
1569. Id. at 1191, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1275.
1570. Id. at 1191, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1275.
1571. Id. at 1991, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1275.
1572. Id. at 1192, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1276 (quoting the district court
opinion).
1573. Id. at 1192-93, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1276.
1574. Id. at 1193, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1273.
1575. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277.
1576. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277.
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intrinsic evidence supporting a construction of “mounted on” that
1577
(2) the specification
would include connection by serial cable;
used the phrase “mounted on” with respect to other components in a
context that made clear that the phrase was used to mean securely
1578
affixed to objects; (3) the specification and prosecution history’s
repeated use of the phrase “mounted on” interchangeably with “on,”
“which in context clearly denotes a form of attachment, not simply an
1579
electrical connection;”
(4) the patent distinguished between
features that were “connected to” or “in electrical communication
1580
with” an object and those that were “mounted on” an object;
(5) the inventors’ amendment of a claim during prosecution which
deleted the requirement that a second communication means be
“adjacent” a processing station and replacement of that requirement
with one that required the second communication means be
“mounted on” the station, suggesting that they “meant for the term
‘mounted on’ to be narrowly limited to a structure that is affixed to
1581
an object;” and (6) a construction of “mounted on” that was broad
enough to allow a single device to be “mounted on” two different
workstations would be awkward and would run counter to one of the
express purposes of the invention which was to “enable a system that
1582
‘does not require centralized control.’”
The Federal Circuit also agreed with the district court’s finding
that the accused’s device could not meet the “mounted on”
1583
requirement under the doctrine of equivalents.
It reasoned that
the “mounted on” limitation was “binary in nature,” meaning that the
second microcomputer means was either mounted or unmounted,
and for purposes of equivalents, “an unmounted microcomputer
1584
means cannot be equivalent to a mounted one.”
The Federal
Circuit concluded that both the “all elements rule” and “its corollary,
the ‘specific exclusion principle’” supported its holding, since “[t]o
hold that ‘unmounted’ is equivalent to ‘mounted’ would effectively
read the ‘mounted on’ limitation out of the patent,” and “since the
term mounted can fairly be said to specifically exclude objects that
1585
are ‘unmounted.’”

1577.
1578.
1579.
1580.
1581.
1582.
1583.
1584.
1585.

Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277.
Id. at 1194, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277-78.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278 (quoting the patent language).
Id. at 1195, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278 (quoting the district court’s opinion).
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278.
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1586

In Gillette Co. v. Energizer Holdings, Inc.,
the plaintiff sought a
preliminary injunction against the defendant to stop it from
manufacturing and selling “QUATTRO” razors and razorblades that
it contended infringed its patent. Gillette owned a patent for wet1587
shave safety razors with multiple blades.
The patent covered a
disposable safety razor comprising of a
group of first, second, and third blades with parallel sharpened edges
located between the guard and cap, the first blade defining a blade
edge nearest the guard having a negative exposure not less than
-0.2 mm, and the third blade defining a blade edge nearest the cap
having a positive exposure of not greater than +0.2 mm, said second
blade defining a blade edge having an exposure not less than the
exposure of the first blade and not greater than the exposure of
1588
the third blade.

Because the defendant’s QUATTRO products had four blades, the
issue was whether or not the asserted claims of the patent were
1589
The district court denied
limited to razors with only three blades.
Gillette’s motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the terms
“first,” “second,” and “third” of claim 1 limited the scope of that claim
to a razor having solely three blades, and that Gillette had therefore
failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of success on its claim
1590
of literal infringement.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded the
1591
decision to the district court.
It found that the terms “group of”
and “comprising” were “open” terms that extended the claim’s scope
1592
The Federal Circuit found
to razors with more than three blades.
further support for this conclusion in the specification itself, which
discussed a “progressive blade exposure” in which the first and third
blades are defined as leading and trailing blades, respectively, while
the “second” blade is defined only as being between the first and
1593
third blades and having a certain exposure.
Given this description,
the Federal Circuit found that the invention covered a device with
more than one “second blade” including devices with two middle
1586. 405 F.3d 1367, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1586 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
1587. Id. at 1368, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1586-87.
1588. Id. at 1369, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1587 (emphasis added).
1589. Id. at 1371, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1589-90.
1590. Id. at 1369-70, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1588-89.
1591. Id. at 1375, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1593.
1592. See id. at 1372, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1590 (contrasting the phrase “group
consisting of” with “group of,” and explaining that when a patentee uses the phrase
“group consisting of,” he generally signals a Markush group with a closed meaning).
In contrast, “[w]ithout the word ‘consisting’ the simple phrase ‘group of’ is
presumptively open.” Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1590.
1593. Id. at 1372-73, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1591.
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blades that met the definition of “second blade” set forth in the
1594
claim.
The Federal Circuit found additional support for its claim
construction in the first sentence of the specification which stated
that “the invention . . . relates in particular to safety razors having blade
1595
units with a plurality of blades.”
Furthermore, the court found
support in dependent claim 2, which added the limitation that “the
span between the first blade edge and the guard is substantially
smaller than a span between the edges of the first and second blades
1596
and the span between the edges of the second and third blades.”
The Federal Circuit found that the patent drafter’s use of “a span”
1597
recognized that more than one such span may exist.
Finally, the Federal Circuit found that “[t]o make it abundantly
clear that the reference to ‘first,’ ‘second,’ and ‘third’ blades was not
a serial or numerical limitation,” the claim did not discuss the blades
consecutively (i.e. it did not discuss the second blade immediately
1598
after the first).
Thus, the Federal Circuit held that the district
court had erred in its preliminary claim construction and remanded
the case back for a decision on Gillette’s motion for a preliminary
1599
injunction in light of the Federal Circuit’s construction.
It noted,
however, that “because the claim construction set forth in this
opinion is preliminary and based upon an incomplete record, the
1600
district court will have every opportunity to review and revisit” it.
1601
In Hoffer v. Microsoft Corp., the plaintiff sued the defendant for
infringement of a patent directed to an “Interactive Electronic Trade
Network and User Interface” in which remote users of computer
terminals obtain data concerning economic activity from an index,
and interactively post and receive messages concerning economic
topics. The claims at issue provided a
method of messaging among at least two remote user terminals
(“RUTs”) . . . whereby a trade network supports users at said
plurality of RUTs who are each guided by said IAPI [integrated
application program interface] to select an economic activity, to
identify that index topic that corresponds to said activity, to enter
that topic board dedicated to said topic, and who are collectively

1594.
1595.
1596.
1597.
1598.
1599.
1600.
1601.

Id. at 1373, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1591.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1592 (emphasis in original).
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1591 (emphasis in original).
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1591.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1591.
Id. at 1374, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1592.
Id. at 1375, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1593.
405 F.3d 1326, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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able to concurrently engage in interactive data messaging on said
1602
topic boards.

The issue on appeal was whether the “whereby” clause quoted
above limited the claims. The plaintiff claimed that the district court
erred because, rather than limiting the claims, the “whereby clause”
1603
simply described the overall objective of the claimed method.
The
plaintiff argued that since the “whereby” clause did not state the
mechanics of “how to update topic board files or store menu files for
navigation, or show what enables host programmable applications to
transmit to network services,” the clause did not limit the claim to
1604
interactive data messaging.
The Federal Circuit disagreed, affirming the district court’s
construction of the “whereby” clause as requiring interactive data
1605
messaging.
It explained that the “whereby” clause described more
than the intended result of the process step, but was part of the
1606
It based this conclusion on its findings that the
process itself.
interactive data messaging feature was described in the specification
1607
and prosecution history as a central part of the invention.
Moreover, it rejected the plaintiff’s argument that a statement made
during prosecution of the patent that the claim “solely t[aught]
methods distinct from real-time messaging” supported its broader
1608
construction.
Rather, it found that “there was a difference between
real-time messaging and interactive messaging,” as interactive
1609
messaging “can occur in real time or asynchronously.”
Thus, the
Federal Circuit found that the asserted claims were limited to a
1610
method that provided interactive data messaging.
1611
the
In Howmedica Osteonics Corp. v. Tranquil Prospects, Ltd.,
plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that it did not infringe the
defendant’s patent directed to intramedullary prosthesis apparatuses
1612
and methods for their surgical implantation. The apparatus claims
required that the stem component have “a layer of coating material
surrounding [it] . . . said layer of coating material being of a

1602.
1603.
1604.
1605.
1606.
1607.
1608.
1609.
1610.
1611.
1612.

Id. at 1329, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483 (emphasis omitted).
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483.
Id. at 1330, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483-84.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484.
401 F.3d 1367, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1680 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1368, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681.
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1613

generally uniform predetermined thickness . . . .”
The parties
agreed that this limitation covered a stem coated with bone cement
before insertion into the stem socket but disputed whether this
limitation covered prostheses with stems that are coated with bone
1614
cement upon insertion into the stem socket.
The district court
held that the limitation covered pre-coated stems and did not include
1615
stems coated upon insertion.
On appeal, Howmedica argued that
the district court’s narrower construction was correct because the
claims required that the “coating material” cover the prosthesis in a
“generally uniform predetermined” thickness but bone cement, when
injected into the stem socket before prosthesis insertion, could not
1616
The Federal Circuit disagreed with this
achieve this limitation.
argument, noting that the claims only required that the coating be
1617
“generally uniform,” not exactly uniform.
Moreover, it explained,
the prosecution history repeatedly described the coating as only
approximately uniform, revealing that the limitation did not exclude
coating the stem by injecting bone cement into the stem socket
1618
before insertion of the prosthesis.
The Federal Circuit also rejected the notion that the
1619
“predetermined” limitation required a different result.
It found
that the invention disclosure revealed a way to “predetermine” the
thickness of the bone cement coating by selecting prosthesis of a
particular size and shape for insertion into a particular medullary
1620
canal.
Thus, a “process that does not coat the stem until insertion
into a stem socket filled with bone cement” could still satisfy the
1621
“predetermined thickness” requirement.
Finally, the Federal Circuit found support for its construction in
the parties’ agreement that placing a layer of bone cement on the
1622
stem before insertion meets the “coated stem” requirement. The
court reasoned that, because the claim at issue was “an apparatus
claim without process limitations,” there was “no difference in
‘coating’ for a stem covered with bone cement before insertion and a

1613.
1614.
1615.
1616.
1617.
1618.
1619.
1620.
1621.
1622.

Id. at 1369-70, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682-83.
Id. at 1373, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685-86.
Id. at 1368, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681.
Id. at 1374, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1686.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1686.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1686.
Id. at 1374-75, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1686-87.
Id. at 1374, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1686.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1686.
Id. at 1375, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1686-87.
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stem covered with bone cement upon insertion into the stem
1623
socket.”
1624
the
In Nazomi Communications, Inc. v. ARM Holdings, PLC,
plaintiff asserted that the defendant infringed its patent directed to
the use of computer hardware “to quickly translate Java bytecodes
1625
into native instructions for a central processing unit (“CPU”).”
After the district court granted the defendant partial summary
judgment that one of its accused devices did not infringe the asserted
1626
patent claims, the plaintiff appealed.
The district court concluded
that the accused device could not meet the asserted claims’
requirement for a “hardware unit adapted to convert stack-based
1627
instructions into register-based instructions.”
In arriving at its
conclusion, the district court construed this requirement to mean
that the hardware unit converts stack-based instructions into the
register based instructions “prior to the processing of those
1628
instructions by the processor in the so-called ‘decode stage.’”
On
appeal, the Federal Circuit found the district court’s claim
construction and infringement analysis so lacking that it was
insufficient for appellate review and therefore vacated and remanded
1629
the case back to the district court.
For its claim construction analysis, the district court explained that
its construction did not read limitations from the specification into
the claims but instead followed from the specification and
prosecution history’s identification of prior art Java processors which
1630
“implement a hardware solution for processing Java bytecodes.”
The district court continued, “[i]t follows necessarily that the claims
of the patent, to be valid, must reach a different type of hardware
1631
solution, and that the solution of the prior art does not infringe.”
The Federal Circuit found that the district court’s “limited
approach” to claim construction focused on validity and therefore
glossed over the intrinsic evidence, including the claims, the
specification, and the prosecution history, “that must inform the
1632
The Federal Circuit acknowledged the
court’s claim construction.”
“old axiom” that patents should be construed to preserve their
1623.
1624.
1625.
1626.
1627.
1628.
1629.
1630.
1631.
1632.

Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1686-87.
403 F.3d 1364, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1458 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1366, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459.
Id. at 1367, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1460.
Id. at 1371-72, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463-64.
Id. at 1368, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1461.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1461.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1461.
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validity “if practicable,” but explained that the courts had no license
1633
The Federal Circuit observed
to rewrite claims for this purpose.
that to do otherwise would “put the validity cart before the claim
1634
construction horse.”
The Federal Circuit firmly rejected the defendant’s argument that,
because the appellate court reviews claim construction de novo, the
fact that the district court did not sufficiently articulate its claim
1635
construction reasoning “does not matter.”
Although it reviews
claim construction issues without deference, the Federal Circuit
explained, “this court takes into account the views of the trial judge,
as well as the record of the trial, which helped that judge to
1636
understand the terms of the claim.”
Therefore, “‘common sense
1637
dictates that the trial judge’s view will carry weight.’”
The Federal
Circuit held that in order to review a district court’s claim
construction, it “must be furnished ‘sufficient findings and reasoning
1638
to permit meaningful appellate scrutiny.’”
1639
the parties
In Nellcor Puritan Bennett, Inc. v. Masimo Corp.,
disputed the term “attenuated and filtered from the composite” in
the plaintiff’s patent claims directed to “pulse oximeters,” medical
instruments that measure oxygen saturation levels in patients’

1633. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1461.
1634. Id. at 1369, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1461.
1635. Id. at 1371, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1462.
1636. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1462-63.
1637. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463.
1638. See id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463. The court cited only two cases in which
it previously remanded issues of claim construction, Gechter v. Davidson, 116 F.3d
1454, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1030 (Fed. Cir. 1997) and Graco, Inc. v. Binks Mfg., 60
F.3d 785, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1255 (Fed. Cir. 1995), and recognized that in such
rare instances, the district court records were “devoid of any claim construction” in
contrast to the current case, where the district court presented insufficient analysis.
Nazomi, 403 F.3d at 1371, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463.
The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the case back to the district court for
factual findings in support of its noninfringement opinion. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1463. In support of its opinion that the defendant’s accused devices did
not infringe the asserted patent, the district court stated that the plaintiff did not
explain how certain prior art processors would not infringe the asserted claims under
plaintiff’s proposed interpretation of its claims. Id. at 1371-72, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
at 1463. “‘The Court therefore concludes that [the accused device at issue on
appeal] does not infringe the ‘215 patent either literally or under the doctrine of
equivalents, and that no reasonable trier of fact could find to the contrary.’” Id. at
1372, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463 (quoting Nazomi Communications, Inc. v. ARM
Holdings, PLC, No. C 02-02521, slip op. at 6-7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2003). The
Federal Circuit found this “analysis” to be circular and based upon an interpretation
that “strives to preserve validity.” Nazomi, 403 F.3d at 1372, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1463. Absent findings of fact on the nature of the accused device, the court had no
basis to determine on appeal whether the accused devices infringed. Id., 74
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463.
1639. 402 F.3d 1364, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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1640

blood.
The patented oximeters pass red and infrared light
1641
The degree of oxygen saturation is
through a patient’s finger.
then calculated based on the differences between the amounts of red
and infrared light detected by the photodetector, making use of the
fact that oxygenated and deoxygenated hemoglobin absorb red light
1642
and infrared light in different amounts.
The plaintiff’s patent
covered a method and apparatus for calculating oxygen saturation
and separating some of the “aperiodic noise” generated by the
1643
pulsing of the patient’s blood.
Each asserted patent claim required
generation of a composite waveform by processing a time-measure of
the absorption signal and that the “aperiodic information” included
in the time-measure be “attenuated and filtered from the
1644
composite.”
The district court construed the term “attenuated and filtered” to
mean “reduced and removed,” relying heavily on statements made by
the plaintiff during prosecution of the patent that, in contrast to
certain prior art oximeters, the plaintiff’s invention:
teaches that by collecting and collectively processing time-measures
to obtain a composite waveform from which aperiodic information
is removed, and which yields a composite relative maximum and
minimum, one does not need to examine each pulse against
confidence criteria or to determine whether that pulse is [a]
periodic or aperiodic pulse before the blood constituent can be
1645
reliably and accurately determined.

Based on this construction, the district court granted defendant
summary judgment of non-infringement as to all of the asserted
1646
claims.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that the district court erred in
its construction, and instead construed “attenuated and filtered” to
1647
mean “reduced in comparison to the desired information.”
First, it
found that a standard dictionary prepared by the Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers provided eight different
definitions of “filter,” two of which supported plaintiff’s proposed
meaning that aperiodic signal data may be simply reduced in
1640. Id. at 1365-66, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1352-53.
1641. Id. at 1365, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1352.
1642. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1352-53.
1643. See id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1352 (noting that with each heart beat, more
blood pulses through a patient’s finger and therefore less light is detected on the
photodetector at that time).
1644. Id. at 1366, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1352-53.
1645. Id. at 1369, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1356.
1646. Id. at 1370, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1356.
1647. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1356.

LATHAM.OFFTOPRINTER

2006]

5/20/2006 3:02:04 PM

2005 PATENT SUMMARY

1167

comparison to the desired signals instead of being removed
1648
Second, it found that the specification of the patent
entirely.
clearly supported the broader meaning. Specifically, it found that
the “Background of the Invention” section used the words “attenuate
and filter” to summarize a technique later described in detail in the
patent to reveal that the aperiodic noise is relatively reduced in
1649
significance.
The court further pointed to the Summary of the
Invention section of the specification in which the patent described
“the relative reduction of the impact of aperiodic noise on the
composite signal,” as resulting in “new aperiodic information being
‘quickly and effectively attenuated, and thus filtered out of the
1650
Moreover, the court found that the
resultant additive portions.’”
district court’s narrow construction would exclude all of the
embodiments of the invention described in the patent, and
1651
commented that such a construction is “rarely, if ever correct.”
Finally, the court found that the district court erroneously relied on
the prosecution history in support of its construction. The court
explained that the plaintiff had sought to draw a distinction between
the prior art method in which (1) each pulse-like event is tested to
determine whether it was related to a patient’s heartbeat, and
(2) using a cumulation technique to separate synchronous pulse
1652
events from aperiodic events unrelated to the patient’s heartbeat.
The court found that the applicant’s reference to the “removal” of
aperiodic data “must be interpreted to refer to a reduction in the
1653
aperiodic noise relative to the desired signal.” Accordingly, it did
not regard the prosecution history as providing support for the
1654
district court’s construction of “attenuated and filtered.”
Each asserted claim also required that, after processing the timemeasure collectively to determine a composite waveform, “the
amount of blood constituent from the relative maximum and
minimum amplitude of the composite periodic waveforms of the
1648. See id. at 1367, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1354 (quoting AUTHORITATIVE
DICTIONARY OF IEEE STANDARD TERMS 435 (7th Ed. 2000) (explaining that the
supporting definitions included “a device ‘that separates data, signals, or material in
accordance with specified criteria’ and a circuit that ‘eliminates certain portions of a
signal, by frequency, voltage, or some other parameter.’”). The Court did not
mention whether there were any definitions which contradicted plaintiff’s proposed
construction. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1354.
1649. Id. at 1367-68, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1354.
1650. Id. at 1368, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1354.
1651. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1355 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic,
Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
1652. Nellcor, 402 F.3d at 1370, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1356.
1653. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1356.
1654. Id. at 1370, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1356.
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detected wavelengths” must be calculated. In construing this claim
term, the district court held that the minimum amplitude of the
composite periodic wave form “must be part of the composite and
that it must be determined and used only after the composite
1656
waveform is generated.”
Without specifically explaining its conclusion, the Federal Circuit
agreed with the district court that the minimum amplitude must be
1657
part of the composite.
It disagreed, however, that the minimum
1658
amplitude must be determined only after the composite waveform.
On this point, the Federal Circuit explained that the district court
had added a limitation that was not present in the claim or supported
1659
by the specification or prosecution history.
Instead, it held that
this limitation required “only that both the relative maximum and the
relative minimum of the red and infrared waveforms must be
1660
mathematically used in the oxygen saturation calculation.”
1661
In Playtex Products, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co. the plaintiff sued
the defendant for infringement of its patent directed to “a tampon
applicator designed to enhance the user’s control over tampon
1662
insertion and placement.”
One of the claimed features of the
applicator was that it contained “a rearward portion adapted to
partially house and engage said plunger, said rearward portion of
said barrel comprising two diametrically opposed, substantially flattened
1663
surfaces.”
The parties disputed the meaning of “substantially
1664
flattened surfaces” as it was used in the asserted claims.
The district court determined that the term “substantially flattened
surfaces” had a plain meaning, “two opposing surfaces with a
curvature less than either the barrel or the transitional portion of the
1665
prior art.”
However, it found that this plain meaning excluded the
preferred embodiment, which teaches “thumb and finger hold
surfaces that are flat except for the addition of protruding ribs or an
arcuate depression to the otherwise flat surface,” and therefore
resorted to extrinsic evidence including expert testimony to resolve

1655.
1656.
1657.
1658.
1659.
1660.
1661.
1662.
1663.
1664.
1665.

Id. at 1365-66, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1353.
Id. at 1366, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1353.
Id. at 1370, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1356.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1356.
Id. at 1371, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1356-57.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1357.
400 F.3d 901, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2010 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 902, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2011.
Id. at 903, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2012.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2012.
Id. at 904, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2012.
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1666

the ambiguity.
Relying on the testimony of the defendant’s expert,
the district court concluded that one of skill in that art would view
the flattened requirement as requiring surfaces within a
1667
manufacturing tolerance for flatness.
The district court thus
ultimately construed the “substantially flat surfaces” requirement to
encompass a device with “two opposite or opposed surfaces that are
flat within a geometric, manufacturing tolerance; the flat surfaces
may or may not have imperfections or surface features such as ribs or
1668
treads.”
On appeal, the Federal Circuit rejected the district court’s
construction. The Federal Circuit first found that the district court
erred in its conclusion that “substantially flat surfaces” was
ambiguous, explaining that the district court had
mistakenly assumed that a surface having less curvature than
another surface is necessarily curved, and cannot be flat. This is a
false premise in the context of this claim. When we “flatten” a
curved surface, we can either make it completely flat, or merely
make it flatter than it was originally. Either way, the newly
flattened surface would be less curved than the original. Thus, the
1669
district court found ambiguity where there is none.

Moreover, because the meaning of “substantially flattened surfaces”
could be resolved solely on the intrinsic record, the Federal Circuit
found that there was no need for the district court to resort to expert
1670
testimony to interpret the disputed term.
Based on the intrinsic evidence, the Federal Circuit construed the
term “substantially flattened surfaces” more broadly than the district
court to mean “surfaces, including flat surfaces, materially flatter than
1671
the cylindrical front portion of the applicator.”
It found that the
term “substantial” was a “meaningful modifier implying
1672
‘approximate,’ rather than ‘perfect.’”
Moreover, it found that any
construction of “substantially flattened surfaces” which introduced a
numerical tolerance would contradict its previous decisions in Cordis
1673
Corp. v. Medtronic AVE, Inc.
and Anchor Wall Systems v. Rockwood
1674
Retaining Walls, Inc.,
which respectively interpreted “substantially

1666.
1667.
1668.
1669.
1670.
1671.
1672.
1673.
1674.

Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2012.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2012.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2012.
Id. at 907, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2014.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2015.
Id. at 909, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2016.
Id. at 907, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2015.
339 F.3d 1352, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1876 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
340 F.3d 1298, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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uniform thickness” and “generally parallel” broadly and without a
1675
strict numerical limitation.
In addition to “substantially flattened surfaces,” the parties also
disputed the meaning of the means-plus-function term “means for
1676
limiting movement of the plunger” in a dependent claim.
The
patent’s abstract expressly provided a corresponding structure for the
limiting means, revealing that
[o]ne manner of limiting the movement of the plunger is by
providing at least one curled lip integral with the inner end of the
plunger and engageable with the angled shoulders and preferably a
second curled lip integral with the outer end of the plunger and
1677
engageable with the plunger entry area of the barrel.

The defendant argued that the claim should be limited to require a
curved lip at both ends of the plunger, however, because the only
drawing in the specification depicting the limiting means showed a
1678
plunger with a curved lip at both ends.
The Federal Circuit found
that the district court had properly construed this means-plusfunction term to require a curved-shaped lip at only one end of the
1679
plunger, not both.
1680
In Sentry Protection Products, Inc. v. Eagle Manufacturing Co., the
plaintiff sued the defendant for infringement of two patents related
to “barriers used for ‘protecting structural columns and supports
from damage resulting from impact from a moving vehicle while
preventing or reducing damage to that vehicle and its driver . . . such
1681
as in a warehouse . . . .’” The asserted claims in the patent required
“a plurality of ‘impact protection components’” each of which is a
1682
“single unitary part,”
wherein the term “single unitary part” was
1683
The
added during prosecution to overcome a prior art rejection.
district court construed “single unitary part” to mean “that the impact
protection component is a single part, which is complete by itself
1684
without additional pieces.”
Applying this construction, the district
court held that the defendant’s accused products did not infringe
and that the asserted claims were invalid over a prior art reference

1675.
1676.
1677.
1678.
1679.
1680.
1681.
1682.
1683.
1684.

400 F.3d at 907, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2015.
Id. at 905, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2013.
Id. at 903, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2012.
Id. at 905, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2013.
Id. at 909, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2016.
400 F.3d 910, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1929 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 912, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1930.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1930.
Id. at 913, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1931.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1931.
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(“the Chase reference”) disclosing a “boat bumper” that protects
1685
posts on a dock from impact by boats.
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the proper construction of the
term “single unitary part” is a “single or sole unitary or whole part”
and includes a part that comprises multiple pieces joined together to
1686
provide or act as one whole piece.
It contended that the district
court misinterpreted the patentees’ statements about the prior art
reference as distinguished by adding “single unitary part” during
1687
prosecution.
Instead of saying that the invention was
distinguishable because the prior art cushion had multiple
components, the plaintiff argued that the patentees were comparing
the invention to the entire assembly of the prior art, not just the
1688
cushion.
1689
In V-Formation, Inc. v. Benetton Group SPA, the parties disputed the
meaning of the term “releasably attaching” in the claims of certain
1690
patents directed to in-line roller skates.
Certain asserted claims
required “a plurality of fasteners for releasably attaching said first and
second sidewalls to respective ones of said toe and heel plate flange
1691
pairs.”
The district court determined that “releasably attaching”
meant that the fasteners “must permit the sidewalls to be easily
1692
and concluded that rivets would not
removed and replaced,”
1693
qualify as a “releasable fastener.”
The Federal Circuit affirmed this
construction, finding it to be sufficiently supported by the
specification’s repeated emphasis of the ease of sidewall removal and
replacement, and its description of the object of the invention as an
in-line skate frame with sidewalls that can be separated and singularly
1694
The Federal Circuit also found that the district court
replaced.
had properly considered other intrinsic evidence that rivets are
considered by persons of ordinary skill in the art to be permanent
fasteners, not releasable fasteners, including a prior art patent listed
on the face of the asserted patent which used “strikingly similar
1695
language” to the asserted patent and explained that the toe and
heel plates are “permanently attached . . . through the use of rivets or
1685.
1686.
1687.
1688.
1689.
1690.
1691.
1692.
1693.
1694.
1695.

Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1931.
Id. at 914, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1932.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1932.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1932.
401 F.3d 1307, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1042 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1310, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1045.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1045.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1045.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1045.
Id. at 1311, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1046.
Id. at 1312, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1046.
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releasably attached through the use of fasteners such as screws or bolts.”
Finally, the Federal Circuit also agreed with the district court’s
1697
which
analysis of its decision in K-2 Corp. v. Salomon, S.A.,
contrasted screws and rivets, stating that screws are meant to be
unscrewed and removed whereas “a rivet . . . is meant to remain
permanent, unremovable unless one is bent on breaking the
1698
permanent structure apart.”
1699
In an en banc decision, the court in Phillips v. AWH Corp.
summarized and clarified its claim construction methodology and the
role specifications and prosecution history play in that
1700
methodology.
The plaintiff, Edward H. Phillips, owned a patent
covering steel-shell panels that when welded together, formed
1701
vandalism-resistant walls.
Moreover, these walls were load-bearing
and could be customized to insulate against fire, noise, and impacts,
1702
The plaintiff contracted with AWH Corporation
including bullets.
(“AWH”) for the marketing and sale of his panels, although this
1703
arrangement ended in 1990.
The plaintiff brought an
infringement suit against AWH, alleging that AWH failed to cease
using the plaintiff’s patented technology after their agreement
1704
ended.
The district court granted the defendant summary
1705
While
judgment, and the plaintiff appealed to the Federal Circuit.
a Federal Circuit panel affirmed the district court’s finding of
1706
noninfringment, it did so on different grounds.
The Federal
Circuit reheard appeal arguments en banc, revisited both the district
court’s and the panel’s findings, and vacated and remanded the
1707
noninfringement ruling on the bases indicated below.

1696. Id. at 1311, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1046. The Federal Circuit made a point
to emphasize that prior art references cited in the patent or in the prosecution
history are not extrinsic, but intrinsic evidence. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1046.
1697. 191 F.3d 1356, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
1698. 401 F.3d at 1312, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1047. The Federal Circuit found
that the district court had “properly referred to a related, non-binding judicial
opinion to support its independent conclusion in this case.” Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1047.
1699. 415 F.3d 1303, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
1700. See id. at 1311-19, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325-31 (noting that a
determination of the extent to which the court should rely on a patent’s specification
turns on the court’s basic principles of claim construction as well as consideration of
the use of dictionaries in claim construction).
1701. Id. at 1309, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323.
1702. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1321.
1703. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323.
1704. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323.
1705. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323.
1706. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323.
1707. Id. at 1310, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324.
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The district court granted summary judgment to the defendant
after construing the plaintiff’s claims as “means-plus-function” under
35 U.S.C. § 112 and finding that the defendant’s products did not
1708
infringe upon this claim construction.
The Federal Circuit panel
rejected that the plaintiff’s claims were “means-plus-function,” but
after conducting its own claim construction, affirmed the district
1709
court’s finding of noninfringement.
The en banc Federal Circuit
affirmed the panel’s finding that the district court erred in
1710
The en
construing the plaintiff’s claims as “means-plus-function.”
banc Federal Circuit, however, disagreed with the panel’s claim
1711
construction, and therefore, conducted its own claim construction.
Before doing so, the Federal Circuit set forth the methodology courts
1712
should use in construing claim terms.
The Federal Circuit first expounded upon the importance
specifications, prosecution history, and actual claims have in claim
1713
construction, while it deemphasized the use of extrinsic evidence.
The Federal Circuit noted that these sources are necessary to assist
courts with understanding what “a person of skill in the art would
1714
have understood disputed claim language to mean.”
Then, the Federal Circuit analyzed how claims guide claim term
1715
The court insisted that the claim in which the termconstruction.
at-issue appears provides the context in which courts should construe
1716
the term.
Further, courts may look at other claims in which the
same term appears, as “claim terms are normally used consistently
1717
throughout the patent . . . .”
The Federal Circuit next focused on the role that specifications
1718
It emphasized the importance it, as
play in construing claim terms.
1708. Id. at 1309, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323.
1709. See id. at 1310, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323-24 (discussing the Panel’s
conclusion that the claim term “baffles” excludes structures extending at a ninety
degree angle from the walls).
1710. Id. at 1311, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324.
1711. See id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325 (concluding that “we [the en banc
court] must determine the correct construction of the structural term ‘baffles,’ as
used in the ‘798 patent.”).
1712. See id. at 1311-19, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325-31 (requiring that the
specification describe the invention contained in the claims and that the Court
determine what the applicant considers his invention).
1713. See id. at 1314-19, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327-31 (recognizing that extrinsic
evidence is not as significant as intrinsic evidence in finding the legally operative
construction of claim language).
1714. Id. at 1314, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327.
1715. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327.
1716. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327.
1717. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327 (citing Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp.,
274 F.3d 1336, 1342, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1851, 1854 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
1718. Id. at 1315, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327.
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well as the United States Supreme Court, has placed on considering
1719
The court traced
the specification when construing claim terms.
the specification’s central role in “inform[ing] the proper
1720
construction of claims” to section 112 of the Patent Act,
which
requires the specification to describe the claimed invention in “full,
1721
In finding that the court in
clear, concise and exact terms.”
1722
Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni
perfectly stated how
courts should review the specification during claim construction, it
quoted, “[t]he construction that stays true to the claim language and
most naturally aligns with the patent’s description of the invention
1723
will be, in the end, the correct construction.”
Focusing on prosecution history’s function in claim construction,
the Federal Circuit then instructed courts to consider “the patent’s
1724
prosecution history, if it is in evidence.”
First, the court defined
“prosecution history” as “the complete record of proceedings before
the PTO and includes the prior art cited during the examination of
the patent” and concluded that prosecution history is considered
1725
intrinsic evidence.
Although the court noted that prosecution
history represents an “ongoing negotiation between the PTO and the
applicant,” and therefore can be less useful, it recognized that courts
may find it helpful in determining “how the inventor understood the
invention” and whether the inventor disclaimed or narrowed any
1726
claims.
In contrast to the importance placed on claims, specification, and
prosecution history, the Federal Circuit downplayed the role of
1727
extrinsic evidence in claim construction.
Included in its definition
of extrinsic evidence was “expert and inventor testimony,
1719. See id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327 (“[C]laims ‘must be read in view of the
specification, of which they are a part.’”) (citing Markman v. Westview Instruments,
Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). “[T]he
specification ‘is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is
dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’” Id., 75
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327 (citing Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d
1576, 1582, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). “[T]he specification
is a ‘component part of the patent’ and ‘is as much to be considered with the [letters
patent] in construing them, as any paper referred to in a deed or other contract.’”
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328 (citing Hogg v. Emerson, 47 U.S. 437, 482 (1848)).
1720. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
1721. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328 (citing 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 (2000)).
1722. 158 F.3d 1243, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
1723. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328-29 (citing Renishaw,
158 F.3d at 1250, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1122 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
1724. Id. at 1317, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329.
1725. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329.
1726. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329.
1727. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1330.
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1728

dictionaries, and learned treatises.”
Although the court did not
ban the use of extrinsic evidence for claim construction, it gave
several reasons why it found extrinsic evidence less reliable than the
1729
patent or its prosecution history.
These reasons include:
(1) extrinsic evidence is not part of the patent, and so it does not
have the purpose of “explaining the patent’s scope and meaning”;
(2) extrinsic evidence may not reflect “the understanding of a skilled
artisan in the field of the patent”; (3) any extrinsic evidence that
consists of expert testimony or findings cannot be unbiased because
it is for the purpose of litigation; (4) given the wide array of extrinsic
evidence available, inevitably some evidence may be found by
litigation parties to support their argument; and (5) relying on
extrinsic evidence increases the likelihood that courts will change the
1730
meaning of claims.
After setting forth the above principles of claim construction, the
Federal Circuit admitted that some of its recent case law placed
greater emphasis on extrinsic evidence while overlooking patents’
1731
specifications and prosecution history.
Specifically, the court
1732
focused on the incorrect methodology presented in Texas Digital
1733
As the court noted, the court in Texas
Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc.
Digital supported a methodology that used extrinsic evidence to
determine the “ordinary meaning or meanings of the claim term in
1734
dispute” and then checking this meaning against the specification.
The purpose of this methodology, the Texas Digital Court explained,
was to avoid “one of the cardinal sins of patent law—reading a
1735
limitation from a written description into the claims.”
While the Federal Circuit agreed with this purpose, it rejected and
1736
overruled the Texas Digital methodology of claim construction.
1728. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329.
1729. See id. at 1318-19, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1330-31 (suggesting that
technological dictionaries and expert testimony can educate a court regarding
technology and how one skilled in the art might use certain terms).
1730. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1330-31.
1731. See id. at 1319, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331 (describing the court’s prior
emphasis on dictionary definitions of claim terms).
1732. See id. at 1319-24, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331-35 (disagreeing with the
approach that consults specification only after a determination of the ordinary
meaning of a claim term had been made based on dictionaries, treatises, and other
sources).
1733. 308 F.3d 1193, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1812 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
1734. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1320, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332.
1735. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331 (quoting SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced
Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1340, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1059, 1062 (Fed.
Cir. 2001)).
1736. See id. at 1320-21, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332 (warning against elevating the
dictionary’s prominence because it provides an abstract meaning of words rather
than meaning within the context of a patent).
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The court stressed that, instead of broadening the definition of the
relevant claim by using extrinsic evidence, it should instead focus on
1737
The Federal
the claims, the specification, and prosecution history.
Circuit endorsed the methodology used in Vitronics Corp. v.
1738
1739
Conceptronic, Inc.,
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
and
1740
Innova/Pure Water Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Systems, Inc., which
did not “provide a rigid algorithm for claim construction, but simply
attempted to explain why, in general, certain types of evidence are
1741
more valuable than others.”
After detailing the methodology courts should use in claim
construction, the court finally dealt with the plaintiff’s use of the
1742
term “baffles.”
The district court and the Panel focused on claim
language from the first claim, which stated “further means disposed
inside the shell for increasing its load bearing capacity comprising
1743
internal steel baffles extending inwardly from the steel shell walls.”
The Panel restrictively construed the term “baffles” and determined
that the plaintiff’s use of the term excluded any structures that
1744
“extend[ed] at a 90 degree angle from the walls.”
Looking to the
first claim, the court determined that it imposed three requirements
as to the baffles—that they be: (1) made of steel, (2) “part of the
load-bearing means for the wall section,” and (3) they point inward
1745
from the walls.
The court also noted that the parties stipulated
that baffles were “objects that check, impede, or obstruct the flow of
1746
The court then looked to other claims of the
something.”
1747
plaintiff’s patent.
The court found that these claims identified
1748
The
different functions for baffles, as well as different limitations.
court concluded that these “limitation[s] would be unnecessary if
persons of skill in the art understood that the baffles inherently
1749
served such a function.”
Moving on to the specification, the court found the specification
1750
described several functions of baffles.
Finding that both the claims
1737.
1738.
1739.
1740.
1741.
1742.
1743.
1744.
1745.
1746.
1747.
1748.
1749.
1750.

Id. at 1321, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1333.
90 F.3d 1576, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
52 F.3d 967, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
381 F.3d 1111, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1335.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1335.
Id. at 1309, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323.
Id. at 1310, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323.
Id. at 1324, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1335.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1335.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1335.
Id. at 1324-25, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1335.
Id. at 1325, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1335.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1336.
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and the specification contain numerous functions for the baffles, the
court concluded that the Panel erred by restrictively construing the
term “baffles” to exclude any structures that extended at a ninety
1751
degree angle from the walls.
The court, therefore, remanded the
case back to the district court to determine infringement based on
1752
the Federal Circuit’s new claim construction.
Although this decision mainly dealt with the court’s claim
construction methodology, the Federal Circuit also addressed the
issue of when courts should construe claims in a manner that
1753
maintains their validity.
The defendant, AWH Corporation,
argued that the court should affirm the restrictive construction of the
term “baffles,” and that failure to do so would result in invalid
1754
claims.
Although the court recognized the maxim that “claims
1755
it
should be construed, if possible, as to sustain their validity,”
denied that such an analysis was “a regular component of claim
1756
construction.”
Instead, the Federal Circuit concluded that courts
should only apply the maxim when “the court concludes, after
applying all the available tools of claim construction, that the claim is
1757
still ambiguous.”
After determining that the term “baffles” was not
ambiguous, the court refused to consider whether another
construction would render the claims invalid. Consequently, the
Federal Circuit denied the defendant’s request to affirm the
restrictive reading, and accordingly, the court vacated a finding of
1758
noninfringement and remanded the case to the district court.
1759
In North American Container, Inc. v. Plastipak Packaging, Inc., the
Federal Circuit examined the lower court’s construction of two claim
terms in the plaintiff’s patent for one piece plastic bottles. The lower
court had found noninfringement, granting thirty-seven defendants
1760
(collectively “Plastipak”) summary judgment.
The plaintiff alleged that the defendants’ bottles infringed on the
1761
technology covered by its patent.
The two claim constructions at
1751. Id. at 1327, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1336.
1752. Id. at 1328, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1338.
1753. Id. at 1327, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1336-37.
1754. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337.
1755. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1336 (quoting Rhine v. Casio, Inc., 183 F.3d
1342, 1345, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
1756. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1336.
1757. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337 (quoting Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad,
Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 910, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1809 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
1758. Id. at 1328, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1338.
1759. 415 F.3d 1335, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
1760. Id. at 1338, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547; see supra Part III.C.3.e
(summarizing North American Container’s factual background).
1761. Id. at 1340, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549.
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issue on appeal involved the terms “generally convex” and “re-entrant
1762
In reviewing the construction of these claims, the
portion.”
Federal Circuit examined the patent’s specification and found the
prosecution history particularly guiding. The PTO rejected the
plaintiff’s original patent application affiliated with the patent as
obvious in view of two other patents (the “Dechenne patent” and the
1763
“Jakobsen patent”).
The plaintiff amended its claims in response
to include that the inner walls of its plastic bottles were “generally
1764
The plaintiff further argued that the shape of its bottle
convex.”
differed from the Dechenne and Jakobsen patents because the
Dechenne patent had bottle walls that were “slightly concave,” and
the Jakobsen patent had a re-entrant portion which was “concave in
1765
its entirety.”
Based on these distinguishing factors, the examiner
1766
granted the plaintiff’s patent application.
During the district court proceedings, the district court appointed
1767
a special master to provide claim construction recommendations.
Accepting the special master’s recommendation, the district court
constructed “generally convex” to mean “mostly convex,” which
“allowed the outer walls of the base portion [of the blow-molded
bottle] to have straight and concave points, as long as the majority of
1768
Because of the plaintiff’s
points along the walls were convex.”
patent’s prosecution history, however, the district court also accepted
1769
an additional limitation.
Reviewing the plaintiff’s argument that
distinguished the inner walls of the base portion of its patent from
the “slightly concave” walls of the Dechenne patent, the court
interpreted this as the plaintiff’s disclaimer that the inner walls of its
1770
patent would have no concavity.
In other words, the majority of
points on the inner walls of the plaintiff’s patent would be convex,
1771
with no concave points.
In construing “re-entrant portion,” the district court created two
constructions—one for footed bottles and a second for non-footed
1772
bottles.
For footed bottles, “re-entrant portion” was “the wall
portions of the base that in cross-section begin at the lowermost point
1762.
1763.
1764.
1765.
1766.
1767.
1768.
1769.
1770.
1771.
1772.

Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549 (emphasis omitted).
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549.
Id. at 1342, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1550.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1551.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1551.
Id. at 1343, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1551.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1551.
Id. at 1342, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1550.
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on which the bottle would rest if the feet were removed . . . .”
And
for non-footed bottles, “re-entrant portion” was “the wall portions of
the base that in cross-section begin at the lowermost point on which
1774
the bottle rests, and then rise towards the center.”
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the district court’s claim
construction of “generally convex” was incorrect, as it precluded the
plaintiff’s patent from having any concave points on the inner walls
1775
1776
of the base portion.
The plaintiff proffered four arguments.
First, the plaintiff rejected the district court’s finding that the plaintiff
1777
disclaimed any concave points along its inner walls.
Instead, the
plaintiff argued that the district court misread the prosecution
history, and that the plaintiff was merely distinguishing the “generally
convex inner walls” of its invention from the inner walls of prior art,
1778
“which were ‘concave in [their] entirety.’”
The Federal Circuit
rejected this argument, and affirmed the district court’s finding that
the plaintiff disclaimed that its invention’s inner walls at the base
1779
would contain any concavity.
The Federal Circuit acknowledged
that a showing of prosecution disclaimer required a high standard,
however, the court concluded that standard was satisfied after
1780
reviewing the prosecution history.
The Federal Circuit reasoned
that in order for the plaintiff to overcome an obviousness rejection,
the plaintiff had attempted to distinguish the “slightly concave” inner
walls of the Dechenne patent from the inner walls of the Jakobsen
patent that were “clearly concave in its entirety”—an unneeded
distinction if the plaintiff’s point was merely that both of these
1781
patents had inner walls that were entirely concave.
Second, the plaintiff argued that the district court erred by
construing the “generally convex” claim term differently for the inner
and outer walls of the plaintiff’s patent, as terms “should be
1782
construed consistently throughout the claims.”
The Federal
Circuit recognized that, generally, claim terms appearing in different
parts of the same claim are given a consistent interpretation and

1773. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1550.
1774. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1550.
1775. Id. at 1344, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1552.
1776. See id. at 1344-45, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1552-53.
1777. Id. at 1344, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1552.
1778. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1552.
1779. Id. at 1345, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1553.
1780. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1553.
1781. Id. at 1346, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1553.
1782. Id. at 1344-45, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1552 (citing CVI/Beta Ventures, Inc.
v. Tura LP, 112 F.3d 1146, 1159, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577, 1586 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
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1783

construction.
In this case, however, the Federal Circuit refused to
do so, reasoning that the plaintiff’s arguments during the patent
1784
While the “generally convex”
prosecution precluded this result.
limitation of the outer walls of the plaintiff’s invention allowed for
some concave points, the plaintiff’s arguments during the patent
prosecution prohibited this interpretation of “generally convex” for
1785
the inner walls.
Third, the plaintiff argued that the district court’s construction of
“generally convex” was inconsistent with the patent’s preferred
1786
embodiments.
The Federal Circuit also rejected this argument,
pointing out that even if it accepted the plaintiff’s proposed
definition of “generally convex” and some concave points were
allowed on the inner walls near the base, the preferred embodiments
1787
“would still not fall within the scope of the claims.”
Additionally,
the court cited to its previous precedent stating that “limitations may
be construed to exclude preferred embodiment if the prosecution
1788
history compels such a result.”
Lastly, the plaintiff argued that the district court erred in
construing “generally convex” to require the “majority of points on
the inner walls to be convex,” as “generally” should not be narrowly
1789
defined to a “strict numerical boundary.”
Instead, the plaintiff
argued, the district court should have construed “generally” to mean
1790
“on the whole,” or “in a general manner.”
While the Federal
Circuit agreed with the plaintiff that a court need not construe “terms
of approximation” with “mathematical precision,” the Federal Circuit
1791
did not find that the district court did this.
Rather, the Federal
Circuit found the district court’s use of a dictionary in construing
“generally” proper in determining a “common-sense understanding
1792
of the term . . . .”
The plaintiff also argued that the district court erred in two ways in
1793
its construction of “re-entrant portion.”
The district court
construed “re-entrant portion” to include the lowermost points of the

1783. Id. at 1346, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1553.
1784. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1553-54.
1785. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1553-54 (concluding that the plaintiff disclaimed
this possibility during patent prosecution).
1786. Id. at 1344-45, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1552.
1787. Id. at 1346, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1554.
1788. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1554.
1789. Id. at 1345, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1552-53.
1790. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1553.
1791. Id. at 1346, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1554.
1792. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1554.
1793. Id. at 1347, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1554.
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inner walls, while also having a re-entrant portion depth-to-thickness
1794
The plaintiff, in arguing against the first part of this
ratio of 3.75.
construction, contended that this construction is inconsistent with
figures 10-12 of its patent, which have a re-entrant portion that
1795
extends “from some point above the lowermost point.”
Rejecting
the plaintiff’s first argument, the Federal Circuit denied that figures
1796
10-12 were inconsistent with the district court’s construction.
The
Federal Circuit also referenced the Dechenne patent’s use of “re1797
The
entrant portion” to support the district court’s construction.
Federal Circuit found that the Dechenne patent used “re-entrant
portion” interchangeably with the term “recessed,” and the
Dechenne patent defined the term “recessed” as “extending from the
1798
lowermost point of the inner wall to the central region.”
The court
also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that it did not, during
prosecution, define re-entrant portion “as extending from the
1799
lowermost points of the inner wall . . . .”
It pointed to the
plaintiff’s statement during prosecution that its “independent
[c]laims . . . have been amended to refer to the convex nature of the
inner wall portions of the central re-entrant portion (i.e. those wall
portions disposed inwardly of the lowermost points of the base upon which the
1800
Consequently, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
container rests).”
district court’s construction of “re-entrant portion” to include the
1801
lowermost points of the container’s inner walls.
The Federal Circuit, however, did modify the district court’s
second “re-entrant portion” requirement - that it have a depth-to1802
thickness ratio of 3.75.
The Federal Circuit found that the district
court “imported” this requirement from the specification’s
recommended
dimensions
for
one
of
its
commercial
1803
embodiments.
Reiterating a previously stated tenant of the court,
“unless required by the specification, limitations that do not
otherwise appear in the claims should not be imported into the
1804
claims.”
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit eliminated the depth-to1805
ratio limitation for the term “re-entrant portion.”
1794.
1795.
1796.
1797.
1798.
1799.
1800.
1801.
1802.
1803.
1804.

Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1554.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1554.
Id. at 1348, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1555.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1555.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1555.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1555.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1555 (emphasis in original).
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1555.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1555.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1555.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1555 (citing E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.
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1806

In Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Laboratories, Inc.,
the defendant
cross-appealed the district court’s grant of partial summary judgment.
The district court held that the defendant’s PowerScript RT product
infringed four claims of the plaintiff’s patent. The district court
construed language in the claim, concluding that the phrases “no
detectable RNase H activity” and lacks “RNase H activity” denoted “a
1807
complete absence of RNase H activity” to “one of skill in the art.”
On appeal, the defendant did not take issue with the lower court’s
1808
Rather, the defendant argued that
interpretation of these terms.
the district court erred by failing to construct the plaintiff’s claims
using the test results of a solubilization assay, which is the method the
1809
defendant used in developing its product.
The Federal Circuit reviewed the specification, reasoning that the
terms “no detectable” and “lacks” cannot be understood by one of
skill in the art without first understanding how to measure RNase H
1810
activity.
The specification indicated the inventors used a gel assay
to confirm that the RT lacked RNase H activity, and it explained this
method in detail, while also providing the results of the gel assay in
1811
an attachment.
The specification, however, also indicated that a
solubilization assay showed no RNase H activity, though it did not
1812
The Federal Circuit
provide the details or results of this test.
admitted that the written description provided directions on how one
could achieve different levels of RNase H activity by using a mix of gel
1813
and solubilization assays.
However, the court dismissed this
because the claims related only to a “complete absence” of RNase H
activity, and the specification clearly directed the use of the gel assay
1814
for this purpose.
1815
In Terlep v. Brinkmann Corporation, the Federal Circuit affirmed
the district court’s grant of summary judgment of noninfringement,
1816
The plaintiff,
based on its claim construction of the term “clear.”
Stephen K. Terlep, was the owner of a patent that related to light
Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1433, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129, 1131 (Fed.
Cir. 1988)).
1805. Id. at 1349, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1556.
1806. 429 F.3d 1052, 1074, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1176 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
1807. Id. at 1076, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1178.
1808. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1178.
1809. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1178.
1810. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1178.
1811. Id. at 1077, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1178.
1812. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1178.
1813. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1178.
1814. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1178.
1815. 418 F.3d 1379, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1053 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
1816. Id. at 1380, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1054.
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emitting diode lamps (“LED”) that had omni-directional light
1817
The main claim contained the three key
capabilities.
characteristics of the patent at issue: (1) it contained an omnidirectional LED; (2) it used a semi-spherical reflector, positioned
above the LED; and (3) it had a clear plastic tubular holder used to
1818
hold the semi-spherical reflector directly above the LED.
The
district court interpreted the claim term “clear” to mean
“‘transparent’ or ‘having the property of transmitting light without
appreciable scattering so that bodies lying beyond are seen
1819
clearly.’”
The plaintiff argued the term “clear” should also
encompass “translucent,” contending that the word “clear” means
1820
only “permit[ting] the passage of light.”
In reviewing the district court’s claim construction, the Federal
Circuit noted that the plaintiff’s claims gave little guidance, and
therefore looked to the written description and prosecution
1821
history.
Referencing the Background and Prior Art sections, the
Federal Circuit noted the plaintiff’s mention of previous failed
invention attempts, all of which applied diffusion directly to the LED
1822
device.
The court also looked to the Summary of the Invention
section, which indicated that the invention “does not use a diffusion
1823
The court found that these statements
lens over the LEDs.”
distinguished between “holders that diffuse or scatter light and those
that transmit light without obstruction,” thereby supporting the
district court’s construction of “clear” to include having “the property
of transmitting light without appreciable scattering so that bodies
1824
lying beyond are seen clearly.”
The Federal Circuit also found implicit meaning in reviewing the
1825
patent’s prosecution history.
From this history, the court found
that the plaintiff had amended his claims to avoid a rejection of his
1826
The amended claims included a “clear plastic
patent application.
tubular holder,” thereby distinguishing it from prior art, which used
1827
sandblasting to “diffuse light output.”
The Federal Circuit found

1817. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1054.
1818. Id. at 1380-81, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1054-55.
1819. Id. at 1382, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1056 (quoting the district court).
1820. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1056.
1821. Id. at 1383, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1056-57.
1822. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1056.
1823. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1056.
1824. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1056 (quoting the district court’s order).
1825. See id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1056 (analyzing the prosecution history to
find additional support for the district court’s interpretation).
1826. Id. at 1383-84, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1057.
1827. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1057.
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that this amendment supported the district court’s construction of
“clear,” which excluded any attempt to diffuse light emitted from the
1828
Lastly, the Federal Circuit supported its decision by
LED.
1829
referencing the dictionary definition of “clear.”
While the
dictionary indicated “transparent” and “translucent” were synonyms,
it also stated that “transparent stresses complete absence of
obstruction to vision” while “translucent applies to that which permits
1830
passage of light but bars clear and complete vision.”
The court felt
this comparison “mirror[ed] the distinction reflected in the written
description and prosecution history between the unobstructed
passage of light of the holder of the patented invention and the prior
1831
art structures that diffuse light.”
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment based on its
1832
claim construction of the term “clear.”
1833
the Federal
In AquaTex Industries, Inc. v. Techniche Solutions,
Circuit affirmed the district court’s claim construction of the term
“fiberfill batting” material, and its grant of summary judgment based
1834
on an absence of literal infringement.
The plaintiff’s patent
covered a method of evaporative cooling by using a “multi-layered,
liquid-retaining composite material comprising a fiberfill
1835
batting . . . .”
The defendant used a similar method of cooling, but
its fiberfill batting consisted of both natural and synthetic
1836
materials.
The district court construed “fiberfill” to include only synthetic
materials—excluding any natural materials, or combination
1837
thereof.
It did so after reviewing the plaintiff’s patent
specification, as well as several technical and industry-related
1838
dictionaries.
The Federal Circuit agreed with this construction.
Recognizing that the claims themselves gave little guidance, the court
1839
The written
first reviewed the plaintiff’s patent specification.
description stated, “[t]he particular fiberfill is not known to be
critical. That is, any commercial fiberfill may be used as long as it
1828. Id. at 1384, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1057.
1829. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1057.
1830. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1057 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD INT’L DICTIONARY
419 (1993)).
1831. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1057.
1832. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058.
1833. 419 F.3d 1374, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1213 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
1834. Id. at 1376-77, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1214.
1835. Id. at 1377, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1214.
1836. Id. at 1378, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1216.
1837. Id. at 1378-79, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1216.
1838. Id. at 1379, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1216.
1839. Id. at 1380-81, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1217.
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1840

does not adversely affect the performance of the end composite.”
The written description also provided several examples of acceptable
commercial fiberfill—all of which consisted exclusively of synthetic
1841
materials.
Additionally, the Federal Circuit reviewed the specifications of
1842
All of these
three other patents incorporated by reference.
specifications described “fiberfill” to generally refer to “synthetic”
1843
materials, “normally polyester.”
Using the patent specification, the
specifications of the patents incorporated by reference, and extrinsic
evidence provided by technical dictionary definitions, the court
affirmed the district court’s claim construction of “fiberfill” to only
1844
include synthetic materials.
The Federal Circuit in TAP Pharmaceutical Products, Inc. v. OWL
1845
Pharmaceuticals, L.L.C., reviewed an appeal and cross-appeal where
the defendant appealed the district court’s decision that the
defendant infringed two of the plaintiff’s patents. The plaintiff crossappealed the district court’s ruling that the defendant did not
1846
infringe three of its other patents.
All patents at issue related to
the plaintiff’s pharmaceutical drug, Lupron Depot, used to treat
1847
prostate cancer.
The defendant’s appeal related to the district court’s construction
of the phrase, “comprising a copolymer . . . of lactic acid and . . . of
1848
glycolic acid.”
While the defendant argued that the court should
construe this phrase to include only copolymers made from lactic and
glycolic acid as starting materials, the district court interpreted the
phrase broadly to include “copolymers composed of lactic acid and
glycolic acid mers produced by any method, including the use of
1849
lactide and glycolide.”
The Federal Circuit focused on the patent’s
specification and prosecution history, though the court noted that
nothing in the claims explicitly named the starting materials for
1850
making copolymers.
Looking to the specification, the Federal
Circuit admitted that all examples of polymerization provided by the

1840.
1841.
1842.
1843.
1844.
1845.
1846.
1847.
1848.
1849.
1850.

Id. at 1381, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1217-18 (quoting the patent).
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1218.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1218.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1218.
Id. at 1381-82, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1218.
419 F.3d 1346, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1126 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1348, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1128.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1128.
Id. at 1349, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1129 (omissions in original).
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1129.
Id. at 1349, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1129.
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plaintiff used lactic and glycolic acid as starting materials.
However, the Federal Circuit quoted explicit language in the
specification indicating starting materials for the polymerization “may
1852
be produced by any method.”
The Federal Circuit also
disregarded the contrary evidence negating the district court’s claim
1853
The
construction given by the defendant’s expert witness.
defendant noted the plaintiff’s prosecution history contained
statements showing polymerization by using lactic and glycolic
1854
acid.
Rejecting this evidence, the Federal Circuit noted an absence
of statements excluding polymerization by other methods, such as
1855
using lactide or glycolide.
The defendant also provided evidence showing that the plaintiff’s
European patent application excluded copolymers made from lactide
1856
or glycolide.
The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court’s
decision to give this evidence little weight, as the European examiner
rejected the plaintiff’s characterization and the plaintiff subsequently
1857
abandoned this characterization.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court’s claim construction of “comprising a
1858
copolymer . . . of lactic acid and . . . of glycolic acid.”
The Federal Circuit also affirmed the district court’s construction
of the claim phrase, “particles containing a water-soluble drug, the
particles being dispersed in a spherical microcapsule matrix,” which
1859
had led to the district court’s finding of noninfringement.
The
district court construed “particles” to contain both a drug and a drug1860
retaining substance.
While the claims did not explicitly refer to a
“drug-retaining substance,” the Federal Circuit found support for the
1861
The Federal
district court’s construction in the specifications.
Circuit listed the following support it found in the specification:
(1) all examples in the specification contain both a drug and a drugretaining substance, (2) the specification instructed that a drugretaining substance “must be used in sufficient amount to ensure that
the initial viscosity of the inner aqueous layer in the water-in-oil
emulsion described hereinafter will not be lower than about 5000
1851.
1852.
1853.
1854.
1855.
1856.
1857.
1858.
1859.
1860.
1861.

Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1129.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1129 (quoting the patent).
Id. at 1349-50, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1129.
Id. at 1350, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1129-30.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1130.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1130.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1130.
Id. at 1349-50, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1129-30.
Id. at 1353, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1132 (quoting district court’s opinion).
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1132.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1132.
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1862

centipoises,” and (3) the specification noted how the use of a drug1863
After reviewing this
retaining substance benefitted the invention.
evidence, the Federal Circuit concluded that the district court’s claim
construction was correct, and it affirmed the district court’s finding
1864
of noninfringement.
1865
NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd. involved an appeal regarding
1866
the construction of the term “electronic mail system.”
The district
court construed the term to mean
[a] type of communication system which includes a plurality of
processors running electronic mail programming wherein the
processors and the electronic mail programming are configured to
permit communication by way of electronic mail messages among
recognized users of the electronic mail system. The various
constituent processors in the electronic mail system typically
function as both “originating processors” and “destination
1867
processors.”

On appeal, the defendant argued that “electronic mail system” had
two ordinary meanings: “a broad definition that encompasses
‘communicating word processors, PCs, telex, facsimile, videotex,
voicemail and radio paging systems (beepers)’ and a narrow
definition that defines the term in the context of ‘pull’
1868
technology.”
The defendant thus argued that in light of the
prosecution history, the term “electronic mail system” requires “a
processor interconnected with other processors to serve the common
purpose of providing electronic mail services to end users through
pull
technology
while
utilizing
wireline,
point-to-point
1869
connections.”
The plaintiff countered that (1) the defendant’s argument that
“electronic mail system” should be construed to require pull
technology “contravenes the plain language of the claim and is
inconsistent with [the inventor’s] disclosure;” (2) not only did the
defendant not raise the pull technology claim construction at the
original hearing, but the defendant argued the opposite construction
at that hearing; (3) the defendant’s limitation of “electronic mail
system” to only a “wireline system” “simply cites the prior art

1862.
1863.
1864.
1865.
1866.
1867.
1868.
1869.

Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1132 (emphasis omitted).
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1132.
Id. at 1354, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1133.
418 F.3d 1282, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1763 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1294, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771.
Id. at 1295, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772.
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description of those terms, and not [the inventor’s] use of the term
1870
as including wireless connections.”
Addressing the waiver issue, the Federal Circuit explained that
“[w]e have previously held that presenting proposed claim
constructions which alter claim scope for the first time on appeal
1871
invokes the doctrine of waiver as to the new claim constructions.”
The Federal Circuit held that because the defendant was trying to
add a “pull technology limitation” to the claim that it failed to raise
before the district court, the argument was waived and the Federal
1872
Circuit declined to address it on the merits.
The Federal Circuit then analyzed the intrinsic evidence and
affirmed the district court’s construction. The Federal Circuit first
explained that the “claims themselves recite that an ‘electronic mail
system’ includes various configurations of originating processors and
destination processors that communicate via wireline connections or
1873
over an RF transmission network.”
The Federal Circuit noted that
the “written description recognizes that electronic mail systems may
1874
The Federal Circuit also
have various processor architectures.”
reviewed the prosecution history and found “no disclaimers or
disavowals limiting an ‘electronic mail system’ to a wireline only
1875
system.”
Rejecting the defendant’s argument that “electronic mail system”
must be limited to only a wireline system, the Federal Circuit
explained that
[t]he written description expressly indicates that the “electronic
mail system” in the patent claims may include wireless connections.
[The inventor] described prior art “[e]lectronic mail services” as
“basically a wire line-to-wire line, point-to-point type of
communications” system. The use of the term “basically” suggests
that an electronic mail system may include other types of
1876
connections, including wireless connections.
1877

Collegenet, Inc. v. Applyyourself, Inc.,
an infringement case
concerning an online college admission application service patent,
1870. Id. at 1295-96, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773.
1871. Id. at 1296, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773 (referring to CCS Fitness, Inc. v.
Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1370, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1658, 1666 (Fed. Cir.
2002); Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1346, 59
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1401, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
1872. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773.
1873. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773.
1874. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773.
1875. Id. at 1297, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774.
1876. Id. at 1296, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773 (emphasis and internal citations
omitted).
1877. 418 F.3d 1225, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1733 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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involved an appeal regarding the claim term “in a format specified by
1878
The district court construed the term to mean
the institution.”
“any file format, and it may include any other type of format,
1879
specified by the institution.”
The Federal Circuit began its analysis
by noting that because the asserted patent did not explicitly define
the disputed term, the Federal Circuit would have to derive its
1880
meaning from its usage and context.
The Federal Circuit
explained that a court “seeks a term’s usage in the ordinary and
accustomed meaning of the words amongst artisans of ordinary skill
1881
in the relevant art at the time of invention.”
However, the Federal
Circuit noted that “[i]mportantly, the person of ordinary skill in the
art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the
particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the
1882
context of the entire patent, including the specification.”
The
Federal Circuit clarified that, therefore, if a patent applicant
consistently and unambiguously uses a term more or less expansively
than its use in the relevant community, the applicant could affect the
1883
scope of the term in the context of the patent claim.
Applying these principles, the Federal Circuit rejected the district
court’s construction that “a format specified by the institution”
1884
required an unlimited number of formats.
The Federal Circuit
first noted that the district court incorrectly interpreted the term
“format” to mean “any file format” even though “[t]he specification
and claims use the word ‘format’ in its customary sense to mean the
1885
arrangement of data for storage or display.”
The Federal Circuit
observed that a passage in the specification suggested that data
arrangements could be tailored to fit within one of five exemplary
1886
supported formats.
The Federal Circuit emphasized that although
“the particular set of supported formats may indeed be broader than
those specifically listed in the specification, at no point, however,
does the patent require support for an ‘unlimited’ number of

1878. Id. at 1230, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1738.
1879. Id. at 1231, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1738.
1880. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1738.
1881. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1738 (referring to Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415
F.3d 1303, 1312-13, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Rexnord
Corp. v. Laitram Corp., 274 F.3d 1336, 1342, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1851, 1854 (Fed.
Cir. 2001)).
1882. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1738 (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312, 75
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326).
1883. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1738.
1884. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1739.
1885. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1739.
1886. Id. at 1232, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1739.
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1887

formats.”
The Federal Circuit then noted that the district court
also overlooked well settled precedent that “the term ‘a’ or ‘an’
ordinarily means ‘one or more,’” and improperly construed “a” to
1888
mean “any.”
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit concluded that the
“the district court defined ‘format’ too narrowly by limiting it to any
‘file format’ and erroneously imported the term ‘any’ into the claim
1889
language, ignoring the ordinary meaning of the term ‘a.’”
Collegenet also involved the appeal of the construction of the term
“automatically,” which the district court construed to mean “once
initiated, the function is performed by a machine, without the need
1890
for manually performing the function.”
The defendant argued
that the term should be construed to mean a “process that occurs
without human intervention, such that a human does not have the
1891
option to intercede and alter the flow of that process.”
In
affirming the district court’s construction, the Federal Circuit
explained that the asserted claim also uses the term “comprising”
which is a transitional phrase that “is inclusive or open-ended and
1892
does not exclude additional, unrecited elements or method steps.”
The Federal Circuit thus noted that
consistent with this court’s precedent, the district court correctly
adopted [the plaintiff’s] inclusive definition and rejected [the
defendant’s] preclusive definition. While [the asserted claim] does
not expressly provide for human intervention, the use of
“comprising” suggests that additional, unrecited elements are not
excluded. Such elements could include human actions to expressly
initiate the automatic storing or inserting, or to interrupt such
1893
functions.
1894

In Norian Corporation v. Stryker Corporation, the issue was whether
the term “a sodium phosphate” should be construed to mean a
solution made from “a mixture of multiple types of sodium
1895
phosphates as well as a single sodium phosphate.”
The Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court’s construction to require that “a
1887. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1739 (quoting patent language).
1888. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1739 (quoting Tate Access Floors, Inc. v.
Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1370, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1647,
1657 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
1889. Id. at 1233, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740.
1890. Id. at 1235, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1741 (emphasis in original).
1891. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1741 (emphasis in original).
1892. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1741 (quoting Georgia-Pac. Corp. v. United
States Gypsum Co., 195 F.3d 1322, 1327, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1590, 1595 (Fed. Cir.
1999)).
1893. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1741.
1894. 432 F.3d 1356, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1242 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
1895. Id. at 1358, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1244.
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sodium phosphate” means a solution made from a single sodium
1896
The Federal Circuit first explained the district court’s
phosphate.
analysis, which found that
[because] the asserted claims use the restrictive term “consisting
of” to define the contents of the claimed solution . . . the term “a”
must be interpreted to mean that the solution consists of water and
only a single solute, i.e., a single type of sodium phosphate, not a
1897
mixture of different sodium phosphates.

The Federal Circuit also agreed with the district court’s analysis of
the structural language of the claim, noting that the asserted claim
“uses the phrase ‘at least one’ in the first limitation, which refers to
sources of calcium or phosphoric acid, but does not use that phrase
in the second limitation, which refers to the ingredients of the
1898
solution.” The Federal Circuit explained that if “the patentee had
meant to claim the use of at least one type of sodium phosphate in
the recited solution, it would have been simple to use the same
language in the second portion of the claim that was used in the
1899
first.”
The Federal Circuit further reasoned that the district court’s
interpretation was consistent with the specification, particularly with a
chart listing different solutions, each one with a solute that is “either
1900
a type of sodium phosphate or a type of sodium carbonate.” The
Federal Circuit explained that
[w]hile the scope of a claim is not necessarily limited to the
examples disclosed in the specification, nothing in [the asserted
patent] specification points away from the district court’s
construction limiting [the asserted claim] to single-solute solutions.
Rather, each of the solutions described in the specification uses
only a single solute, and the specification makes no reference to
1901
using a mixture of multiple solutes in a single solution.

The Federal Circuit then concluded that “nowhere in the
specification does the patentee refer, either explicitly or implicitly, to
making the claimed solution from a mixture of multiple sodium
1902
phosphates.”
The Federal Circuit next determined that the prosecution history
1903
In particular, the
re-enforced the district court’s construction.
1896.
1897.
1898.
1899.
1900.
1901.
1902.
1903.

Id. at 1359, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1245.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1245.
Id. at 1358-59, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1245.
Id. at 1359, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1245.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1245.
Id. at 1359-60, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1245-46.
Id. at 1360, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1246.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1246.
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Federal Circuit observed that the patentee had responded to a
number of rejections by narrowing the claim so that the transitional
phrase “comprising” was changed to “consisting essentially of” and
1904
then ultimately to “consisting of.”
The Federal Circuit also noted
that the “critical claim language” was changed from “a sodium
phosphate solution” to “a solution consisting of water and a sodium
1905
phosphate.”
The Federal Circuit explained that any lingering
ambiguity around whether or not “a sodium phosphate” meant a
single type of phosphate was resolved by the examples of the single1906
solute solutions in the specification’s tables.
As the prosecuting
attorney had noted, the amended claim’s example solutions were
made from monobasic sodium phosphate, dibasic sodium phosphate,
and trisodium phosphate, but none was made from a mixture of
1907
different sodium phosphates.
The Federal Circuit concluded that
“the specification contemplates the use of various forms of sodium
phosphate, but used individually, not simultaneously in the same
1908
solution.”
1909
Warner-Lambert Company v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.
presented the issue of whether the term “discoloration” meant
1910
“oxidative discoloring” or just “change in color.”
The Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court’s construction, reasoning that the
“the only type of discoloration referred to in the [disputed] patent is
1911
oxidative discoloration.”
The Federal Circuit also noted that the
“the parties previously stipulated that ‘discoloration’ referred to
1912
oxidative discoloration.”
The Federal Circuit therefore held that
1913
the claimed embodiments require oxidative discoloration.
Harris Corporation v. Ericsson, Inc. presented a dispute regarding the
defendant’s waiver of the claim construction argument that it
1914
proffered on appeal.
The Federal Circuit began its analysis by
asserting that while “[w]aiver is a procedural issue,” a narrow view of
the issue as a ‘waiver of a claim construction argument,’ makes it
1915
indisputably unique to patent law.”
The Federal Circuit then
1904. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1246.
1905. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1246.
1906. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1246.
1907. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1246.
1908. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1246.
1909. 418 F.3d 1326, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
1910. Id. at 1340, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874.
1911. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874 (citing the district court’s ruling on a
motion for summary judgment).
1912. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874.
1913. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874.
1914. 417 F.3d 1241, 1248-49, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1710-11 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
1915. Id., at 1250-51, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711-12.
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embarked on a two-step analysis that first, compared the defendant’s
1916
appellate and trial arguments, and second, inquired whether the
difference in the argument on appeal is “so insubstantial” that it is
essentially the “same concept” that the defendant brought before the
1917
district court.
The Federal Circuit determined that the defendant’s claim
construction theory presented on appeal differed from its assertion in
1918
district court.
However, in the second step of the analysis, the
court found that the claim construction argument differed so slightly
from the assertion on the district court level that it did not constitute
1919
a waiver.
The Federal Circuit reasoned that “the asserted claims
require a two-step algorithm of producing nondiscrete estimates and
1920
deriving discrete decisions therefrom.”
Thus, the defendant’s
claim construction at the appellate level argued the “same concept”
1921
as its claim at the district court level.
Addressing the plaintiff’s argument, the Federal Circuit explained
that the slight change in the defendant’s claim construction theory
only affects whether infringement will be literal or under the
1922
doctrine of equivalents.
Finding that this technical distinction was
insignificant, the Federal Circuit held “that [the defendant’s] district
court claim construction arguments do not preclude its [] argument
1923
on appeal.”
The Federal Circuit also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the
defendant’s failure to object to the jury instructions constituted a
1924
waiver of its claim construction position.
The Federal Circuit
explained that no such waiver existed because the defendant
appealed the district court’s denial of JMOL and the test for
evaluating a JMOL motion is “whether there is a legally sufficient
basis for a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party ‘under the
1925
The Federal Circuit then reasoned that “the
controlling law.’”
1926
‘controlling law’ is the legal interpretation of the asserted claims.”
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit concluded that regardless of the jury
instruction, “the JMOL decision is based on whether a reasonable
1916.
1917.
1918.
1919.
1920.
1921.
1922.
1923.
1924.
1925.
1926.

Id. at 1251, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712.
Id. at 1252, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712-13.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713.
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jury could find that [the defendant] infringed the properly construed
1927
claims based on the evidence presented.”
In dissent, Judge Gajarsa reasoned that the defendant waived the
1928
argument it was asserting on appeal.
Judge Gajarsa explained that
“courts describe the failure to make an argument to the trial court as
a waiver, suggesting a party’s conscious choice to withhold a known
1929
argument.”
Therefore, Judge Gajarsa reasoned that the
defendant’s failure to assert its WMS Gaming argument, which had
been available prior to any claim construction in this action, or to
raise the issue after the claim construction’s conclusion, constituted a
1930
waiver of the argument.
Judge Gajarsa further explained that the
defendant’s “new argument has different implications for both the
claim construction process, and the subsequent infringement
1931
analysis.”
The dissent thus reasoned that the majority’s decision
“established a new exception to the waiver rule—the Oops I Forgot
Rule: no matter how many opportunities you have below to make the
proper argument now you can make any argument at any time and
1932
the court will allow it.”
B. Means-Plus-Function
In an en banc decision, the Federal Circuit in Phillips v. AWH
1933
Corporation affirmed the Panel’s finding that the district court erred
1934
by construing the plaintiff’s claim as a “means-plus-function” claim.
The plaintiff, Edward H. Phillips, owned a patent covering steel-shell
panels that when welded together, formed vandalism-resistant
1935
walls.
Moreover, these walls were load-bearing and could be
customized to insulate against fire, noise, and impacts, including
1936
The plaintiff contracted with AWH Corporation (“AWH”)
bullets.
1937
for the marketing and sale of his panels, which ended in 1990.
The plaintiff brought an infringement suit against AWH, alleging that
AWH failed to cease using the plaintiff’s patented technology after
1938
their agreement ended.
The lower court granted the defendant
1927.
1928.
1929.
1930.
1931.
1932.
1933.
1934.
1935.
1936.
1937.
1938.

Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713.
Id. at 1260, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1719.
Id. at 1263, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1721.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1721.
Id. at 1264, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1722.
Id. at 1265, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1723.
415 F.3d 1303, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
Id. at 1311, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324-25.
Id. at 1309, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323.
Id. at 1309, 1324, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323, 1335.
Id. at 1309, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323.
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summary judgment, and the plaintiff appealed to the Federal
1939
While a Federal Circuit panel affirmed the lower court’s
Circuit.
1940
The
finding of noninfringment, it did so on different grounds.
Federal Circuit reheard appeal arguments en banc, and revisited
both the lower court’s and the Panel’s findings.
The plaintiff’s claim 1 stated “further means disposed inside the
shell for increasing its load bearing capacity comprising internal steel
1941
baffles extending inwardly from the steel shell walls.”
The district
court construed this claim as “means-plus-function” under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 and granted summary judgment to the defendant, finding
1942
nonfringement.
The Panel denied the plaintiff’s claims were
“means-plus-function,” but after conducting its own claim
construction,
affirmed
the
lower
court’s
finding
of
1943
noninfringement.
The en banc court explained that “[m]eans-plus-function claiming
applies only to purely functional limitations that do not provide the
1944
structure that performs the recited function.”
While the Federal
Circuit admitted that claim 1’s language resembled a means-plusfunction claim format, it pointed out that the internal “steel baffles”
1945
are the structure that actually perform the claimed function.
Because the claim did not include the word “means” with “baffles,”
the court concluded that 35 U.S.C. § 112 did not apply, explaining
that “the absence of that term [“means”] creates a rebuttable
1946
presumption” that section 112 does not apply.
Moreover, the court
found that the claims and the specification clearly establish “baffles”
as a “physical apparatus”—a structure, not a “purely functional
1947
limitation.”
In support of this, the court cited to the claim’s
mention of baffles “extend[ing] inwardly,” as well as to the
specification’s use of the term to refer to specific “internal wall
1948
structures.”
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Panel’s
finding that the lower court erred in construing the plaintiff’s claims
1949
as “means-plus-function.”

1939.
1940.
1941.
1942.
1943.
1944.
1945.
1946.
1947.
1948.
1949.

Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323.
Id. at 1310, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323.
Id. at 1311, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324-25.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325.
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C. Literal Infringement
1950

In Business Objects, S.A. v. Microstrategy, Inc., the plaintiff sued the
defendant for infringement of a patent directed towards an
1951
improvement for searching relational databases.
Searching such
databases required a database user to construct queries that needed
to be written in a complex query language including certain clauses,
such as “SELECT, WHERE, FROM, HAVING, ORDER BY and
1952
GROUP BY clauses.”
The patent in suit was directed towards a
method allowing end users to query the relational database “without
knowing a query language or understanding the structure” of the
1953
database.
Using the patented invention, a lay user only needed to
select familiar names of business objects, specify any desired
conditions to limit the results, and state the retrieval order for the
data, and a “query engine” would select the appropriate clauses for
1954
the query language to be executed by the database.
The accused
products “allow[ed] lay users of relational databases to use familiar
names to query [the] database,” even though using a “more
1955
sophisticated approach” was available.
The district court granted
the defendant’s motion for summary judgment of non-infringement
1956
either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents.
Addressing the district court’s claim construction, the Federal
Circuit found that the district court properly construed each claim of
the patent-in-suit. In its claim construction order, “the district court
construed the ‘associating step’ limitation of claim 1 as associating a
familiar name with ‘elements of SELECT and WHERE clauses’ before
1957
the ‘generating a query’ step.”
In its summary judgment order, the
district court further construed the claim so that the “elements”
limitation “‘is not so broad as to encompass information that will be,
1958
but is not yet, associated with a SELECT/WHERE clause.’”
The
plaintiff challenged the district court’s construction of the “elements”
1959
limitation as being improperly narrowed.
In affirming, but

1950. 393 F.3d 1366, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1520 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
1951. Id. at 1368, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521.
1952. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522.
1953. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522.
1954. Id. at 1368-69, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522.
1955. Id. at 1370-71, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1523.
1956. Id. at 1367, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521.
1957. Id. at 1372, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525 (quoting Bus. Objects, S.A. v.
MicroStrategy, Inc., No. C 01-3908 CRB, slip op. at 9 (N.D. Cal. May 1, 2003)).
1958. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525.
1959. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525 (quoting Bus. Objects, S.A., No. C 01-3908
CRB, slip op. at 9).
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clarifying the district court’s claim construction, the Federal Circuit
reasoned that
The associating step of claim 1 requires the association of a familiar
name with SELECT/WHERE clauses used by the query engine to
generate the SELECT/WHERE statements. Thus, the phrase
“element of a SELECT/WHERE clause” in the district court’s
[claim construction order] refers to an element of the final
SELECT/WHERE statement, as labeled in this opinion, generated
by the query engine. The “element” is the SELECT/WHERE
clause associated with a familiar name that the query engine
concatenates with the SELECT/WHERE clauses of other familiar
names to generate SELECT/WHERE statements for execution by
the [database]. The district court’s construction of the associating
step limitation, and subsequent clarification in the [summary
judgment order] that “an element” excludes “information that will
be, but is not yet, associated with a SELECT or WHERE clause[,]”
1960
therefore, are correct.

The Federal Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the
1961
district court’s construction precluded “dynamic semantics.”
The
Federal Circuit held that the patent:
clearly teaches that the inclusion of a particular familiar name in a
query will always return information from the same table and
column, but the information returned by using the familiar name
will change depending on the other familiar names included in the
query. Consequently, the district court’s claim construction
requiring the association of SELECT/WHERE clauses to familiar
names before the “generating a query” step does not preclude
1962
dynamic semantics.

The plaintiff also challenged the district court’s claim construction
of the terms “predefined query language” from claim 1 and
1963
“predetermined query language” from claim 4.
The district court
construed the terms as having the same meaning, that a “query
language that must be determined prior to the ‘generating a query’
1964
step but not necessarily prior to the associating step.”
Additionally,
the Federal Circuit reasoned that “the ‘predefined [or
predetermined] query language’ must support the functions and
1965
operators contained in the associating step’s SELECT clause.” The
1960. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525.
1961. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525.
1962. Id. at 1373, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525.
1963. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525.
1964. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525.
1965. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525 (quoting Bus. Objects, S.A. v.
MicroStrategy, Inc., No. C 01-3908 CRB, slip op. at 9-10 (N.D. Cal. May 1, 2003)).
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Federal Circuit agreed with the district court’s construction, and
rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the district court’s construction
“improperly import[ed] the ‘associating step’ from claim 1 into claim
1966
4.”
The Federal Circuit, in affirming the district court’s
construction of the terms “predetermined query language” and
“predefined query language” held that the district court’s claim
construction was “consistent with the structural limitations of the
query engine means and does not improperly import the associating
1967
step limitation of claim 1.”
Finally, because the plaintiff’s challenges to the district court’s
grant of summary judgment of no literal infringement rested on its
arguments that the district court’s claim constructions were in error,
the Federal Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment of no
1968
literal infringement.
1969
In Imonex Services, Inc. v. W.H. Munzprufer Dietmar Trenner GmBH,
the Federal Circuit reviewed a jury verdict of infringement. The
defendants had argued that their coin selectors, used on coinoperated washing machines, did not infringe Imonex’s patent, which
1970
required a surface that “contact[s] each coin.”
The defendants
challenged the jury verdict on the grounds that Imonex’s expert
admitted on cross-examination that he was not sure that the
1971
protrusion in the accused devices would contact every coin.
Imonex argued that this was merely an admission that if an infinite
number of coins were introduced into the coin slot, it is possible that
1972
one or more coins might not engage the protrusion.
The Federal
Circuit, applying Fifth Circuit law, concluded that substantial
evidence supported the jury’s verdict finding of infringement and
1973
upheld the lower court’s decision.
1974
In ArthroCare Corp. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., the defendant argued
that it was not liable for contributory or induced infringement
because there was no evidence that its products were used in a
manner that directly infringed the patents in suit. The district court
had construed the claims at issue to require that the electrodes of an
electrosurgical device not contact the body at all during the
1966. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1526.
1967. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1526.
1968. Id. at 1373-74, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1526.
1969. 408 F.3d 1374, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1936 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
1970. Id. at 1377, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1938 (emphasis in original).
1971. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1938.
1972. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1938.
1973. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1938-39 (citing Hiltgen v. Sumrall, 47 F.3d 695,
699-700 (5th Cir. 1995)).
1974. 406 F.3d 1365, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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performance of the claimed method, but that “[t]he claimed method
1975
Rejecting the arguments of
does not contain any time limitations.”
Smith & Nephew, the Federal Circuit interpreted that construction to
mean that the electrodes could not touch the body when a step of the
claimed methods was being performed, but that the electrodes could
1976
touch the body in the times in between steps.
The Federal Circuit
explained that
When the district court construed the claim language at issue here,
it rejected Smith & Nephew’s proposed construction, which was
that the return electrode must never touch the body at any time
during the surgery . . . . In effect, Smith & Nephew is now
advancing that rejected claim construction, while maintaining that
1977
it has accepted the district court’s claim construction.

Rejecting Smith & Nephew’s arguments, the Federal Circuit held
that there was substantial evidence at trial to support the jury’s
determination and that the district court’s denial of JMOL was
1978
1979
appropriate.
In Boss Control, Inc. v. Bombardier Inc., the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment of
noninfringement based on the district court’s claim construction.
The patent was directed to a security power interrupt apparatus that
1980
prevents unauthorized use of an electrically operated product.
The district court construed the term “interrupt” in the asserted
claim to mean more than a simple “on-off” interruption of electrical
power, and accordingly found that Bombardier’s personal watercraft
and snowmobiles, equipped with a Digitally Encoded Security System
1981
(“DESS”), did not infringe.
The Federal Circuit, affirming the
district court’s claim construction, determined that “interrupt” meant
“(1) providing electrical current to a device up to a preset threshold
so that auxiliary components may continue to operate; and
(2) completely shutting off electrical current to the device when the
1982
electrical current exceeds the preset threshold.”
The accused
devices include a cap that fits on a post, the cap including circuitry
1983
When the cap is pulled off, for
carrying an electronic code.
example, when a rider falls off of a watercraft, power to the engine is

1975.
1976.
1977.
1978.
1979.
1980.
1981.
1982.
1983.

Id. at 1376, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1758.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1759.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1758.
Id. at 1376-77, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1758-59.
410 F.3d 1372, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1038 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1374-75, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1039.
Id. at 1375-76, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1039.
Id. at 1379, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1043.
Id. at 1375, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1040.
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cut while power to auxiliary gauges and lights remains for thirty
1984
seconds.
The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that the DESS in
the accused devices did not interrupt power in response to
disconnection of the cap because the power to the auxiliary gauges
and lights supplied while the engine is cut did not depend in any way
1985
on the electrical current level.
In particular, the DESS did not
provide electrical current to the watercraft up to a preset threshold so
1986
The
that the auxiliary components could continue to operate.
Federal Circuit also determined that the DESS completely shuts off
electrical current to the watercraft when the cap is removed from the
1987
post, relying on concessions by Boss at oral argument.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary
1988
judgment.
1989
In SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., SmithKline had taken
a license in 1980 from Ferrosan, a British company, for a patent
covering a class of compounds that included a compound later
1990
known as paroxetine hydrochloride (PHC).
SmithKline was
granted a U.S. patent on PHC hemihydrate in 1988 (“the ‘723
patent”) and was granted approval by the FDA to commercially
1991
market it as an antidepressant drug under the name Paxil. In 1993,
Apotex filed an ANDA with the FDA under 21 U.S.C. § 355(j),
seeking approval to market its own generic version of PHC
1992
anhydrate.
Apotex’s ANDA included a Paragraph IV certification
1993
that its drug would not infringe the ‘723 patent.
Nevertheless,
SmithKline sued Apotex for infringement of its ‘723 patent under 35
U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) as a result of Apotex’s ANDA filing, asserting
infringement of Claim 1 which read in its entirety: “Crystalline
1994
paroxetine hydrochloride hemihydrate.”

1984. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1040.
1985. Id. at 1379, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1043.
1986. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1043.
1987. Id. at 1379-80, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1043.
1988. Id. at 1381, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1044.
1989. 403 F.3d 1331, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1398 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
1990. Id. at 1334, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1399-1400; see supra Part II.B.1
(summarizing SmithKline’s factual history).
1991. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1400.
1992. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1400.
1993. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1400. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2000)
provides that a person may file an abbreviated application for the approval of a new
drug as long as, “to the best of the [applicant’s] knowledge . . . the [patent of the
listed drug] is invalid or will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the
new drug . . . .”
1994. SmithKline, 403 F.3d at 1334, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1400.
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SmithKline alleged that although Apotex listed the active
ingredient in its PHC product as PHC anhydrate, its product would
nevertheless infringe the ‘723 patent claim directed to hemihydrate
forms because Apotex’s PHC anhydrate would necessarily contain at
least trace amounts of PHC hemihydrate as a result of a conversion
1995
According to SmithKline and its
process it described as “seeding.”
experts, once PHC hemihydrate was formed in SmithKline’s facilities,
the general environment became “seeded” with crystals of PHC
1996
hemihydrate.
When exposed to this environment, PHC anhydrate
1997
inevitably converts to PHC hemihydrate.
Based on this evidence, the district court found that Apotex’s PHC
anhydrous tablets would necessarily contain at least trace amounts of
1998
PHC hemihydrate.
Nevertheless, it construed claim 1 to require
“commercially significant amounts” of PHC hemihydrate based on
certain representations made in the patent specification, including
statements regarding the superior pharmaceutical and commercial
1999
properties of PHC hemihydrate.
It further reasoned that to allow
claim 1 to cover trace amounts of PHC hemihydrate would render
claim 1 indefinite, because potential infringers would not be able to
determine whether they infringe if they could not detect the
2000
presence of the claimed compound.
Moreover, such a broad
construction would contravene public policy because it would likely
2001
preclude attempts to make the prior art anhydrous compound.
Finally the district court found that, even if claim 1 were construed to
cover trace amounts of PHC hemihydrate, Apotex should not be
found liable for infringement because SmithKline, by producing the
first PHC hemihydrate crystals, was responsible for “seeding” the
2002
environment and causing the alleged infringement.
1995. Id. at 1335-36, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1401.
1996. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1401.
1997. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1401. SmithKline also argued that PHC
anhydrous would convert to PHC hemihydrate in the stomach of patients. The
Federal Circuit found that the district court did not clearly err in excluding this
evidence, however, finding that SmithKline would likely not meet its burden of
showing “gastrointestinal infringement.” Id. at 1336, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1401.
SmithKline also presented evidence that tests of Apotex’s tablets showed detectable
quantities of PHC hemihydrate, but the district court excluded this evidence because
it found that SmithKline had excluded certain tablets that represented the product
Apotex would manufacture from the testing without reasonable explanation. Id. at
1336, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1401. The Federal Circuit again found that the district
court did not err in its conclusion.
1998. Id. at 1340, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1404.
1999. Id. at 1339, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1403.
2000. Id. at 1339-40, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1403-04.
2001. Id. at 1339, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1403.
2002. Id. at 1342, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1405.
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The Federal Circuit rejected the district court’s analysis for a
couple of reasons. First, it held that claim 1 was plain on its face, as it
2003
Artisans in this area of
described a very specific compound.
technology, it concluded, would understand the claim to embrace
2004
PHC hemihydrate without further limitation.
Moreover, the
Federal Circuit found that the references in the specification upon
which the district court relied merely commented on the favorable
2005
characteristics of PHC hemihydrate.
It explained that “[a]
description of characteristics does not redefine a compound with an
2006
established and unambiguous structural definition.”
Second, the
Federal Circuit explained that claim construction is not a policydriven inquiry; rather, “it is a contextual interpretation of
2007
language.”
Thus, it concluded that, properly construed, Apotex’s
proposed product would infringe claim 1 of the ‘723 patent because
it would contain trace amounts of the claimed PHC hemihydrate
2008
compound.
2009
the Federal
In Pfizer, Inc., v. Teva Pharmaceuticals, USA, Inc.,
Circuit affirmed the lower court’s grant of a preliminary injunction to
the plaintiff, Pfizer, Inc. (“Pfizer”). In this case, the Federal Circuit
outlined four elements needed for a grant of a preliminary
2010
injunction.
As to the first element, that the movant has a
2011
“reasonable likelihood of success on the merits,”
the Federal
Circuit stated that to prove this element, plaintiff would need to show
that it owned a valid and enforceable patent, and that the defendant
2012
likely infringed on this patent.
Because the defendant did not
question the former, the Federal Circuit focused on whether the
lower court correctly determined that defendants likely infringed
2013
Pfizer’s patent.
2003. Id. at 1340, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1404.
2004. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1404.
2005. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1404.
2006. Id. at 1339, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1403. The court subsequently elaborates
on its reasoning by stating that: “For this precise reason, this court has repeatedly
stated that a court must construe claims without considering the implications of
covering a particular product or process.” Id. at 1340, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1404.
2007. Id. at 1339, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1403.
2008. Id. at 1341, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1405. The Court ultimately found claim
1 to be inherently anticipated, however.
2009. 429 F.3d 1364, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
2010. See id. at 1372, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261 (listing the four factors as:
“(1) a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the prospect of irreparable
harm to the patent owner in the absence of the injunction; (3) that this harm would
exceed harm to the alleged infringer when subject to the injunction” and finally
“(4) that granting the injunction is in the public interest.”).
2011. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
2012. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
2013. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261-62.
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In making this determination, the Federal Circuit reviewed the
2014
and then compared these
lower court’s claim construction,
2015
The Federal
construed claims to the accused infringing product.
Circuit affirmed the lower court’s claim construction of the term
2016
“saccharide” to include polysaccharides.
Next, the Federal Circuit reviewed the lower court’s comparison of
the patent and the accused product, stating that infringement occurs
when the “accused product or method meets every claim limitation
2017
either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents.”
The Federal
Circuit affirmed the lower court’s finding that the defendants’
2018
product likely infringed both claims 1 and 16 of Pfizer’s patent.
Subsequently, the Federal Circuit determined that defendants
likely infringed claim 16, stating that the defendants necessarily
concede infringement on this claim if the court were to affirm the
lower
court’s
construction
of
“saccharide”
to
include
2019
polysaccharides.
Given that the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower
court’s construction to include polysaccharides, the court moved on
2020
In order for the
to discuss claim 1 of the plaintiff’s patent.
defendants’ product to infringe claim 1, it needed to “inhibit
2021
hydrolysis,” which the lower court did find in its analysis.
The
defendants argued that the lower court erred by relying on the
plaintiff’s expert who did not actually test the defendant’s product,
2022
but instead reviewed tests performed on two different products.
Additionally, the defendants argued that the lower court erred by
requiring the defendants to prove that their product did not inhibit
2023
hydrolysis, which improperly shifted the evidentiary burden.
In
response to the defendants’ first argument, the court only stated that
“it is particularly appropriate at the preliminary injunction stage not
to set a hard and fast rule that infringement can only be shown
2024
through quantitative testing of an accused product.”

2014. Id. at 1372-73, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261-62.
2015. Id. at 1376, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1264.
2016. Id. at 1377, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1264.
2017. Id. at 1376, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1264-65.
2018. See id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1264-65 (commenting that the district court
also did not clearly err in determining that the plaintiff is likely to prevail in its
charge that Ranbaxy literally infringes claim 1).
2019. Id. at 1377, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1265.
2020. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1265.
2021. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1265.
2022. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1265.
2023. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1265.
2024. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1265 (citing Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco, Ltd.,
850 F.2d 660, 667, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097, 1103 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
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The Federal Circuit also rejected the defendants’ second
2025
In its analysis, the court denied that the lower court
argument.
had shifted the evidentiary burden, and found that the defendants’
failure to provide any evidence on its behalf validated that the lower
2026
court’s ruling.
Accordingly, the court found that sufficient
evidence existed to suggest that the defendants’ product inhibited
2027
hydrolysis, and thus, infringed claim 16 of the plaintiff’s patent.
In MicroStrategy Inc. v. Business Objects, S.A., the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the
defendant, Business Objects, finding non-infringement of the
2028
plaintiff’s patent.
Both parties competed in the business
2029
The plaintiff’s patent related to a
intelligence software field.
system and method responsible for automatically broadcasting
information “to multiple types of subscriber output devices and
formatting output for those devices using configurable
2030
parameters.”
The main issue before the Federal Circuit was
whether the plaintiff’s patent required that it support multiple types
of output devices, or if it also allowed for support of only one type of
2031
output device.
In order to make this determination, the Federal
Circuit reviewed the lower court’s claim construction of “device2032
specific style,” and whether, based on this construction, the lower
court correctly concluded that the defendant’s product infringed on
2033
the plaintiff’s patent.
The district court construed the plaintiff’s claim term “devicespecific style” to mean “[t]he format in which a particular type of
output device receives and displays service output, consisting of
2034
values of a plurality of parameters.”
Construing the remaining
claim language, the district court concluded that the plaintiff’s patent
“requires a particular format and presentation for one device, e.g.
mobile phone data, that could differ from the format for a second
2035
device, e.g., electronic mail data.”
On appeal, the Federal Circuit
rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the correct meaning of the

2025. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1265.
2026. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1265.
2027. Id. at 1378, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1265-66.
2028. 429 F.3d 1344, 1349, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1002-03 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see
supra Part III.A (summarizing the case’s factual history).
2029. Id. at 1348, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002.
2030. Id. at 1349, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003.
2031. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003.
2032. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003.
2033. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003.
2034. Id. at 1350, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004.
2035. Id. at 1350-51, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004.
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district court’s claim construction would not require support for
2036
Instead, the Federal Circuit
more than one type of output device.
found that the plaintiff’s patent required it to support more than one
2037
type of output device.
The Federal Circuit then moved on to determine whether the
2038
The
defendant’s product infringed on the plaintiff’s patent.
Federal Circuit found that the defendant’s product was designed only
to deliver information through e-mail, and that its system only
2039
supported one style.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
district court’s claim construction and finding of non2040
infringement.
In NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., the Federal Circuit
2041
addressed the scope of Section 271(a).
The Federal Circuit
clarified that the “territorial reach of section 271 is limited . . . [to]
2042
The
patent infringement that occurs within the United States.”
Federal Circuit explained that:
[o]rdinarily, whether an infringing activity under section 271(a)
occurs within the United States can be determined without
difficulty. This case presents an added degree of complexity,
however, in that: (1) the “patented invention” is not one single
device, but rather a system comprising multiple distinct
components or a method with multiple distinct steps; and (2) the
nature of those components or steps permits their function and use
2043
to be separated from their physical location.

The Federal Circuit thus determined that the case presented the
question of “whether the using, offering to sell, or selling of a
patented invention is an infringement under section 271(a) if a
component or step of the patented invention is located or performed
2044
abroad.”
The Federal Circuit began its analysis by noting that § 271(a)
provides that whoever without authority “uses, offers to sell, or sells
any patented invention, within the United States . . . . during the
2045
term of the patent therefore, infringes the patent.”
The Federal
Circuit reasoned that the “grammatical structure of the statute
2036.
2037.
2038.
2039.
2040.
2041.
2042.
2043.
2044.
2045.

Id. at 1351, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005.
Id. at 1352, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006.
Id. at 1353, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006.
418 F.3d 1282, 1313, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1763, 1786 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1786.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1787.
Id. at 1315, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1788.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1788.
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indicates that ‘within the United States’ is a separate requirement
2046
The Federal Circuit concluded
from the infringing acts clause.”
that “it is unclear from the statutory language how the territoriality
requirement limits direct infringement where the location of at least
a part of the ‘patented invention’ is not the same as the location of
2047
the infringing act.”
In MEMC Electronic Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon
2048
Corp.,
the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court’s grant of
summary judgment to the defendants (“SUMCO”) regarding the
plaintiff’s (“MEMC”) allegation of direct infringement under 35
2049
U.S.C. § 271(a).
Both the plaintiff and the defendants
2050
The plaintiff
manufactured silicon wafers for semiconductors.
owned a patent that related to the creation of single crystal silicon,
2051
which improved upon prior art by decreasing crystal defects.
The
plaintiff brought suit against SUMCO arguing that SUMCO’s single
2052
crystal silicon wafers infringed on its patent.
SUMCO motioned for
summary judgment arguing that the plaintiff failed to prove SUMCO
2053
Although SUMCO
sold silicon wafers in the United States.
manufactured its wafers in Japan, it acknowledged it sold its wafers to
Samsung Japan Corporation, which then sold the wafers to Samsung
2054
Austin Semiconductor, located in Austin, Texas.
The district court
reviewed the evidence: (1) SUMCO manufactured the wafers bound
for Austin by specifications provided by Samsung Korea, the parent
2055
company of both Samsung Japan and Samsung Austin;
(2) Samsung Japan generally determined the number of wafers
2056
SUMCO sent to Samsung Austin; (3) SUMCO packaged the wafers
and attached a packing label designating the wafers were bound for
2057
Austin, Texas;
(4) SUMCO then delivered the packaged and
labeled wafers to a packaging company in Japan, which then
2058
transported the wafers “free on board” to Samsung Austin.
Finding no evidence that SUMCO sold or offered to sell its wafers in

2046.
2047.
2048.
2049.
2050.
2051.
2052.
2053.
2054.
2055.
2056.
2057.
2058.

Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1788.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1788.
420 F.3d 1369, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1371, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277-78.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278.
Id. at 1372, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1279.
Id. at 1373, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1279.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1279.
Id. at 1373-74, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1279.
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the United States, or imported its wafers into the United States, the
2059
lower court granted SUMCO’s motion for summary judgment.
On appeal, MEMC argued it had evidence that Samsung Japan was
merely a “conduit” for the defendants to sell its silicon wafers to
Samsung Austin, and therefore, the district court erred by granting
2060
summary judgment.
The evidence it produced included: (1) emails from SUMCO to Samsung Austin providing electronic data of
wafers it was waiting to send until Samsung Austin gave its approval
2061
after its review of the electronic data;
(2) e-mails suggesting
SUMCO and Samsung Austin communicated directly to discuss
shipping dates and quantity of wafers—all subject to Samsung
2062
Austin’s final approval; (3) direct e-mails from Samsung Austin and
SUMCO regarding wafer problems, which after communicated, often
resulted in manufacturing adjustments either at the SUMCO or
2063
Samsung Austin plants;
(4) e-mails from SUMCO to Samsung
Austin requesting permission to send a shipment of modified silicon
wafers, which Samsung Austin approved after experiencing problems
2064
with some wafers SUMCO previously supplied;
and (5) evidence
that at least two SUMCO employees visited Samsung Austin on two
separate occasions, each time giving a technical presentation
2065
regarding the accused silicon wafers.
Based on the evidence presented by MEMC, the Federal Circuit
framed the issue as whether this evidence was sufficient so that a
reasonable jury could find that an “offer for sale” or “sale” occurred
within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), which requires that the
2066
offer or sale occur within the United States.
In its assessment of
whether the defendant made an offer to sell, the Federal Circuit
2067
reviewed its decision in 3D Systems, Inc. v. Aarotech Laboratories, Inc.
In 3D Systems, Inc. the Federal Circuit found an offer to sell where the
defendant provided potential customers “with price quotations,
brochures, specification sheets, videos, and sample parts of their
2068
The Federal Circuit distinguished the instant case with
products.”
3D Systems, Inc., finding SUMCO’s e-mailed electronic data
transmittal to Samsung Austin was unlike the price sheet sent by the
2059.
2060.
2061.
2062.
2063.
2064.
2065.
2066.
2067.
2068.

Id. at 1372-73, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1279.
Id. at 1372, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278.
Id. at 1374, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1279-80.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280.
Id. at 1375, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1281.
160 F.3d 1373, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1773 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
MEMC Elec. Materials, 420 F.3d at 1376, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1281.
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2069

defendant in 3D Systems, Inc.
Therefore, the Federal Circuit
concluded that the data transmittal could not constitute an offer for
2070
sale.
The Federal Circuit also found that there was no evidence that an
2071
actual sale occurred between SUMCO and Samsung Austin.
Rather, it pointed to evidence suggesting that all “essential activities”
related to the wafer sales occurred between SUMCO and Samsung
Japan, including evidence that (1) Samsung Japan decided when
SUMCO received a purchase order and how many wafers SUMCO
sent Samsung Austin, (2) a third party packaging company was
responsible for transporting the wafers to Samsung Austin, and
(3) Samsung Japan paid for the wafers after delivery to the third party
2072
packaging company.
Finding no evidence of an offer for sale or
actual sale by SUMCO to Samsung Austin, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment to the
2073
defendants.
In NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., the Federal Circuit
2074
The Federal Circuit
addressed the scope of Section 271(a).
clarified that the “territorial reach of section 271 is limited . . . [to]
2075
patent infringement that occurs within the United States.”
The
Federal Circuit explained that:
[o]rdinarily, whether an infringing activity under section 271(a)
occurs within the United States can be determined without
difficulty. This case presents an added degree of complexity,
however, in that: (1) the “patented invention” is not one single
device, but rather a system comprising multiple distinct
components or a method with multiple distinct steps; and (2) the
nature of those components or steps permits their function and use
2076
to be separated from their physical location.

The Federal Circuit thus determined that the case presented the
question of “whether the using, offering to sell, or selling of a
patented invention is an infringement under section 271(a) if a
component or step of the patented invention is located or performed
2077
abroad.”

2069.
2070.
2071.
2072.
2073.
2074.
2075.
2076.
2077.

Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1281.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1281.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1282.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1282.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1282.
418 F.3d 1282, 1313, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1763, 1786 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1786.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1787.
Id. at 1315, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1788.
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The Federal Circuit began its analysis by noting that § 271(a)
provides that whoever without authority “uses, offers to sell, or sells
any patented invention, within the United States . . . . during the
2078
term of the patent therefore, infringes the patent.”
The Federal
Circuit reasoned that the “grammatical structure of the statute
indicates that ‘within the United States’ is a separate requirement
2079
from the infringing acts clause.”
The Federal Circuit concluded
that “it is unclear from the statutory language how the territoriality
requirement limits direct infringement where the location of at least
a part of the ‘patented invention’ is not the same as the location of
2080
the infringing act.”
2081
affirmed the
The Federal Circuit in Terlep v. Brinkmann Corp.
2082
lower court’s grant of summary judgment of noninfringement.
The lower court granted summary judgment based on its claim
2083
construction of the term “clear,” and its subsequent determination
2084
of no literal infringement.
The plaintiff was the owner of a patent that related to light
emitting diode lamps (“LED”) that had omni-directional light
2085
capabilities.
The main claim at issue contained three key
characteristics: (1) it contained an omni-directional LED; (2) used a
semi-spherical reflector, positioned above the LED; and (3) had a
clear plastic tubular holder used to hold the semi-spherical reflector
2086
directly above the LED.
The lower court construed the claim term,
“clear,” to mean “transparent or having the property of transmitting
light without appreciable scattering so that bodies lying beyond are
2087
seen clearly.”
The plaintiff argued the term “clear” should also
encompass “translucent,” as “clear” only means “permit[ting] the
2088
passage of light.”
The lower court granted summary judgment based on
noninfringement after reviewing the plaintiff’s claim 1, which used
2089
the phrase, “clear plastic tubular holder.”
None of The
2090
On appeal,
defendant’s products included a transparent holder.
2078.
2079.
2080.
2081.
2082.
2083.
2084.
2085.
2086.
2087.
2088.
2089.
2090.

Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1788.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1788.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1788.
418 F.3d 1379, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1053 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1380, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1054.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1054.
Id. at 1385, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058.
Id. at 1380, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1054.
Id. at 1380-81, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1054-55.
Id. at 1382, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1056.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1056.
Id. at 1385, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058.
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the plaintiff argued that the defendant’s products used a clear plastic
2091
The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument, stating there is
cover.
no evidence that any of the defendant’s products used a transparent
2092
holder.
Moreover, the court pointed to the defendant’s ribbed
holders, which scatters the light, rather than “transmitting light
2093
Consequently, the court
without appreciable scattering . . . .”
affirmed the lower court’s determination that the defendant did not
2094
literally infringe the plaintiff’s patent.
D. Infringement Under the Doctrine of Equivalents
1. Festo
2095
Business Objects, S.A. v. Microstrategy, Inc. also involved an appeal
from the district court’s grant of summary judgment of noninfringement under the doctrine of equivalents. In that case, the
lower court applied “procesution history estoppel” to prohibit the
plaintiff, Business Objects, from asserting the equivalents of the
2096
The plaintiff
“associating step limitation of claims 1 and 2.”
conceded that the associating step limitation of claim 1 was the result
of a narrowing amendment to advance patentability during
2097
prosecution of the patent in suit, and thus, that a Festo presumption
2098
of estoppel was raised.
Although the plaintiff tried to overcome
the presumption by arguing that the amendment was “only
2099
tangentially related to [the defendant’s] accused equivalent,” the
Federal Circuit pointed out that the amendments directly related to
2100
the claimed equivalents.
The Federal Circuit reasoned that the
district court properly determined that the plaintiff’s amendments
2101
were “directly related to the claimed equivalents.”
The Federal
Circuit agreed that the lower court’s holding was correct because the
plaintiff’s claim 1 included the associating step, and was therefore
permissible over two prior art references “because neither of those
references associated WHERE clauses with a familiar name. [The
plaintiff] now alleges that the accused products infringe claims 1 and
2091. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058.
2092. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058-59.
2093. Id. at 1384-85, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1056.
2094. Id. at 1385, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1056.
2095. 393 F.3d 1366, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1520 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also supra
notes 1027-46 and accompanying text.
2096. Id. at 1374, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1526 (citing district court order).
2097. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
2098. 393 F.3d at 1374, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1526.
2099. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1526.
2100. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1526.
2101. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1526-27.
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2 under the doctrine of equivalents because they associate something
2102
equivalent to SELECT and WHERE clauses to the familiar name.”
The Federal Circuit held that the plaintiff could not assert that the
accused products contained equivalents of the associating step in
claims 1 and 2, affirming the district court’s finding that the
plaintiff’s amendments “are directly related to the claimed
2103
equivalents.”
With respect to claim 4 in Business Objects, the district court held
that plaintiff was estopped from contending that the accused devices
practiced a functional equivalent to the claimed query engine
2104
means.
The district court held that this claim, added during the
prosecution of the patent in suit, raised a Festo presumption because
it narrowed the scope of the function of the query engine means for
2105
purposes of patentability.
The Federal Circuit disagreed with the
district court’s conclusion, and pointed out that “the amended term
‘generating queries in a predetermined query language’ is broader
than the original term ‘translating said user query into a structured
2106
query language (SQL) equivalent statement.’”
The Federal Circuit reasoned that “translating said user query into
a structured query language (“SQL”) equivalent statement” did not
2107
refer to languages that are equivalent to SQL.
Rather, the court
found that “translating said user query into a structured query
language equivalent statement” meant that the lay user’s query
specific language would be translated from the lay user’s selected
2108
business objectives into its SQL equivalent.
The Federal Circuit
was not persuaded by the defendant’s argument that the qualifier
“predetermined” served to narrow the query engine’s function means
2109
as originally filed.
This argument was not persuasive because the
original term implicitly contained the limiting qualifier
“predetermined,” and therefore the amendment specifically stating
that the query language must be “predetermined” did not narrow the
2110
The court
scope of the query engine for purposes of patentability.
determined that the plaintiff’s claim of equivalents was not
2111
precluded.
2102.
2103.
2104.
2105.
2106.
2107.
2108.
2109.
2110.
2111.

Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1526-27.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527 (quoting district court order).
Id. at 1374-75, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527.
Id. at 1375, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527 (quoting district court order).
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527.
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Based on its rejection of the district court’s prosecution history
estoppel finding with respect to claim 4, the Federal Circuit vacated
the district court’s grant of summary judgment of non-infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents with respect to claim 4, and
remanded the case to the district court for a determination of
whether the defendant infringed claim 4 under the doctrine of
2112
equivalents.
2113
the issue was
In Freedman Seating Co. v. American Seating Co.,
whether the district court’s grant of summary judgment of
infringement “had the effect of vitiating the claim limitation
requiring that the moveable end of the support member be ‘slidably
2114
mounted to said seatbase.’”
On appeal, the defendant argued that
“while the claims of [the asserted patent] unequivocally state that the
moveable end is ‘slidably mounted,’ the moveable end of the
2115
[product at issue] is rotatably mounted using revolute joints.”
The
defendant also argued that at the time of filing for the asserted
patent, “the interchangeability of four bar mechanisms was
foreseeable to one of skill in the art,” and that the patentee “could
have chosen to claim a fourth link mechanism (or even all types of
2116
four bar mechanisms).”
The Federal Circuit began its analysis by noting that the doctrine of
equivalents does not require that a product or process literally
infringe upon the patent claim’s express terms, but rather
infringement can be found if the elements of the accused product or
2117
process and the patented invention’s elements are “equivalent.”
The court explained that the doctrine of equivalents evolved because
literal interpretation of patents’ terms would not “capture every
nuance of the invention” and would therefore diminish the value of
2118
patents.
The court noted also that literal interpretation would
allow patents to be defeated by insubstantial substitutes for certain
elements, which would further lessen the value of patents to
2119
inventors.
The Federal Circuit also noted that the doctrine of
equivalents results in a degree of uncertainty and to that extent limits
the public-notice function of patent claims in the scope of patent

2112.
2113.
2114.
2115.
2116.
2117.
2118.
2119.

Id. at 1375-76, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527.
420 F.3d 1350, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1357, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007.
Id. at 1358, 76 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1007.
Id. at 1358, 76 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1007.
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claims and also has the potential to deter non-infringing and
2120
innovative inventions.
The Federal Circuit then observed that “[o]f relevance to the case
is the ‘all limitations’ rule. The rule holds that an accused product or
process is not infringing unless it contains each limitation of the
2121
claim, either literally or by an equivalent.”
The Federal Circuit
noted that the “all limitations” rule has two primary implications for
the doctrine of equivalents. The first implication is that equivalence
is analyzed not from a perspective of looking at the entire invention
as a whole, but rather on a limitation-by-limitation basis, and the
second implication is that “an element of an accused product or
process is not, as a matter of law, equivalent to a limitation of the
claimed invention if such a finding would entirely vitiate the
2122
limitation.”
The Federal Circuit further advised that courts need to consider
the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the alleged
equivalence is an “insubstantial change from the claimed subject
matter without rendering the pertinent limitation meaningless” and
2123
that there is no set formula for making this determination.
After canvassing the relevant cases, the Federal Circuit concluded
that “[i]n the instant case, we think the district court’s finding of
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents had the effect of
2124
entirely vitiating the ‘slidably mounted’ limitation.”
The Federal
Circuit explained that a structural difference existed between the
plaintiff’s and the accused’s products because the plaintiff’s product’s
moveable end was capable of rotating but could not slide along the
seatbase, and that this structural difference was “a clear, substantial
2125
difference or difference in kind.”
The Federal Circuit then noted that the public was therefore
justified in relying on the specific language in assessing the claim.
“Accordingly, we think that to now say the claims include other four
bar mechanisms under the doctrine of equivalents would unjustly
2126
undermine the reasonable expectations of the public.”

2120. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007.
2121. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007.
2122. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007-08 (citing Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton
Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997)).
2123. Id. at 1359, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008.
2124. Id. at 1361, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1010.
2125. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1010 (quoting Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. U.S.
Surgical Corp., 149 F.3d 1309, 1321, 47 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1272, 1280 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
2126. Id. at 1362, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1010.
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In PC Connector Solutions LLC v. SmartDisk Corp.,
the Federal
Circuit determined that the plaintiff had not properly raised the issue
2128
The plaintiff had
of doctrine of equivalence in the trial court.
“presented the district court with only conclusory statements
regarding equivalence, without any particularized evidence and
linking argument as to the ‘insubstantiality of the differences’
between the claimed invention and the accused device, or with
respect to the ‘function, way result’ test” and was thus “foreclosed
from invoking the substantive application of the doctrine of
2129
equivalents.”
Moreover, the Federal Circuit foreclosed the plaintiff from raising
the issue of doctrine of equivalents on remand, stating that
“conclusory statements regarding equivalence are not enough to
warrant a remand on that issue, as they do not raise any genuine issue
2130
of material fact.”
Addressing the plaintiff’s substantive arguments regarding the
doctrine of equivalents, the Federal Circuit determined that
[A] finding of equivalence in this case would effectively vitiate the
time-related limitation on the I/O ports, if what is “normally
connectable,” “conventional,” “traditionally connectible,” and
“standard” at the time of filing were deemed to be equivalent to
what is “normally connectable,” “conventional,” “traditionally
2131
connectible,” and ‘standard’ at a future date.

The court concluded that this would vitiate the implicit limitation
of time-dependence, and thus there could be no infringement under
2132
the doctrine of equivalents as a matter of law.
2133
the Federal Circuit also
In Boss Control, Inc. v. Bombardier Inc.,
determined that the plaintiff had waived its right to raise
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. In particular, the
court noted that Boss had not presented any arguments concerning
2134
the doctrine of equivalents in its submissions to the district court.
The court found that Boss had only mentioned the doctrine of
2127. 406 F.3d 1359, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1698 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
2128. Id. at 1364, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d. (BNA) 1701.
2129. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1701.
2130. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1701.
2131. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1701 (explaining that Federal Circuit construed
the terms “normally connectable,” “conventional,” “traditionally connectible,” and
“standard” to be implicitly time-dependant, and accordingly upheld the district
court’s summary judgment of no literal infringement).
2132. Id. at 1365, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1701-02.
2133. 410 F.3d 1372, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1038 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
2134. See id. at 1380, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1044 (noting that Boss had “failed to
address infringement under the doctrine of equivalents in its complaint or in its two
briefs to the district court on the issue of summary judgment of noninfringment”).
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equivalents in one sentence in its briefs, and did not reference any
evidence showing infringement under the doctrine of equivalents,
2135
thus failing to present anything for the Federal Circuit to review.
Accordingly, the court held that “[b]ecause Boss failed to present
substantive arguments to the district court concerning infringement
2136
under the doctrine of equivalents, . . . Boss waived the issue.”
2137
In Seachange International, Inc. v. C-COR Inc., the Federal Circuit
addressed the “all elements rule” in light of its construction of certain
2138
The court construed the term “network for data
claim elements.
communications” as limited to those “networks in which every
processor system is connected to every other processor system via
2139
direct, point-to-point, two-way channel interconnections.”
C-COR
asserted that under such a construction, a finding of infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents, where only some processors are
interconnected via point-to-point interconnections, would “vitiate”
2140
this claim limitation.
The Federal Circuit agreed, holding that
“equivalents under such a theory would vitiate the requirement that
every processor be connected to every other processor point-to-point,
2141
and therefore must fail as a matter of law.”
2142
the plaintiff, VIn V-Formation, Inc. v. Benetton Group SPA,
Formation, claimed that its patents for in-line roller skates, which
required that certain components of the skates be “releasably
2143
attache[d],” were infringed by Benneton, whose skates used rivets
2144
The district court construed the
to fasten their frame sidewalls.
claim term “releasably attaching” to require “that the fasteners must
2145
permit the sidewalls to be easily removed and replaced.”
The
2146
Therefore, because
Federal Circuit agreed with this construction.
the rivets in Benetton’s skates were not releasable attachments,
Benneton’s skates did not literally infringe the asserted patent
2147
claims.
2135. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1044.
2136. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1044 (citation omitted).
2137. 413 F.3d 1361, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
2138. See id. at 1378, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396 (“[T]he ‘all elements rule’
provides that the doctrine of equivalents does not apply if applying the doctrine
would vitiate an entire claim limitation.” (quoting Asyst Techs., Inc. v. Emtrak, Inc.,
402 F.3d 1188, 1195, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1272, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2005))).
2139. Id. at 1375, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1394.
2140. Id. at 1378, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396.
2141. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396.
2142. 401 F.3d 1307, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1042 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
2143. Id. at 1309, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1044.
2144. Id. at 1312, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1047.
2145. Id. at 1310, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1045 (internal citations omitted).
2146. Id. at 1311, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1046.
2147. Id. at 1312, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1047.
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The Federal Circuit then analyzed the claims under the doctrine of
2148
The court noted that the rivets on the accused skates
equivalents.
were “not intended to be removed for replacement of broken or
2149
damaged individual sidewalls.”
It also agreed with the district court
that “rivets do not achieve substantially the same function (releasable
attachment) in substantially the same way (without special tools) to
achieve substantially the same result (easy, convenient, and fast
replacement of sidewalls) as ‘releasably attached’ fasteners, such as
2150
Therefore, the Federal Circuit held
threaded bolts and screws.”
that the accused devices did not infringe the patent claims under the
2151
doctrine of equivalents.
2152
the Federal
In Research Plastics, Inc. v. Federal Packaging Corp.,
Circuit ruled that pursuant to the Festo doctrine, the plaintiff was
precluded from asserting one of its infringement claims, but it
vacated the lower court’s grant of summary judgment of
noninfringement because the lower court had erred in its claim
2153
construction.
The plaintiff’s patent related to tubes used for caulk
2154
The patent integrated the use of ridges
or other fluent materials.
placed on the interior of the caulking tubes, which allowed for an
2155
even flow of fluent material.
The examiner initially rejected the
plaintiff’s patent application as obvious, in view of United States
Patent No. 4,852,772 (“Ennis patent”), which also used interior ridges
in its caulking tube, placing its ridges near the nozzle end of the
2156
caulking tube.
The plaintiff amended its application to state that
2157
the ridges, “extend[] to said rear end of said hollow tube body.”
Based on this amendment, the examiner concluded that the plaintiff
sufficiently distinguished its invention from the Ennis patent, and
2158
thus, the PTO issued the plaintiff’s patent.
The plaintiff brought an infringement suit against the defendant
for its manufacture and sale of two types of caulking tubes that
2159
included ridges placed in the rear half of the tube.
The district
court rejected the plaintiff’s argument of infringement under the

2148.
2149.
2150.
2151.
2152.
2153.
2154.
2155.
2156.
2157.
2158.
2159.

Id. at 1313, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1047.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1047.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1047.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1047.
421 F.3d 1290, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1133 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1298-99, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139-40.
Id. at 1292, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1134.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1134-35.
Id. at 1293, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1135.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
Id. at 1294, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
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2160

doctrine of equivalents after constructing the term “rear end,”
2161
The district
which appeared in claim 10 of the plaintiff’s patent.
court also held that the plaintiff’s amendment of its patent
application in response to an obviousness objection operated to
preclude the plaintiff from expanding the scope of its patent to
include equivalents of the placement of the ridges involved in its
2162
patent.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed with the district court’s
ruling that the Festo doctrine precluded the plaintiff from expanding
2163
the scope of its patent claims.
The Festo doctrine provides that “a
narrowing amendment made to satisfy any requirement of the Patent
2164
When “[a] narrowing
Act may give rise to an estoppel.”
amendment [is] made to avoid prior art[, it] creates a presumption
that the patentee surrendered the territory between the original
2165
claims and the amended claims.”
In order to rebut this
presumption, a patentee must prove “that the alleged equivalent
(1) could not reasonably have been described at the time the
amendment was made, (2) was tangential to the purpose of the
amendment, or (3) was not foreseeable (and thus not claimable) at
2166
the time of the amendment.”
Because the plaintiff had amended
its claims in response to prior art, the Festo doctrine applied, and the
Federal Circuit focused its attention to determine if the plaintiff
rebutted the presumption that it surrendered “the territory between
2167
the original claims and the amended claims.”
The Federal Circuit found that none of the three rebutting criteria
2168
applied.
First, the plaintiff could have described the equivalent at
the time of its amendment, as it could have amended its claim to
include the placement of ridges anywhere in the tube, except near
2169
the nozzle end, which the Ennis patent covered.
Second, the
equivalent was not tangential to the purpose of the amendment—the
very reason for the plaintiff’s amendment was to revise the claimed
placement of the ridges to avoid the PTO’s rejection of its

2160. Id. at 1294-95, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
2161. Id. at 1292, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1135.
2162. Id. at 1298, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139.
2163. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139.
2164. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139 (quoting Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 736).
2165. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139 (citing Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 741 (2002)).
2166. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139 (citing Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 740-41).
2167. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139.
2168. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139.
2169. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139.
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application.
Third, the plaintiff could have foreseen that ridge
placement was a point of differentiation, as this is how the plaintiff
2171
Accordingly, the
distinguished its patent from the Ennis patent.
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that the Festo
doctrine precluded the plaintiff from expanding the scope of its
2172
patent by claiming equivalents.
However, it remanded the case to
the district court for further proceedings consistent with the Federal
Circuit’s finding that the district court’s construction of the term
2173
“rear end” was flawed.
2174
In Terlep v. Brinkmann Corp.,
the Federal Circuit affirmed the
2175
district court’s grant of summary judgment of noninfringement.
The district court granted summary judgment based on its claim
2176
construction of the term “clear,”
and its determination that the
2177
defendant did not infringe under the doctrine of equivalents.
The plaintiff, Stephen K. Terlep, was the owner of a patent that
related to light emitting diode (“LED”) lamps that had omni2178
directional light capabilities.
The main claim at issue contained
three key characteristics: (1) it contained an omni-directional LED,
(2) it used a “semi-spherical reflector” implanted above the LED, and
(3) it had a “clear plastic tubular holder” used to hold the semi2179
spherical reflector directly above the LED.
As the Federal Circuit
recited, “[t]he district court construed the term ‘clear’ . . . to mean
‘transparent’ or ‘having the property of transmitting light without
appreciable scattering so that bodies lying beyond are seen
2180
clearly.’”
The plaintiff argued the term “clear” should also
encompass “translucent” because in view of the record “clear” only
2181
meant “permit[ting] the passage of light.”
The lower court granted summary judgment based on
noninfringement after reviewing the plaintiff’s claim 1, which used
2182
the phrase “clear plastic tubular holder.”
The plaintiff added this
phrase to its claim during the patent prosecution in an effort to

2170.
2171.
2172.
2173.
2174.
2175.
2176.
2177.
2178.
2179.
2180.
2181.
2182.

Id. at 1299, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140.
Id. at 1298, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139.
Id. at 1299, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140.
418 F.3d 1379, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1053 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1380, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1054.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1054.
Id. at 1386, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1059.
Id. at 1380-81, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1054-55.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1054 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 1382, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1056.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1056.
Id. at 1385, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058.
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2183

overcome prior art.
The plaintiff argued the doctrine announced
2184
The Federal
in Festo did not preclude it from claiming equivalents.
2185
First, the Federal Circuit noted that an added
Circuit disagreed.
limitation during a patent’s prosecution “may give rise to an
2186
estoppel.”
Further, the addition of such a limitation “creates a
presumption that the patentee surrendered the territory between the
2187
original claims and the amended claims.”
A patentee may rebut
this presumption in several ways, including showing “that the alleged
2188
equivalent was tangential to the purpose of that amendment . . . .”
The plaintiff argued that adding the term “clear” to his claim was
tangential, as he merely added the term to describe the plastic used
2189
for the holder.
The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, finding
that the plaintiff added the term “clear” to distinguish it from prior
2190
art, and therefore, the amendment was not tangential.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court’s grant of
summary judgment and finding of noninfringement by considering
2191
the doctrine of equivalents.
2. Dedication-disclosure rule
2192
In Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals, USA, Inc., the court affirmed
the lower court’s grant of preliminary injunction to the plaintiff,
Pfizer, Inc. (“Pfizer”). The Federal Circuit outlined the four
2193
elements needed for a grant of preliminary injunction.
As to the
first element, that the movant has a “reasonable likelihood of success
2194
the Federal Circuit stated that to prove this
on the merits,”
element, the plaintiff needed to show it owned a valid and
enforceable patent, and that the defendant likely infringed on this
2195
patent.
Because the defendants did not question the former, the
Federal Circuit focused on whether the lower court correctly
2196
determined that the defendants likely infringed Pfizer’s patent.
In

2183. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058.
2184. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058 (citing Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 733 (2002)).
2185. Id. at 1386, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058-59.
2186. Id. at 1385, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058 (citing Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 736).
2187. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058 (citing Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 741).
2188. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058 (citing Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 740-41).
2189. Id. at 1385-86, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058.
2190. Id. at 1386, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058-59.
2191. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1059.
2192. 429 F.3d 1364, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
2193. Id. at 1372, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
2194. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
2195. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
2196. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.

LATHAM.OFFTOPRINTER

1220

5/20/2006 3:02:04 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:1001

making this determination, the Federal Circuit reviewed the lower
2197
and then compared these construed
court’s claim construction,
2198
The Federal Circuit
claims to the accused infringing product.
affirmed the lower court’s claim construction of the term
2199
“saccharide” to include polysaccharides.
Next, the Federal Circuit reviewed the lower court’s comparison of
the patent and the accused product, stating that infringement occurs
when the “accused product or method meets every claim limitation
2200
either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents.”
After
affirming the lower court’s finding that the defendants’ product
2201
likely literally infringed both claims 1 and 16 of Pfizer’s patent, the
Federal Circuit turned to address whether the lower court erred in its
determination that the defendants’ products also likely infringed the
2202
plaintiff’s patent under the doctrine of equivalents.
The lower court ruled that under the doctrine of equivalents, even
if the term “saccharide,” as used in the plaintiff’s patent, was
constructed to include sugars and not polysaccharides, the
2203
defendants still infringed the plaintiff’s claims 1 and 16.
On
appeal, the defendants argued the lower court erred by failing to
assign a function to the term “saccharide” for the purposes of
equivalency, and that it should have assigned the function of
2204
“inhibiting hydrolysis.”
The defendants argued that no evidence
presented at trial suggests that its product “inhibit[s] hydrolysis,” and
therefore, if the lower court had correctly assigned a function to
“saccharide,” the defendants do not infringe the plaintiff’s patent
2205
under the doctrine of equivalents.
The Federal Circuit rejected
the defendants’ argument, finding that Pfizer provided evidence that
the defendants’ product inhibited hydrolysis and the defendant
2206
failed to provide any rebutting evidence.

2197. See supra Part III.A.
2198. Pfizer, 429 F.3d at 1372-73, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261-62.
2199. Id. at 1376, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1264.
2200. Pfizer, 429 F.3d at 1376, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1264-65 (citing Dynacore
Holdings Corp. v. U.S. Phillips Corp., 363 F.3d 1263, 1273, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1369, 1375-76 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
2201. See id. at 1377, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1265 (stating the plaintiff “is likely to
prevail in its charge that Ranbaxy literally infringes claim 16.”); id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1265 (commenting “[t]he district court also did not clearly err in
determining that [] [the plaintiff] is likely to prevail in its charge that Ranbaxy
literally infringes claim 1.”)
2202. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1265.
2203. Id. at 1378, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1265.
2204. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1265.
2205. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1265.
2206. Id. at 1380, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1267.
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The defendants also argued that the plaintiff’s patent dedicated
the use of microcrystalline cellulose, which is the polysaccharide used
in the defendants’ product, to the public by disclosing it but failing to
2207
claim its use.
The Federal Circuit began its analysis by stating that its precedent
finds dedication to the public when “one of ordinary skill in the art
can understand the unclaimed disclosed teaching upon reading the
written description” and “identify the subject matter that had been
2208
The court rejected the defendants’
disclosed and not claimed.”
argument, reasoning that the defendants failed to indicate where the
patent actually disclosed and dedicated microcrystalline cellulose to
2209
the public.
The court did recognize that Example C of the
plaintiff’s patent listed microcrystalline cellulose as an ingredient of a
2210
particular formulation of the patented product.
The court denied,
however, that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize this as
the patent disclosing microcrystalline cellulose as an unclaimed
2211
alternative to a saccharide.
Moreover, after reviewing the other
ingredients listed in Example C, the Federal Circuit concluded that it
corresponded to an older, and unsuccessful formulation of the
2212
plaintiff’s product.
Therefore Example C, and thus, the mention
of microcrystalline cellulose, did not actually reference the claimed
2213
product.
The Federal Circuit also refused to apply the all limitations rule,
which “provides that the doctrine of equivalents does not apply if
2214
applying the doctrine would vitiate an entire claim limitation.”
Further, in “determining whether a finding of equivalence would
vitiate a claim limitation” the court needed to establish “whether the
alleged equivalent can be fairly characterized as an insubstantial
change from the claimed subject matter without rendering the
2215
Looking at the term
pertinent limitation meaningless.”
“saccharides” as if it included sugars, the Federal Circuit concluded
2207. Id. at 1378, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1266.
2208. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1266 (quoting PSC Computer Prods., Inc. v.
Foxconn Int’l. Inc., 355 F.3d 1353, 1360, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1460, 1465 (Fed. Cir.
2004)).
2209. Id. at 1379, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1266.
2210. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1266.
2211. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1266.
2212. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1267.
2213. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1267.
2214. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1267 (quoting Asyst Techs., Inc. v. Emtrak, Inc.,
402 F.3d 1188, 1195, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1272, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
2215. Id. at 1380, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1267 (quoting Freedman Seating Co. v.
Am. Seating Co., 420 F.3d 1350, 1359, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1008 (Fed. Cir.
2005)).
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that microcrystalline cellulose “can be fairly characterized as an
insubstantial change from the claimed subject matter without
rendering the ‘saccharide’ limitations meaningless[,]” and therefore,
the court held that the all limitations rule did not prohibit the lower
2216
court from applying the doctrine of equivalents.
E. Prosecution History Estoppel
In Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Laboratories, Inc., the defendant,
Clontech Laboratories (“Clontech”), cross-appealed the lower court’s
grant of partial summary judgment that its PowerScript RT product
2217
infringed four claims of the plaintiff’s patent.
The relevant claim
language the lower court construed was “no detectable RNase H
2218
The lower court determined
activity” and lacks “RNase H activity.”
that to one skilled in the art, these terms denoted “a complete
2219
absence of RNase H activity.”
On appeal, Clontech did not take
2220
Instead,
issue with the lower court’s interpretation of these terms.
it argued that the Federal Circuit should invoke prosecution history
2221
estoppel or prosecution disclaimer.
Specifically, the defendant
contended that in the plaintiff’s original patent application, claim 1
required “substantially no” RNase H activity, which the plaintiff later
cancelled with a preliminary amendment and revised to “substantially
2222
reduced” RNase H activity.
Noting that the plaintiff never even
presented to the PTO the “substantially no” language of the original
application, the Federal Circuit refused to apply prosecution history
2223
estoppel or prosecution disclaimer.
While noting the principle
“that the prosecution of one claim term in a parent application will
generally not limit different claim language in a continuation
2224
application,”
the Federal Circuit recognized the exception when
“an amendment to a related limitation in the parent application
distinguishes prior art and thereby specifically disclaims a later
(though differently worded) limitation in the continuation

2216. Id.
2217. 429 F.3d 1052, 1060, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1166 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see
supra Part II.B.2 (detailing the facts of the case).
2218. Id. at 1074, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1176; see also U.S. Patent No. 6,063,608
col.19 ll.38-41 (filed Feb. 10, 1997).
2219. Id. at 1076, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1178.
2220. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1178.
2221. Id. at 1078, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1179.
2222. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1179.
2223. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1179.
2224. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1179 (citing ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc.,
346 F.3d 1374, 1383, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d 1619, 1625 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
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2225

application.”
The Federal Circuit, however, rejected the notion
2226
that this exception applied in this case.
In Salazar v. Procter & Gamble Company, the Federal Circuit vacated
the lower court’s grant of summary judgment, finding that the lower
court erred in determining that the defendant did not, literally or
under the doctrine of equivalents, infringe on the plaintiff’s
2227
patent.
The plaintiff, Alfred Salazar, owned a patent that involved
a toothbrush that had two sets of rods, one that polished teeth, and a
2228
Although Mr. Salazar’s patent claims
second that stimulated gums.
did not mention anything about an “elastic” feature of its rods, the
Examiner’s Statement of Reasons for Allowance noted that his claims
differed from an obvious claim (“Clemens” claim) in that the
“‘Clemens’ ‘rods’ 22 are made of nylon, which is not considered
2229
‘elastic.’”
The defendant, Procter & Gamble, motioned for
summary judgment, arguing that its toothbrushes do not include an
2230
“elastic” feature, and thus, could not infringe the plaintiff’s patent.
The lower court ruled that even though Mr. Salazar did not amend
the claim language according to the examiner’s remarks in the
Examiner’s Statement for Reasons of Allowance, the examiner’s
remarks essentially “amended” the claim language to include the
2231
The lower court construed the term “elastic,”
“elastic” limitation.
and determined that the accused products did not fall within the
court’s construction of that term, and consequently granted Procter
2232
& Gamble summary judgment.
More importantly, the lower court
“found that the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel barred Mr.
Salazar from asserting infringement of the ‘elastic’ limitation under
2233
the doctrine of equivalents.”
In vacating the lower court’s grant of summary judgment and
reversing its finding that the patent’s prosecution history bars Mr.
Salazar from arguing infringement of the “elastic” element under the
doctrine of equivalents, the Federal Circuit first defined the doctrine
2234
of prosecution history estoppel.
The Federal Circuit stated that
this doctrine “serves to limit the doctrine of equivalents when the
2225. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (DNA) at 1179 (citing Elkay Mfg. Co. v. EBCO Mfg. Co.,
192 F.3d 973, 978-79, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d 1109, 1112-13 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
2226. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1179.
2227. 414 F.3d 1342, 1343, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1369, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
2228. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1370.
2229. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1370.
2230. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1370.
2231. Id. at 1347, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1373.
2232. Id. at 1344, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1370.
2233. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1370.
2234. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1371.
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applicant makes a narrowing amendment for purposes of
patentability, or clearly and unmistakably surrenders subject matter
2235
Using this definition as a
by arguments made to the examiner.”
backdrop, the Federal Circuit framed the issue as whether an
examiner’s unilateral statements of reasons for claim allowance “can
create a clear and unambiguous disavowal of claim scope and give
2236
rise to prosecution history estoppel.”
First, the Federal Circuit
noted the only time the examiner mentioned “elastic” as a claim
limitation was in the Examiner’s Statement of Reasons for
2237
Allowance.
Moreover, at no other place in the prosecution history
2238
After noting this, the Federal
is the “elastic” limitation mentioned.
Circuit cited to the regulations that were in force at the time Mr.
2239
Salazar prosecuted his patent.
The regulations stated that,
[i]f the examiner believes that the record of the prosecution as a
whole does not make clear his or her reasons for allowing a claim
or claims, the examiner may set forth such reasoning . . . . The
applicant or patent owner may file a statement commenting on the
reasons for allowance within such time as may be specified by the
examiner. Failure to file such a statement shall not give rise to any
implication that the applicant or patent owner agrees with or acquiesces in
2240
the reasoning of the examiner.

The Federal Circuit then noted that in addition to the language of
the regulations, it had previously held that an Examiner’s Statement
2241
of Reasons for Allowance “will not necessarily limit a claim.”
Additionally, the court added that the “[p]rosecution history . . .
cannot be used to limit the scope of a claim unless the applicant took
2242
a position before the PTO.”
While the court admitted that an
examiner’s statements may be used as evidence of how one of skill
would understand a term, its final holding was that an examiner’s
2235. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1371 (citing Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 736 (2002); Eagle Comtronics, Inc. v. Arrow
Commc’n Labs., Inc., 305 F.3d 1303, 1316, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2002);
Elkay Mfg. Co. v. EBCO Mfg. Co., 192 F.3d 973, 979, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d 1109, 1112-13
(Fed. Cir. 1999)).
2236. Id. at 1345, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1371.
2237. Id. at 1344, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1371.
2238. Id. at 1345, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1371.
2239. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1371.
2240. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1371 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 1.109 (1996))
(emphasis in original).
2241. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1371 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting
ACCO Brands, Inc. v. Micro Sec. Devices, Inc., 346 F.3d 1075, 1079, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d
1526, 1529 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
2242. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1371-72 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting
3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 350 F.3d 1365, 1373-74, 69
U.S.P.Q.2d 1050, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (internal citation omitted)).
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2243

unilateral statements could not amend the claims.
Accordingly,
the Federal Circuit vacated the lower court’s grant of summary
2244
judgment and remanded for further proceedings.
2245
In Aquatex Industries, Inc. v. Techniche Solutions,
the Federal
Circuit affirmed the lower court’s claim construction of the term
2246
and reversed the grant of summary
“fiberfill batting material”
judgment to the defendant related to noninfringement under the
2247
doctrine of equivalents.
The plaintiff, Aquatex Industries, Inc.,
held a patent which covers a method of evaporative cooling by using
a “multi-layered, liquid-retaining composite material comprising a
2248
fiberfill batting . . . .”
The defendant, Techniche Solutions, used a
similar method of cooling, but its fiberfill batting consists of both
2249
natural and synthetic materials.
The lower court construed “fiberfill” to include only synthetic
materials—excluding any natural materials, or combination
2250
2251
thereof.
The Federal Circuit affirmed this construction.
The
lower court also ruled that prosecution history estoppel precluded
the plaintiff from arguing infringement under the doctrine of
2252
equivalents.
The lower court found the prosecution history to
suggest “fiberfill” included synthetic materials, but also to specifically
2253
During prosecution, the examiner
exclude any natural materials.
2254
indicated prior art contained both natural and synthetic filler.
The
plaintiff, however, did not address this statement, but instead
2255
distinguished its invention on different grounds.
The lower court also supported its holding from the plaintiff’s
statement that prior art “fails to disclose or suggest the fiberfill
2256
batting . . . of the composite material in the claimed method.”
In
its review, the Federal Circuit noted two types of prosecution:
2257
(1) argument-based estoppel and (2) amendment-based estoppel.
To prove argument based estoppel, which the defendant argued
2243.
2244.
2245.
2246.
2247.
2248.
2249.
2250.
2251.
2252.
2253.
2254.
2255.
2256.
2257.

Id. at 1347, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1373.
Id. at 1348, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1373.
419 F.3d 1374, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1213 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1377, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1215.
Id. at 1376, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1214.
Id. at 1377, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1215.
Id. at 1378, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1216.
Id. at 1378-79, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1216.
Id. at 1382, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1218.
Id. at 1379, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1216.
Id. at 1381, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1218.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1218.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1218.
Id. at 1379, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1216.
Id. at 1382, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1219.
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applied, the prosecution history “must evince a clear and
2258
The Federal Circuit
unmistakable surrender of subject matter.”
2259
found no evidence of the plaintiff providing such a surrender.
First, the court found that Aquatex Industries, Inc. failed to confirm,
or even address, the examiner’s comment regarding prior art’s use of
2260
both natural and synthetic materials.
Second, the plaintiff’s
statement regarding how the prior art failed “to disclose or suggest
the fiberfill batting . . . of the composite material in the claimed
2261
material,” did not actually relate to the fiberfill’s composition.
Instead, the plaintiff’s statement explicated that prior art failed to
2262
explain how the materials cooled the person wearing them.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit disagreed with the lower court’s
determination that Aquatex Industries, Inc. clearly surrendered
subject matter, and it thus reversed the lower court’s ruling that
barred it from arguing infringement based on the doctrine of
2263
equivalents.
F. Inducement of Infringement
2264

Fuji Photo Film Co., Ltd. v. Jazz Photo Corp., involved a lawsuit over
the plaintiff’s patents directed towards disposable cameras, or lens2265
fitted film packages (“LFFPs”).
Plaintiff sued defendant
corporation and one of its former directors and consultants for
2266
infringing its patents.
With respect to the individual defendant,
Plaintiff alleged that he had induced the corporate defendant’s
2267
Defendants purchased used LFFP shells from
infringement.
foreign factories, then refurbished LFFPs by inserting new film
2268
through multiple steps.
After the jury determined that the
individual defendant induced the corporate defendant’s
infringement, the defendants appealed, and argued that substantial
evidence did not support the jury’s finding that the individual
2269
defendant possessed the requisite intent.
2258. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1219 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting
Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 170 F.3d 1373, 1376-77, 50
U.S.P.Q.2d 1033, 1036 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
2259. Id. at 1383, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1219.
2260. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1219.
2261. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1219.
2262. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1219.
2263. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1219.
2264. 394 F.3d 1368, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1678 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
2265. Id. at 1370-71, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680-81.
2266. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680-81.
2267. Id. at 1377, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1686.
2268. Id. at 1371, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681.
2269. Id. at 1377, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1686.

LATHAM.OFFTOPRINTER

2006]

5/20/2006 3:02:04 PM

2005 PATENT SUMMARY

1227

The Federal Circuit noted that a “patentee may prove intent
2270
While the individual defendant
through circumstantial evidence.”
took the position that he “did not believe refurbishing LFFPs had any
effect on [plaintiff’s] patent rights, the record show[ed] he was aware
2271
of [plaintiff’s] infringement contentions.”
Further, “the record
show[ed] that [individual defendant] twice sought a license from
2272
[plaintiff].”
Also, the corporate defendant had “continued to sell
2273
The
refurbished LFFPs even after the ITC found infringement.”
Federal Circuit also noted plaintiff’s evidence that the individual
defendant’s “selecting the foreign refurbisher supplier factories and
in his overall acts of directing [defendant’s] business model caused
2274
the infringement.”
The court held that “substantial evidence
supports the jury’s finding of intent . . . [and] this court sees no
reason to disturb the jury’s finding of . . . intent to induce
2275
infringement.”
2276
In MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp.,
the Federal Circuit reversed the lower court’s grant of summary
judgment to the defendants (“SUMCO”) regarding the plaintiff’s
(“MEMC”) allegation of inducement of infringement under 35
2277
U.S.C. § 271(b) (2000).
Both the plaintiff and the defendants
2278
The plaintiff
manufactured silicon wafers for semiconductors.
owned a patent that related to the preparation of single crystal
silicon, which improved upon prior art by decreasing crystal
2279
defects.
SUMCO manufactured its wafers in Japan, sold its wafers
to Samsung Japan Corporation, who then sold the wafers to Samsung
2280
Austin Semiconductor, located in Austin, Texas.
The plaintiff
brought suit arguing that SUMCO actively induced Samsung Austin
2281
to infringe the plaintiff’s patent.
The plaintiff argued that the
defendant knowingly induced Samsung Austin’s infringement and
2282
The plaintiff
had specific intent to encourage that infringement.
provided undisputed evidence that it sent to the defendants a letter
notifying them that the defendant’s wafers were covered by the
2270.
2271.
2272.
2273.
2274.
2275.
2276.
2277.
2278.
2279.
2280.
2281.
2282.

Id, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1686.
Id. at 1377-78, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1686-87.
Id. at 1378, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1687.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1687.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1687.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1687.
420 F.3d 1369, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1371, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277-78.
Id. at 1371-72, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278.
Id. at 1371, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278.
Id. at 1372, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278.
Id. at 1377, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1282.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1282.
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2283

plaintiff’s patent, and it also offered the defendants a license.
Additionally, the plaintiff pointed to deposition testimony of a former
Samsung Austin employee who stated that Samsung Austin would
only enter into wafer purchase agreements if the supplier also
2284
provided technical support for the wafers.
Finding this evidence
insufficient for inducement of infringement, the lower court granted
2285
SUMCO’s motion for summary judgment.
The Federal Circuit reviewed the same evidence and found
2286
First,
sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find inducement.
the court made clear that finding inducement of infringement under
35 U.S.C. § 271(b) requires the plaintiff to show direct infringement,
that the “alleged infringer knowingly induced infringement and
2287
possessed specific intent to encourage another’s infringement.”
The Federal Circuit further commented that circumstantial evidence
2288
The Federal Circuit found that the
was sufficient to prove intent.
plaintiff’s notification letter to the defendants provided proof of
intent, as the defendants had knowledge of the plaintiff’s patent and
2289
Samsung Austin’s potentially infringing activities.
The court also
found sufficient evidence that SUMCO encouraged Samsung Austin
2290
to infringe.
The court pointed to e-mails between SUMCO and
Samsung Austin regarding the coordination and shipment of wafers
and SUMCO’s resolution of problems experienced by Samsung
2291
Austin with previously shipped wafers.
The Federal Circuit
believed a jury could view these e-mails as providing technical
support, which was a prerequisite to Samsung Austin’s purchase of
2292
the wafers.
This technical support allowed Samsung Austin to
purchase the wafers, which a jury could interpret as SUMCO
2293
encouraging Samsung Austin’s infringement.
Accordingly, the
Federal Circuit reversed the lower court’s grant of summary
2294
judgment to SUMCO on the issue of inducement of infringement.

2283. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1282.
2284. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1282.
2285. Id. at 1372-73, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1279.
2286. Id. at 1379, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1284.
2287. Id. at 1378, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1283 (quoting Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co.
v. Chemque, Inc., 303 F.3d 1294, 1305, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d 1270, 1276-77 (Fed. Cir.
2002)).
2288. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1283.
2289. Id. at 1379, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1283.
2290. Id. at 1380, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1284.
2291. Id. at 1379, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1283.
2292. Id. at 1380, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1284.
2293. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1284.
2294. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1284.
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G. Infringement Under the Hatch-Waxman Act
2295

In AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., the Federal Circuit reviewed an
infringement action by the plaintiff, AT&T, under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)
2296
and affirmed the district court’s finding of infringement.
AT&T
alleged that Microsoft exported master versions of its software that
2297
included “speech codecs” that infringed on one of AT&T’s patents.
The district court ruled that Microsoft’s software was a “component”
under § 271(f), and Microsoft had supplied this software from the
United States, thus violating § 271(f) and infringing AT&T’s
2298
patent.
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Microsoft argued that (1) the
master versions of its exported software did not constitute
“components” under § 271(f) and (2) the copies of its software made
2299
in foreign countries are not supplied from the United States.
The
Federal Circuit quickly rejected Microsoft’s first argument. The court
cited a recent case that clearly held that software and software code
qualified as components under § 271(f), and that § 271(f) was not
limited to “patented ‘machines’ or patented ‘physical
2300
structures’ . . . .”
The Federal Circuit addressed Microsoft’s second argument in
2301
more detail, as it was an issue of first impression.
Microsoft made
several arguments in support of its proposition that “a foreignreplicated copy made from a master version supplied from the
United States has actually been ‘manufactured’ abroad by encoding a
2302
storage medium with the Windows® software.”
Before addressing
these arguments, the Federal Circuit defined “supplied,” as § 271(f)
2303
did not provide a definition.
The court stated that the “nature of
technology” was such that “supplying” software involved creating
copies, and that “sending a single copy abroad with the intent that it
be replicated invokes § 271(f) liability for those foreign-made
2304
Microsoft’s first argument in response to this was that
copies.”
§ 271(f) liability should only arise when a specific software disk is
2295. 414 F.3d 1366, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1506 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
2296. Id. at 1368, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1507.
2297. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1507.
2298. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1507.
2299. Id. at 1368-69, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1507.
2300. Id. at 1369, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1507 (citing Eolas Techs. Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1339, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1782, 1793 (Fed. Cir.
2005)).
2301. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1507-08.
2302. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1508.
2303. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1508.
2304. Id. at 1370, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1508.
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2305

“shipped and incorporated into a foreign-assembled computer.”
The Federal Circuit dismissed this argument, finding that it failed to
2306
“account for the realities of software distribution.”
Microsoft’s second argument was that the Federal Circuit should
2307
abide by its holding in Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc.,
which
established that § 271(f) is not violated when mere manufacturing
instructions or management oversight is sent abroad from the United
2308
States.
The Federal Circuit disagreed distinguished Pellegrini by
pointing out that Microsoft’s software is an actual component, not
just instructions regarding designing or coding Windows®
2309
software.
Likewise, the Federal Circuit dismissed Microsoft’s
argument that § 271(f) liability does not occur when software is sent
2310
abroad by electronic transmissions.
The Federal Circuit stated that
liability under § 271(f) does not depend on the medium on which
the component is sent overseas, and finding otherwise, “would
2311
amount to an exaltation of form over substance.”
The Federal Circuit also rejected the defendant’s final
2312
Microsoft proffered a policy argument that suggested
argument.
that interpreting the term “supplied” to include copies made from
master versions of software would cause U.S. companies to relocate
2313
their manufacturing facilities abroad.
The Federal Circuit
questioned the likelihood of Microsoft’s prediction given that
2314
§ 271(f)’s enactment precipitated no such exodus.
Additionally,
the loss of American jobs to foreign manufacturing plants did not
2315
justify patent infringement.
Lastly, the Federal Circuit commented
that its interpretation of “supplied” complied with § 271(f)’s purpose
of closing the loophole that previously allowed infringers to escape
liability when they manufactured product components in the United
2316
States and then sent the components abroad to complete assembly.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding
2317
of Microsoft’s infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f).

2305.
2306.
2307.
2308.
2309.
2310.
2311.
2312.
2313.
2314.
2315.
2316.
2317.

Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1508.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1508.
375 F.3d 1113, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d 1630 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
AT & T Corp., 414 F.3d at 1370, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1509.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1509.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1509.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1509.
Id. at 1372, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1509.
Id. at 1371, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1509.
Id. at 1372, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1510.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1510.
Id. at 1371, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1509-10.
Id. at 1372, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1510.
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H. Willful Infringement
2318

In Imonex Services, Inc. v. W.H. Munzprufer Dietmar Trenner GmBH,
the Federal Circuit reviewed a denial of JMOL on a jury’s verdict of
willful infringement. The court explained that “[a]ctual notice of
2319
another’s patent rights triggers an affirmative duty of due care”
and addressed the issue of when the defendants had actual notice
and their behavior afterwards. The Federal Circuit determined that
the jury reasonably could have concluded that the defendants had
actual notice of the patents based on Imonex’s display of its products
at trade shows, its widespread distribution of literature depicting the
its products as patented, and correspondence with the defendants’
employees regarding the use of patented devices in the defendants’
2320
products.
The defendants argued that they exercised their duty of care by
2321
obtaining opinions of counsel.
Imonex countered by arguing that
2322
the defendants waited too long to obtain their opinions of counsel.
2323
The Federal Circuit, citing its en banc decision in Knorr-Bremse,
explained that “while early receipt of legal advice would have
strengthened the defendants’ argument that they had not willfully
infringed, failure to have solicited such advice does not give rise to an
2324
inference of willfulness.”
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit
concluded that the jury had substantial evidence to support its
2325
finding of willfulness.
The Federal Circuit also affirmed the district court’s finding that
2326
the case was exceptional under 35 U.S.C. § 285.
The jury had
determined that the defendants’ infringement was willful, and the
district court assessed attorneys fees for the time elapsed between this
jury verdict and the verdict in a second trial re-trying the issue of
damages, during which the defendants continued to sell infringing
2327
devices.
The Federal Circuit determined that the district Court did
2328
not abuse its discretion.
2318. 408 F.3d 1374, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1936 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
2319. Id. at 1377, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939.
2320. Id. at 1378, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939.
2321. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939.
2322. See id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939 (contending that the defendants should
have obtained counsel as soon as they learned of possible infringement and not after
being served with the complaint).
2323. Knorr—Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmBH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d
1337, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1560 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
2324. Imonex Services, Inc., 408 F.3d at 1378, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939.
2325. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1940.
2326. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1940.
2327. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1940.
2328. Id. at 1378-79, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1940.
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J. Repair and Reconstruction
2329

In Fuji Photo Film Co., Ltd. v. Jazz Photo Corp., the plaintiff held
patents directed towards disposable cameras, or lens-fitted film
2330
Defendants purchased used LFFP shells from
packages (“LFFPs”).
foreign factories, then refurbished LFFPs by inserting new film
2331
through multiple steps. Plaintiff instituted proceedings before the
International Trade Commission (“ITC”) against defendant and
2332
twenty-five other respondents.
The primary issue before the ITC
was whether defendants’ refurbishing of the LFFPs was permissible
2333
The administrative judge
repair or impermissible reconstruction.
determined that eight common steps in each of respondents’
refurbishing
of
the
LFFPs
constituted
impermissible
2334
reconstruction.
Prior to the ITC’s final order, Plaintiff sued
defendants in the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey, seeking damages and injunctive relief for direct and indirect
2335
infringement of the LFFP patents.
This lawsuit was stayed pending
the appeal of the ITC action, in which the Federal Circuit reversed
the ITC’s final determination, and found that the eight-step
refurbishment procedure was permissible repair, and that only LFFPs
first sold in the United States qualified for the repair exclusion under
2336
the exhaustion doctrine.
Because defendants acknowledged that
its specific refurbishment procedure comprised nineteen possible
steps, the Federal Circuit’s reversal of the ITC determination was not
entirely dispositive of the repair/reconstruction issue confronting the
2337
district court, and the plaintiff’s lawsuit proceeded.
During the
lawsuit, the parties entered into several stipulations: (1) to the use of
the record developed before the ITC; (2) to a special jury verdict
form that generally asked whether defendants’ supplier factories
performed each of the nineteen refurbishment steps (the form did
not query the jury for each of defendant’s eight supplier factories in
China, but instead grouped the steps generally); (3) the district court
would not be bound by the advisory jury determination of the
number of repaired LFFPs; and (4) the district court instructed the
2329.
2330.
2331.
2332.
2333.
2334.
2335.
2336.
2337.

394 F.3d 1368, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1678 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1370-71, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680-81.
Id. at 1371, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681.
Id. at 1370-71, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680-81.
Id. at 1371, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681.
394 F.3d 1371, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681.
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jury that plaintiff had not sought an order before the ITC or the
2338
district court compelling discovery in the Chinese factories.
After trial, the jury determined that: defendants had infringed
defendant’s patents by refurbishing nearly fourty million LFFPs,
willfully infringed the patents by selling more than 1.2 million newlymade LFFPs, and that defendants owed a reasonably royalty of $0.56
per LFFP.
The district court then considered the repair,
2339
reconstruction issue, as well as the exhaustion issue.
The district
court determined that the nineteen steps defendants acknowledged
were “effectively sub-steps of the eight steps . . . previously deemed
2340
permissible repair.”
The court then determined that three of the
eight Chinese factories performed the nineteen steps, as defendants
2341
had presented evidence on only three of the eight factories.
In
doing so, the court rejected defendants’ proposed inference that its
evidence represented the refurbishing activities of all eight factories,
2342
and found that ten percent of the LFFPs were permissibly repaired.
Turning its analysis to the foreign LFFP sales, the district court
interpreted the Federal Circuit precedent from the appeal of the ITC
action as holding that “only first sales in the United States would
2343
serve as the appropriate basis for the repair affirmative defense.”
Based on “evidence presented by both parties” the district court
determined that 9.5% of defendant’s refurbished LFFPs derived from
United States first sales, and that 9.5% of the total of potentially
permissibly repaired cameras were attributable to United States first
2344
sales.
The district court also denied defendants’ motion for JMOL
challenging the jury’s findings of willfulness, inducement and the
reasonable royalty rate. The district court denied the motion, finding
substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict, but the district
2345
court declined to enhance damages for willful infringement.
On
appeal, defendants challenged the district court’s finding that
defendants failed to provide sufficient evidence of all eight Chinese
factories performing the nineteen repair steps, the district court’s
application of the exhaustion doctrine, and the jury’s finding of
2346
inducement, willfulness, and the reasonable royalty.
Plaintiff cross-

2338.
2339.
2340.
2341.
2342.
2343.
2344.
2345.
2346.

Id. at 1371-72, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681-82.
Id. at 1372, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682.
Id. at 1373, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682.
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appealed, and argued that the defendants failed to sufficiently prove
that ten percent of its refurbished LFFPs fell within the repair safe
harbor, as well as the district court’s refusal to enhance damages and
2347
its denial of a permanent injunction.
The Federal Circuit affirmed
the district court’s conclusions.
First, the Federal Circuit determined whether defendants had met
their burden of persuasion on the affirmative defense of repair. In
doing so, the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual
findings for clear error, and reviewed its JMOL determination and
2348
interpretation of the parties’ stipulations without deference.
The
Federal Circuit rejected defendants’ argument that the district court
was bound by the jury’s determination that each of the eight Chinese
factories performed the permissible repair steps. The court reasoned
that the parties’ own stipulation “rendered the jury’s determination
of repaired LFFPs advisory. Thus, the district court retained the right
2349
to make its own determination.”
The court saw no error in the
2350
In addressing
district court’s honoring of the parties’ stipulation.
the district court’s factual determinations, the Federal Circuit found
no clear error in the district court’s determinations. The court
determined that because no
representative [of defendants] had personal knowledge of the
refurbishing acts performed at five Chinese factories, this court
cannot form a ‘definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed’ in the district court’s holding that [defendant] did not
meet its burden of proving the repair defense
...
[A]s the district court found, [defendant] provided only
incomplete evidence. This court detects no clear error in the
district court’s assessment of the insufficiency of [defendants’]
2351
proof.

The court also determined, in plaintiff’s cross-appeal, that the
district court did not clearly err in finding that ten percent of the
LFFPs were permissibly repaired. The Federal Circuit determined
that plaintiff had not sought to compel discovery from the eight
Chinese factories, and “cannot now complain that [defendant’s]
evidence is not verifiable in the absence of any effort on its own part
2352
to seek verifying discovery.”
The court also noted that:
2347.
2348.
2349.
2350.
2351.
2352.

Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682.
Id. at 1375, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684.
Id. at 1374, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684.
Id. at 1375, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684.
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In sum, the district court walked an evidentiary tight rope. On one
side, the trial court refused to credit Jazz’s evidence as
representative of all eight factories. On the other, it found that
evidence credible for the three factories for which Jazz presented
some direct testimony. Further, the district court faced the
difficulty of determining the number of LFFPs both first sold in the
United States and permissibly repaired in one of the three
factories. In the absence of any direct evidence on the number of
United States sales, the district court permissibly used
circumstantial evidence to calculate the total repaired LFFPs.
Upon review of the entire record, this court finds no clear error in
2353
any of the district court's findings.

The Federal Circuit also rejected plaintiff’s argument that that the
district court misapplied the exhaustion doctrine, or that the effect of
the exhaustion doctrine holding from the appeal of the ITC
proceeding should be purely prospective. The court rejected both
2354
arguments. First, the court noted that the holding from Jazz did
not limit the exhaustion principle to unauthorized sales, as defendant
argued. Thus, the defendant could not “escape application of the
exhaustion principle because [plaintiff] or its licensees authorized
2355
the international first sales of these LFFPs.”
The court reasoned
that
The patentee’s authorization of an international first sale does not
affect exhaustion of that patentee’s rights in the United States.
Moreover, the “solely foreign provenance” language does not
negate the exhaustion doctrine when either the patentee or its
licensee sells the patented article abroad.
Read in full context, this court in Jazz stated that only LFFPs sold
within the United States under a United States patent qualify for
the repair defense under the exhaustion doctrine. Moreover, Fuji’s
foreign sales can never occur under a United States patent because
the United States patent system does not provide for
extraterritorial effect. In Jazz, therefore, this court expressly
limited first sales under the exhaustion doctrine to those occurring
within the United States. Accordingly, the district court correctly
2356
applied this court’s exhaustion precedent.

2353. Id. at 1375-76, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685 (citation omitted).
2354. Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1907 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
2355. 394 F.3d at 1376, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685.
2356. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685.
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The court also rejected defendants’ prospective application
argument as waived, because defendant did not raise the issue “in a
2357
form that requested or required a decision from the district court.”
IV. INEQUITABLE CONDUCT AND OTHER DEFENSES
A. Inequitable Conduct
In Bruno Independent Living Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Services,
2358
Ltd., the plaintiff sued the defendant, alleging infringement of a
patent directed towards a “stairlift,” a device that allows persons with
impaired mobility to “ascend and descend stairways on a chair that
2359
travels along a rail.”
The defendant produced numerous
disclosures of prior art stairlifts that had not been disclosed to the
2360
The defendant moved for
PTO during prosecution of the patent.
summary judgment of noninfringment and invalidity following
discovery, and the plaintiff admitted that the asserted claims were
2361
invalid in light of the prior art that the defendant had identified.
The motion for summary judgment of invalidity was granted, and the
defendant then “accused [the plaintiff] of having intentionally
withheld [the] invalidating prior art from the PTO, and asked the
district court to declare the case ‘exceptional’ for the purpose of
2362
awarding attorney fees under [35 U.S.C.] § 285.”
The district court
found that the defendant had engaged in inequitable conduct before
the PTO while prosecuting the patent, and declared the case
2363
exceptional.
The district court based its inequitable conduct determination on
its finding that the plaintiff had failed to disclose to the PTO
information about several invalidating stairlifts that it had disclosed
to the FDA when it sought approval to sell a stairlift covered by the
2364
patent.
Because the FDA disclosure was concurrent with the
prosecution of the patent before the PTO, and because the plaintiff
did not have a credible, good faith explanation for not disclosing the
information to the PTO, the district court inferred that the plaintiff

2357.
2358.
2359.
2360.
2361.
2362.
2363.
2364.

Id. at 1377, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685.
394 F.3d 1348, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1593 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1350, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1594.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1594-95.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1595.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1595.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1595.
Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1595.
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withheld the information with the requisite deceptive intent for
2365
inequitable conduct.
The Federal Circuit noted that inequitable conduct “can arise from
a failure to disclose information material to patentability, coupled
2366
with an intent to deceive or mislead the PTO.”
The Federal Circuit
found no error in the district court’s treatment of a stairlift as prior
2367
art subject to the duty of disclosure.
The Federal Circuit reasoned
that the record supported that the plaintiff had actual knowledge of
the prior art and that it knew or should have known of its materiality,
because a letter that the plaintiff had sent to the FDA seeking
approval discussed the prior art stairlift as a stairlift “similar in design
2368
This description of the
and function” to the plaintiff’s stairlift.
stairlift had been included in a section of the letter labeled
2369
“Substantial Equivalence.”
Both the district court and Federal Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s
argument that its claim of “substantial equivalence” was relevant only
to seeking FDA approval for its stairlift device. The Federal Circuit
reasoned:
This distinction is disingenuous in light of what the record reflects:
the FDA submission was prepared by William Belson, who was also
involved in the prosecution of the ‘405 patent and had asked [the
plaintiff’s] patent attorney to conduct a prior art search in
preparation for filing the patent application. More importantly,
[the plaintiff’s] distinction is not persuasive because “an applicant
who knew of the art or information cannot intentionally avoid
learning of its materiality . . . it may be found that the applicant
‘should have known’ of that materiality.” Accordingly, we are not
persuaded that the district court clearly erred in charging [the
2370
plaintiff] with knowledge of the [the prior art’s] materiality.

The Federal Circuit also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the
prior art stairlift was not material prior art because it was cumulative
2371
The court pointed out
to the information submitted to the PTO.
that the definition of materiality promulgated in 37 C.F.R. § 1.56,
which was active at the time the plaintiff prosecuted the patent, was
that information was material to patentability when it “refutes, or is
inconsistent with, a position the applicant takes in . . . asserting an
2365. Id. at 1350-51, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1595.
2366. Id. at 1351, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1595 (citing Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc.
48 F.3d 1172, 1178, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1823, 1826 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
2367. Id. at 1351-52, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1596.
2368. Id. at 1352, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1596 (internal quotation marks omitted).
2369. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1596.
2370. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1596 (internal citations omitted).
2371. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1596.
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2372

argument of patentability.”
Reasoning that the plaintiff would not
have touted a feature of an “off center pivot that was proximate to the
front edge of the seat” as a point of novelty in an amendment to a
2373
claim had the examiner been made aware of the prior art stairlift,
the Federal Circuit did not consider the district court’s finding of
materiality to be clearly erroneous.
With respect to the deceptive intent prong of the inequitable
conduct analysis, the Federal Circuit also found that the district court
did not clearly err in finding that the plaintiff acted with deceptive
intent in withholding the prior art stairlift from the PTO. The
Federal Circuit noted that the plaintiff’s disclosure of the prior art to
the FDA, but not the PTO, supported a “finding of deceptive intent
2374
to withhold the disclosure from the PTO.”
The Federal Circuit also pointed to the plaintiff’s failure to offer a
credible explanation for the non-disclosure, and reasoned that “an
inference of deceptive intent may fairly be drawn in the absence of
2375
such an explanation.”
The Federal Circuit found no clear error in
the district court’s finding of deceptive intent, and affirmed that
2376
court’s finding that the case was exceptional under 35 U.S.C. § 285.
2377
Frazier v. Roessel Cine Photo Tech, Inc. involved an appeal from the
district court’s finding that a patent for an aerial image photo lens
was unenforceable for inequitable conduct, given the patentee’s
submission of a misleading video to the examiner during
2378
prosecution.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district
court’s finding, which had explained that the patentee submitted
“video containing footage shot with lenses other than that claimed in
2379
the [asserted patent] . . . .”
The Federal Circuit rejected the
patentee’s argument that there was no evidence that the examiner
relied on the submitted footage, explaining that the patentee’s
arguments “overlook the fact that the mere submission of the video
with footage shot with other than the claimed invention constituted a
sufficiently material misrepresentation without regard to whether the
2380
[claimed] lens could create the same shots.”

2372. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1596 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b)(2)) (emphasis
omitted).
2373. Id. at 1353, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1597.
2374. Id. at 1354, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1598.
2375. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1598.
2376. Id. at 1355, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1598.
2377. 417 F.3d 1230, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1822 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
2378. Id. at 1232, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823.
2379. Id. at 1234, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1825.
2380. Id. at 1235, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1825-26.
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Regarding intent, the Federal Circuit again affirmed the district
court’s findings, explaining that the patentee failed to inform the
PTO that portions of the video were not shot with the claimed lens
system even though the patentee was fully aware of that fact when the
2381
video was submitted to the PTO.
The Federal Circuit also credited
the district court’s finding that the patentee’s “claimed lack of intent
to mislead was not credible based on his repeatedly testifying to
2382
different versions of events under oath.”
2383
involved an appeal from a
Pharmacia Corp. v. Par Pharm., Inc.
district court’s holding that a patent for a topical medication for
glaucoma was unenforceable due to inequitable conduct. Another
2384
patent, for the same drug, remained enforceable.
The district
court found that the patentees’ declaration to the PTO contained
material misrepresentations, which they submitted in order to
2385
overcome an obviousness rejection.
In particular, the patentees’
declaration was inconsistent with prior work and research conducted
2386
by the declarant.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding
of inequitable conduct, explaining that:
Paragraph 10 [of the declaration] conflicts with the prior
[declarant’s] article and supporting Japanese articles, which were
never disclosed to the PTO. On the point of materiality, the
applicants submitted these statements in support of patentability
over the sole prior art reference relied upon by the Examiner.
Thus these misleading declarations go to the very point of novelty.
2387
The district court properly found paragraph 10 highly material.

The Federal Circuit found the district court correctly concluded
that the declarant possessed an intent to deceive because of the
significantly material nature of the submitted material and because
the declarant neglected to submit a conflicting article that he had co2388
authored.
Next, the Federal Circuit addressed the issue of whether the district
court properly concluded that a terminal disclaimer was not, without
more, sufficient to render another unrelated patent unenforceable as
2389
well.
Affirming the district court’s holding that the unrelated
2381.
2382.
2383.
2384.
2385.
2386.
2387.
2388.
2389.

Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1826.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1826.
417 F.3d 1369, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1949 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1370-71, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1950.
Id. at 1371, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1950.
Id. at 1372, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951.
Id. at 1373, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952.
Id. at 1374, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1953.
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patent was not unenforceable by mere virtue of the terminal
disclaimer, the Federal Circuit first noted that “a terminal disclaimer
ties the affected patents together; they expire on the same date and
are enforceable only during periods in which they are owned by the
2390
same person.”
The Federal Circuit went on to explain that,
“[b]eyond their shared expiration date, however, two disclaimed
2391
patents maintain significant attributes of individuality.”
The court
then clarified:
For example, Pharmacia pays two sets of maintenance fees—one
for each of the ‘368 and ‘504 patents. If Pharmacia does not pay
the maintenance fee on one of the patents, that oversight would
have no effect on the validity or enforceability of the other patent.
This individuality between terminally disclaimed patents indicates
2392
something more than a naked terminal disclaimer is required.

The Federal Circuit concluded that the “specific terminal
disclaimer in this case illustrates that the two patents retain individual
attributes. The language of the terminal disclaimer in this case
emphasizes that validity doctrines will apply separately to the two
2393
patents that share an expiration date.”
Finally, the Federal Circuit acknowledged case law in which
inequitable conduct with respect to a single claim of a patent renders
2394
the remaining claims of the same patent unenforceable.
The court
reasoned that its “inequitable conduct cases do not extend
inequitable conduct in one patent to another patent that was not
acquired through culpable conduct. In other words, these cases
simply do not apply to the facts of this case, which involve two
2395
separate patents.”

2390. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1953 (quoting DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM
PATENTS, § 9.04[5] at 9-107 (2003)).
2391. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1953.
2392. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1953.
2393. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1953. The terminal disclaimer provided:
In making the above disclaimer, petitioner does not disclaim the terminal
part of any patent granted on the instant application that would extend to
the expiration date of the full statutory term as defined in 35 U.S.C. §§ 154
to 156 and 173 of the prior patent as presently [shortened] by any terminal
disclaimer, in the event that it later: expires for failure to pay a maintenance fee,
is held unenforceable, is found invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction, is
statutorily disclaimed in whole or terminally disclaimed under 37 C.F.R. 1.321, has
all claims canceled by a reexamination certificate, or is in any manner terminated
prior to the expiration of its full statutory term as shortened by any terminal
disclaimer.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1953 (emphasis in original).
2394. Id. at 1375, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1953.
2395. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1953.

ON
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Warner-Lambert Company v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. involved
an appeal from a district court’s finding that a patent was not
unenforceable due to inequitable conduct despite the patentee’s
failure to disclose a third-party’s drug product to the PTO during
2397
prosecution of the disputed patent.
The defendant argued that
the district court “failed to appreciate the difference between what
2398
the [disputed] patent disclose[d] and what it claim[ed].”
In
particular, the defendant contended that the patentees knew that
their claims were broader than the disclosure and that such claims
2399
covered the third-party’s drug product.
Therefore, the defendant
asserted that the patentees intentionally did not disclose the third2400
In doing so, the defendant argued
party drug product to the PTO.
that:
an inference of intent to deceive the PTO is warranted . . .
[because] a “patentee facing a high level of materiality and clear
proof that it knew or should have known of that materiality, can
expect to find it difficult to establish ‘subjective good faith’
2401
sufficient to prevent the drawing of an inference to mislead.”

The Federal Circuit determined that the record was insufficient to
show that the district court erred in finding the absence of
2402
inequitable conduct.
The Federal Circuit recognized “that
‘[d]irect evidence of intent or proof of deliberate scheming is rarely
available in instances of inequitable conduct,’ and that ‘intent may
2403
[therefore] be inferred from the surrounding circumstances.’”
The Federal Circuit continued, observing “that ‘[t]he more material
the omission or the misrepresentation, the lower the level of intent
required to establish inequitable conduct . . . .’
However,
determining whether there was intent to deceive is still a contextual
exercise, and ‘materiality does not presume intent, which is a
2404
separate and essential component of inequitable conduct.’”
After
acknowledging the difficulty the patentee will have in demonstrating
2396. 418 F.3d 1326, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
2397. Id. at 1343, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876.
2398. Id. at 1345, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878.
2399. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878.
2400. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878.
2401. Id. at 1345, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878 (quoting Critikon, Inc. v. Becton
Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1257, 43 U.S.P.D.2d (BNA) 1666,
1669 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
2402. Id. at 1346, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1879.
2403. Id. at 1346, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1879 (quoting Critikon, Inc. v. Becton
Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1256, 43 U.S.P.D.2d (BNA) 1666,
1668 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
2404. Id. at 1346, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1879 (quoting GFI, Inc. v. Franklin
Corp., 265 F.3d 1268, 1274, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1141, 1144 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
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“subjective good faith” to rebut the allegation of misleading the PTO,
the Federal Circuit admitted that the possibility was not foreclosed.
Therefore, while “smoking gun” evidence is not required in order
to find intent to deceive, “the involved conduct, viewed in light of
all the evidence, including evidence indicative of good faith, must
indicate sufficient culpability to require a finding of intent to
2405
deceive.”

The Federal Circuit then reasoned that while the third-party drug
was highly material to the case, the evidence showed that the
inventors did not disclose it when filing the patent because
they simply did not think it had any relevance to their
application . . . and consequently had no intent to deceive the PTO
in not disclosing [the third-party drug]. In keeping within our role
as an appellate court of review, we cannot say that the district court
2406
committed clear error in making these findings.

In Syntex (U.S.A.) LLC v. Apotex, Inc., the Federal Circuit affirmed
the district court’s determination that no inequitable conduct
2407
existed.
During prosecution, the applicant for the patent
submitted a declaration stating that the surfactant octoxynol 40 is
satisfactory for use in the claimed formulation while octoxynols 3 and
2408
5 were not.
Syntex, however, knew that octoxynol 40 did not
outperform another surfactant, octoxynol 12.5, but this was not
2409
included in the applicant’s declaration.
In explaining the law of inequitable conduct, the court stated that
2410
“[m]ateriality and intent to deceive are distinct factual inquiries,
2411
and each must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.”
The
court reasoned that “[i]n making the ultimate determination of
inequitable conduct, the trial court ‘must conduct a balancing test
between the levels of materiality and intent, with a greater showing of

2405. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1879 (emphasis in original) (quoting Kingsdown
Med. Consultants Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1384,
1392 (Fed. Cir. 1988)(en banc)).
2406. Id. at 1347-48, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1879-80.
2407. 407 F.3d 1371, 1384, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1823, 1833 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
2408. Id. at 1375, 1382-83, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1826, 1832.
2409. Id. at 1375, 1383, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1826, 1832.
2410. Because the application for the patent in suit was filed on December 7, 1990,
and issued on May 5, 1992, the Federal Circuit used the standard of materiality in
place prior to March 16, 1992, namely that an inequitable conduct determination
required a showing that “a reasonable examiner would have considered such [data]
important in deciding whether to allow the patent application.” Id. at 1384, 74
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1833 (quoting Dayco Prods. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329
F.3d 1358, 1363, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1804 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
2411. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1833 (quoting Life Techs., Inc. v. Clontech Lab.,
Inc., 224 F.3d 1320, 1324, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1186, 1189 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
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one factor allowing a lesser showing of the other.’”
While the
Federal Circuit disagreed with the district court and ultimately found
the omission of octoxynol 12.5 material to the case, it found no error
with the district court’s finding that no intent to deceive the patent
2413
examiner existed.
In addressing the testimony of the inventors,
the Federal Circuit reiterated that trial, not appellate, courts are best
2414
suited to determine issues of fact and credibility.
The Federal
Circuit refused to substitute its judgment for that of the district court
where credibility was concerned, noting that the defendant could not
2415
point to any material evidence ignored by the district court.
The
Federal Circuit therefore affirmed the district court’s finding of no
2416
inequitable conduct.
2417
In Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc., the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that the patent was
2418
unenforceable due to inequitable conduct before the PTO.
Purdue filed suit against Endo alleging infringement of its patent
2419
based on Endo’s proposed generic version of OxyContin®.
At
issue was Purdue’s statements in the patent specification and the
prosecution history that its claimed controlled release of oxycodone
control pain over a narrower dosage range than prior art
2420
compositions was “surprisingly discovered.”
The district court
concluded that these repeated representations misled the PTO into
thinking that the invention was supported by scientific evidence when
in fact it was based only on “insight,” and that such representations
2421
constituted “a clear pattern of intentional misrepresentation.”
The Federal Circuit first agreed with the district court’s
determination that the lack of scientific evidence was a material
2422
fact.
The lower court also held that Purdue failed to disclose
material information because it had represented to the PTO that it
“discovered” the invention while withholding the fact that the
2423
discovery was not based on scientific evidence.
The Federal Circuit
detailed Purdue’s “consistent representations” to the PTO, which

2412.
2413.
2414.
2415.
2416.
2417.
2418.
2419.
2420.
2421.
2422.
2423.

Id. at 1384, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1833.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1833.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1833.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1833.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1833.
410 F.3d 690, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1109 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 693, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1110.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1110.
Id. at 694, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1111.
Id. at 695, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1112.
Id. at 696, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1112-13.
Id. at 696-97, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1113.
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included the inventor’s declaration describing the difficulty of
predicting the pharmacological characteristics of opioids, explaining
the importance of basing conclusions on the results of therapeutic
evaluations, and highlighting the “clinical significance” of the
2424
claimed invention.
Likewise, Purdue’s representations led the
examiner to believe that it had conducted clinical trials when it had
not and linked the features of the claimed invention to the
2425
controlled, four-fold release of the drug.
“In light of Purdue’s
consistent representations of the four-fold dosage range for
controlled release oxycodone as a ‘surprising discovery’ and the
context in which that statement was repeatedly made, [the Federal
Circuit could not] say the trial court’s finding that Purdue failed to
2426
disclose material information was clearly erroneous.”
The Federal
Circuit agreed that, although Purdue did not expressly say that its
invention was based on scientific evidence, “that conclusion was
clearly to be inferred from the language used by Purdue in both the
2427
patents and prosecution history.”
The Federal Circuit explained that “[i]n the absence of any
statements indicating the true origin of its ‘surprising discovery,’
Purdue’s arguments to the PTO provide enough of a suggestion that
clinical trials had been performed that failure to tell the PTO the
discovery was based on [the inventor’s] insight and not scientific
2428
proof was a failure to disclose material information.”
The Federal Circuit rejected Purdue’s argument that the examiner,
in allowing the claims, could have relied on arguments other than
those relied upon by the district court, explaining that “[e]ven if the
examiner did not necessarily rely on Purdue’s discovery of a four-fold
dosage range, however, that would not be inconsistent with a finding
2429
of materiality.”
Likewise, the Federal Circuit dismissed Purdue’s
argument that the district court improperly construed the claims to
2430
require the four-fold dosage that resulted from the discovery.
The
Federal Circuit explained that “[u]nder the PTO’s current materiality
standard, information may be material if it refutes or is inconsistent
with the applicant’s patentability arguments, which may be
2431
independent of the claims.”
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit was
2424.
2425.
2426.
2427.
2428.
2429.
2430.
2431.

Id. at 698, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1114.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1114.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1114.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1114.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1114.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1114.
Id. at 699, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1114.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1114.

LATHAM.OFFTOPRINTER

2006]

5/20/2006 3:02:04 PM

2005 PATENT SUMMARY

1245

not persuaded by Purdue’s argument that the four-fold dosage range
was merely “a benefit of the claimed invention and therefore not
2432
material because the examiner would have given it little weight.”
Instead, the controlled, four-fold dosage range “was one of the key
arguments Purdue made consistently and repeatedly during
prosecution to overcome prior art cited by the examiner in an
2433
obviousness rejection.”
Finally, the Federal Circuit clarified that a discovery can be made
by insight or experiment, and that pharmaceutical discovery does not
2434
have to be supported by clinical results.
In this case, however, the
existence of scientific results was implied when in fact those results
2435
The Federal Circuit explained that:
did not exist.
the trial court’s finding in this case was not based on Purdue’s
failure to provide scientific proof of its “surprising discovery,” but
on its claim to have made a surprising medical discovery without
disclosing the evidentiary basis for it, i.e., that the alleged
“discovery” under these circumstances was based on insight and was
2436
without an empirical basis.

The Federal Circuit next addressed the district court’s conclusion
that Purdue intended to deceive the PTO. The Federal Circuit
determined that intent to mislead the PTO could be inferred in this
case because Purdue’s “carefully chosen language” suggests that its
discovery was based on scientific evidence rather than insight, and
2437
The court found “a clear
that this suggestion was left unclarified.
pattern of misdirection throughout prosecution” of Purdue’s patents,
and that “Purdue continued to describe its discovery in terms of
2438
‘results,’ using precise, quantitative, and comparative language.”
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit concluded that “[t]he consistent and
repetitive nature of Purdue’s communications with the PTO fully
supports the trial court’s conclusion that Purdue made a deliberate
decision to withhold and thus misrepresent the origin of its
2439
‘discovery’ to the PTO.”
The Federal Circuit in TAP Pharmaceutical Products, Inc. v. OWL
2440
Pharmaceuticals, L.L.C.,
reviewed the lower court’s denial of the
defendant’s argument that the plaintiff’s patent was unenforceable
2432.
2433.
2434.
2435.
2436.
2437.
2438.
2439.
2440.

Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1114.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1115.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1115.
Id. at 699-700, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1115.
Id. at 700, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1115.
Id. at 701, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1116.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1116.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1116.
419 F.3d 1346, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1126 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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due to its alleged inequitable conduct.
In the lower court, the defendant argued that the plaintiff
exercised inequitable conduct when it failed to timely apprise the
patent examiner of a published European patent application (“Kent
2442
2443
application”), and when it misled the patent examiner.
During
the prosecution in the United States of U.S. Patent No. 4,728,721
(“‘721 patent”), the plaintiff received notification of the Kent
2444
application in a European search report.
The search report listed
the Kent application as “technical background,” related to the
2445
plaintiff’s European application for ‘721’s European counterpart.
The plaintiff filed the search report with the PTO as a supplemental
Information Disclosure Statement within one month of receiving the
2446
report, although, it was after the plaintiff had received the notice
2447
The defendant argued that the Kent
of allowance for ‘721.
application, and the Boswell patent described in the Kent
application, was material, and its suppression constituted inequitable
2448
2449
conduct.
The Federal Circuit disagreed.
It began its analysis by explaining that information is “material”
when a reasonable examiner would attach importance to the
2450
information in making her decision to issue a patent.
It further
stated that information is not material when it is cumulative “in light
2451
of other references considered by the examiner.”
The Federal
Circuit found that the Kent application was in fact cumulative in view
2452
The
of other materials submitted by the plaintiff to the examiner.
plaintiff submitted the Nevin patent, which explicated the use of
polymers in a manner that more closely resembled the technology of
2453
the plaintiff’s invention than the Kent application did.
Additionally, the plaintiff submitted an article (“Pitt article”),
which described the same method of purification as described in the
2454
Boswell patent.
The defendant argued the Pitt article was
insufficient, as it only disclosed the relevant polymer, and it failed to
2441.
2442.
2443.
2444.
2445.
2446.
2447.
2448.
2449.
2450.
2451.
2452.
2453.
2454.

Id. at 1350, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1130.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1130.
Id. at 1352, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1131-32.
Id. at 1350, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1130.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1130.
Id. at 1352, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1132.
Id. at 1350, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1130.
Id. at 1350-51, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1130.
Id. at 1352, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1131.
Id. at 1351, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1130.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1130.
Id. at 1352, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1131.
Id. at 1351, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1131.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1131.

LATHAM.OFFTOPRINTER

2006]

5/20/2006 3:02:04 PM

2005 PATENT SUMMARY

1247

2455

discuss the relevant purification method.
The Federal Circuit
found that even if the lower court erred in finding the Kent
application cumulative in view of the Nevin patent, it was harmless
error, as the Kent application was cumulative in view of the Pitt
2456
article.
Consequently, the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower
2457
court’s finding that the Kent application was immaterial.
The Federal Circuit also agreed with the lower court that no clear
and convincing evidence existed supporting the defendant’s
2458
argument that the plaintiff misled the patent examiner.
The
defendant argued that the plaintiff misled the patent examiner in two
2459
ways.
First, the plaintiff intentionally suppressed disclosure of the
2460
Kent application until after it had received the notice of allowance.
Second, the plaintiff’s attorney misled the examiner by stating the
Kent application did not disclose any technique in respect to
2461
purifying polymers.
The defendant argued the Kent application
2462
disclosed such a technique in its reference to the Boswell patent.
The lower court did not find sufficient evidence to support the claim
2463
It cited
that the plaintiff intentionally misled the patent examiner.
the following three factors as influencing its decision: (1) the search
report indicated the European Patent Office did not believe the Kent
application was material, (2) the plaintiff submitted the search report
to the patent examiner within one month of receiving it, and (3) the
“significant evidence” produced by the plaintiff suggested it did not
2464
believe the Kent application to be material.
The Federal Circuit
found no evidence suggesting the lower court considered these
factors and evidence in clear error, and therefore, affirmed the lower
court’s “ruling that the . . . patents are not unenforceable for
2465
inequitable conduct.”
B. Estoppel
2466

In SanDisk Corp. v. Memorex Products, Inc.,
the Federal Circuit
vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the
2455. Id. at 1352, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1131.
2456. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1131.
2457. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1131.
2458. Id. at 1352, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1131.
2459. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1131-32.
2460. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1131.
2461. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1131-32.
2462. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1131-32.
2463. Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1132.
2464. Id. at 1352-53, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1132.
2465. Id. at 1353, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1132.
2466. 415 F.3d 1278, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.
Ct. 829 (2005).
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defendants. The district court found that the defendants did not
infringe on the plaintiff’s patent, which involved electrically erasable
programmable read only memory (“EEprom”) that improved the
2467
efficiency over prior art.
Specifically, the patent introduced two
2468
First, it arranged memory cells into sectors in a
new technologies.
novel way that allowed for the erasing of information on either just
2469
one EEprom chip or multiple sectors at the same time.
Second,
these sectors portioned into at least two components, consisting of
2470
“user data” and “overhead.”
Three years before SanDisk Corp. (“SanDisk”) filed suit against the
defendants, it prevailed in a suit against another alleged infringer of
2471
the same patent (“the Lexar suit”).
On appeal to the Federal
Circuit, the defendant, Ritek, argued that SanDisk’s arguments
during the Lexar suit and the preliminary injunction proceeding in
the instant action were contrary to the plaintiff’s current position,
2472
and therefore the court should apply judicial estoppel.
In
considering the defendant’s argument, the Federal Circuit defined
judicial estoppel and the factors a court must consider in its
2473
application.
The court described judicial estoppel as “an equitable
doctrine that prevents a litigant from ‘perverting’ the judicial process
by, after urging and prevailing on a particular position in one
litigation, urging a contrary position in a subsequent proceeding—or
at a later phase of the same proceeding—against one who relied on
2474
Additionally, courts must consider the three
the earlier position.”
following factors before applying judicial estoppel:
[T]he party’s later position must be “clearly inconsistent” with the
earlier position; (2) the party must have succeeded in persuading a
court to adopt the earlier position in the earlier proceeding; and
(3) the courts consider “whether the party seeking to assert an
inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage or impose
2475
an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped.”

2467. Id. at 1280, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1477.
2468. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1477-78.
2469. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1477-78.
2470. Id. at 1282, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1478.
2471. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1479 (citing SanDisk Corp. v. Lexar Media, Inc.,
No. C 98-01115 CRB, 1999 WL 129512, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 1999)).
2472. Id. at 1290, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484-85.
2473. Id. at 1290-91, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484-85.
2474. Id. at 1290, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485 (citing Hamilton v. State Farm Fire
& Cas. Co., 270 F.3d 778, 782 (9th Cir. 2001)).
2475. Id. at 1290-91, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485 (quoting New Hampshire v.
Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 751 (2001)).
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After considering these three factors, the Federal Circuit refused to
2476
As to the first factor, the court reasoned
apply judicial estoppel.
that because the Lexar suit involved a different issue, the plaintiff’s
arguments in that case were not “clearly inconsistent” with its current
2477
arguments.
Additionally, the court found that the plaintiff’s
arguments at the preliminary injunction proceedings mirrored those
made to the Federal Circuit, and thus were not “clearly
2478
inconsistent.”
The Federal Circuit further reasoned that because
the plaintiff’s arguments differed in the Lexar suit, the lower court
“cannot be said to have adopted such a position at SanDisk’s
urging[]”—thereby denying the applicability of the second factor of
2479
judicial estoppel.
The Federal Circuit also rejected factor three’s
2480
applicability.
The court reasoned that equity compels courts to
allow arguments to evolve during the period after a preliminary
injunction proceeding, as “a preliminary construction made without
full development of the record or issues should be open to
2481
revision.”
V. REMEDIES
A. Preliminary Injunction
2482

In Pfizer, Inc., v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.,
the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of preliminary injunction to
the plaintiff, Pfizer, Inc. (“Pfizer”). The Federal Circuit outlined the
2483
four elements needed for a grant of preliminary injunction.
These
elements are “(1) [A] reasonable likelihood of success on the merits;
(2) the prospect of irreparable harm to the patent owner in the
absence of the injunction; (3) that this harm would exceed harm to
the alleged infringer when subject to the injunction; and (4) that
2484
granting the injunction is in the public interest.”
The Federal Circuit addressed the first element in terms of claim
2485
As to the second element,
construction and literal infringement.
2476. Id. at 1291-92, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485.
2477. Id. at 1291, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485.
2478. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485.
2479. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485.
2480. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486.
2481. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486 (citing Gillette Co. v. Energizer Holdings,
Inc., 405 F.3d 1367, 1375, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1586, 1593 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
2482. 429 F.3d 1364, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
2483. Id. at 1372, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
2484. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261 (citing Jeneric/Pentron, Inc. v. Dillon Co.,
205 F.3d 1377, 1380, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1086, 1088 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
2485. The court did find that the plaintiff had a reasonable likelihood of
succeeding on the merits. See supra Parts III.A.1 and III.C.
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the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that Pfizer
2486
The
would suffer irreparable harm absent an injunction.
defendants advanced several arguments. First, the defendants argued
that the lower court erred by presuming irreparable harm, as “the
loss of the statutory right to exclude alone does not constitute
2487
irreparable harm.”
The Federal Circuit rejected this argument and
explained that courts should presume that patent owners will suffer
irreparable harm if evidence suggests that the defendant is infringing
2488
a valid and enforceable patent.
Additionally, the Federal Circuit
observed that exceptions to this general rule include instances where
future infringement is unlikely, the patent owner relegated his
statutory right to exclude by licensing the patent, or when the
2489
patentee delayed bringing suit.
Second, the defendants argued
that Pfizer granted a license under its patent and that the company
2490
The Federal Circuit rebuffed this
does not have market exclusivity.
argument and pointed to evidence provided by Pfizer that the sales of
its products “dwarf” those of generic providers, and that the license it
granted under its patent was for moexipril, and not its Accupril®2491
related products.
Lastly, the defendant Ranbaxy pointed out that it
provided Pfizer with a paragraph IV certification letter stating why its
2492
The defendants argued
product did not infringe Pfizer’s patent.
that the Federal Circuit should consider Pfizer’s failure to respond or
file suit within forty-five days of receiving Ranbaxy’s letter, as doing so
would have triggered a thirty-day stay of the FDA’s approval of
2493
Ranbaxy’s ANDA.
The Federal Circuit accepted Pfizer’s
explanation that it did not file suit within forty-five days because
another defendant, Teva, had first filed an ANDA, and thus
2494
precluded the FDA from filing a later ANDA.
Additionally, the
Federal Circuit commented that patent owners need not take
advantage of the statutory stay—as there is no extra benefit for doing
2495
so and no penalty for failing to do so.
Accordingly, the Federal
Circuit did not find that the district court erred in finding irreparable
2496
harm.
2486.
2487.
2488.
2489.
2490.
2491.
2492.
2493.
2494.
2495.
2496.

429 F.3d at 1380-82, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1267-69.
Id. at 1380, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1267.
Id. at 1381, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1268.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1268.
Id. at 1380, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1267.
Id. at 1380-81, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1268.
Id. at 1371, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260.
Id. at 1381, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1267-68.
Id. at 1381-82, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1268.
Id. at 1382, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1268.
Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1269.
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The Federal Circuit also affirmed the lower court’s holding that
Pfizer’s harm would exceed that of the defendants’ and that the
2497
Ranbaxy argued that
injunction would serve the public interest.
absent an injunction, it would suffer greater harm than Pfizer
because a preliminary injunction would force Ranbaxy to remove its
2498
product from the market.
Consequently, Ranbaxy would lose its
2499
market share and customer relationships.
The Federal Circuit
disregarded Ranbaxy’s argument and stated that “an alleged
infringer’s loss of market share and customer relationships, without
more, does not rise to the level necessary to overcome the loss of
exclusivity experienced by a patent owner due to infringing
2500
conduct.”
The district court held that the public interest is greater served by
protecting a valid patent against an infringer because this encourages
2501
innovation.
Agreeing with the district court, the Federal Circuit
stated that “[s]elling a lower priced product does not justify
2502
infringing a patent.”
However, the Federal Circuit recognized that
the statutory framework, under which Ranbaxy filed its ANDA,
2503
supports lower cost drugs without infringing valid patents.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit found that all preliminary injunction
elements had been satisfied and thus affirmed the district court’s
2504
grant to Pfizer.
B. Damages
2505

In Group One Ltd v. Hallmark Cards, Inc.,
the district court
decided not to award prejudgment interest for infringement of one
of the patents in suit. The Federal Circuit explained that 35 U.S.C.
§ 284 “leaves the court some discretion in awarding prejudgment
2506
interest.”
The Federal Circuit further explained that the
prejudgment interest can be limited because the award must have
2507
Thus, the Federal
some relationship to the prejudgment interest.
2497. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1269.
2498. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1269.
2499. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1269.
2500. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1269.
2501. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1269.
2502. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1269 (quoting Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok
Int’l Ltd., 998 F.2d 985, 991, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1516, 1521 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
2503. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1269.
2504. Id. at 1983, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1269.
2505. 407 F.3d 1297, 1307, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1759, 1767 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
2506. Id. at 1307, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1767 (quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v.
Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 656-57 (1983)).
2507. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1767 (quoting Radio Steel & Mfg. Co. v. MTD
Prods., Inc., 788 F.2d 1554, 1557-58, 229 U.S.P.Q. 431, 434 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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Circuit rejected several of the trial court’s justifications for awarding
prejudgment interest. Specifically, the court rejected the following
arguments:
(1) that [the inventor] had not built a machine based upon his
patent; (2) that [the inventor] had not been successful in
marketing, selling, or licensing his patent; (3) that the Hallmark
machines include features not disclosed in Group One’s patents;
(4) that neither party conducted market studies to determine a
reasonable royalty; (5) that [a different patent in suit] went
uncorrected for over seven years; (6) that [a different patent in
suit] had been held invalid due to an on-sale bar, a ruling that was
reversed by this court; and (7) that Group One delayed filing suit
2508
on [a different patent in suit].

The Federal Circuit noted that the latter three grounds are not
related to the right to receive interests on damages for
2509
Moreover, the Federal Circuit noted that a reversed
infringement.
district court opinion was not sufficient grounds for denying
2510
prejudgment interests.
The patent at issue had been reinstated after a lapse for failure to
2511
pay the requisite maintenance fees to the Patent Office.
The
Federal Circuit affirmed the trial court’s decision not to award
prejudgment interest during the lapse period because the appellant,
Group One, could not initiate suit for patent infringement when the
2512
patent had expired.
2513
In Imonex Services, Inc. v. W.H. Munzprufer Dietmar Trenner GmBH,
the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s exclusion of Imonex’s
expert testimony on the entire market value rule. This rule allows
the plaintiff to calculate damages based on the value of the entire
device where the patent-related feature is the source for customer
2514
demand.
The Federal Circuit determined that the record
contained no evidence that the patented features (coin selectors)
were the basis for customer demand for the laundry machines as a
2515
whole.
Thus, the Federal Circuit affirmed the trial court’s
2516
exclusion of the testimony.
2508. Id. at 1308 n.8, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1767 n.8.
2509. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1767 n.8.
2510. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1767 n.8.
2511. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1767 n.8.
2512. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1767 n.8.
2513. 408 F.3d 1374, 1379, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1936, 1941 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
2514. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941 (citing Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d
1538, 1549, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d 1065, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
2515. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941.
2516. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941.

LATHAM.OFFTOPRINTER

2006]

5/20/2006 3:02:04 PM

2005 PATENT SUMMARY

1253

Imonex also challenged the district court’s finding that the record
2517
The Federal Circuit
did not support the jury’s damages verdict.
applied the law of the Fifth Circuit to affirm the district court’s
2518
decision.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court and
concluded that the jury must have based its damages calculation on a
2519
misleading chart shown to the jury by Imonex’s attorney.
1. Reasonable royalty
Harris Corp. v. Ericsson Inc. presented the issue of what constitutes
the effective date of first infringement for purposes of a reasonable
2520
royalty analysis.
The Federal Circuit explained that precedent
mandates that it consider a hypothetical negotiation on the date of
2521
However, it is not required to exclude evidence
first infringement.
2522
from subsequent events.
Further, the Federal Circuit explained
that it would apply the applicable royalty rate based on the period
2523
during which damages are available.
2. Attorneys fees and costs
In Brooks Furniture Manufacturing, Inc. v. Dutalier International,
2524
Inc., the plaintiff brought an action in the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Tennessee for declaratory judgment that the
defendant’s design patent was invalid and not infringed. The
defendant filed a suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Delaware, asserting infringement, Lanham Act and common law
unfair competition, and deceptive trade practices under state
2525
consumer protection law.
When the defendant’s attempt to
transfer the Tennessee action to Delaware was unsuccessful, it
dismissed the Delaware action and filed equivalent counterclaims in
2526
Tennessee.
After the district court granted summary judgment of
non-infringement, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its invalidity and
2527
patent mismarking claims.
The defendant voluntarily dismissed its

2517. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941.
2518. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941 (relying on Vogler v. Blackmore, 352 F.3d
150, 154 (5th Cir. 2003)).
2519. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941.
2520. 417 F.3d 1241, 1257, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1717 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
2521. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1717 (alluding to Wang Lab. v. Toshiba Corp.,
993 F.2d 858, 869, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1767, 1777 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
2522. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1717.
2523. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1717.
2524. 393 F.3d 1378, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1457 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
2525. Id. at 1380, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459.
2526. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459.
2527. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459.
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counterclaims for infringement. The district court found that the
2528
case was exceptional and awarded attorney fees.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit considered whether the case was
exceptional. The Federal Circuit noted that “[a]bsent misconduct in
conduct of the litigation or in securing the patent, sanctions may be
imposed against the patentee only if both (1) the litigation is brought
2529
in subjective bad faith, and (2) the litigation is objectively baseless.”
The plaintiff argued that the district court correctly found the case
exceptional, based on its findings that the defendant had acted in
bad faith in sending a cease and desist letter and in filing the action
in Delaware, and in considering the defendant’s behavior in the
market place and its policy of suing and acquiring competitors, most
2530
of whom were significantly smaller than the defendant.
The
Federal Circuit disagreed that the litigation was brought in subjective
2531
The Federal Circuit reasoned that “[t]here is a
bad faith.
presumption that the assertion of infringement of a duly granted
patent is made in good faith. Thus, the underlying improper
conduct and characterization of the case as exceptional must be
2532
established by clear and convincing evidence.”
The district court had found that the opinions of counsel upon
which the defendant based its cease and desist letter were inadequate
and their conclusions unreasonable because the opinions failed to
2533
address two differences between the two designs at issue.
The
Federal Circuit disagreed with the district court’s conclusions,
reasoning that:
The legal criterion for infringement of a design patent is
substantial identity, whereby “in the eye of an ordinary observer,
giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives, two designs are
substantially the same, if the resemblance is such as to deceive such
an observer, inducing him to purchase one supposing it to be the
2534
other, the first one patented is infringed by the other.”

Addressing the opinions relied upon by the defendant, the Federal
Circuit held:
The fact that an infringement opinion may not have mentioned
every detail of the patented or the accused design does not

2528. Id. at 1379, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459.
2529. Id. at 1381, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1460.
2530. Id. at 1382, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1460.
2531. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1460.
2532. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1460.
2533. Id. at 1383, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1461.
2534. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1461 (citing Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White, 81 U.S.
(14 Wall.) 511, 528 (1871)).
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necessarily render the opinion wrong or unreliable. The district
court described the attorney’s opinion as appearing to be
“reasonable, comprehensive and competent.” Such an opinion
cannot be transformed into the opposite extreme of unreliability
and incompetence, simply because the court reached a different
conclusion on the merits of infringement.
Bringing an
infringement action does not become unreasonable in terms of
‘285 if the infringement can reasonably be disputed. Infringement
is often difficult to determine, and a patentee’s ultimately incorrect
view of how a court will find does not of itself establish bad faith.
The several opinions of counsel and other expert opinions
obtained by Dutailier are not charged with having been obtained
for specious “cosmetic” purposes, and their analysis of the designs
is not unreasonable. We conclude that there was not clear and
convincing evidence of bad faith by Dutailier in charging Brooks
2535
with infringement and in pressing this charge in litigation.

The Federal Circuit also considered the district court’s other
grounds for finding the case exceptional, and dismissed them. The
Federal Circuit reasoned that “[a] duly granted patent is a grant of
the right to exclude all infringers, not just those of comparable
2536
size.”
The Federal Circuit held that the difference in size between
the defendant and the plaintiff was not a factor indicative of bad
2537
faith, and vacated the district court’s judgment.
2538
In Evident Corporation v. Church & Dwight Co., the Federal Circuit
reviewed whether the district court properly found that the case was
exceptional and whether the district court abused its discretion in
awarding attorney fees to the defendant-appellant. The patentee
argued that the district court erred in imposing joint and several
liability for the attorney fee award, and should have apportioned the
2539
award.
The Federal Circuit disagreed, finding that the district
court did not err in finding the case exceptional because of the
2540
underlying inequitable conduct of the patentee.
The Federal
Circuit agreed with the defendant that because the patentee was a
partnership, the issue of its liability for the inequitable conduct had
to be considered under the Uniform Partnership Act, which New
2541
Jersey had adopted.
The Uniform Partnership Act provides that “a
2535. Id. at 1384, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1462.
2536. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1462.
2537. Id. at 1384-85, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1462.
2538. 399 F.3d 1310, 1315, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1910, 1913 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
2539. 399 F.3d at 1315, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913.
2540. See id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913 (citing Evident Corp. v. Church &
Dwight Co., Inc., 78 Fed. Appx. 113 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
2541. Id. at 1316, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914 (citing N.J. STAT. § 42:1A-3 (2004)).

LATHAM.OFFTOPRINTER

1256

5/20/2006 3:02:04 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:1001

partner’s knowledge, notice or receipt of a notification of a fact
relating to the partnership is effective immediately as knowledge by,
2542
The
notice to or receipt of, a notification by the partnership . . . .”
Federal Circuit analogized the partnership’s liability for inequitable
conduct to the principal that every member of a partnership is liable
for torts committed by a member acting in the scope of the firm
2543
business.
The Federal Circuit held that the principle of joint
2544
It held
responsibility applied since inequitable conduct is a tort.
Peroxydent liable because the close relationship between its partners,
the Evident shareholders, and the inventors negated any possibility of
2545
innocence.
The Federal Circuit found that the district court did not clearly err
in finding the case exceptional, and did not abuse its discretion in
awarding attorney fees or in holding the patentee and its licensee
2546
jointly and severally liable for the fee award.
In Junker v. Eddings, the Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s
2547
award of attorney fees and remanded for further proceedings.
The
actual attorney fees that the plaintiff incurred in its design patent
2548
infringement action totaled $126,712.50.
However, the district
court awarded a fee award of $275,000 and provided no explanation
for why it granted the larger award or why the larger award was
2549
reasonable.
The Federal Circuit found insufficient support on the
2550
record to justify the reward and thus vacated it as unreasonable.
In IPXL Holdings, L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc., the Federal Circuit
reversed the lower court’s grant of attorney’s fees to the defendant,
2551
Amazon.com.
The district court entered final judgment on August
2552
Subsequently, on September 13, 2004, the defendant
27, 2004.
filed a motion seeking attorney fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, Federal
2553
2554
Rule of Civil Procedure 11, and 35 U.S.C. § 285.
Although the
plaintiff, IPXL Holdings, filed a motion arguing that any award of
attorney fees must comport with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
2542. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914 (citing N.J. STAT. § 42:1A-3 (2004)).
2543. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914 (citing Malanga v. Manufacturers Cas. Ins.
Co., 28 N.J. 220, 146 A.2d 105, 108 (1958)).
2544. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914.
2545. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914.
2546. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914.
2547. 396 F.3d 1359, 1365, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d 1850, 1855 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
2548. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1855.
2549. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1855.
2550. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1855.
2551. 430 F.3d 1377, 1386, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d 1140, 1147 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
2552. Id. at 1384, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1145-46.
2553. FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
2554. IPXL, 430 F.3d at 1384, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1146.
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54(d)(2)(B), which requires that a motion for attorney fees be filed
2555
within 14 days after entry of judgment, the lower court awarded
2556
The lower court reasoned
attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285.
that the fourteen day limit imposed by Federal Rule of Civil
2557
Procedure 54(d)(2)(B) did not govern 35 U.S.C. § 285.
Further,
the lower court asserted that even if Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
54(d)(2)(B) did govern, the lower court retained discretion to accept
2558
the defendant’s filing at any time.
The district court subsequently
2559
awarded Amazon.com attorney fees finding the case exceptional.
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling, finding that
awarding fees under § 285 requires compliance with Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 54(d)(2)(B), with which Amazon.com did not
2560
comply.
The Federal Circuit reasoned that nothing in § 285 allows
the award of attorney fees when the defendant does not comply with
2561
Therefore, since
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2)(B).
Amazon.com filed its motion for attorney fees after the fourteen day
time limit, the Federal Circuit concluded that the lower court abused
2562
its discretion in granting Amazon.com’s motion.
In MEMC Electronic Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon
2563
Corporation, the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court’s denial of
attorney fees, even though it noted the issue was neither ripe nor
proper, as there was no prevailing party in the lower court’s
2564
proceedings.
The lower court granted the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment of non-infringement, and the defendants
motioned for an award of attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285, Rule
2565
11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and 28 U.S.C. § 1927.
The defendants argued that the plaintiff failed to sufficiently
2566
investigate its infringement claim prior to filing suit.
In its
investigation, the plaintiff’s attorneys reviewed the patent, construed
the claims “consistent with the standard canons of claim
construction,” and compared the plaintiff’s silicon wafers with those
2555. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(2)(B).
2556. IPXL, 430 F.3d at 1384, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1146.
2557. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(2)(B).
2558. IPXL, 430 F.3d at 1385, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1146 (citing Transcript of Motions
Hearing at 4, IPXL Holdings, L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 04-CV-70 (E.D. Va.
Sept. 24, 2004)).
2559. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1146.
2560. Id. at 1386, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1146.
2561. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1146.
2562. Id., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1146.
2563. 420 F.3d 1369, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
2564. Id. at 1371, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277-78.
2565. Id. at 1380-81, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1285.
2566. Id. at 1381, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1285.
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2567

of the defendants.
The lower court denied the award of attorney
fees finding the plaintiff’s pre-filing investigation “not ideal,” but that
2568
it did “not rise to the level of sanctionable conduct . . . .”
The Federal Circuit agreed with the lower court’s assessment and
found that the plaintiff performed its pre-filing investigation in good
faith and compared its product with the accused silicon wafer in an
2569
“informed” manner.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
2570
lower court’s denial of attorney fees.
3. Marking
2571
In Clonetech Labs., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., the Federal Circuit dealt
with the issue of false marking under 35 U.S.C. § 292(a). Clonetech
alleged that Invitrogen marked its cDNA library products and kits
with four patents even though it knew that the products did not meet
a “substantially no RNase H activity” limitation required by the
2572
The Federal Circuit, finding no cases that substantively
patents.
discussed § 292(a), stated that “this case presents us with virtually an
2573
issue of first impression.”
Section 292(a) provides for a civil fine for false marking of articles,
and in particular for marking an unpatented article with the word
“patent” or other indicia indicating that the article is patented, for
2574
the purpose of deceiving the public.
The Federal Circuit observed
that “[w]hen the statute refers to an ‘unpatented article’ the statute
means that the article in question is not covered by at least one claim
of each patent with which the article is marked.” Thus, according to
the Federal Circuit, “in order to determine if an article is
‘unpatented’ for the purposes of section 292, it must be first
determined whether the claims of a patent cover the article in
2575
question,”
i.e., by construing the claims in question and
ascertaining whether the claims reads on the article.
Assuming the article is mismarked, the next question is whether
2576
the article was mismarked with the intent to deceive the public.
The Federal Circuit observed that “[i]ntent to deceive is a state of
mind arising when a party acts with sufficient knowledge that what it
2567.
2568.
2569.
2570.
2571.
2572.
2573.
2574.
2575.
2576.

Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1285.
Id., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1285.
Id. at 1382, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1286.
Id. at 1383, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1286.
406 F.3d 1347, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1598 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1350, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1601.
Id. at 1352, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1602.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1602.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1602.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1602.
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is saying is not so and consequently that the recipient of its saying will
2577
To elaborate
be misled into thinking that the statement is true.”
on the standard of proof, the Federal Circuit explained that the
2578
intent to deceive is established by “objective criteria.”
Thus, to
establish the requisite intent to deceive, a court must find: (1) an
actual misrepresentation and (2) proof that the party accused of false
2579
marking had knowledge of its falsity.
However, for the plaintiff to
establish knowledge of falsity they must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the accused did not reasonably believe that the
2580
articles were properly marked or else no liability ensues.
The district court had determined that the tests Invitrogen
performed on its products put Invitrogen on notice that its products
were not covered by the patents with which those products were
2581
marked.
In reviewing the district court’s decision, “[t]he question
of whether conduct rises to the level of statutory deception is a
question of fact, and when that question is resolved as here in a
bench trial, [the Federal Circuit] review[s] the decision of the trial
2582
court for clear error.”
The Federal Circuit analyzed the testimony
of one of the inventors on Invitrogen’s patents and an expert that
testified for Invitrogen and concluded that “[t]he testimony
Clonetech elicited from [the inventor] did not address the complete
results of the experiments, and there is no indication that Clonetech
was able to impeach or otherwise discredit [Intvitrogen’s expert’s]
2583
reasoned explanation of the full scope of the tests and results.”
In
light of this evidence, the Federal Circuit found clear error in the
district court’s determination that Invitrogen did not have an honest
2584
good faith belief in marking its products.
Accordingly, the Federal
Circuit concluded that “the evidence adduced by Clonetech to show
2585
false marking fails to meet the required test of preponderance.”
The Federal Circuit rejected an argument by Invitrogen that
“section 292 does not require a good faith belief that the marked
article falls within the subject matter defined by at least one claim of
2586
each patent with which the article is marked.”
Essentially,
Invitrogen argued that the statute allowed for marking products with
2577.
2578.
2579.
2580.
2581.
2582.
2583.
2584.
2585.
2586.

Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1602.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1602.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1602.
Id. at 1352-53, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1602-03.
Id. at 1353, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d(BNA) at 1603.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d(BNA) at 1603.
Id. at 1355, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1604.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1604.
Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1604.
Id. at 1356, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605.
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additional patents that do not cover the articles because that would
2587
The
give the public more information than the law requires.
Federal Circuit rejected Invitrogen’s reasoning and found it to be
contrary to Supreme Court precedent. Specifically, the Federal
2588
2589
Circuit concluded that “Wine Ry. and Bonito Boats explain that
Congress intended the public to rely on marking as ‘a ready means of
discerning the status of intellectual property embodied in an article
2590
2591
of manufacture or design. . . .” and that “Lear articulates federal
patent policy, recognizing an ‘important public interest in permitting
full and free competition in the use of ideas which are in reality a
2592
part of the public domain.’”
The Federal Circuit explained that
“[this] interest is clearly injured by false marking because the act of
false marking misleads the public into believing that a patentee
controls the article in question . . . and increases the cost to the
public of ascertaining whether a patentee [] controls the intellectual
2593
property embodied in the article.”
Invitrogen raised several other arguments including an argument
that the articles might be covered by method of manufacture claims
2594
of the patents for which the articles were marked.
The Federal
Circuit determined that “[t]hese suggestive statements do not
constitute persuasive argument, particularly where, as here, there is
little indication that they were raised in a manner that required the
2595
trial court to decide them.”
Thus, “[f]or the purposes of this
appeal, Invitrogen has effectively waived these arguments by failing to
2596
raise them in a form that required a decision by the trial court.”
2597
In Showmaker v. Advanta USA, Inc., the Federal Circuit addressed
the issue of false marking under the Plant Variety Protection ACT
2598
(“PVPA”).
Advanta sold seed to farmers such as Showmaker under
2587. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605.
2588. Wine Ry. Appliance Co. v. Enter. Ry. Equip. Co., 297 U.S. 387, 397, 28
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 299, 301 (1936).
2589. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 162, 9
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1847, 1856 (1989).
2590. 406 F.3d at 1356, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605.
2591. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670, 162 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1, 8 (1969).
2592. 406 F.3d at 1356, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605.
2593. Id. at 1356-57, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605. The Federal Circuit further
noted that false markings would cause members of the public to incur the cost of
ascertaining whether the patents are valid and enforceable in order to avoid being
found guilty of willful infringement. Id. at 1357, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605-06 n.6
(internal citation omitted).
2594. Id. at 1357, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1606.
2595. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1606.
2596. Id. at 1357-58, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1606.
2597. 411 F.3d 1366, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1210 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
2598. 7 U.S.C. § 2568 (2000).
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contract terms that included that “[b]uyer will not resell or supply
any of this seed to any other person or entity. Furthermore, Buyer is
strictly prohibited from saving or selling, for seed purposes, any grain
2599
products from this seed.”
Showmaker filed suit on behalf of a class
of farmers that had purchased the seed, claiming false marking under
2600
The district court granted Advanta’s motion to dismiss
the PVPA.
2601
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
The Federal Circuit explained that section 2568(a) of the PVPA
prohibits use of the words “U.S. Protected Variety” or any word or
number importing that the seed was protected by the PVPA
certificate, and also prohibits use of either the phrase “Unauthorized
Propagation Prohibited” or “Unauthorized Seed Multiplication
Prohibited” or similar phrases when that seed is not in fact protected
2602
by the PVPA.
The Federal Circuit further explained that “the
phrases ‘Unauthorized Propagation Prohibited’ and ‘Unauthorized
Seed Multiplication Prohibited’ are terms of art used throughout the
statute to notify prospective users that the PVPA’s protections
2603
apply.”
Moreover, “[t]he legislative history confirms the
2604
importance of these precise statutory terms.”
Accordingly, the
“similar phrases” language in § 2568(a) “does not permit a wide
variance from ‘Unauthorized Propagation Prohibited’ or
2605
‘Unauthorized Seed Multiplication Prohibited.’”
Because
Advanta’s contractual language did not use either of those phrases,
or any confusingly similar phrase, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim. In conclusion,
the Federal Circuit observed that
[u]nlike these terms of art, Advanta’s contract language did not
put the potential purchaser or the public on notice of a plant
variety owner’s rights. Rather, the agreement merely restricts some
activities of the buyer. Like any contract, these terms bind only the
2606
parties. Thus, Advanta does not engage in false marking.

2599.
2600.
2601.
2602.
2603.
2604.
2605.
2606.

Showmaker, 411 F.3d at 1367, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1211.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1211.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1211.
Id. at 1368, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212.
Id. at 1369, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1212.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1212.
Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1212-13.

